TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA v. JONES et al

Filing 23

ORDER granting 21 Motion for Default Judgment; granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 03/20/2018. (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF
AMERICA,

*
*

Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
MONANEKA JONES, KAWANIS SUTTON,
FELICIA BLACKWELL, and TERRY
*
BLACKWELL,
*
Defendants.
*

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-92 (CDL)

O R D E R
Plaintiff Travelers Indemnity Company of America seeks a
declaration that it has no obligation to defend or indemnify
Defendants
claims

Monaneka

brought

Blackwell.

Jones

against

and

them

by

Kawanis

Defendants

Travelers’

granted.

for

Felicia

liability
and

Terry

Travelers moved for summary judgment on this issue,

and none of the Defendants responded.
below,

Sutton

summary

judgment

For the reasons set forth
motion

(ECF

No.

22)

is

Travelers’ motion for default judgment as to Jones and

Sutton (ECF No. 21) is also granted.1
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
1

The Clerk previously entered a default as to Jones and Sutton because
they did not answer or otherwise respond after they were served with
the Complaint.

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

In determining whether a

genuine

Fed. R.

dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

Under the Court’s local rules, a party moving for summary
judgment

must

attach

to

its

motion

“a

separate

and

concise

statement of the material facts to which the movant contends
there is no genuine dispute to be tried.”

M.D. Ga. R. 56.

Those facts must be supported by the record.

The respondent to

a summary judgment motion must respond “to each of the movant’s
numbered material facts.”

Id.

“All material facts contained in

the movant’s statement which are not specifically controverted
by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the
record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise
inappropriate.” Id.
Travelers
facts.

submitted

a

statement

of

Defendants did not respond to it.

undisputed

material

Therefore, Travelers’

statement of material facts is deemed admitted pursuant to Local

2

Rule 56.

The Court must still review Travelers’ citations to

the record to determine whether a genuine fact dispute exists.
Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Based on the Court’s review of Travelers’ citations to the
record, the record reveals the following facts.
On November 28, 2015, Breanna Blackwell, the daughter of
Defendants Felicia and Terry Blackwell, drove her car to a party
at the home of Defendant Monaneka Jones in Athens, Georgia.

The

party was hosted by Jones’s son, Defendant Kawanis Sutton, who
lived with his grandparents and not at Jones’s house.

While

Breana was still in her car, a gun fight broke out at the party,
and Breana was struck and killed by a stray bullet.

Jones was

not home at the time of the party, but she learned about the
shooting incident from Sutton within forty-eight hours.
Travelers had issued a homeowners insurance policy to Jones
that included liability coverage.

The policy defines “insured”

as the named insured and relatives who are residents of her
household.
at 22.

Compl. Ex. F, Policy § Definitions ¶ 4, ECF No. 1-6

In the event of a loss, the Travelers policy requires

the insured to give written notice of the accident or occurrence
to Travelers “as soon as is practical.”
¶ 3(a), ECF No. 1-6 at 39.

Id. § II – Conditions

The policy also requires the insured

to forward promptly to Travelers “every notice, demand, summons,

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or other process relating to the accident or ‘occurrence.’”
§ II – Conditions ¶ 3(b), ECF No. 1-6 at 39.

Id.

These notice

provisions are expressly made a condition precedent to coverage
because the policy provides that no action shall be brought
against Travelers “unless there has been compliance with the
policy provisions.”
40.

Id. § II – Conditions ¶ 6, ECF No. 1-6 at

See, e.g., Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 703

S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that a similar
provision

made

notice

provisions

a

condition

precedent

to

coverage).
Neither
shooting

Jones

incident

nor
or

Sutton

notified

Travelers

about

requested

coverage

under

policy—not

the

the

after Jones received a letter from the Blackwells’ lawyer in
April 2016 stating that litigation was contemplated, not after
the Blackwells filed the underlying lawsuit and served Jones in
August 2016, and not after Sutton was added as a defendant to
the

underlying

Blackwells’
November

lawsuit

lawyer

2016

in

about

deposition

March
the

in

2017.

Travelers

the

Jones

did

policy

underlying

tell

during

lawsuit,

and

the
her
the

Blackwells’ lawyer immediately contacted Travelers to provide
notice

of

the

shooting

incident

and

the

underlying

lawsuit.

Neither Jones nor Sutton has responded to Travelers’ several
requests for information about the shooting incident.

4

Travelers

is providing a defense to Jones and Sutton in the underlying
lawsuit subject to a reservation of rights.
DISCUSSION
Travelers argues that Sutton is not entitled to coverage
because he was not an insured under the policy.
agrees.

The Court

The policy only covered Jones and her relatives who

were residents of her household.

Based on the record, Sutton

lived with his grandparents and was not a resident of Jones’s
household, and Defendants did not offer any evidence to create a
genuine fact dispute on this issue.

And, Sutton never requested

coverage under the policy or responded to Travelers’ requests
for information about the shooting incident.

For these reasons,

Sutton is not entitled to coverage under the policy.
Travelers argues that Jones is not entitled to coverage
because

she

precedent.

did

not

comply

with

The Court agrees.

the

policy’s

conditions

Under Georgia law, an insured

must comply with her insurance policy’s conditions precedent to
coverage.

As discussed above, the notice provisions in Jones’s

insurance policy are conditions precedent to coverage.
provision

that

is

“expressly

made

a

condition

A notice

precedent

to

coverage is valid and must be complied with, absent a showing of
justification.”

Barclay v. Stephenson, 787 S.E.2d 322, 329 (Ga.

Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Lankford, 703 S.E.2d at 438-39).
unjustified

failure

to

give

such

5

notice

ends

the

“An

insurer’s

coverage obligations.”
showing

justification

Id.

“The insured has the burden of

for

a

delay

in

providing

notice.”

OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Catholic Diocese of Savannah, 477 F.
App’x 665, 670 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (applying Georgia
law).

If an insured is contractually required to provide notice

of a loss or a lawsuit and fails to do so, then there is no
coverage

under

justification

the

for

policy

her

unless

failure.

the

See,

insured

e.g.,

demonstrates

id.;

Burkett

v.

Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 629 S.E.2d 558, 560 (Ga. Ct. App.
2006).
Here,

Jones

did

not

notify

Travelers

of

the

shooting

incident, even after she received a letter from the Blackwells’
attorney stating that litigation was contemplated.

She did not

notify Travelers of the Blackwells’ lawsuit against her.

She

did not respond to Travelers’ several requests for information
about the shooting incident.

Thus, Jones did not comply with

the policy’s conditions precedent to coverage.
justification for these failures.

She offered no

Under Georgia law, Jones is

not entitled to coverage under the policy.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, Travelers’ summary judgment motion (ECF
No. 22) is granted, and its motion for default judgment as to
Jones and Sutton (ECF No. 21) is also granted.

6

Travelers has no

duty under the policy to defend or indemnify Jones and Sutton
for liability claims brought against them by the Blackwells.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 20th day of March, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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