CAMP v. GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY
Filing
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ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Ordered by Judge C. Ashley Royal on 7/17/12 (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
RUBEN CAMP,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
No. 3:11‐CV‐154 (CAR)
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER :
COMPANY,
:
:
Defendant.
:
___________________________________ :
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Ruben Camp’s Motion to Dismiss Without
Prejudice [Doc. 18]. Having considered the matter and the relevant case law,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice [Doc. 18] is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ruben Camp began working for Defendant, The Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Company1 (“Goodyear”), in September 2006 as a Vent Press Operator.
According to his amended Complaint, Camp endured persistent verbal and physical
Goodyear’s Notice of Removal represented that Camp had incorrectly named Goodyear in its
Amended Complaint. Goodyear stated that it is correctly named The Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company.
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abuse from October 2006 until May 2010, because of his sexual orientation. These
incidents, caused by his managers and co‐workers, included name calling, crotch
grabbing, and whistling, as well as more severe conduct such as having a rubber dildo
shoved forcefully up his buttocks and being hit repeatedly with a chair on his left
shoulder and back. Camp and other non‐offending coworkers consistently reported
this conduct to several members of Goodyear’s upper level management team. In
large part, this conduct went without consequence.
Procedural History
Goodyear removed the instant action from Walton County Superior Court on
October 24, 2011. Prior to removal, Camp’s original complaint alleged claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), negligent retention, and assault
and battery against Goodyear and several managers and coworkers. Shortly
thereafter, Camp amended his Complaint, alleging only IIED and negligent retention
and hiring against Goodyear.2 Goodyear filed its answer in this Court on November
11 and asserted the following affirmative defense: “Camp’s negligent hiring and
retention claims fail as a matter of law because they are derivative claims and cannot
survive with [sic] a viable underlying state tort claim.” [Doc. 4].
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It is this amended Complaint that was removed and forms the basis of the instant suit.
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Discovery formally commenced on January 9, 2012, and was to be completed by
May 11, 2012. Based on the parties willingness to participate in binding arbitration, an
arbitration hearing was scheduled for June 22. By April, the parties had exchanged
their initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules and Civil
Procedure and had “engaged in limited written discovery.” [Doc. 13]. Additionally,
the parties had scheduled depositions to begin early May. As indicated in the parties’
Joint Discovery Status Report submitted March 29, 2012, Camp did not timely respond
to Goodyear’s initial interrogatories and requests for production of documents. The
Report indicated, however, that Camp would do so no later than April 6. For all
intents and purposes, this appears to have been completed.
During discovery, Camp learned that he needed to add additional parties and
claims in order to successfully pursue his negligent hiring and retention claim against
Goodyear. Camp and Goodyear attempted to resolve this dilemma outside of the
Court, but were ultimately unsuccessful. When Camp decided to file the instant
Motion, the parties agreed to postpone the depositions pending its resolution.
On May 2, 2012, Camp filed the instant Motion, asserting that dismissal without
prejudice is warranted under Rule 41(b) and Rule 19(b). Camp requests that this
Court dismiss the instant action so that he can re‐file his claim in state court and add
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claims of assault and battery against four supervisors and three co‐workers, three of
which were named in Camp’s original complaint before removal. Camp also intends
to add a claim of failure to maintain a safe work environment against Goodyear. On
May 7, 2012, the Court granted Camp’s request to stay proceedings, including the
scheduled arbitration on June 22.
DISCUSSION
Camp’s Motion argues that a dismissal without prejudice is warranted under
both Rule 41(a)(2) and 19(a). Because the Court concludes that dismissal is proper
under Rule 41, the Court need not discuss the application of Rule 19.3 In addition to
objecting to Camp’s Motion, Goodyear argues that if Camp re‐files the instant matter
in state court, curative conditions should be imposed. The Court will consider each of
these issues in turn.
Voluntary Dismissal
In asserting this argument, Camp ignores the first step of the analysis in Rule 19(a) and
immediately argues that this action must be dismissed under Rule 19(b). However, the Court notes that
before it can decide whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court must first conclude that the party is
necessary and that joinder is not feasible. See Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth.,
344 F.3d 1263, 1279‐80 (11th Cir. 2003) (“First, the court must ascertain under … Rule 19(a) whether the
person in question is one who should be joined if feasible. If the person should be joined but cannot be
… then the court must inquire whether, applying the factors enumerated in Rule 19(b), the litigation
may continue.”).
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Rule 41(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to seek a court’s permission to dismiss an
action. Under this Rule, the court has discretion to grant or deny a motion to
voluntarily dismiss based on the circumstances of the case. McCants v. Ford Motor
Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855, 857 (11th Cir. 1986). When making this determination, a court
should focus on the interests of the defendant because Rule 41(a)(2) was intended to
protect defendants. Fisher v. P.R. Marine Mgmt., Inc., 940 F.2d 1502, 1503 (11th Cir.
1991). However, in most cases “a voluntary dismissal should be granted unless the
defendant will suffer clear legal prejudice, other than the mere prospect of a subsequent
lawsuit, as a result.” Pontenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp., 252 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Goodyear claims that dismissal without prejudice at this juncture would
impose clear legal prejudice against Goodyear because it would “face the prospect of
prolonged litigation and a potential jury trial at some later date.” [Doc. 18, p. 7]. This
argument is without merit. Subjecting Goodyear to the prospect of a second lawsuit
on the same set of facts is insufficient to constitute plain legal prejudice to justify
denying such a motion. Pontenberg, 252 F.3d at 1255. Additionally, while the parties
have engaged in some discovery, it appears to be limited, at best. At this time, the
parties have not conducted any depositions and the parties’ arbitration hearing was
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postponed pending the result of the instant Motion. See Jones v. Smartvideo Techs.,
Inc., No. 1:06‐cv‐2760‐WSD, 2007 WL 1655855, at *1 (granting dismissal under Rule
41(a)(2) when parties had answered a total of five sets of written discovery, no
depositions had been taken, and dispositve motions had not been filed).
There is also no indication that Camp is seeking dismissal to avoid an adverse
ruling in federal court. As Goodrich notes, neither party has filed a dispositive
motion, and from the pace of discovery, it appears that neither party is anywhere close
to filing such a motion. In opposition, Goodyear argues that the legal deficiency in the
amended Complaint would lead to an adverse result, and thus that Camp is seeking
dismissal to avoid this result. However, this speculation by no means indicates that
Camp is attempting to avoid an adverse ruling. Goodyear does not have a pending
motion to dismiss Camp’s claims based on this deficiency. Additionally, while the
time to amend without court permission has expired, Camp would still be in a
position to request a motion for leave to amend, depending on a showing of good
cause.
Although the Court concludes that Camp is not trying to avoid an adverse
ruling, the Court does acknowledge that this legal deficiency is prejudicial to
Goodyear because Goodyear raised this issue as an affirmative defense in November.
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However, in light of the rest of the circumstances, the Court concludes that this, by
itself, is an insufficient basis from which to conclude that Defendant will suffer plain
legal prejudice. In sum, the Court concludes that Goodyear will not suffer plain legal
prejudice as a result of such a dismissal. Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.
Curative Conditions
In its Response Brief, Goodyear argues that Camp should pay Goodyear’s
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this action should Camp elect to re‐
file. Rule 41(d) states, “If a plaintiff who previously dismissed an action in any court
files an action based on or including the same claim against the same defendant, the
court … may order the plaintiff to pay all or part of the costs of that previous
action….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d). Under this Rule, a court has broad discretion to
award fees and costs. See Pontenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp., 252 F.3d 1253, 1256
n.2, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, “a court, in its discretion, should assess whether a
plaintiffʹs conduct satisfies the requirements of Rule 41(d) and whether the facts
surrounding the case justify an award of costs to prevent prejudice to the defendant.”
Wishneski v. Old Republic Ins. Co., No. 5:06–cv–148, 2006 WL 4764424, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 10, 2006).
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The factors to consider in determining whether to award a party costs under
Rule 41(d) include the costs incurred by the moving party on dispositive motions and
the expense of relitigating issues that might be mitigated by recyclable legal work
from the original case in state court. Id. at 700. Other factors that have been cited as
relevant to this type of analysis are the amount of time the previous case was litigated
before dismissal and the relative evidence of “bad faith” or “abuse of the judicial
process.” Fin. Bus. Equip. Solutions, Inc. v. Quality Data Sys., Inc., No. 08‐60769‐CIV,
2009 WL 1423931, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Pafumi v. Davidson, No. 05‐61679‐CIV,
2008 WL 4084418 (S.D. Fla. 2008)).
Here, the Court notes that the sole reason Camp is requesting that this case be
dismissed without prejudice is to re‐file the instant action in state court with
additional claims and additional defendants. Notwithstanding, the Court concludes
that none of the aforementioned factors warrant setting curative conditions. As noted
above, there is currently no dispositive motion pending. Additionally, from the basis
of the record, the Court concludes that some, if not all, of the legal work would likely
be recyclable, and, is therefore not compensable. See Wolf v. Pac. Nat. Bank, N.A., No.
09‐21531‐CIV, 2010 WL 1462298, at *4 (Mar. 18, 2010) (“It is well understood that an
award of fees for purposes of Rule 41 should not award such fees when the work
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involved will prove necessary for the ultimate resolution of the second‐filed action.).
Finally, the parties have only engaged in written discovery and the Court can find no
indication of bad faith or abuse of the judicial process.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Camp’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice [Doc. 16]
is GRANTED. Defendant’s request for curative conditions pursuant to Rule 41(d) is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of July, 2012.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
LMH
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