GLASS v. FEDEX CORPORATION, et al

Filing 22

ORDER denying 7 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; granting 14 request for jurisdictional discovery. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 2/9/2018. (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
NORMA GLASS, as Temporary
Administrator of the Estate of
Roger Phillip Glass, III,
Plaintiff,

*
*
*

vs.

*

FEDEX CORPORATION; FEDEX
FREIGHT, INC.; and FEDEX
FREIGHT CORPORATION,

*

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-143 (CDL)

*

Defendants.

*

O R D E R
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S.

413 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).1

For

the reasons set forth below, the Court denies that motion (ECF
No. 7).

Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery to

respond to Defendants’ contention that this Court also lacks
personal

jurisdiction

over

the

Defendants

(ECF

No.

14)

is

granted.

1

Resolution of this motion has been prolonged with Defendants even
agreeing at one point to withdraw the motion. But because the motion
raises issues of subject matter jurisdiction that arguably cannot be
waived, the Court has determined that it must decide the issues.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s son, Roger Phillip Glass III, was struck and
killed

by

a

tractor-trailer

driven

by

David

Kent

Fleming.

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in the State Court of
Athens-Clarke

County,

Georgia,

alleging

that

Fleming

was

operating the vehicle for Defendants FedEx Corporation, FedEx
Freight, Inc., and FedEx Freight Corporation.

Defendants did

not dispute that Fleming was operating the tractor-trailer in
the

scope

of

his

employment

with

FedEx

Freight,

Inc.,

and

Defendants did not dispute that the state court had personal
jurisdiction over FedEx Freight, Inc.

FedEx Corporation and

FedEx Freight Corporation did, however, argue that the state
court

lacked

personal

jurisdiction

over

them

and

moved

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them on that ground.

to
The

state court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiff had
not

presented

sufficient

evidence

to

jurisdiction over these two Defendants.

establish

personal

See generally Order

Granting Mot. to Dismiss, Glass v. FedEx Corp., ST-15-CV-0435
(State Ct. of Athens-Clarke Cty. June 6, 2017), ECF No. 17-5.
The state court also denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel
responses to her discovery requests related to the issue of
personal jurisdiction.

Order Den. Mot. to Compel,

Glass v.

FedEx Corp., ST-15-CV-0435 (State Ct. of Athens-Clarke Cty. June
9, 2017), ECF No. 17-6.

And the state court denied Plaintiff

2

permission to take an immediate appeal of the order dismissing
Plaintiff’s claims against FedEx Corporation and FedEx Freight
Corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Order Den. Mot.

for Certificate of Immediate Review, Glass v. FedEx Corp., ST15-CV-0435 (State Ct. of Athens-Clarke Cty. June 15, 2017), ECF
No. 17-2.

Plaintiff thus could not appeal that order.

Instead,

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remainder of the state court
action and filed this action in federal court asserting the same
wrongful
action.

death

claims

she

had

asserted

in

the

state

court

With regard to personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges

in this action that FedEx Corporation, a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Tennessee, transacted
business

in

ventures,

Georgia

and

“through

wholly

its

owned

agents,

and

alter

controlled

egos,

joint

subsidiaries,

including FedEx Freight[, Inc.] and FedEx Freight Corp.,” and
that

Plaintiff’s

claims

arise

out

of

FedEx

Corporation’s

transaction of business in Georgia. Compl. ¶¶ 15-33, ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff

also

alleges

that

FedEx

Freight

Corporation,

a

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Tennessee, transacted business in Georgia and that Plaintiff’s
claims arise out of its transaction of business in Georgia.

Id.

¶¶ 50-69.
FedEx

Corporation

and

FedEx

Freight

Corporation

filed

a

motion to dismiss this federal action, arguing that the Court

3

lacks

subject

doctrine.

matter

jurisdiction

under

the

Rooker-Feldman

In the alternative, these Defendants argue that the

Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over them based on
the factual record.2

Plaintiff contends that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not apply, and she seeks jurisdictional discovery
so she can investigate these Defendants’ contacts with Georgia
before

responding

to

their

motion

to

dismiss

on

personal

jurisdiction grounds.
DISCUSSION
The

sole

question

for

Rooker-Feldman

doctrine

bars

the

Court

Plaintiff

today
from

is

whether

maintaining

the
this

action against FedEx Corporation and FedEx Freight Corporation
based

on

the

state

court’s

determination

that

it

could

not

exercise personal jurisdiction over these two Defendants in the
state court action.

The state court decided that it could not

exercise personal jurisdiction over these two Defendants because
2

Plaintiff had the initial burden of alleging “sufficient facts to
make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction” in this action. Diamond
Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260,
1274 (11th Cir. 2009)). Then, the defendants challenging jurisdiction
have the burden to submit evidence in support of their position. Id.
The Defendants submitted an affidavit regarding the relationship
between FedEx Corporation, FedEx Freight Corporation, and FedEx
Freight, Inc., see Eslami Aff., ECF No. 7-2, which they contend
establishes that this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over
FedEx Corporation and FedEx Freight Corporation.
So, the burden
shifts
back
to
Plaintiff
“to
produce
evidence
supporting
jurisdiction.”
Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1257
(quoting Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274). Plaintiff asserts that she cannot
rebut Defendants’ affidavit without some jurisdictional discovery.

4

the record before it did not reveal sufficient contacts with
Georgia, although the state court denied Plaintiff’s motion to
compel responses to her jurisdictional discovery requests and
did not allow Plaintiff to conduct jurisdictional discovery to
investigate these two Defendants’ contacts with Georgia.
The

Rooker–Feldman

doctrine

eliminates

subject

matter

jurisdiction in the federal district courts “over those cases
that are essentially an appeal by a state court loser seeking to
relitigate a claim that has already been decided in a state
court.”

Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., No. 16-

10141, 2018 WL 706524, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 2018).

“The

doctrine is rooted in an understanding that Congress[, under
28 U.S.C. §

1257,]

has

given

only

the

United

States

Supreme

Court the ability to hear an appeal from a state court” final
judgment or decree.

Id. at *4; accord Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (“[Section]
1257, as long interpreted, vests authority to review a statecourt judgment solely in [the Supreme] Court.”).

In contrast,

this Court has “original, not appellate, jurisdiction.”

Target

Media Partners, 2018 WL 706524, at *4 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1332).

The Rooker-Feldman bar is “narrow,” and federal courts

must “ensure that litigants whose claims are properly within the
cognizance of the courts are not denied a hearing.”

5

Id. at *1.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two U.S. Supreme
Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)
and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983).

In Rooker, parties who lost in state court brought

suit in federal district court to have the state court judgment
“declared null and void.”

Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414.

In Feldman,

parties who were denied waivers from a bar admission requirement
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the District’s
highest court) filed suit in federal district court seeking an
injunction

allowing

them

to

be

admitted

to

the

bar

and

a

declaration that the D.C. court’s actions violated federal law.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 468-69.

The Supreme Court concluded that

the district court did not have jurisdiction over the claim for
injunctive relief, which would have required the district court
to “review a final judicial decision of the highest court of a
jurisdiction.”

Id.

at

486.

The

district

court

did

have

jurisdiction over the claims that amounted to “a general attack
on the constitutionality” of certain bar rules, although the
Supreme Court did not reach the question whether the doctrine of
res judicata applied to foreclose litigation of those claims.
Id. at 487-88.
In both

Rooker

and

Feldman, “the losing party in state

court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings
ended,

complaining

of

an

injury

6

caused

by

the

state-court

judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.”
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291.

In other words, the plaintiffs

asked the district court “to overturn an injurious state-court
judgment.”

Id. at 292.

Again, under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, only the

Supreme Court has authority to review a state court’s final
judgment, which is why the district courts lacked jurisdiction
in Rooker and Feldman even though the district courts otherwise
would

have

been

congressional

able

grant

of

to

adjudicate

authority

such

the
as

matters
28

under

U.S.C. §

a

1331

(federal question) or 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity).
The

Supreme

Court

has

only

applied

the

Rooker-Feldman

doctrine to bar subject matter jurisdiction in two cases: Rooker
and Feldman.
but

The lower courts gradually expanded the doctrine,

the

Supreme

Court

inferior

federal

courts

broadly.”

in
had

Exxon
been

Mobil

“concluded

applying

that

the

Rooker–Feldman

too

Target Media Partners, 2018 WL 706524, at *5 (citing

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283).

The Supreme Court emphasized

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is confined to cases of the
kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments

rendered

before

the

district

court

proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of

7

those judgments.”

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.3

So, if the

federal plaintiff “present[s] some independent claim, albeit one
that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in
a case to which he was a party . . ., then there is jurisdiction
and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under
principles of preclusion.”

Id. at 293 (alterations in original)

(quoting GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir.
1993)).
Following Exxon Mobil, the Eleventh Circuit applies RookerFeldman “to bar only those claims asserted by parties who have
lost in state court and then ask the district court, ultimately,
to review and reject a state court’s judgments.”

Target Media

Partners, 2018 WL 706524, at *5; accord Nicholson v. Shafe, 558
F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[L]ower federal courts are
precluded

from

exercising

appellate

jurisdiction

over

final

state-court judgments.” (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,
463 (2006))).
whether

Thus, the central question for the Court here is

Plaintiff’s

federal

claims

3

in

this

Court

“invite

Exxon Mobil was not such a case; it involved parallel litigation in
state court and federal court.
While a pretrial ruling in favor of
the federal court plaintiff/state court defendant was before the
federal Court of Appeals on an interlocutory appeal, the state court
held a jury trial and entered a judgment in that party’s favor.
At
that point, the federal Court of Appeals concluded, sua sponte, that
federal jurisdiction terminated when the state court entered the
judgment on the jury verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that Rooker-Feldman “did not emerge to vanquish jurisdiction” after
the federal court plaintiff/state court defendant won the state court
trial. Id. at 294.

8

rejection of a state court decision.”
2018 WL 706524, at *5.

Target Media Partners,

Such an invitation exists if Plaintiff’s

claims asserted in this Court were “actually adjudicated by a
state court” or were “‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state
court judgment.”

Id. (citing Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258,

1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)).4

They were not.

It is clear that Plaintiff’s wrongful death claims were not
adjudicated by the state court, and it is clear that there was
no state court final judgment against Plaintiff on her wrongful
death claims.

Cf. South v. Montoya, 537 S.E.2d 367, 369 (Ga.

Ct. App. 2000) (stating that once a trial court determines that
it lacks jurisdiction over the defendant, it “loses jurisdiction
to rule on the merits of the case”).

Defendants do not appear

to deny that there was no final judgment based on the state
court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; they simply contend
that a state court final judgment is not required for RookerFeldman

to

apply.

But

at

least

4

one

panel

of

the

Eleventh

A claim is only “‘inextricably intertwined’ if it asks to
‘effectively nullify the state court judgment, or it succeeds only to
the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.’” Target
Media Partners, 2018 WL 706524, at *5 (quoting Casale, 558 F.3d at
1260). But “a federal claim is not ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a
state court judgment when there was no ‘reasonable opportunity to
raise’ that particular claim during the relevant state court
proceeding. Id. (quoting Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260). “Thus, the class
of federal claims that” the Eleventh Circuit has “found to be
‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court judgments is limited to
those raising a question that was or should have been properly before
the state court.” Id.

9

Circuit has held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply
when the state court decision at issue is not a “final state
court judgment.”

Smith v. HSBC Bank USA, 679 F. App’x 876, 878

(11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
panel

found

that

the

state

In Smith, the Eleventh Circuit
court’s

denial

of

a

temporary

restraining order request was not a “final state court judgment”
to which the
O.C.G.A. §
Eleventh

Rooker-Feldman

9-11-54(a)).

Circuit

restraining

In

emphasized

order

doctrine applied.

decision

reaching

that
was

the

this

state

not

a

Id.

(citing

conclusion,
court’s

the

temporary

“judgment”

under

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54(a) because it was not a decree or order “from
which an appeal lies” given that appeals of orders granting or
denying a temporary restraining order are not authorized under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(7).

Id.

Similarly, here, the state court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims against FedEx Corporation and FedEx Freight Corporation
for lack of personal jurisdiction was not a final judgment.
Under Georgia law, dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(2) for
lack of personal jurisdiction is a dismissal without prejudice
as

a

matter

in

abatement.

South,

537

S.E.2d

at

369.

A

dismissal without prejudice means that the plaintiff may refile
the claim with sufficient factual allegations to support the
claim (including a jurisdictional basis for the claim).

And,

since the state court judge only dismissed FedEx Corporation and

10

FedEx Freight Corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction and
did not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the other Defendants,
it

did

not

O.C.G.A. §

enter

a

final

5-6-34(a)(1),

judgment

which

within

defines

a

the

final

meaning

of

judgment

as

meaning that “the case is no longer pending in the court below.”
Because the state court’s personal jurisdiction decision was not
a

final

judgment,

discretionary

it

appeal

could

only

procedure

under

be

appealed

via

the

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b).

Plaintiff sought to follow that procedure, but the state court
judge denied Plaintiff’s request for a certificate of immediate
review.
In

summary,

the

state

court’s

dismissal

of

FedEx

Corporation and FedEx Freight Corporation for lack of personal
jurisdiction was not a final state court judgment; Plaintiff’s
wrongful death claims were not actually adjudicated by the state
court, and the claims were not inextricably intertwined with a
state court final judgment.

Since the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

only applies when there is a final state court judgment and
since

the

state

court

did

not

issue

a

final

judgment

on

Plaintiff’s wrongful death claims, Rooker-Feldman does not bar
this action.

This Court must decide the personal jurisdiction

11

issue based on the facts before it, which may not be the same as
the facts that were before the state court.5
CONCLUSION
As

discussed

above,

Defendants’

motion

Rooker-Feldman grounds (ECF No. 7) is denied.

to

dismiss

on

The Court grants

Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery (ECF No. 14).
Defendants may file a new motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction
warranted.
fourteen

after

that

discovery

has

been

completed

The present motion to dismiss is terminated.
days

of

today’s

Order,

5

the

parties

shall

if

Within
file

a

The Court is aware that years before the Supreme Court decided ExxonMobil, a Florida district judge dismissed a federal court action on
Rooker-Feldman grounds because a Florida state court had previously
determined that it did not have personal jurisdiction over two of the
defendants. See generally Bosdorf v. Beach, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D.
Fla. 1999). The Florida district judge acknowledged that the case did
“not fall within the typical Rooker–Feldman framework in that [the
plaintiffs] have not directly challenged the state court’s ruling or
asked this court to direct the state court to do something,” but the
Florida district judge concluded that the “spirit” of the RookerFeldman doctrine warranted its application in that context.
Id. at
1341. The Florida district judge also acknowledged that there was no
final judgment but concluded that a final judgment was not required
“before giving preclusive effect to a state court order.”
Id. at
1340. This ruling now has no persuasive value in light of Exxon Mobil
and Smith. Even if it did, Bosdorf is distinguishable from this case
because the Florida district judge emphasized that the plaintiff in
Bosdorf had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the personal
jurisdiction issue in state court and that the plaintiffs’ failure to
obtain jurisdictional discovery in the state court action was caused
by their own inaction and not because the state court denied them an
opportunity to obtain it. Id. at 1342. In contrast, here, Plaintiff
served jurisdictional discovery requests on the FedEx Corporation and
FedEx Freight Corporation and asked the state court to compel
responses to that discovery, but her motion to compel was denied.
Thus, it appears that Plaintiff did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the personal jurisdiction issue in the state
court.

12

proposed

scheduling/discovery

order

that

sets

a

schedule

for

jurisdictional discovery and related dispositive motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 9th day of February, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

13