RANDALL v. ATHENS CLARKE COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al
ORDER granting 33 Motion for Summary Judgment by Athens Clarke County; dismissing without prejudice claims against Scott Boswell. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 11/08/2017. (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WANDA C. RANDALL,
ATHENS CLARKE COUNTY, GEORGIA
and SCOTT BOSWELL,
CASE NO. 3:16-cv-147 (CDL)
O R D E R
Presently pending before the Court is the summary judgment
motion of Defendant Athens Clarke County (“ACC”).
below, the motion (ECF No. 33) is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
In determining whether a genuine dispute of material
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant
or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248.
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
Under the Court’s local rules, a party moving for summary
statement of the material facts to which the movant contends
there is no genuine dispute to be tried.”
M.D. Ga. R. 56.
Those facts must be supported by the record.
The respondent to
a summary judgment motion must respond “to each of the movant’s
numbered material facts.”
“All material facts contained in
the movant’s statement which are not specifically controverted
by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the
record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise
ACC submitted a statement of undisputed material facts with
its summary judgment motion.
Plaintiff Wanda Randall, who is
proceeding pro se, received a notice regarding the significance
respond to the motion and statement of material facts.
to Pro Se Party of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 34.
not respond to the motion or to ACC’s statement of material
Therefore, ACC’s statement of material facts is deemed
admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.
The Court reviewed ACC’s
citations to the record to confirm that they support ACC’s fact
Randall alleges that unnamed ACC police officers arrested
her based on a false report by Randall’s former employer, Scott
Compl. ¶¶ 68, 70, ECF No. 1.
Randall further alleges
that these unnamed officers knew or should have known that there
was no legitimate outstanding arrest warrant for Randall.
¶¶ 72, 76.
She asserts § 1983 claims against ACC based on this
Randall alleged in her Complaint that she was arrested on
July 2, 2015.
According to ACC, however, there is no record of
an arrest of Randall on July 2, 2015.
There is an arrest record
for “Wanda Holly Chastain” on August 7, 2015, and ACC contends
that Randall’s claims are based on this arrest.
ACC, Randall confirmed in her interrogatory responses that she
was known as Wanda Holly Chastain before she was married and
changed her name to Wanda C. Randall.
¶ 8, ECF No. 33-2 at 16.
Randall Interrog. Resp.
Randall did not present any evidence
to dispute that she is, in fact, Wanda Holly Chastain.
also did not dispute that her claims are based on the August 7,
2015 arrest, and she did not present any evidence to show that
she was arrested on July 2, 2015.
The Court thus concludes that
Randall’s claims are based on the August 7, 2015 arrest.
ACC presented evidence that warrants were issued for the
transaction card fraud and theft by taking.
ECF No. 33-3 at 6, 8, 10.
ACC also presented evidence that
Randall was arrested on August 7, 2015 pursuant to the warrants.
Arrest Report, ECF No. 33-3 at 4.
Again, Randall did not point
to any evidence to dispute that she is Wanda Holly Chastain, and
arrested pursuant to arrest warrants on August 7, 2015.
Finally, Randall did not present any evidence to suggest
that the warrants were invalid.
An arrest pursuant to an arrest
warrant that is supported by probable cause does not generally
violate the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., Carter v. Butts Cty.,
Ga., 821 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that “where
probable cause supports an arrest, it acts as ‘an absolute bar
to a section 1983 action for false arrest.’”) (quoting Kingsland
v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Randall did not present any evidence to suggest that the officer
who swore out the warrants lacked probable cause to do so, and
she did not present any evidence to suggest that the arresting
officers knew that there was no probable cause to support the
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.
Her § 1983 claim against
ACC thus fails, and ACC is entitled to summary judgment.
For the reasons set forth above, ACC’s summary judgment
motion (ECF No. 33) is granted.
Boswell are dismissed without prejudice.
The Court previously
noted on March 15, 2017 that Randall had not filed a proof of
service demonstrating that Boswell has been served in accordance
with the law.
The Court ordered Randall to show good cause why
her claims against Boswell should not be dismissed for failure
to perfect service on him.
Mar. 15, 2017 Order 4, ECF No. 27.
Randall did not show cause for her failure to perfect service on
Boswell, and she did not file a proof of service for Boswell.
prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 8th day of November, 2017.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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