MINOTT v. MERRILL

Filing 34

ORDER granting 17 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 09/27/2016. (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
BASIL R. MINOTT,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

MICHAEL J. MERRILL,

*

Defendant.

CASE NO. 3:16-CV-3 (CDL)

*

O R D E R
Defendant Michael Merrill filed a partial summary judgment
motion, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Basil Minott’s claim for
punitive damages.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion

(ECF No. 17) is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

Fed. R.

In determining whether a genuine dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id.

at 248.

A

factual

dispute

is

genuine

if

the

evidence

would

allow

a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
Under the Court’s local rules, a party moving for summary
judgment

must

attach

to

its

motion

“a

separate

and

concise

statement of the material facts to which the movant contends
there is no genuine dispute to be tried.”

M.D. Ga. R. 56.

Those facts must be supported by the record.

The respondent to

a summary judgment motion must respond “to each of the movant’s
numbered material facts.”

Id.

“All material facts contained in

the movant’s statement which are not specifically controverted
by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the
record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise
inappropriate.”

Id.

Merrill submitted a statement of undisputed material facts
with his summary judgment motion.

Minott, who is proceeding pro

se, received a notice regarding the significance of Merrill’s
summary judgment motion and of his opportunity to respond to the
motion and statement of material facts.

Notice to Pro Se Party

of Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20.

Minott sought an

extension of time to respond to the summary judgment motion,
which was granted.

Minott did not respond to Merrill’s summary

judgment motion or statement of material facts by the extended
deadline.

Therefore, Merrill’s statement of material facts is

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deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.

The Court reviewed

Merrill’s citations to the record to confirm that they support
Merrill’s fact statements.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a car wreck on Interstate 20 in
Morgan County, Georgia.

Minott asserts that as he was traveling

in the right lane, Merrill struck the rear panel of Minott’s
vehicle, causing Minott’s vehicle to spin and come to rest on
the side of the road.

Minott’s airbag did not deploy, and he

did not report any injuries at the scene.
to check on Minott.

Merrill pulled over

The police were called.

officer did not issue any citations.

The investigating

The officer did note in

his report that Merrill reported “that his cell phone was on his
right

leg,

when

it

began

to

slip,

he

went

to

grab

it

and

snatched the steering wheel, striking vehicle in the right rear
quarter panel.”

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, Motor Vehicle

Accident Report 3, ECF No. 17-2.
DISCUSSION
Minott’s Complaint contains two counts: one for negligence
and one for punitive damages.

Merrill seeks summary judgment

only on the punitive damages claim.
Georgia

law

applies.

See,

e.g.,

In this diversity action,
Grange

Mut.

Cas.

Co.

v.

Woodard, 826 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Federal courts
sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum

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state.”).

Under Georgia law, “[p]unitive damages may be awarded

only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful
misconduct,
entire

malice,

want

conscious
5.1(b).

of

fraud,

care

wantonness,

which

indifference

to

would

oppression,

raise

the

consequences.”

or

that

presumption

of

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-

“Negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to

support a punitive damage award. . . . [S]omething more than the
mere

commission

damages.

of

There

outrage.”

a

tort

must

be

is

always

required

circumstances

of

for

punitive

aggravation

or

Brooks v. Gray, 585 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ga. Ct. App.

2003) (alterations in original) (quoting Tower Fin. Servs. v.
Smith, 423 S.E.2d 257, 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)).
automobile

collision

cases,

‘punitive

damages

“Thus, in
are

not

recoverable where the driver at fault simply violated a rule of
the road.’” Id. (quoting Miller v. Crumbley, 548 S.E.2d 657, 659
(Ga.

Ct.

Georgia

App.

2001)).

“To

courts

require

“that

justify
the

punitive

collision

damages,”

result

‘from

the
a

pattern or policy of dangerous driving, such as driving while
intoxicated or speeding excessively.’”

Id. (quoting Miller, 548

S.E.2d at 659).
For example, in Brooks, the Georgia Court of Appeals found
no

error

in

the

grant

of

partial

summary

judgment

on

the

plaintiff’s punitive damages claim where the defendant crossed

4

the centerline and veered into oncoming traffic; there was no
evidence that the defendant had a pattern or policy of dangerous
driving.
of

Id. at 189-90.

Appeals

found

no

Likewise, in Miller, the Georgia Court

error

in

the

grant

of

partial

summary

judgment on the plaintiff’s punitive damages claim where the
defendant failed to keep a proper lookout and pled guilty to
following too closely; as in Brooks, there was no evidence that
the defendant had a pattern or policy of dangerous driving.
Miller,

548

Dolatowski,

S.E.2d
771

at

659;

accord

S.E.2d

378,

380

&

Archer
n.7

Forestry,

(Ga.

Ct.

LLC

App.

v.

2015)

(reversing the trial court’s denial of partial summary judgment
on

the

plaintiff’s

punitive

damages

claim

where

there

was

evidence that the defendant was speeding slightly and talking on
his

cell

phone

at

the

time

of

the

wreck

but

there

was

no

evidence that the defendant had a pattern or policy of dangerous
driving); Lindsey v. Clinch Cty. Glass, Inc., 718 S.E.2d 806,
808 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming grant of partial summary
judgment on a punitive damages claim where there was evidence
that the defendant was distracted by looking up a number on his
cell phone at the time of the wreck but there was no evidence
that

the

defendant

had

a

history

of

dangerous

driving);

Doctoroff v. Perez, 615 S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
(affirming

grant

of

partial

summary

5

judgment

on

a

punitive

damages claim where the defendant, who lacked a valid license,
caused a wreck when she failed to yield to the plaintiff).
Here, there is evidence that Merrill veered into Minott’s
lane when he tried to keep his cell phone from falling off of
his lap.

Minott, however, pointed to no evidence that Merrill

had a pattern or policy of dangerous driving.

Without such

evidence, this case is indistinguishable from Brooks, Miller,
Archer Forestry, Lindsey, and Doctoroff.

Under the rationale of

these cases, Merrill is entitled to summary judgment on Minott’s
punitive

damages

claim.

Merrill’s

partial

summary

judgment

motion (ECF No. 17) is therefore granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 27th day of September, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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