OCONEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. AB

Filing 17

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim. Ordered by U.S. District Judge CLAY D LAND on 01/15/2015. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
OCONEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,

*
*

vs.

*

A.B., by and through L.B.,

*

Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:14-CV-72 (CDL)

*

O R D E R
Defendant A.B. is a student with a disability covered by the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §
1400, et seq., as amended by the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–446, 118 Stat.
2647.

A.B.,

who

suffers

from

potentially

life-threatening

seizures, brought a Due Process Complaint against Plaintiff Oconee
County School District because the School District did not provide
A.B. with an aide trained to administer his seizure medication on
the school bus.

Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge Kimberly W. Schroer ruled in favor of
A.B.

Final Decision 48-49, A.B. v. Oconee Cnty. Sch. Dist., OSAH-

DOE-SE-1417873-108-SCHROER, ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter ALJ Order].
The ALJ also found that A.B.’s mother, Defendant L.B., should be
reimbursed the cost of driving A.B. to and from school until the
School

District

provides

the

trained

aide.

Id.

at

48.

But

because L.B. “share[d] the blame for derailing the cooperative

[individualized education program] process,” the ALJ only awarded
L.B. fifty percent of her transportation costs.

Id.

The School District appeals the ALJ’s final decision, arguing
that the ALJ erred in at least twenty different ways.
L.B. (“the Family”) filed a Counterclaim.

A.B. and

The School District

seeks to dismiss that Counterclaim for failure to state a claim.
Although the Counterclaim is not entirely clear and its supporting
brief

is

decipher

less

than

three

illuminating,

claims

buried

survive a motion to dismiss.

the

within

Court

has

counsel’s

been

able

verbosity

to

that

Accordingly, as explained in the

remainder of this Order, the School District’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 10) is, for the most part, denied.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).

The

complaint

must

include

sufficient

factual

allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In other words, the factual

allegations must “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims.
“Rule

12(b)(6)

does

not

permit

2

dismissal

of

Id. at 556.
a

well-pleaded

complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable.’” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
COUNTERCLAIM ALLEGATIONS
Although

much

of

the

Counterclaim

simply

describes

in

excruciating detail why the ALJ’s decision in the Family’s favor
should

be

affirmed,

hidden

within

affirmative claims for relief.

the

allegations

are

three

Those claims are (1) the ALJ erred

by reducing the transportation costs for which the Family should
be reimbursed; (2) the ALJ erred by requiring L.B. to sign a
release to let the school talk to A.B.’s doctors; and (3) the
School District has failed to comply with the ALJ’s order and
continues to violate A.B.’s IDEA rights by acting with hostility
toward his mother.

The Counterclaim also includes a prayer for

attorney’s fees and asks that the Court award the Family “all
other appropriate relief.”

Defs.’ Answer & Countercl. 73 ¶ 4, 75

¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 6.
DISCUSSION
The issue for the Court to decide today is whether the Family
may maintain its Counterclaim.
only

be

decision”

brought

by

a

of

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A);

party

Under the IDEA, a civil action may
“aggrieved

an
34

by

the

administrative
C.F.R. § 300.516(a).

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findings

and

hearing.
The

Court

reviewed the Family’s seventy-six page Answer and Counterclaim but
was unable to find any short and plain statement that the ALJ
erred.

In fact, the Counterclaim primarily argues why the ALJ was

correct.

Thus, the School District’s argument that the Family has

not stated how it has been aggrieved to give it standing to assert
a counterclaim is not frivolous.

While a brief cannot substitute

for an actual pleading, the Family’s brief does shed light on the
arguable intention of the Counterclaim.
while

the

ALJ

correctly

found

that

The Family complains that
A.B.’s

IDEA

rights

were

violated, the ALJ erred by reducing L.B.’s transportation costs
award and ordering L.B. to sign a release to allow the School
District to review A.B.’s medical records and consult with A.B.’s
neurologist before changing its general procedure regarding the
administration of A.B.’s seizure medicine.1
Although counsel could have made these claims clearer in his
Counterclaim
litigating

and
the

likely
present

avoided
motion,

the
the

unnecessary
Court

finds,

expense

of

albeit

by

straining the concept of notice pleading, that the Family asserts
1

For A.B., continuous seizures lasting more than five minutes can be
life threatening. For such seizures, A.B.’s anti-seizure medicine must
be administered rectally.
Before the Due Process Action, the School
District’s policy was that if A.B. had a prolonged seizure on the bus
(which apparently has not happened), then the bus driver would call 911
and attempt to reach A.B.’s home or school, where emergency medical
personnel could meet the bus to administer the drug.
The ALJ ordered
that the School District was not required to change this policy until
L.B. signed a release allowing the School District to review A.B.’s
medical records and speak to his neurologist. ALJ Order at 49. But the
ALJ also ordered that the School District provide a trained aide to
administer the drug in the event that the bus cannot reach A.B.’s home or
school within five minutes. Id.

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these claims.

The Court also finds that the Family sufficiently

alleges that the School District continues to hinder cooperation
by

exhibiting

allegations,

hostility

the

Court

toward
is

the

Family.

satisfied

that

Based

A.B.

“aggrieved parties” within the meaning of the IDEA.

on

and

L.B.

these
are

Although A.B.

and L.B. prevailed on most of their claims before the ALJ, they
did not receive all the relief they contend is due.

See Diatta v.

Dist. of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D.D.C. 2004) (“A party
is considered “aggrieved” under the Act where relief requested in
satisfaction

of

the

Act

is

denied.”);

see

also

D.E.

v.

Cent.

Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that
family

who

won

at

the

administrative

level

but

later

faced

a

“noncompliant school district” was “‘aggrieved’ for purposes of
the IDEA”).

Therefore, A.B. and L.B. may pursue these claims

through their Counterclaim. Furthermore, if A.B. and L.B. are the
prevailing parties in this action, they may seek attorney’s fees
and

costs

under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

54(d)

and

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).2

2

The School District argues that the Court should dismiss the Family’s
“claim” for attorney’s fees. The Family listed attorney’s fees and costs
in its prayer for relief to preserve its right to seek such fees at the
appropriate time under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), just as the
School District listed fees and costs in its prayer for relief so it
could
seek
them
at
the
appropriate
time
under
20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II) or (III). The Court will handle attorney’s
fees and costs at the appropriate time on a motion under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d) and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

5

The School District also criticizes the following allegations
by the Family in their Counterclaim: 1) an attempt to reserve for
the District Court certain claims in their Due Process Complaint;
(2)

claims

based

on

the

Family’s

cooperation

with

the

School

District during and after the Due Process Hearing; and (3) claims
for relief under Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Rehab Act”), and the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”).

See Compl.

Ex. B, Due Process Compl. 40-41, ECF No. 1-2 at 41-42 (reserving
certain rights and claims); Defs.’ Answer & Countercl. 40 ¶ 104
(alleging that the School District violated the Rehab Act and the
ADA).

The Family now clarifies that it is not asserting any

claims

that

it

previously

attempted

to

reserve,

and

it

is

no

longer asserting any claims based on its cooperation with the
School District during or after the Due Process Hearing.

The

Family also acknowledges that it is not asserting any claims under
the Rehab Act or the ADA.

Accordingly, to the extent that the

Family’s Counterclaim may be construed to include those claims,
the

Court

finds

that

they

have

been

abandoned,

and

they

are

dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The

School

District’s

motion

to

dismiss

the

Family’s

Counterclaim (ECF No. 10) is granted in part and denied in part.
The following claims asserted by the Family in their Counterclaim

6

remain pending for adjudication: (1) the ALJ erred by reducing the
transportation costs for which the Family should be reimbursed;
(2) the ALJ erred by requiring L.B. to sign a release to let the
school talk to A.B.’s doctors; and (3) the School District has
failed to comply with the ALJ’s order and continues to violate
A.B.’s IDEA rights by acting with hostility toward his mother.
The Court will handle attorney’s fees and costs at the appropriate
time on a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

To the extent that the Family asserted

other affirmative claims in its Counterclaim, those claims are
dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 15th day of January, 2015.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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