THE GUARANTEE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA v. GARY'S GRADING & PIPELINE CO INC et al
Filing
117
ORDER denying 88 Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 08/16/2016 (nmr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
THE GUARANTEE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA,
*
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
CASE NO. 3:15-CV-83 (CDL)
*
GARY’S GRADING & PIPELINE CO.,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
*
*
O R D E R
In the first trial of this action, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Plaintiff against Pine Plantation, LLC in
the amount of $2,546,354.69 (ECF No. 77).
After the jury could
not reach a unanimous verdict as to the claim against Defendant
Gary G. Opolka, the Court declared a mistrial as to that claim,
and
directed
Plaintiff
on
that
the
final
claim
judgment
against
be
Pine
entered
in
Plantation
and
several Defendants who were in default (ECF No. 79).
was subsequently entered by the Clerk.
favor
(ECF No. 83)
of
against
Judgment
The claim
against Gary G. Opolka remained pending for retrial.
After the first trial, Defendants Gary G. Opolka and Pine
Plantation, LLC renewed their trial motions for judgment as a
matter of law (ECF No. 88).
The Court deferred ruling on those
motions until after the retrial of the claim against Gary G.
Opolka.
That
trial
has
now
been
completed,
and
the
jury
returned a verdict in favor of Gary G. Opolka (ECF No. 113).
Judgment
has
been
entered
in
his
favor
(ECF
No.
115).
Therefore, Mr. Opolka’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
is moot and shall be terminated.
Pine Plantation’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law regarding the first trial remains
pending.
As explained in the remainder of this Order, that
motion (ECF No. 88) is denied.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from a construction company’s failure to
complete various projects which required its surety to step in
and make payments under its payment and performance bonds.
surety,
The
Guarantee
Company
of
North
America
That
(“Guarantee
Co.”), sued the construction company, Gary’s Grading & Pipeline
Co., Inc. (“Gary’s Grading”), along with other related entities,
CGP Equipment Company, Inc. (“CGP Equipment”), Bold Springs, LLC
(“Bold Springs”), Pine Plantation, LLC (“Pine Plantation”), and
individuals, Gary Opolka and Christopher Opolka.
claimed
that
Gary
Opolka
and
Christopher
Guarantee Co.
Opolka
signed
an
Indemnity Agreement to repay Guarantee Co. for any payments it
made on the surety bonds.
performance
requires
of
the
a
provision
indemnitors
Guarantee Co. also sought specific
in
to
the
Indemnity
provide
additional
security under the circumstances presented here.
2
Agreement
that
collateral
Three of the
Defendants,
Gary’s
Grading,
CGP
Equipment
and
Bold
Springs,
never answered Guarantee Co.’s complaint, and default judgments
have been entered against them.
Christopher Opolka has filed
for protection under the bankruptcy laws, and thus this action
is automatically stayed as to him.
The Court previously granted partial summary judgment in
favor of Guarantee Co. and against Pine Plantation finding that
Pine Plantation was bound by the Indemnity Agreement.
The Court
subsequently conducted a jury trial on Guarantee Co.’s claims
against Pine Plantation and Gary G. Opolka with damages being
the
only
issue
to
be
decided
as
to
the
claim
against
Pine
Plantation but with liability and damages to be decided as to
the claim against Gary G. Opolka.
jury
trial
resulted
in
a
verdict
As mentioned previously, that
in
favor
of
Guarantee
Co.
against Pine Plantation and a mistrial on the claim against Gary
G. Opolka based on a hung jury.
The Court scheduled a second
trial for the claim against Mr. Opolka, and the jury returned a
verdict in his favor finding that he did not sign or ratify the
Indemnity Agreement.
After
the
first
trial,
Pine
Plantation
filed
a
motion
renewing its motion for judgment as a matter of law that it had
made during the first trial.
In that motion, Pine Plantation
focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
verdict.
But the Court also understands Pine Plantation to be
3
reasserting its previous position that the Court erred when it
granted partial summary judgment and found as a matter of law
that Pine Plantation was bound by and had breached the Indemnity
Agreement.
RENEWAL OF RULE 50 MOTION
During the first trial, Pine Plantation made a motion for
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure after Guarantee Co. rested its case and
at the conclusion of all of the evidence.
The Court deferred
ruling on the motion and submitted the case to the jury subject
to the Court’s later deciding the legal question raised by the
motion.
Pine Plantation now renews that motion.
The issue presented by the motion is whether the jury had a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to award the damages it
awarded
See
to
Fed.
Guarantee
R.
Civ.
Co.
P.
50(a)
and
against
(prescribing
judgment as a matter of law).
Pine
this
Plantation.
standard
for
Pine Plantation maintains that
the Court should not have decided its liability as a matter of
law at summary judgment and that the amount of damages found by
the jury was not supported by admissible evidence.
considered
the
record
at
trial
and
the
Having fully
evidentiary
rulings
objected to by Pine Plantation, the Court finds that sufficient
admissible evidence was presented at trial to support the jury’s
award
of
damages.
The
Court
further
4
finds
that
a
detailed
analysis of why this is so would not likely facilitate appellate
review.
The
Court
further
finds
that
its
previous
summary
judgment ruling was not erroneous and thus does not provide Pine
Plantation with an argument for judgment as a matter of law or
new
trial.
The
Court
does
find,
however,
that
further
discussion of that issue in this Order may facilitate appellate
review of the issue.
THE COURT’S PREVIOUS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
I.
Factual Record at Summary Judgment
The record for summary judgment was as follows.
Plaintiff Guarantee Co. is a Michigan surety company that
issues payment and performance bonds on construction projects.
At times relevant to this action, Gary’s Grading was a Georgia
construction company primarily operated by Christopher Opolka.
Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Prelim. Inj. Attach. 2, Gary Opolka
Aff.
I
¶ 3,
Oct.
28,
2015,
ECF
No.
27-2.
Defendant
Pine
Plantation, a Georgia limited liability company, was co-owned
and co-managed by Christopher Opolka and his two brothers, Gary
Opolka and Peter Opolka, Jr.
Id. ¶¶ 4 & 5; Def.’s Surreply in
Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. 1, Peter Opolka, Jr.
Aff. ¶¶ 2 & 3, ECF No. 53-1.
Defendants CGP Equipment and Bold
Springs are also Georgia entities.
The Pine Plantation Operating Agreement that governs the
division of authority between the brothers provides:
5
At any time when there is more than one Manager, no
one Manager may take any action permitted to be taken
by the Managers without agreement of the other Manager
or Managers, or unless other approval requirements of
the Managers are expressly set forth elsewhere in this
Operating Agreement or the Georgia Act.
Pl.’s
Mot.
for
Summ.
J.
Ex.
C,
Operating
Agreement
art.
V
§ 5.01, ECF No. 42-5.
In 2012, Guarantee Co. contracted with Gary’s Grading to
provide payment and performance bonds for several construction
projects in Georgia.
In exchange for the Gary’s Grading bonds,
Christopher Opolka signed a General Agreement of Indemnification
(“Indemnity Agreement”) in favor of Guarantee Co. on behalf of
himself, CGP Equipment, Bold Springs and Pine Plantation.
Pl.’s
Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 1, Indemnity Agreement 6-7, ECF No.
22-1.
Gary Opolka’s signature also appears on the Indemnity
Agreement
on
behalf
of
himself
and
Gary’s
Grading.
Id.
According to Gary Opolka, however, he did not sign the Agreement
and he did not give Christopher Opolka permission to sign the
Agreement on behalf of their co-managed entity Pine Plantation.
Gary
Opolka
Aff.
I
¶¶ 8
& 9.
Gary
Opolka
believes
Christopher Opolka forged his signature on the Agreement.
that
Id.
John Redding, the Guarantee Co. employee responsible for
issuing the Gary’s Grading bonds in 2012, believed that all the
signatures on the Indemnity Agreement were genuine.
Redding
states that he “had no reason to distrust the authenticity of
6
the notarized signature[] of Gary Opolka.”
Pl.’s Reply in Supp.
of Summ. J. Ex. A, Redding Aff. ¶ 12, ECF No. 50-1.
Redding
also had no concerns “as to Chris Opolka’s authority to sign the
Indemnity Agreement on behalf of Pine Plantation.”
The
Indemnity
Id. ¶ 11.
Agreement provides the following indemnity
provision:
The UNDERSIGNED shall indemnify [Guarantee Co.] and
hold it harmless from and against all claims, damages,
expenses, losses, costs, professional and consulting
fees, disbursements, interests and expenses of every
nature (including premiums and fees due for the
issuance and continuance of any BOND or BONDS) which
[Guarantee Co.] may sustain, incur or become liable
for by reason of having executed or procured the
execution of any BOND or BONDS, or by making any
investigation of any matter concerning any BOND or
BONDS, or by prosecuting or defending any action in
connection with any BOND or BONDS, or by recovering
any salvage or enforcing this Agreement.
Indemnity Agreement ¶ 4.
The Indemnity Agreement also gives
Guarantee Co. the right to settle any claims against the bonds:
[Guarantee Co.] may settle or compromise any claim,
liability, demand, suit or judgment upon any BOND or
BONDS executed or procured by it, and any such
settlement or compromise shall be binding upon the
UNDERSIGNED.
Vouchers or other evidence of payments
made by [Guarantee Co.] shall be prima facie evidence
of the fact and amount of the liability of the
UNDERSIGNED to [Guarantee Co.].
Id. ¶ 7.
And it contains a collateral security provision:
Upon [Guarantee Co.]’s reasonable belief that it may
incur a loss on a BOND or BONDS, [Guarantee Co.] may
demand and, upon [Guarantee Co.]’s demand,
the
UNDERSIGNED shall deliver over to [Guarantee Co.]
collateral security acceptable to [Guarantee Co.] to
cover any contingent losses and any subsequent
7
increase thereof. {Guarantee Co.] shall return to the
UNDERSIGNED any unused portion of collateral upon
termination of the liability of [Guarantee Co.] on all
BONDS and satisfaction by the UNDERSIGNED of [their]
obligations to [Guarantee Co.] under this Agreement.
Id. ¶ 5.
Several
of
the
subcontractors
and
suppliers
for
Gary’s
Grading submitted claims to Guarantee Co. against the Gary’s
Grading bonds.
Guarantee Co. paid substantial amounts to settle
various bond claims.
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, Zabek Aff.
¶ 13, ECF No. 42-2.
Guarantee Co. demanded that Defendants
indemnify it for its losses and post collateral pursuant to the
Indemnity Agreement.
Defendants failed to indemnify Guarantee
Co. or post collateral.
II.
Summary Judgment Rationale
When subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity, the
Court applies the forum state’s choice-of-law rules to determine
which law governs the action.
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Advanced
Adhesive Tech., Inc., 73 F.3d 335, 337 (11th Cir. 1996).
Under
Georgia’s choice-of-law rules, “[contracts] are to be governed
as to their nature, validity and interpretation by the law of
the place where they are made . . . .”
Trimm,
252
Ga.
95,
95,
311
S.E.2d
Gen. Tel. Co. of Se. v.
460,
461
(1984)
(first
alteration in original) (quoting Tillman v. Gibson, 44 Ga. App.
440, 442-43, 161 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1931)).
Here, there is no
indication that the Indemnity Agreement was made in a state
8
other
than
Georgia,
“and
the
parties
seem
to
agree
that
substantive Georgia law applies because almost all of the cases
cited in their briefs discuss Georgia law.”
OneBeacon Am. Ins.
Co. v. Catholic Diocese of Savannah, 477 F. App’x 665, 669 (11th
Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
Accordingly, the Court applies Georgia
law.
It is well established under Georgia law that “an act done
by
an
agent
in
excess
principal . . . .”
S.E.2d
288,
294
Christopher
Indemnity
Plantation
his
authority
does
not
bind
the
Gaulding v. Courts, 90 Ga. App. 472, 480, 83
(1954).
Opolka
Agreement
is
of
not
Here,
exceeded
on
its
bound
Pine
his
authority
behalf
by
the
Plantation
and,
by
argues
that
signing
the
therefore,
Agreement.
that
Pine
Guarantee
Co.
responds that Christopher Opolka had actual authority to bind
Pine Plantation to the Indemnity Agreement, and even if he did
not
have
actual
authority,
he
certainly
acted
with
apparent
authority.
The Pine Plantation Operating Agreement provides that one
co-manager may not unilaterally bind Pine Plantation “without
agreement of the other Manager or Managers,
or
unless
other
approval requirements of the Managers are expressly set forth
elsewhere
in
this
Operating
Agreement
Operating
art.
V
Agreement
§ 5.01
or the
(emphasis
Georgia
added).
Act.”
Pine
Plantation ignores the phrase beginning with “unless” and argues
9
that
Pine
concur.
the
Plantation
which
“unless . . . other
in . . . the
refers
only
be
bound
if
all
the
managers
This interpretation disregards the plain language of
agreement
forth
can
to
the
provides
approval
Georgia
Georgia
that
all
managers
requirements
Act.”
Limited
“The
Liability
are
must
agree,
expressly
Georgia
Act”
Company
set
clearly
Act.
Id.
art. I, at 3 (defining “Georgia Act” as the “Georgia Limited
Liability
manager
Company
of
an
LLC
Act”).
is
an
And
that
agent
of
Act
provides
the
LLC
with
that
a
every
limited
exception if two requirements are met:
Every manager is an agent of the limited liability
company for the purpose of its business and affairs,
and the act of any manager, including, but not limited
to, the execution in the name of the limited liability
company of any instrument for apparently carrying on
in the usual way the business and affairs of the
limited liability company of which he or she is a
manager, binds the limited liability company, unless
the manager so acting has in fact no authority to act
for the limited liability company in the particular
matter, and the person with whom he or she is dealing
has knowledge of the fact that the manager has no such
authority.
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-301(b)(2).
The Act also provides:
No act of a manager or member in contravention of a
restriction on authority shall bind the limited
liability company to persons having knowledge of the
restriction.
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-301(d).
Here, there is no dispute that Christopher Opolka was a
manager of Pine Plantation.
Nor does Pine Plantation dispute
10
that Christopher Opolka was “apparently carrying on in the usual
way
the
signed
business
the
and
affairs
Indemnity
of
[Pine
Agreement.
Plantation]”
O.C.G.A.
§
when
he
14-11-301(b)(2).
Thus, Pine Plantation is bound under the Act unless: “[1] the
manager
so
acting
has
in
fact
no
authority
to
act
for
the
limited liability company in the particular matter, and [2] the
person with whom he or she is dealing has knowledge of the fact
that the manager has no such authority.”
Id.
Even if Christopher Opolka had “no authority to act for
[Pine
Plantation]
Guarantee
Co.
“knowledge
authority.”
in
[signing
presents
of
the
fact
the
undisputed
that
Indemnity
evidence
Agreement],”
that
[Christopher]
it
ha[d]
had
no
no
such
After reviewing the underwriting documents for the
Gary’s Grading bonds in 2012, Guarantee Co. underwriter Redding
had no concerns “as to Chris Opolka’s authority to sign the
Indemnity Agreement on behalf of Pine Plantation.”
¶ 11.
Redding Aff.
Redding also “had no reason to distrust the authenticity
of the notarized signature[] of Gary Opolka” on the Indemnity
Agreement.
Id.
¶ 12.
And
Redding
had
never
seen
Pine
Plantation’s Operating Agreement.
Def.’s Surreply Attach. 4,
Redding Dep. 80:1-2, ECF No. 53-4.
Pine Plantation points to no
evidence
from
which
a
reasonable
jury
could
conclude
that
Guarantee Co. knew that Christopher Opolka had no authority to
act on behalf of Pine Plantation.
11
Instead
of
producing
evidence
of
a
factual
dispute
on
Guarantee Co.’s knowledge, Pine Plantation argues that Guarantee
Co.
did
not
do
enough
to
verify
that
Christopher
had
requisite authority to act on behalf of Pine Plantation.
the
Pine
Plantation presumably maintains that Guarantee Co. should have
asked to review the Operating Agreement.
no reason to do so.
But Guarantee Co. had
It had been dealing with Christopher Opolka
with no indication that he did not possess the authority to act
on behalf of Pine Plantation.
Agreement
may
have
created
While a review of the Operating
some
concern,
the
Agreement
also
provided that the agreement of all the managers was not the
exclusive means for Pine Plantation to act given the language in
the Agreement that makes an exception if the Georgia LLC Act
provides otherwise.
bind
Pine
Plantation
To invalidate Christopher’s authority to
under
the
circumstances
presented
here
would be directly contrary to the LLC Act, the requirements of
which Pine Plantation was aware of given that it incorporated
the Act into its Operating Agreement.
The cases relied on by Pine Plantation are distinguishable.
Pine Plantation relies on Ly v. Jimmy Carter Commons, LLC, 286
Ga. 831, 832-33, 691 S.E.2d 852, 853 (2010) in which the Georgia
Supreme Court held that a genuine factual dispute regarding the
third party’s knowledge precluded summary judgment in favor of
the LLC.
Ly, 286 Ga. at 833, 691 S.E.2d at 853-54.
12
Unlike
here,
the
third
requirement
party
in
Nevertheless,
the
the
in
Ly
knew
LLC’s
third
of
the
operating
party
relied
manager
approval
agreement.
on
a
forged
document purporting to show the managers’ consent.
Id.
Id.
consent
The Ly
court assumes that on remand the third party must show that its
reliance on the consent document was justified.
Id.
This makes
sense because whether the third party was justified in relying
on the forged consent document was relevant to determine the
third party’s actual knowledge under the statute.
dispute
exists
knowledge.
of
the
regarding
Guarantee
Co.’s
lack
But here no
of
actual
Pine Plantation recognizes that Redding did not know
manager
approval
Operating Agreement.
requirement
in
Pine
Plantation’s
And there are no other facts in the record
tending to show that Guarantee Co. had knowledge.
The Court
does not interpret Ly or any other Georgia authority to impose a
duty
on
Guarantee
representations
of
Co.
to
authority
investigate
by
Christopher
reading
Pine
Opolka’s
Plantation’s
Operating Agreement.1
Guarantee Co. presents undisputed evidence that Christopher
Opolka held himself out as an agent of Pine Plantation and that
Guarantee Co. had no indication that he lacked the authority to
bind Pine Plantation to the Indemnity Agreement.
1
Accordingly,
Given that Guarantee Co.’s claim is not one for fraud, the fraud
cases cited by Pine Plantation are inapposite.
13
based on the undisputed evidence, he acted as an agent of Pine
Plantation when he executed the Indemnity Agreement.
Whether he
was an “actual” or an “apparent” agent does not matter.
clearly
had
the
legal
authority
to
bind
Pine
He
Plantation.
Accordingly, Guarantee Co. is entitled to a finding as a matter
of law that Pine Plantation is bound by the Indemnity Agreement.
The next question is whether Pine Plantation breached the
Indemnity
Agreement.
Guarantee
Co.
must
To
establish
establish:
(1)
a
an
breach
of
enforceable
contract,
agreement;
(2) breach of that agreement; and (3) damages as a result of
that breach.
S.E.2d
Broughton v. Johnson, 247 Ga. App. 819, 819, 545
370,
up[hold]
371
the
(2001).
validity
Georgia
and
courts
enforceability
“consistently
of
[]
indemnification
agreements executed in connection with the issuance of surety
bonds.”
Anderson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 267 Ga. App. 624,
627, 600 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2004).
Plantation
breached
its
To determine whether Pine
obligations
under
the
Indemnity
Agreement, the Court “appl[ies] the ordinary rules of contract
construction.”
Id.
However, “[n]o construction is required or
even permissible when the language employed by the parties in
the
contract
is
plain,
unambiguous
reasonable interpretation.”
Mut.
Cas.
Co.,
261
Ga.
and
capable
of
only
one
Id. (quoting Nguyen v. Lumbermens
App.
553,
(2003)).
14
555,
583
S.E.2d
220,
223
It is clear that Pine Plantation breached the indemnity
provision as a matter of law.
The relevant provision states
that the “UNDERSIGNED shall indemnify [Guarantee Co.] and hold
it
harmless”
for
sustain . . . by
any
damages
reason
of
“which
having
[Guarantee
Co.]
executed . . . any
BONDS” on behalf of Gary’s Grading.
BOND
may
or
Indemnity Agreement ¶ 4.
Guarantee Co. “may settle or compromise any claim, liability,
demand, suit or judgment upon any BOND or BONDS executed or
procured by it, and any such settlement or compromise shall be
binding upon the UNDERSIGNED.”
Indemnity Agreement ¶ 7.
The
Court finds this language unambiguous and therefore it must be
strictly enforced.
S.E.2d
at
713-14
See Anderson, 267 Ga. App. at 624-25, 600
(affirming
summary
judgment
for
a
surety
company based on similar language in an indemnity agreement).
It is undisputed that Guarantee Co. received several claims
against the Gary’s Grading bonds and chose to settle many of the
claims with payments to the claimants.
Pine Plantation does not
argue that any of these settlements were made in bad faith or an
abuse of discretion.
See Nguyen, 261 Ga. App. at 555, 583
S.E.2d at 223 (“[W]here a decision is left to the discretion of
a designated entity, the question is not whether it was in fact
erroneous,
but
whether
it
was
in
bad
faith,
arbitrary,
or
capricious so as to amount to an abuse of that discretion.”
(alteration
in
original)
(quoting
15
MacDougald
Constr.
Co.,
v.
State Highway Dep’t, 125 Ga. App. 591, 593, 188 S.E.2d 405, 406
(1972))).
Yet Pine Plantation has not indemnified Guarantee Co.
for its damages.
Thus, Pine Plantation breached this provision
as a matter of law.
It is also undisputed that Pine Plantation breached the
collateral security provision.
that
“if
Guarantee
Co.
The Indemnity Agreement provides
“reasonabl[y]
belie[ves]
that
it
may
incur a loss” from the Gary’s Grading bonds, Guarantee Co. may
demand, and Pine Plantation “shall deliver over to [Guarantee
Co.] collateral security acceptable to [Guarantee Co.] to cover
any contingent losses.”
unambiguously
requires
Indemnity Agreement ¶ 5.
Pine
Guarantee Co.’s discretion.
Plantation
to
post
This language
collateral
at
Here, Zabek states that Guarantee
Co.’s records indicate that it will incur additional losses on
the
Gary’s
demanded
Grading
that
Pine
potential losses.
bonds.
Zabek
Plantation
Aff.
post
¶ 16.
collateral
Guarantee
Co.
to
the
cover
Pine Plantation has failed to present any
evidence that the demand was made in bad faith and has not
posted collateral.
Based on the foregoing, the Court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of Guarantee Co. on its claims against Pine
Plantation and found as a matter of law that Pine Plantation was
bound by the Indemnity Agreement and had breached it.
The Court
found, however, that a jury question existed as to the amount of
16
Guarantee
Co.’s
damages
and
denied
summary
judgment
as
to
damages.
That issue was subsequently tried by a jury which
returned a verdict awarding damages to Guarantee Co. and against
Pine Plantation.
The Court confirms the correctness of its
prior rulings.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s partial summary judgment ruling finding that
Pine
Plantation
was
bound
by
and
breached
the
indemnity
agreement with Guarantee Co. was not erroneous, and therefore,
the Court declines to reconsider that ruling.
The jury verdict
awarding damages to Guarantee Co. against Pine Plantation was
fully
supported
Federal
Rules
of
by
evidence
Evidence.
that
was
admissible
Accordingly,
Pine
under
the
Plantation’s
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (ECF No. 88) is
denied.
The jury verdict was not against the weight of the
evidence, and Pine Plantation is also not entitled to a new
trial.2
2
Given the somewhat complicated procedural posture of this case with
several defendants, two separate trials, and an interlocutory summary
judgment order, the Court finds it appropriate to clarify that all
claims in this action have now been finally determined except for the
claims against Christopher Opolka. And the claims against Christopher
Opolka have been stayed due to his pending bankruptcy proceedings.
Accordingly, the judgments in this case should be appealable at this
time, and if for any reason they are found not to be appealable as a
matter of right, the Court finds that no legitimate reason exists to
deny a permissive appeal and certifies that an appeal should be
permitted at this time.
17
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 16th day of August, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
18
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