HOBBS v. ASTRUE

Filing 15

ORDER affirming the decision of the Social Security Commissioner re 1 Complaint filed by CATHERINE LYNN HOBBS. Ordered by US Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles on 11-8-13. (mpm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
CATHERINE LYNN HOBBS,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CAROLYN COLVIN,
:
Commissioner of Social Security,
:
:
Defendant.
:
__________________________________

CASE NO. 3:12-CV-148-MSH
Social Security Appeal

ORDER
The Social Security Commissioner, by adoption of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (ALJ’s) determination, denied Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits,
finding that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and
Regulations. Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner’s decision was in error and seeks
review under the relevant provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). All
administrative remedies have been exhausted.

Both parties have filed their written

consents for all proceedings to be conducted by the United States Magistrate Judge,
including the entry of a final judgment directly appealable to the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).
LEGAL STANDARDS
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination of
whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards
were applied. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

“Substantial evidence is something more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this
court must affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.
3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s role in
reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The court may
neither decide facts, re-weigh evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.1 Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F. 3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). It must,
however, decide if the Commissioner applied the proper standards in reaching a decision.
Harrell v. Harris, 610 F.2d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The court must
scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s
factual findings.

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).

However, even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it
must be affirmed if substantial evidence supports it. Id.
The Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that she is unable to perform her
previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1986). The Plaintiff’s burden
is a heavy one and is so stringent that it has been described as bordering on the
unrealistic. Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1981).2 A Plaintiff
seeking Social Security disability benefits must demonstrate that he/she suffers from an

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Credibility determinations are left to the Commissioner and not to the courts. Carnes v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991). It is also up to the Commissioner and not to the
courts to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir.
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decision of the former Fifth Circuit rendered
prior to October 1, 1981.
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impairment that prevents him/her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a
twelve-month period. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). In addition to meeting the requirements of
these statutes, in order to be eligible for disability payments, a Plaintiff must meet the
requirements of the Commissioner’s regulations promulgated pursuant to the authority
given in the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 et seq.
Under the Regulations, the Commissioner uses a five-step procedure to determine
if a Plaintiff is disabled. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). First, the Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff is
working.

Id.

If not, the Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff has an

impairment which prevents the performance of basic work activities. Id. Second, the
Commissioner determines the severity of the Plaintiff’s impairment or combination of
impairments. Id. Third, the Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff’s severe
impairment(s) meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of Part 404 of the
Regulations (the “Listing”).

Id. Fourth, the Commissioner determines whether the

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity can meet the physical and mental demands of past
work. Id. Fifth and finally, the Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience prevent the performance of
any other work. In arriving at a decision, the Commissioner must consider the combined
effects of all of the alleged impairments, without regard to whether each, if considered
separately, would be disabling. Id. The Commissioner’s failure to apply correct legal
standards to the evidence is grounds for reversal. Id.

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Administrative Proceedings
Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income and disability insurance
benefits on January 15, 2009, alleging disability as of December 30, 2008, due to Bipolar disorder, mania mood disorder, anxiety, panic attacks, agoraphobia, interstitial
cystitis, migraines, and high blood pressure.

(Tr. 179; ECF No. 10.)

Plaintiff’s

application was denied, and Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”). The Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ on March 3, 2011, and
following the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on April 22, 2011. (Tr.
23-32.)

The Appeals Council ultimately denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review on

November 7, 2012. (Tr. 1-3.) This appeal followed.
Statement of Facts and Evidence
After consideration of the written evidence and the hearing testimony in this case,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her
alleged onset date. (Tr. 25.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had bipolar disorder and
anxiety which were determined to be severe. (Id.) The ALJ then determined that
Plaintiff’s severe impairment and nonsevere impairments did not meet or medically
equal, either individually or in any combination, any one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 26.)
The ALJ next found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform work at all levels except that she is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks
with few, if any, workplace changes; no contact with the public; no contact with coworkers except when starting or ending a shift; and restricted from fast-paced production
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requirements. (Tr. 27.) The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff has past relevant work as
a cashier, nursing assistant, fast food worker, kennel attendant, cook, and spool maker.
(Tr. 30.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was thirty-eight at the time of her alleged onset
date, which is considered to be a younger individual. (Tr. 30.) The ALJ then found that
Plaintiff had a limited education and could communicate in English. (Id.) Considering
her age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs
which existed in significant numbers in the national economy which Plaintiff could
perform. (Id.)
ISSUES
I.

Whether the ALJ applied the proper standard in determining that Plaintiff’s
interstitial cystitis was not severe.

II.

Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the testimony of Plaintiff’s father.
DISCUSSION

I.

Did the ALJ follow the “slight abnormality” standard in determining that
Plaintiff’s interstitial cystitis was not severe?
In her first enumeration of error, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to

follow the “slight abnormality” standard when she determined that Plaintiff’s interstitial
cystitis was not a severe impairment. (Pl.’s Br. 3; ECF No. 13.) The Regulations, at SSR
96-3p, state that an impairment is severe if it has more than a minimal effect on a
claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
interstitial cystitis was not severe because her symptoms from this impairment were
controlled by prescription medication (Tr. 25).

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Plaintiff contends that because her interstitial cystitis causes her to urinate ten to
eleven times a day, it has more than a minimal effect on her ability to work, and thus, is a
severe impairment. (Pl.’s Br. 4.) A review of the record, however, reveals that when
Plaintiff is taking Utira-C, a medication she is prescribed for her interstitial cystitis, her
urinary frequency improves. (Tr. 432, 570-574.) Furthermore, the medical record shows
that although Plaintiff visited the Urology Clinic many times, there is no record of her
complaining of frequent urination in treatment notes when she was on the Utira-C
medication. (Tr. 563-598.) Plaintiff’s citation to a medical article which states that
interstitial cystitis can cause significant limitations on a person’s ability to work, is
immaterial.

Simply stating that an impairment may cause significant work-related

limitations does not constitute proof that those limitations exist for the Plaintiff.
“The burden is on the claimant to provide evidence of the effect of the impairment
on her ability to work.” Wind v. Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 684, 690 (11th Cir. 2005).
Claimant did not satisfy her burden of proof because she failed to establish that her
interstitial cystitis was a “severe,” medically determinable impairment.

The ALJ

discussed Plaintiff’s interstitial cystitis and found, based on the evidence of record, that it
had no more than minimal impact on her ability to do work-related activities. Thus, it is
found that the ALJ’s decision was based on proper standards and was supported by
substantial evidence.
As noted above, at Step Two of the sequential process, the ALJ must determine
whether a claimant's impairments are severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A
severe impairment is one that significantly limits the claimant's ability to do basic work
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activities. Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir.1997). The Eleventh
Circuit has repeatedly held that even if an ALJ errs in failing to determine whether one of
a claimant’s impairments was a severe impairment, the error is harmless as long as the
ALJ concludes that any other of the claimant’s impairments are severe, which is all that
step two requires. Heatly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 824-25 (11th Cir.
2010). “Nothing requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments
that should be considered severe.

Instead, at step three, the ALJ is required to

demonstrate that it has considered all of the claimant’s impairments, whether severe or
not, in combination.” Heatly, 382 F. App’x at 825. Thus, even if this Court found that
the ALJ erred in determining this impairment was nonsevere, which it does not find, the
ALJ did not commit reversible error finding that Plaintiff’s interstitial cystitis was
nonsevere.
II.

Did the ALJ err in rejecting the testimony of Plaintiff’s father?
In her second enumeration of error, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing

to provide any reasons for rejecting the opinion testimony of Plaintiff’s father, who
testified regarding her mental functioning. (Pl.’s Br. 5.) Plaintiff’s argument, however,
is flawed.
There is no requirement that the ALJ specifically state the reasons she rejected the
testimony of a lay witness. It is generally required that an ALJ “state specifically the
weight accorded each item of evidence and the reasons for his decision.” Gibson v.
Heckler, 779 F.2d 619, 623 (11th Cir.1986). Where the ALJ fails to make an explicit
credibility determination as to a family member’s testimony or statements, however, no
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error is found as long as the credibility determination made by the ALJ “was implicit in
the rejection of the claimant’s testimony.” Foreman v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3292810, *6
(M.D.Fla. 2010); Osborn v. Barnhart, 194 Fed. App'x 654, 666 (11th Cir.2006) (citing
Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254–55 (11th Cir.1983)).
In this case, in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ stated that while she
found “the Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected
to cause the alleged symptoms, the Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent that they
are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (Tr. 28.) It is
clear that in making his specific finding as to Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ implicitly
rejected the testimony of Plaintiff. Because the ALJ was not required to articulate her
reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s father’s testimony where she discredited the testimony
of the Plaintiff herself, no error is found.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the
Commissioner’s decision in this case be affirmed.
SO ORDERED, this 8th day of November, 2013.

/s/ STEPHEN HYLES
UNTED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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