ROMAN v. LEGGETT AND PLATT INC
Filing
46
ORDER granting 25 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 11/03/2015. (CGC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
JOSE ROMAN,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC.,
*
Defendant.
CASE NO. 3:14-CV-20 (CDL)
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff
during
a
Jose
random
Roman
drug
tested
screening
positive
for
conducted
Defendant Leggett and Platt, Inc.
phenobarbital
by
his
employer,
Upon confirming the positive
result, Leggett terminated Roman’s employment consistent with
its policy.
Roman does not seriously dispute that his test
showed a positive result, but he argues that it was likely a
false positive or due to some reason other than his ingestion of
non-prescription
may
quarrel
drugs containing phenobarbital.
with
the
test
results
and
While Roman
his
subsequent
termination, he points to no evidence to support his claim under
the
Americans
with
Disabilities
because of his epilepsy.
Act
that
he
was
discharged
Specifically, he fails to create a
genuine factual dispute on the issue of whether Leggett’s stated
reason
for
terminating
him,
the
positive
drug
test,
was
a
pretext for disability discrimination.
Accordingly, Leggett’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 25) is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
In determining whether a
genuine
Fed. R.
dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant
or necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to Roman, the record
reveals the following.
Roman worked on the production floor of
Leggett’s mattress innerspring manufacturing facility in Monroe,
Georgia.
Leggett had a substance abuse policy that prohibited
employees from working with “unacceptable levels of drugs or
alcohol in their systems”
because “[t]he
abuse of drugs and
alcohol can cause a serious threat to a safe and productive work
environment.”
Roman Dep. Ex. 6, Substance Abuse Policy, ECF No.
2
28-1 at 68.
The policy also prohibits “abuse or improper use of
prescription or over-the-counter drugs.”
Id.
An employee who
violates the substance abuse policy is “subject to immediate and
severe disciplinary action, up to and including termination of
employment for the first offense.”
Id.
Roman was aware of the
substance abuse policy and knew that failing a drug test could
result in his termination.
Leggett considered Roman’s position to be safety sensitive.
Employees working safety sensitive positions were subjected to
random drug screenings “to determine the possible presence of
substances
of
abuse.”
Id.
Clinical
Reference
Laboratory
analyzes the random drug screen samples of Leggett employees and
reports the results to Leggett.
Clinical’s analysis is designed
to test for the presence of substances in the employee’s body in
an amount above a “cutoff level.”
were
tested
detectable
ingestion.
for
in
a
the
presence
person’s
of
system
In 2011, Leggett employees
barbiturates,
for
at
least
which
a
remains
week
after
The cutoff level used by Clinical for barbiturates
in oral fluid samples is twenty nanograms per milliliter (20
ng/mL).
Irving Dep. 20:3-13, ECF No. 36.
That is the level
Clinical and several other major testing laboratories usually
set as the cutoff level for barbiturates unless the employer
requests a different cutoff level.
If
Id. at 17:1-12, 54:19-55:3.
Clinical’s first test of an employee’s
3
oral
fluid sample
detects a substance in an amount above the cutoff level, then
Clinical runs a secondary confirmation test on the sample.
If
the confirmation test detects a substance in an amount above the
cutoff level, then Clinical reports a positive test result to
the employer.
Clinical
employees
reports
to
Jenny
coordinator.
any
positive
Madsen,
test
results
Leggett’s
for
employee
Leggett
relations
Madsen then contacts the human resource manager at
the employee’s branch to report the positive result.
In 2011,
the human resource manager at Leggett’s Monroe facility was Mick
Crain.
When Crain is notified of a positive test result, he
removes the employee from the production floor and notifies the
employee
of
the
test
results.
The
employee
is
given
an
opportunity to show Leggett that the result should be excused by
producing
information
medication.
result
caused
the
employee’s
prescription
If the employee cannot convince Leggett that the
should
by
about
be
a
excused
(for
medication
for
example,
which
as
the
a
false
employee
prescription), then the employee is terminated.
positive
has
a
Altman Dep.
134:19-135:18, ECF No. 34.
Roman
and
other
employees
working
in
safety
sensitive
positions of Leggett’s Monroe facility were subjected to random
drug screenings.
Each month, a random sample of employees was
tested for drugs.
Roman was selected for the random drug screen
4
in January 2011.
based
on
cutoff
an
oral
level
negative.
The drug test, conducted by Clinical, was
of
swab
20
and
tested
ng/mL.
for
Roman’s
barbituates
January
above
the
test
was
2011
Roman was selected for the random drug screen on
September 7, 2011.
Again, Clinical conducted the drug test,
which was based on an oral swab.
This time, however, Roman’s
sample tested positive for phenobarbital, a barbiturate, with a
concentration of 44 ng/mL.
During the timeframe relevant to
this action—in both January 2011 and September 2011—Roman took
Dilantin to treat his epilepsy, and his dosage did not change.
He also took methotrexate to treat rheumatoid arthritis.
Clinical reported Roman’s positive test result to Madsen,
who reported the result to Crain.
She told Crain that if Roman
contested the positive result, Crain should collect information
regarding Roman’s prescription medications.
When Roman reported
to work on September 14, 2011, Crain told him that his drug test
had come back positive and that he could not work that day.
Roman requested a copy of his test results and told Crain that
he would come back the next day with his prescription medication
information.
Roman returned to Crain on September 15, 2011 and showed
him several prescription bottles.
down
the
medication
name
of
each
Dilantin,
and
Crain or his assistant wrote
prescription,
faxed
5
the
including
list
to
the
Madsen.
epilepsy
It
is
undisputed that no one at Leggett knew that Roman had epilepsy
until Roman disclosed that he took Dilantin.
Madsen sent the
list to Clinical, whose certifying scientists were not able to
verify that any of Roman’s medications could have caused the
positive test result.1
Madsen Decl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 31-1.
Madsen
relayed the information to Michael Altman, Leggett’s director of
labor relations.
Roman
was
possible.
a
Altman spoke with Crain, who told Altman that
valuable
employee
who
should
be
retained
if
Altman told Crain that none of Roman’s prescription
medications explained the positive result, and Altman said that
if
Roman
could
not
provide
an
adequate
explanation
positive drug test, he would be terminated.
13.
for
the
Altman Dep. 73:6-
Crain, in turn, told Roman that none of his prescription
medications explained the positive result.
Roman said he had
additional information and would give it to Crain.
Roman’s
daughter
found
information
on
the
internet
suggesting that Roman’s epilepsy medication, Dilantin, may cause
false positives in drug tests, and Roman contacted his primary
care
physician,
Dr.
Suzanne
Lester,
1
to
investigate
the
Roman contends that this fact is disputed by pointing to a
communication between Madsen and Clinical’s toxicology director, who
stated that he did not see “any medications in [Roman’s] record that
will cause a positive phenobarbital” and that “Dilantin will not cause
a positive for phenobarbital.” Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 25, Email
from John Irving to Jenny Madsen (Sept. 27, 2011), ECF No. 32-21.
This evidence does not refute Madsen’s statement that Clinical’s
certifying scientists could not verify that Dilantin could cause a
false positive for barbiturates.
6
possibility that one of his medications caused a false positive.
Dr. Lester wrote a letter stating: “It is my understanding that
in
some
cases
Dilantin
or
of
drug
Phenytoin
screening
may
give
that
a
Barbiturates and Phenobarbital.”
the
False
prescription
Positive
result
drug
for
Crain Dep. Ex. 18, Letter from
Dr. Suzanne Lester (Sept. 27, 2011), ECF No. 35-18.
She also
stated that Roman was taking Dilantin and suggested “further
testing
to
differentiate
Phenytoin/Dilantin.”2
Id.
between
Phenobarbital
and
Roman presented the letter to Crain
on September 27, 2011—nearly three weeks after his original drug
test.
Crain sent the letter to Altman.
At
that
point,
Madsen
sought
toxicology director, John Irving.
input
from
Clinical’s
She provided Irving with a
list of Roman’s medications—including Dilantin and methotrexate—
as well as a note from Roman’s doctor.
Madsen Decl. ¶¶ 20-21.
Irving responded that he did “not see any medications in the
donor’[s]
Pl.’s
record
Resp.
Ex.
that
25,
will
Email
cause
from
a
John
positive
Irving
(Sept. 27, 2011 at 3:57 PM), ECF No. 32-21.
phenobarbital.”
to
Jenny
He further stated,
“Dilantin will not cause a positive for phenobarbital.”
On
September
29,
2011—more
than
three
weeks
original drug test—Roman took two more drug tests.
2
Madsen
Id.
after
the
One of the
Roman admitted that he did not understand this issue; Dr. Lester
later told him that Dilantin would not cause a false positive for
barbiturates. Roman Dep. 110:4-19, ECF No. 28.
7
tests was negative for barbituates.
The other was positive for
barbiturates, although Dr. Jan Bennett, the doctor who reviewed
that drug screen and Roman’s medications, wrote that she was
“strongly convinced that a false positive could be obtained from
Keppra or methotrexate.”
Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 15, Note from Jan M.
Bennett,
2011,
D.O.,
Oct.
14,
ECF
No.
32-16.
There
is
no
evidence in the present record that Roman was taking Keppra at
the time of any of his drug screens.
See Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 6 at
LP 00038, Memo from Eric M. Pitts, M.D., Aug. 29, 2011, ECF No.
32-7 at 3 (noting that Roman “was unable to tolerate Keppra and
has
returned
to
Dilantin,
no
further
problems”).
evidence that Roman was taking methotrexate.
There
is
Pl.’s Resp. Ex.
25, Email from Jenny Madsen to John Irving (Sept. 27, 2011 at
2:21
PM),
ECF
No.
32-21.
Methotrexate
was
on
the
list
of
medications that Madsen initially gave to Irving, which Irving
reviewed and said that he did “not see any medications in the
donor’[s]
Pl.’s
record
Resp.
Ex.
that
25,
will
Email
cause
from
a
John
positive
Irving
phenobarbital.”
to
Jenny
Madsen
(Sept. 27, 2011 at 3:57 PM), ECF No. 32-21.
Altman did not consider the two additional drug tests and
did not send the results to Clinical because Altman was only
concerned about the results of the first drug test, which had
taken place more than three weeks earlier.
64:1.
Altman Dep. 63:12-
Altman also did not give any weight to Dr. Bennett’s
8
letter because “she is a medical doctor, not a clinical-drugtest analyst trained in the fingerprinting of drugs.”
67:22-68:3.
the field.
Id. at
Instead, Altman relied on Clinical’s expertise in
Id. at 68:3-6.
Roman did not provide any additional
documentation to explain the positive result from the September
7 drug test, and Leggett terminated him on October 18, 2011.
DISCUSSION
The
employers
Americans
from
with
Disabilities
discriminating
basis of disability.
against
Act
their
prohibits
employees
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
covered
on
the
To establish a
discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that
he suffers from a disability, he is a qualified individual able
to perform the essential functions of his job, and his employer
unlawfully
disability.
discriminated
against
him
because
of
his
known
Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
Where, as here, there is no direct
evidence that the employer discriminated against the employee
because of his disability, the courts use the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).3
Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365.
3
Under
Roman suggests in a footnote of his brief that there is direct
evidence of disability discrimination in this case because Leggett
learned of Roman’s disability and terminated him even though Roman
contended that the September drug test result was a false positive.
Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, “‘only the most blatant remarks,
9
that framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
disability
discrimination
by
showing
that
(1)
he
has
a
disability within the meaning of the ADA, (2) he is a qualified
individual, and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination
because of his disability.
prima
facie
case,
nondiscriminatory
Id.
the
reason
If the plaintiff establishes a
employer
for
its
may
offer
decision.
a
legitimate
Chapman
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
v.
AI
If the
employer offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision, the plaintiff must show that the proffered explanation
is pretext for discrimination.
proffer
sufficient
evidence
Id.
to
“If the plaintiff does not
create
a
genuine
issue
of
material fact regarding whether each of the defendant employer’s
articulated reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim.”
Id. at 1024-25.
The Court assumes for purposes of summary judgment that
Roman
has
established
discrimination.
a
prima
facie
case
of
disability
It is undisputed that Roman has epilepsy, and
Leggett does not contest for purposes of the present motion that
epilepsy is considered a disability under the current version of
whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis
of age’ will constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Damon v.
Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir.
1999) (quoting Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-82
(11th Cir. 1990)).
If there were evidence that Altman said, “Fire
Roman because he has epilepsy,” that would be direct evidence of
disability discrimination. But Roman pointed to no such evidence.
10
the
ADA.
“epilepsy
See
29
C.F.R. §
substantially
1630.2(j)(3)(iii)
limits”
“neurological function”).
the
major
life
(noting
that
activity
of
Leggett does not dispute that at the
time of his termination, Roman was adequately performing the
essential functions of his job.
And Leggett cannot seriously
dispute that it terminated Roman soon after learning that he was
taking prescription medication for epilepsy.
Leggett proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating Roman: Roman failed a random drug screen and tested
positive for phenobarbital.
So the dispositive issue is whether
Roman pointed to sufficient evidence to establish pretext by
showing that Leggett’s proffered “reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.”
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
“Provided that the proffered
reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an
employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the
employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of
that reason.”
not
sit
as
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030.
a
super-personnel
department
Federal courts “do
that
reexamines
an
entity’s business decisions.” Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939
F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)
(quoting
Mechnig v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988)).
The key
question is “whether the employer gave an honest explanation of
its behavior.”
Id. (quoting Mechnig, 864 F.2d at 1365).
11
“The
inquiry into pretext centers upon the employer’s beliefs, and
not
the
employee’s
own
perceptions
of
his
performance.”
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam).
Roman
because
contends
he
did
that
not
Leggett’s
actually
fail
proffered
reason
his
test.
drug
is
false
But
the
undisputed evidence is that the drug test did come back with a
positive result for phenobarbital.
result was a false positive.4
Roman argues that the test
But, the relevant question for the
pretext inquiry is whether there is enough evidence to suggest
that Altman, the decisionmaker, did not honestly believe that
Roman
failed
to
provide
an
adequate
justification
for
his
positive September 7, 2011 drug test.
In determining whether he believed that Dilantin could have
caused
a
false
positive,
Altman
knew
that
(1)
Clinical’s
toxicology director unequivocally stated that Dilantin would not
cause
a
certifying
false
positive
scientists
for
could
phenobarbital,
not
verify
that
(2)
any
Clinical’s
of
Roman’s
medications (including Dilantin) could have caused the positive
test result, and (3) while Dr. Lester understood that Dilantin
might give a false positive for phenobarbital in some cases, Dr.
Bennett did not list Dilantin as a possible cause of Roman’s
4
The fact that he had a negative test result in January 2011 but a
positive test result in September despite taking the same medications
undercuts this argument.
12
positive test result.
And in determining whether he believed
that methotrexate could have caused a false positive, Altman
knew
that
(1)
Clinical’s
toxicology
director
unequivocally
stated that none of Roman’s medications (including methotrexate)
would cause a false positive for phenobarbital, (2) Clinical’s
certifying
medications
scientists
could
(including
not
verify
methotrexate)
that
could
any
have
of
Roman’s
caused
the
positive test result, and 3) Dr. Bennett listed methotrexate as
a possible cause of Roman’s positive test result (though Dr.
Lester did not).
In
summary,
Altman
received
conflicting
information
on
whether two of Roman’s medications could have caused a false
positive.
perform
The
scientists
Leggett’s
drug
at
tests
the
company
explicitly
Altman
stated
trusted
that
to
Roman’s
medications would not cause a false positive for barbiturates.
On the other hand, Altman received letters from two doctors,
each of whom suggested that one of Roman’s medications might
cause a false positive.
But the two doctors did not point to
the same medication as the culprit—so Roman’s own submissions to
Leggett were in conflict.
Based on this evidence, it was not
unreasonable for Altman to conclude that Roman did not present
sufficient information to excuse the September 7 positive drug
test.
Moreover, the present record does not support a finding
that Altman’s conclusion was pretext for discriminatory animus.
13
Roman pointed to no evidence that Leggett retained any other
employee where Leggett’s drug tester stated that the employee’s
prescriptions would not cause a false positive.
not
point
to
any
evidence
that
Leggett
Roman also did
retained
employee with an unexcused positive drug test.
any
other
For all of these
reasons, the Court finds that Roman has not met his burden of
establishing that Leggett’s proffered reason—the positive drug
test
result—was
false
and
that
discrimination
was
the
real
reason for his termination.
Roman
makes
several
other
arguments
that
Altman’s
investigation of the drug test result was unreasonable.
First,
Roman appears to argue that the drug tests he took in late
September should have influenced Altman’s decision.
But it is
undisputed that the concentration of a substance in the body
decreases from the time of ingestion to the time of testing, so
the Court cannot find that it was unreasonable for Altman to
focus solely on the September 7 drug test results.
Second,
Roman contends that the amount of barbiturates Clinical found in
Roman’s saliva would not have a discernable effect on Roman at
the time of the test.
Roman pointed to no evidence that he or
anyone else submitted any information on this point to Altman.
Plus, it is undisputed that the point of the drug test is not
just to determine whether an employee is under the influence of
drugs at the time of the test but to determine whether the
14
employee has any drugs in his system—which may suggest abuse or
improper use.
Third, Roman contends that the concentration of
barbiturates in Roman’s saliva was likely due to contamination
on the production line in the facility that manufactured Roman’s
Dilantin.
In other words, Roman argues that phenobarbital may
have been in his system due to contamination and not drug usage.
Roman did not point to any evidence that he or anyone else
submitted
Fourth,
information
Roman
points
to
Altman
to
a
regarding
publication
this
by
a
possibility.
drug
testing
laboratory that lists Dilantin as a drug known to cause a false
positive for barbiturates in urine and blood tests.
Roman did
not explain how the publication relates to saliva tests, and he
did not point to any evidence that he or anyone else submitted
the
publication
to
Altman.
Roman
faults
Irving,
Clinical’s
toxicology director, for not considering the publication or the
possibility of production line contamination, but Roman did not
point
to
withheld
any
such
evidence
to
information
suggest
from
that
Altman
Irving
because
intentionally
he
had
a
discriminatory animus toward Roman.5
5
Roman pointed to the expert testimony of Dr. Ilo Leppik in support of
several of his arguments. Dr. Leppik opines that (1) the results of
the drug screen do not indicate drug abuse because the testing method
was too sensitive, (2) the test results were likely due to
contamination, and (3) Roman’s work performance would not be affected
by the low levels reported. Again, the pretext inquiry centers on the
employer’s beliefs, and there is no evidence in the present record
that Roman or anyone else made Altman aware of these potential issues
when Altman investigated Roman’s drug test results.
15
Roman also argues that Altman’s response to the drug test
was
unreasonable.
Roman
contends
that
even
if
he
did
test
positive for barbiturates, Leggett’s substance abuse policy did
not require his termination, so it is reasonable to infer that
his
termination
was
discriminatory.
It
is
true
that
the
substance abuse policy does not state that employees who violate
the
policy
violators
must
are
be
terminated.
“subject
to
But
immediate
the
and
policy
states
that
severe
disciplinary
action, up to and including termination of employment for the
first offense.”
Roman Dep. Ex. 6, Substance Abuse Policy, ECF
No. 28-1 at 68.
Roman did not point to any evidence that the
substance abuse policy was enforced in a way that discriminated
against him because of a disability.
Finally,
Roman
contends
that
Leggett’s
unreasonable for three main reasons.
drug
policy
was
All three reasons require
the Court to second-guess the wisdom of Leggett’s drug policy,
which the Court may not do as long as the policy was not enacted
or enforced in a discriminatory way.
1030
(noting
that
an
employee
See Chapman, 229 F.3d at
cannot
prevail
“by
simply
quarreling with the wisdom of” the employers’ decisions as long
as the decisions are not motivated by a discriminatory animus).
First, Roman contends that he should not have been classified as
a
safety
sensitive
employee
and
subjected to random drug tests.
thus
should
not
have
been
But Roman presented no evidence
16
on this point.
In any event, he was classified as a safety
sensitive
employee
epilepsy,
so
he
before
was
not
anyone
at
classified
Leggett
as
a
knew
safety
he
had
sensitive
employee subject to random drug tests because of his epilepsy.
Second, Roman argues that barbiturates are not a substance of
abuse so Leggett should not have tested for them in the first
place.
The stated point of the substance abuse policy is to
detect abuse or improper use of drugs, which may cause a threat
to a safe and productive work environment.
Roman pointed to no
evidence that it is unreasonable for a manufacturer to prohibit
its
production
floor
employees
from
phenobarbital without a prescription.
working
after
taking
And even if he had, there
is no evidence suggesting that Leggett adopted its policy of
testing
for
barbiturates
with
a
discriminatory
screening employees with disabilities.
purpose
of
It is undisputed that
Leggett began testing for barbiturates months before learning
that
Roman
had
epilepsy.
And
third,
Roman
argues
that
the
cutoff level for barbiturates in Clinical’s screening was too
low because that small an amount of barbiturates in a worker’s
system
would
performance.
have
no
discernable
effect
on
a
worker’s
Again, the point of the drug test is not just to
determine whether an employee is under the influence of drugs at
the time of the test but to determine whether the employee has
any drugs in his system—which may suggest improper use or abuse.
17
The
Court
may
not
second-guess
the
validity
of
a
workplace
policy that prohibits employees from working with minor amounts
of phenobarbital in their system unless that policy is enacted
or
enforced
in
a
discriminatory
way.
Roman
pointed
to
no
evidence that Leggett adopted the cutoff level for barbiturate
testing
with
a
discriminatory
purpose.
For
all
of
these
reasons, the Court concludes that Roman has not established that
the policy was discriminatory.
In sum, the Court finds that Roman has not met his burden
of
providing
sufficient
dispute on pretext.
evidence
to
create
a
genuine
fact
Leggett is therefore entitled to summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
set
forth
above,
Leggett’s
Motion
for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of November, 2015.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
18
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