ADAMS v. HIGGINBOTHAM

Filing 13

ORDER directing briefs within twenty-one days of todays order showing whether this action should be remanded to state court because (1) the TIA prohibits this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this action; and (2) the federal claim asserted in this action is not ripe for adjudication even if the TIA does not prohibit jurisdiction. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D. LAND on 8/13/2018 (tlf).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
PATSY M. ADAMS,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

LORRIE HIGGINBOTHAM, Elbert
County Tax Commissioner,

*

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-158 (CDL)

*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
After her husband’s death, Plaintiff Patsy Adams petitioned
the Elbert County Probate Court for an award of year’s support
from four of their jointly owned properties.

See O.C.G.A. § 53-

3-1(c). Adams served the Elbert County Tax Commissioner, Defendant
Lorrie Higginbotham, with statutory notice and a copy of the
petition as required by law.

The notice required Higginbotham to

object to the petition by April 17, 2017.
Higginbotham did not object in the probate court.

Instead,

based upon unpaid property taxes, she issued tax liens on the four
properties

on

the

general

execution

docket

in

Elbert

County

Superior Court. The probate court subsequently conducted a hearing
on Adams’s petition for a year’s support.
granted

Adams’s

petition

and

awarded

The probate court then

all

four

of

encumbered properties as an award of year’s support.

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the

newly

Adams then brought this action in Elbert County Superior Court
seeking the following remedies: (1) mandamus relief compelling
Higginbotham to cancel the tax liens; (2) an order of contempt of
court against Higginbotham requiring enforcement of the probate
court’s award; (3) declaratory relief confirming the validity of
the probate court’s award; (4) damages based on slander of title
and taking of property under the state and federal constitutions;
and (5) attorney’s fees.

Petition 5-8, ECF No. 1-2.

Higginbotham

removed the state court action to this Court based on federal
question jurisdiction supported by Adams’s federal constitutional
takings claim.

The parties’ motions for summary judgment are

presently pending before the Court.
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and have a duty to
evaluate sua sponte whether they have subject matter jurisdiction
over the controversy presented.
parties, it appears that the
preclude

subject

matter

Although not raised by the

Tax Injunction Act

jurisdiction

here.

(“TIA”) may

The

TIA

bars

jurisdiction when “(1) the relief requested by the plaintiff would
enjoin, suspend, or restrain a state tax assessment, and (2) the
state affords the plaintiff a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.”
Kelly v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 638 F. App’x 884, 889 (11th Cir.
2016)

(per

curiam);

28 U.S.C. § 1341.

The

TIA

“limits

jurisdiction which might otherwise exist” and is “intended to
prevent taxpayers from using federal courts to raise questions of

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state or federal law relating to the validity of particular taxes.”
Id. at 888-89 (quoting Osceola v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 893 F.2d
1231, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Here,

the

first

three

counts

of

Adams’s

complaint

seek

injunctive and declaratory relief invalidating or canceling the
tax liens.

The Court can conceive of no reason why it has subject

matter jurisdiction over these claims in light of the TIA.

See

id. (recognizing that plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and
declaratory relief are plainly barred).

The Court also notes that

the TIA “bars claims for damages because a monetary award against
the state or its tax administrators would have the same detrimental
effect on the state as equitable relief, and would dampen state
tax collectors.”

Id. at 889.

It appears undisputed that Adams’s

damages claims based on unconstitutional takings under the state
or federal constitutions would dampen Elbert County’s efforts to
collect property taxes and thus fall within the TIA jurisdictional
prohibition.

Additionally, no one has suggested that Adams’s

available state remedies are insufficient. Based on the foregoing,
the

Court

has

serious

concerns

jurisdiction over this action.

about

its

subject

matter

But rather than remand this action

sua sponte, the Court finds that the parties should be given an
opportunity to be heard.
Even if the TIA does not prevent federal jurisdiction here,
the Court has concerns about whether Adams’s federal takings claim

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is ripe for adjudication in this Court, and if it is not, the
effect

on

this

Court’s

continued

jurisdiction.

“The

Fifth

Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes
taking without just compensation.”

Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning

Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).
Therefore, “if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of
the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and
been denied just compensation.”

Id. at 195.

Because Higginbotham

removed this action to this Court before Adams had an opportunity
to fully pursue her state remedies, it appears that Adams’s state
law

claims

for

damages

and

injunctive

relief

have

not

been

exhausted and no showing has been made that those state law
remedies are inadequate.

If the federal takings claim is not ripe

for adjudication in this Court, the Court may not have subject
matter jurisdiction over it and would likewise have no basis to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

But

before the Court remands for this reason, the Court finds that the
parties should be given an opportunity to respond.
Within twenty-one days of today’s order, the parties shall
file briefs showing whether this action should be remanded to state
court because (1) the TIA prohibits this Court from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over this action; and (2) the federal

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claim asserted in this action is not ripe for adjudication even if
the TIA does not prohibit jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 13th day of August, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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