SANDERS v. COLVIN

Filing 19

ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner. Ordered by US MAGISTRATE JUDGE STEPHEN HYLES on 11-9-17. (bdd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
ALISHA SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A BERRYHILL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 3:16-CV-152-MSH
Social Security Appeal

ORDER
The Social Security Commissioner, by adoption of the Administrative Law Judge’s
(ALJ’s) determination, denied Plaintiff’s applications for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and Supplemental Security income finding that she is not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. Plaintiff contends that the
Commissioner’s decision was in error and seeks review under the relevant provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). All administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Both parties filed their written consents for all proceedings to be conducted by
the United States Magistrate Judge, including the entry of a final judgment directly
appealable to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).
LEGAL STANDARDS
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination of
whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards

were applied. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
“Substantial evidence is something more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this
court must affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s role in
reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The court may
neither decide facts, re-weigh evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. 1 Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). It must,
however, decide if the Commissioner applied the proper standards in reaching a decision.
Harrell v. Harris, 610 F.2d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The court must
scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual
findings. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). However, even
if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must be affirmed if
substantial evidence supports it. Id.
The Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that she is unable to perform her
previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1986). The Plaintiff’s burden is
a heavy one and is so stringent that it has been described as bordering on the unrealistic.

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Credibility determinations are left to the Commissioner and not to the courts. Carnes v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991). It is also up to the Commissioner and not to the
courts to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir.
1986) (per curiam); see also Graham v. Bowen, 790 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1986).
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Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1981). 2 A Plaintiff seeking Social
Security disability benefits must demonstrate that she suffers from an impairment that
prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a twelve-month period.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). In addition to meeting the requirements of these statutes, in order
to be eligible for disability payments, a Plaintiff must meet the requirements of the
Commissioner’s regulations promulgated pursuant to the authority given in the Social
Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 et seq.
Under the Regulations, the Commissioner uses a five-step procedure to determine
if a Plaintiff is disabled. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). First, the Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff is
working. Id. If not, the Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff has an impairment
which prevents the performance of basic work activities. Id. Second, the Commissioner
determines the severity of the Plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments. Id.
Third, the Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff’s severe impairment(s) meets or
equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of Part 404 of the Regulations (the “Listing”).
Id. Fourth, the Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity can meet the physical and mental demands of past work. Id. Fifth and finally, the
Commissioner determines whether the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, age,
education, and past work experience prevent the performance of any other work. In

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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decision of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to
October 1, 1981.
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arriving at a decision, the Commissioner must consider the combined effects of all of the
alleged impairments, without regard to whether each, if considered separately, would be
disabling. Id. The Commissioner’s failure to apply correct legal standards to the evidence
is grounds for reversal. Id.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Alisha Sanders filed applications for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on January 11, 2013, alleging
that she became disabled on January 1, 1998. Tr. 168-83. Plaintiff’s claims were first
denied by the agency on May 24, 2013, and upon reconsideration on July 25, 2013. Tr.
112, 121. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) which
was held on May 11, 2015, via video conference. Tr. 35-50. At the hearing, Plaintiff
appeared with her attorney and testified; as did a neutral vocational expert (VE). Tr. 38,
47. On May 26, 2015, the ALJ issued his decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled.
Tr. 17-30. Plaintiff requested a review by the Appeals Council, but that request was denied
on September 25, 2016. Tr. 1-6. Having exhausted the administrative remedies available
to her under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision denying her various claims to benefits. This case is ripe for
review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND EVIDENCE
Plaintiff alleges that the onset of her disability occurred when she was nine years
old; she was twenty-seven years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. Tr. 30, 168. Plaintiff
finished high school but has not completed any higher education degree programs. Tr. 195.
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She has no past relevant work experience. Tr. 47, 195. In her applications, Plaintiff alleges
that she is disabled to work due to bipolar disorder, scoliosis, chronic back pain, hip
problems, knee problems, anxiety, and depression. Tr. 37, 38, 194, 212, 219.
The ALJ performed the mandated five-step sequential evaluation process to assess
the Plaintiff’s claims. Tr. 20-30; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(c). At step one, the
ALJ determined Plaintiff’s prior employment “did not rise to the level of substantial gainful
activity.” Tr. 22, Finding 2. The ALJ based this finding on the fact that, although Plaintiff
had prior work experience, her earnings from those positions never exceeded the requisite
levels for classification as substantial gainful activity. In his step-two analysis, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of obesity, bipolar disorder, and generalized
anxiety disorder. Tr. 22, Finding 3.
At step three, the ALJ found that Petitioner does not have any impairment, or
combination of impairments, that meets or equals the severity of those listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 23, Finding 4. Before moving to step four, and after
considering all of Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations, the ALJ formulated a residual
functional capacity (RFC). Tr. 24. The RFC permits Plaintiff to perform light work, as
defined in the regulations, but limits her to unskilled and non-customer service work. Tr.
24, Finding 5.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s lack of previous relevant work rendered
analysis of transferability of job skills “not an issue.” Tr. 29, Finding 9. However, at
Plaintiff’s hearing before the ALJ the VE testified that there are jobs available to Plaintiff
within her RFC that she can do. At step five, the ALJ—citing the VE’s testimony—found
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that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
can perform. Tr. 29, Finding 10. These include housekeeper, stock clerk, and food prep
worker. Id. The ALJ thus found Plaintiff to be not disabled to work. Tr. 30, Finding 11.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that her case should be remanded for further consideration. She
alleges two specific errors by the ALJ: 1) insufficient consideration of a treating doctor’s
medical opinion in formulating a mental RFC; and 2) inadequate consideration of the
limitations associated with Plaintiff’s obesity. Respondent counters that the Plaintiff’s first
argument is “incomplete” and ignores relevant portions of the record. Respondent also
claims Plaintiff’s second argument is inadequate, not supported by the record, and
misconstrues the responsibilities of the ALJ. Respondent argues that the ALJ’s findings
were supported by the requisite substantial evidence and should be conclusive.
I.

The ALJ’s Consideration of Dr. Grace’s Opinion
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not sufficiently evaluating all medical

opinions. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because he
“didn’t include any limitations in [Plaintiff’s] RFC assessment related to attendance or the
ability to respond adaptively to stress” which were mentioned by a consultative examiner.
Pl.’s Br. 9. Dr. Grace, a consultative psychological examiner, assessed Plaintiff on April
22, 2013. In his summary report, Dr. Grace stated that “[Plaintiff’s] ability to be able to
maintain regular attendance is considered impaired given reported anxiety while working.”
Tr. 335. He also wrote that “[Plaintiff’s] ability to respond adaptively would likely be
questionable given her poor coping skills.” Id. The ALJ afforded great weight to the
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opinion evidence, including Dr. Grace’s evaluation, and found it “generally consistent with
the medical evidence of record and the evidence as a whole.” Tr. 28. When considered in
conjunction with other medical evidence, the ALJ found that Dr. Grace’s opinion did not
suggest any greater limitation than that found in the RFC. Id. The ALJ also determined
that the evidence as a whole did not “confirm disabling pain or limitations arising from the
claimant’s underlying medical conditions” or support “a conclusion that the objectively
determined medical conditions are of such severity that they could reasonably be expected
to give rise to disabling pain and other limitations.” Id.
The ALJ’s decision to not explicitly analyze each of Dr. Grace’s determinations is
not cause for remand. The ALJ properly considered the consultative examiner’s opinion,
both individually and as part of the whole record. An ALJ is not required to address each
and every piece of evidence in his written decision. Newberry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 572 F. App’x 671, 672 (11th Cir. 2014). The ALJ properly considered Dr. Grace’s
opinion and its substance along with the other evidence of the record. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
first contention of error is without merit.
II.

The ALJ’s Consideration of Plaintiff’s Obesity
Plaintiff’s second contention of error is that the ALJ did not sufficiently consider

Plaintiff’s obesity in his decision. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in not
explicitly describing how obesity limits her activity or how it was incorporated into
Plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff cites two prior cases from this court’s jurisdiction as support for
her contention that the ALJ made “a legal error by not specifying what limitations the
claimant had because of her obesity.” Pl.’s Br. 14; see Thomas v. Barnhart, 2008 WL
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822514, at *2-3 (M.D. Ga. 2008); see also Taylor v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2197279, at *5 (M.D.
Ga. 2010). In his written decision, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s obesity at multiple stages
of the five-step analysis. The ALJ listed obesity as one of Plaintiff’s severe impairments,
and expressly considered obesity in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. Tr. 22, 25.
An ALJ cannot “make assumptions about the severity or functional effects of
obesity combined with other impairments.” Titles II & XVI: Evaluation of Obesity, SSR
02-1P (S.S.A. Sept. 12, 2002).

When an ALJ determines that a plaintiff’s severe

impairments include obesity, she is not required to find specific functional limitations result
from the obesity. Castel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 355 F. App’x 260, 264 (11th Cir. 2009).
The ALJ acted properly if she considered obesity in conjunction with the other record
evidence. Id. at 264 n. 7 (finding the ALJ’s mention of plaintiff’s height and weight
sufficient in tandem with a finding that obesity was a severe impairment but did not limit
Plaintiff beyond a limitation to certain light work). Here, the ALJ found obesity to be one
of Plaintiff’s severe impairments, but found that the evidence as a whole did not support a
finding that Plaintiff was limited further than to performing certain light work. Tr. 24.
The record shows that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s obesity in making this finding and
that the finding was supported by substantial evidence. Tr. 25, 26. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
second claim is also without merit.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the determination of the Social Security Commissioner
is affirmed.
SO ORDERED, this 9th day of November, 2017.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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