THORNTON v. ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY UNIFIED GOVERNMENT, et al
Filing
15
ORDER granting 12 Motion for Default Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 1/25/2018. (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
BRIAN KEITH THORNTON,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENSCLARKE COUNTY, GEORGIA,
*
CASE NO. 3:17-CV-112 (CDL)
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff
discrimination
Brian
Keith
action
Thornton
against
his
brought
former
this
employment
employer,
Defendant
Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, Georgia (“ACC”), under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq.
ACC
reached
filed
with
a
counterclaim
Thornton’s
to
attorney
enforce
before
the
settlement
Thornton
fired
ACC
him.
Thornton did not answer or otherwise respond to the counterclaim,
and the Clerk entered a default as to Thornton on November 17,
2017.
ACC’s motion for default judgment followed.
not respond.
Thornton did
As discussed below, the motion (ECF No. 12) is
granted.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
By
his
default,
Thornton
admitted
allegations of fact in ACC’s counterclaim.
the
well-pleaded
See, e.g., Eagle Hosp.
Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2009) (“A ‘defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded
allegations
of
fact
. . . .’”
(quoting
Nishimatsu
Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975)).
ACC alleged the following facts in its counterclaim:
ACC terminated Thornton on March 2, 2017.
He appealed via
ACC’s administrative appeal procedures, and he hired attorney Jeff
Del Rio to represent him.
that
he
represented
settlement
demand
of
Del Rio sent ACC a letter to inform ACC
Thornton
$20,000
in
on
the
matter.
behalf
of
Del
Rio
Thornton.
made
a
ACC’s
attorney made a counteroffer of $2,500 in exchange for a release
of Thornton’s claims and several other terms.
Del Rio responded
with a “best and final” settlement offer of $10,000 and stated
that the terms ACC’s attorney proposed were acceptable.
ACC’s
attorney sent an email to Del Rio confirming the terms of the
settlement agreement he and Del Rio reached, which included (1)
payment of $10,000 to be split between Thornton and Del Rio, (2)
release of all of Thornton’s claims against ACC, (3) non-admission
of liability by ACC, (4) confidentiality of agreement terms by
Thornton, (5) withdrawal of Thornton’s charge before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and (6) a neutral reference for
Thornton.
Del Rio responded that he was glad they “could get the
matter resolved.”
Def.’s Mot. for Default J. Ex. B, Email from J.
Del Rio to P. Lail (Apr. 12, 2017 at 9:48 AM), ECF No. 8-2 at 2.
ACC’s
attorney
notified
the
hearing
2
officer
that
the
appeal
hearing could be cancelled.
ACC’s
attorney
limitations
on
that
Neither Thornton nor Del Rio informed
Thornton
Del
Rio’s
had
placed
authority
to
any
restrictions
settle
the
claims
or
on
Thornton’s behalf.
The next day, Del Rio notified ACC’s attorney that Thornton
did not wish to resolve the matter and that Thornton wanted to
reschedule his appeal hearing.
ACC’s attorney informed Del Rio
that there was no need to hold the hearing because the parties had
reached a settlement.
Shortly after that, Del Rio informed ACC’s
attorney that he no longer represented Thornton.
then
wrote
Thornton
a
letter
summarizing
the
ACC’s attorney
details
of
the
parties’ settlement and asking for instructions on how to issue
the
settlement
checks.
Thornton
did
not
respond,
and
ACC’s
attorney tendered the checks in accordance with Del Rio’s prior
instructions.
attorney.
The
checks
were
refused
and
returned
to
ACC’s
Thornton later filed this action.
DISCUSSION
After Thornton filed this action, ACC filed a counterclaim
seeking to enforce the settlement agreement.
Thornton did not
answer or otherwise respond to the counterclaim, and the Clerk
entered a default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a).
Thornton did not seek to set aside the default.
Although the
well-pleaded facts alleged in the counterclaim are taken as true,
the Court must still determine whether those allegations state a
3
claim for relief.
1307
(noting
that
Cf. Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC, 561 F.3d at
a
default
defendant
may
“challenge
the
sufficiency of the complaint, even if he may not challenge the
sufficiency of the proof”).
“A settlement agreement is a contract, and it ‘must meet the
same
requirements
contracts.’”
of
formation
and
enforceability
as
other
DeRossett Enters., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.,
621 S.E.2d 755, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Greenwald v.
Kersh, 621 S.E.2d 465, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)).
the
minds
exists”
and
there
is
an
offer
If a “meeting of
and
acceptance
consideration, then a binding contract is formed.
Greenwald, 621 S.E.2d at 467).
when
parties
have
entered
Id. (quoting
The law “favors compromise, and
into
a
definite,
certain,
unambiguous agreement to settle, it should be enforced.”
(quoting
Greenwald,
621
for
S.E.2d
at
467).
In
other
and
Id.
words,
a
settlement “contract is enforceable when its terms are ‘expressed
in language sufficiently plain and explicit to convey what the
parties agreed upon.’” Id. at 757 (quoting Mon Ami Int’l, Inc. v.
Gale, 592 S.E.2d 83, 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)).
A
formal
written
agreement
is
not
necessary;
“letters
or
documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the
agreement reached will suffice.”
Johnson v. DeKalb Cty., 726
S.E.2d 102, 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Pourreza v. Teel
Appraisals & Advisory, Inc., 616 S.E.2d 108, 111 (Ga. Ct. App.
4
2005)).
In Johnson, for example, the Georgia Court of Appeals
found that emails between the parties’ attorneys constituted a
binding
settlement
agreement.
Id.;
accord
DeRossett
Enters.,
Inc., 621 S.E.2d at 757 (finding that the parties had a binding
settlement agreement based on letters between their attorneys).
Finally,
“[u]nder
Georgia
law
an
attorney
of
record
has
apparent authority to enter into an agreement on behalf of his
client and the agreement is enforceable against the client by
other settling parties.”
Brumbelow v. N. Propane Gas Co., 308
S.E.2d 544, 546 (Ga. 1983).
“This authority is determined by the
contract between the attorney and the client and by instructions
given the attorney by the client, and in the absence of express
restrictions”
that
are
communicated
to
authority may be considered plenary by
parties.”
Id.
opposing
parties,
“the
the court and opposing
“Therefore, where there is no challenge to the
existence or the terms of an agreement but only to an attorney’s
authority to enter into it, the client is bound by its terms even
in the absence of a writing or detrimental reliance on the part of
the opposite party.”
Id. at 547.
Here, the terms of the settlement agreement were memorialized
in an email between Del Rio and ACC’s attorney: (1) payment of
$10,000 to be split between Thornton and Del Rio, (2) release of
all
of
liability
Thornton’s
by
ACC,
claims
(4)
against
ACC,
confidentiality
5
(3)
of
non-admission
agreement
terms
of
by
Thornton, (5) withdrawal of Thornton’s charge before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and (6) a neutral reference for
Thornton.
settle
ACC knew of no restrictions on Del Rio’s authority to
Thornton’s
settlement
therefore
claims.
agreement
grants
Accordingly,
between
ACC’s
Thornton
motion
for
there
and
default
was
a
ACC.
binding
The
judgment
Court
on
its
counterclaim to enforce the settlement (ECF No. 12).
ACC
is
directed
to
provide
Thornton
with
a
release
releases only his claims asserted in this action.
directed
to
sign
the
release
and
return
the
counsel within fourteen days of receipt of it.
that
Thornton is
release
to
ACC’s
Within seven days
of receipt of the release, ACC is directed to provide Thornton
with the settlement funds.
If Thornton’s prior counsel has filed
an appropriate attorney’s lien pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14,
ACC shall pay the funds into the registry of this Court, and the
Court will determine how the funds should be divided.
After the
release has been received and the funds disbursed, ACC shall file
a motion to dismiss the action.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 25th day of January, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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