FN Herstal, S.A. v. Clyde Armory, Inc. et al
Filing
132
ORDER granting 127 Motion to Strike Jury Demand. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE C ASHLEY ROYAL on 7/10/15 (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
FN HERSTAL, S.A.,
Plaintiff,
v.
:
:
:
:
:
No. 3:12‐CV‐102 (CAR)
CLYDE ARMORY, INC.,
:
:
Defendant.
:
___________________________________ :
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE JURY DEMAND
Before the Court is Plaintiff FN Herstal, S.A.’s Motion to Strike the Jury Demand
[Doc. 127] filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a)(2). Therein, Plaintiff
seeks an order striking both parties’ jury demands and ordering that this case be tried
before the Court.
During the pretrial conference held on June 29, 2015, the parties represented that
they would not pursue damages on their trademark infringement claims; instead, the
prevailing party would seek registration of its respective mark and an injunction
against the opposing party. In the instant Motion, Plaintiff moves to strike the parties’
jury demands because the only remaining claims are equitable in nature, and thus
neither party is entitled to a jury trial. Defendant opposes the Motion, arguing that
Plaintiff has consented to a trial by jury in this case by virtue of its submission of a
proposed pretrial order and its failure to object at the pretrial conference to a trial by
jury.
It is well settled that no right to a jury trial exists when the claims at issue are
purely equitable in nature. 1 Moreover, an injunction for trademark infringement is an
equitable remedy.2 Nevertheless, even when no right to a jury trial exists, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 39(c) provides that a court, on motion or on its own, may (1) try the
case with an advisory jury or (2) try the case before a jury with the consent of the
parties.3 Defendant argues that the second scenario applies here—namely, the parties
have consented to a trial by jury. While that may have been true, a party may
unilaterally withdraw its consent to a jury trial when there is no federal right to a trial
by jury. 4 Here, Plaintiff unequivocally withdrew its consent by filing the instant motion
to strike.5
While the Court understands that the parties have operated under the
assumption that this case would be tried before a jury, the Court finds that Defendant
Ford v. Citizens & S. Nat. Bank, Cartersville, 928 F.2d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 1991).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (“The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this
chapter shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms
as the court may deem reasonable”); Sheila’s Shine Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114, 122 (5th
Cir. 1973) (‘[A]ction for injunctive relief relating to trademark infringement and unfair competition was
equitable in nature.”)
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
4 See Kramer v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 355 F.3d 961, 968 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no restraint in the text of
Rule 39 on the ability of a party to withdraw its consent to a jury trial that is not of right.”); Alexander v.
Chattahoochee Valley Cmty. Coll., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (noting that court could grant
plaintiff’s opposed motion to withdraw jury demand if she was not entitled to a jury trial).
5 Kramer, 355 F.3d at 968.
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will suffer no real prejudice from striking the jury demand at this juncture. The parties
have ten days before the trial is scheduled to begin, and a bench trial will likely require
less preparation than a jury trial. 6
Because only equitable claims remain and the parties no longer consent to a jury
trial as required by Rule 39(c), Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [Doc. 127] is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, this case will be tried before the Court on July 20, 2015.
SO ORDERED, this 10th day of July, 2015.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
See CPI Plastics, Inc. v. USX Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that striking jury
demand two weeks before trial provided ample time to permit parties to readjust presentation of
evidence and emphasizing that a bench trial would require less preparation than a jury trial); see also
Kramer, 355 F.3d at 968 (holding that a motion to strike jury demand filed two weeks before trial was not
too late to withdraw consent to jury trial where opposing party provided no reason why she would
prejudiced by a bench trial).
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