ROSE-BURRELL v. CITY OF MONROE et al

Filing 35

ORDER terminating as moot 25 Motion for Leave to File; granting 14 & 17 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Section 1983 claims against Defendants Gee and Silverberg, dismissing state law claims without prejudice. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 03/12/2025 (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
LALLYMAY ROSE-BURRELL,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

CITY OF MONROE, NICHOLAS
SILVERBERG, AND RYAN GEE,

*

CASE NO. 3:24-CV-11 (CDL)

*

Defendants.

*
O R D E R

City

of

Monroe

police

officers

Ryan

Gee

and

Nicholas

Silverberg responded to a report of a suicide attempt at a care
home operated by Lallymay Rose-Burrell.
at

the

suicide.

home,

the

resident

was

no

When the officers arrived

longer

actively

attempting

The resident and the caregiver on duty both reported

that the resident was supposed to be on daily psychiatric medicines
but had not received them.

Rose-Burrell was not at the home when

the officers responded. She did speak with Silverberg on the phone
and told him that the resident was getting his medication, but she
did not know where the staff put it.

Based on his observations at

the home, his interviews of the people there, and his discussion
with Silverberg, Gee concluded that the resident had not received
his medication and that his suicide attempt was connected to his
lack of psychiatric medication.

Gee decided to obtain arrest

warrants against Rose-Burrell for neglecting and exploiting a

disabled person by depriving him of psychiatric medication.

Gee

later arrested Rose-Burrell pursuant to those warrants.

The

charges were ultimately dismissed.
Rose-Burrell brought this action against Gee and Silverberg
in

their

individual

capacities

under

42

U.S.C.

§

1983

for

violations of her Fourth Amendment rights.

She also asserts state

law

the

claims

against

Gee,

Silverberg,

and

City

of

Monroe.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Rose-Burrell’s
claims.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the

summary judgment motion (ECF Nos. 14 & 17) as to Rose-Burrell’s
§ 1983 claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over her state law claims.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).

Fed. R. Civ.

In determining whether a genuine dispute of material

fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment,

drawing

party’s favor.
(1986).

all

justifiable

inferences

in

the

opposing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the

outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

2

A factual dispute is genuine if

the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.

Id.

The parties rely on four video exhibits, which they agree
contain the information the officers used to make a probable cause
determination.

The

Court

reviewed

the

videos.

The

Court

recognizes that it “must construe all ambiguities in the video
footage in favor of” Rose-Burrell, but “where a video is clear,”
the Court must “accept the video’s depiction . . . and view the
facts in the light depicted by the video.”

Baker v. City of

Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2023).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Lallymay Rose-Burrell is a nurse who operates a personal care
home called Anddinn’s Home in Monroe, Georgia (the “Home”).

The

Home is a residential-type personal care home that houses residents
with

significant

health

issues.

The

Home’s

staff

provides

residents with food, daily living assistance, and medications.
Two caregivers lived onsite at the Home: Rassulaiyman Nyahbinghi
(“Rah”) and Kideshia Dent.

Rah was the primary caregiver for the

four residents on weekdays, and Dent provided care for the four
residents on weekends.
I.

John Doe’s Arrival at the Home and Suicide Attempt
On June 8, 2022, a new resident “John Doe” was discharged

from a hospital to the Home.

Doe was sixty-four years old and had

been hospitalized following a suicide attempt during which he cut
3

his wrists.

He was diagnosed with schizophrenia.

Rose-Burrell

knew about the suicide attempt and the schizophrenia diagnosis
when Doe was transferred to the Home.

Rose-Burrell also knew that

it was important for Doe to receive his daily medication to manage
his psychiatric condition because failure to take the medication
could trigger Doe’s psychosis.
obtaining medication for Doe.

The Home was responsible for

Rose-Burrell was the person at the

Home who got residents’ prescriptions issued and filled.

Rose-

Burrell Dep. 51:18-52:25, ECF No. 19.
Dent was on duty on Saturday, July 2, 2022.

She noticed that

Doe began acting strangely to the point that she became scared and
decided that she needed to keep her “guard up.”
24:5, 25:10-25, ECF No. 18.

Dent Dep. 23:22-

On Sunday, July 3, 2022, Dent went

into the Home’s kitchen and saw Doe with a knife, threatening to
harm himself.

Dent called Rose-Burrell, who told Dent to try and

get the knife away from Doe and then call the police.

When Dent

tried to get the knife away from Doe, he acted like he was going
to stab her, but Dent was eventually able to snatch the knife out
of Doe’s hand and get it away from him.
Rose-Burrell called 911 to request an ambulance.

She gave

the address for the Home and described it as a “private home.”
Rose-Burrell Dep. Ex. A, 911 Audio Call 00:06-00:32 (on file with
the Court).

She told the dispatcher, “I have someone trying to

kill himself.”

Id. at 00:33-00:37.
4

Rose-Burrell explained that

the person had a knife and was trying to cut his wrists.
00:37-00:49.

When

the

dispatcher

asked

about

Id. at

Rose-Burrell’s

relationship to the person, Rose-Burrell responded, “I just go to
the home” to take care of him.

Id. at 1:27-1:37.

The dispatcher

asked if the person was being aggressive to Rose-Burrell, who
responded, “No, not being aggressive now, but he was trying to
hurt himself.”

Id. at 1:47-1:55.

Rose-Burrell did not identify

herself as the owner of the Home or inform the dispatcher that she
was not at the Home.
II.

The Officers’ Response to the Suicide Attempt Call
Monroe police officer Ryan Gee and his shift supervisor

Nicholas Silverberg responded to the 911 call, along with several
paramedics.

They knew that they were responding to a report that

a person was actively attempting suicide.
arrived at the Home, Dent was outside.

When the officers

Gee Dep. Ex. 4, Gee Body

Cam Video 1, 15:14:31-15:14:32 (on file with the Court).

Dent

informed them that Doe was in his room lying down and that he no
longer had the knife.

Gee Dep. Ex. 5, Silverberg Body Cam Video

1, 15:14:32-15:14-40 (on file with the Court).

Dent led the

officers into the Home and showed them where Doe’s room was, and
she explained that Doe had a history of suicide attempts.
15:14:50-15:14:55.
in his bed.

Id. at

The officers talked with Doe, who was calm and

Gee asked Doe if he was trying to kill himself, and

Doe responded “I was thinking about it.
5

I ain’t done it yet.”

Gee Body Cam Video 1, 15:15:40-15:15:47.

Doe showed Silverberg

his arm where he had previously cut himself, and said “I’ll do it
now . . . I’m sick.”
15:15:58.

Silverberg Body Cam Video 1 at 15:15:40-

Silverberg asked if Doe wanted to go to the hospital,

and Doe said yes.

Silverberg left Doe’s room and walked outside.

On the way, he asked Dent who ran the Home, and she replied that
it was her boss, Rose-Burrell.
Gee took three paramedics into Doe’s room, and they asked Doe
what was going on.

Doe responded, “This place is rough” and said

he “can’t get” his medications because “they won’t give it—they
ran out and they won’t give it.”
15:17:48.

Gee Body Cam Video 1, 15:17:36-

Gee asked, “They’re not giving you your medicine?” and

Doe responded no. Id. at 15:17:49-15:17:51. Gee asked Dent, “he’s
not

getting

any

medicine?”

Id.

at

15:18:00-15:18:01.

Dent

responded that Doe had a “PRN” medication that he took “as needed,”
and she showed the medication to Gee.

Id. at 15:18:02-15:18:27.

Gee later asked one of the EMTs what the PRN medication was for,
and the EMT said it was a non-narcotic pain medication.
15:24:58-15:25:01.

Id. at

Dent also told Gee that she was “just alerted”

that Doe took daily medication and that she had not previously
been aware that Doe took daily medication “because it wasn’t sat
out” for her to see.

Id. at 15:18:02-15:18:27.

Gee asked Doe

what his daily medication was for, and Doe responded that it was
for “anxiety and all kinds of mental things.”
6

Id. at 15:19:24-

15:19:32.

A paramedic took Doe’s blood pressure, reported that it

was high (150/98), and asked Doe if he usually had high blood
pressure.

Doe said that he did take blood pressure medication but

could not remember the last time he took it.
15:20:50.

Id. at 15:20:20-

Doe also told the paramedic that he was diabetic.

at 15:20:50-15:20:58. 1

Id.

A paramedic asked Dent if she had a sheet

on Doe with his information, and Dent responded that she needed to
call her boss.

Id. at 15:21:05-15:21:12.

Gee went outside and reported to Silverberg: “He’s been here
for days, and nobody’s given him any medicine.
me.

[Dent is] not giving him medicine.

supposed to have it.”

[Dent] just told

[Dent] didn’t know he was

Id. at 15:21:30-15:21:40.

Silverberg

questioned whether Dent had “any medical training whatsoever.”
Id. at 15:21:40-15:21:42.

Gee told Silverberg, “He’s diabetic,

he’s supposed to be taking all kinds of psychotic medications,
he’s getting nothing.

Blood pressure medicine, not getting, his

blood pressure’s elevated.”
Silverberg

went

back

Id. at 15:21:45-15:21:55.
into

speakerphone with Rose-Burrell.

the

Home,

and

Dent

was

on

Silverberg asked to speak with

Rose-Burrell, and Dent handed him the phone.

Rose-Burrell stated

that Rah, the weekday caregiver, was “not there” and she did not

Rose-Burrell asserts that she was not aware that Doe had a history of
high blood pressure or diabetes, and she contends that she did not know
Doe had any prescribed medications for those conditions.
1

7

know “where he’s putting the stuff.”

Gee Dep. Ex. 6, Silverberg

Body Cam Video 2, 15:22:13-15:22:17 (on file with the Court).
Rose-Burrell stated that Doe had a “history” and came to the Home
from a “psych facility.”

Id. at 15:22:17-15:22:21.

Silverberg

asked Rose-Burrell if she knew where Doe’s “medical stuff” was,
and she said, “you are talking about his folder for the Home.

The

staff that works Monday through Friday, if [Dent] doesn’t see it,
I don’t know where [Rah] put it.
not answering.”

I’ve been calling him and he’s

Id. at 15:22:27-15:22:44.

Rose-Burrell repeated

that Doe “does have a history” and stated that “he’s on psych
medication.”

Id. at 15:22:45-15:22:49.

Silverberg said, “But

he’s not getting his medication, from what we’re being told.”
at 15:22:50-15:22:52.
meds.

Rose-Burrell responded, “He is getting his

I just don’t know where the staff put it.”

15:22-57.

Id.

Id. at 15:22:53-

Silverberg did not ask where the records and medication

were usually kept, and Rose-Burrell did not say.

Rose-Burrell

said that she had been “there yesterday” and that she told someone
to “go back through the things to put it in the cabinet.”
15:22:58-15:23:06.

Id. at

Rose-Burrell repeated that Doe had a history

of suicidal ideation and that he had “an attempt a few months ago.”
Id.

at

15:23:12-15:23:19.

She

did

not

state

that

she

had

personally given Doe any medication on Friday or Saturday.
Silverberg told Rose-Burrell that he would talk with Dent,
then take Doe to the hospital.
8

Rose-Burrell said that Dent

“wouldn’t know much because she’s only there on Saturdays and
Sundays,” then Rose-Burrell stated that she was “trying to get
there” but was “far away, like forty-five minutes away.”
15:23:29-15:23:38.

Id. at

Silverberg responded that it “seems to be a

common problem every time something like this happens in any of
these,” then he told Rose-Burrell he would talk with Dent to get
as much information as he could; Rose-Burrell said “all right,”
and Silverberg ended the call.

Id. at 15:23:38-15:23:49.

While

Silverberg was on the telephone with Rose-Burrell, Dent looked in
at least the top drawer of a file cabinet, on top of a desk, and
through the drawers of the desk. Gee Body Cam Video 1, 15:22:5915:23:05; Silverberg Body Cam Video 2, 15:22:23-15:23:11.

Dent

did not alert the officers to anything she saw in the drawers.
The officers saw Dent “actively looking” through the drawers and
“couldn’t find anything.”

Gee Dep. 79:11-18, ECF No. 20.

After the phone call with Rose-Burrell, Gee walked around the
first floor of the Home, looking in another resident’s bedroom,
the living room, Doe’s room, and a bathroom. Meanwhile, Silverberg
asked Dent about her employment at the Home and whether she had
any medical training.

Dent said that she did not have any medical

training, and she reiterated that she was not aware that Doe had
daily medication.

Silverberg Body Cam Video 2, 15:23:50-15:24:49.

Gee told Dent, “it’s not fair to you to be in charge of people if
you don’t know what you’re doing.”
9

Gee Body Cam Video 1, 15:23:57-

15:24:00.

A paramedic asked Dent again what kind of medications

Doe was supposed to take and if she had an information sheet for
Doe.

Dent responded that she only worked Saturday and Sunday and

that the person who worked Monday through Friday was off.
15:25:17-15:25:28.
in any trouble.

Gee told her, “Don’t get nervous.

You’re not

Nobody should put you here if you don’t know

what’s going on . . . . It’s not your fault.”
15:25:38.

Id. at

Id. at 15:25:28-

Dent repeated that she “wasn’t aware that [Doe] was

taking any medication.”

Id. at 15:25:39-15:25:43.

Gee walked

outside.
Silverberg spoke to another resident, then walked outside and
reported to Gee that the other resident said the staff took good
care of him.

Gee went back into the Home to get a copy of Dent’s

identification;

he

upstairs to get it.

waited

in

the

living

room

while

she

Gee Dep. Ex. 7, Gee Body Cam Video 2 15:30:56-

15:31:48 (on file with the Court).

As Gee left the Home, Dent

said that she was “sorry if it was a waste of [his] time.”
15:31:51-15:31:53.

went

Id. at

Gee replied that it was not a waste of his

time but said: “These health care homes like this, they’re not
doing what they’re supposed to be doing.”
15:32:00.

Dent said, “I already know.”

Id. at 15:31:54-

Id. at 15:32:02-15:32:03.

The paramedics removed Doe from the Home and took him to the
hospital.

The

officers

and

paramedics

approximately thirty minutes.
10

were

at

the

Home

III. The Arrest Warrant and Arrest
Based on what Doe, Dent, and Rose-Burrell said, Gee and
Silverberg learned that Doe had a history of suicidal ideation,
had attempted suicide a few months prior, came to the Home from a
psychiatric

facility,

medication,”

and

had

“was

supposed

expressed

a

Body

Cam

giving Doe’s history).

Video

2,

be

“suicidal

before officers arrived at the Home.
Silverberg

to

on

psychiatric

ideation”

shortly

Gee Dep. 38:22-39:5; accord

15:22:17-15:23:19

(Rose-Burrell

Since Dent was the only caregiver on site,

Gee concluded that Dent “was in charge of providing [Doe] with
[his] medicine.”

Gee Dep. 23:5-11.

And based on what Dent and

Doe told him, Gee determined that Doe had “possibly” not received
his required psychiatric medication on Friday night, then had not
received it on Saturday or Sunday.

Id. at 23:12-15.

Given these

circumstances, Gee did not believe Rose-Burrell when she said that
Doe was getting his medication.

Id. at 76:25-77:20.

Gee presumed

that Doe had attempted suicide earlier in the day because he had
not received his required psychiatric medicine.
39:10.

Id. at 38:22-

Gee thought that if Dent was in charge of the Home on

weekends, she should know what required medications each resident
had, but she “didn’t even know about it.”
23.

Id. at 23:5-11, 35:19-

Gee concluded that Rose-Burrell “left somebody in charge of

the residents that was not able to care for them properly or

11

provide the correct medications which she didn’t even know . . .
that he was even supposed to have.”

Id. at 60:21-61:1.

On July 4, 2022, Gee completed arrest warrant affidavits
against Rose-Burrell for violations of two criminal statutes:
O.C.G.A.

§

16-5-102(a)

(exploitation

of

disabled

adults)

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-101 (neglect of a disabled adult).

and

In both

affidavits, Gee stated that Rose-Burrell was the “owner of a
licensed personal care home and the person supervising the welfare
and having immediate charge, control, and custody of [Doe], who is
by definition mentally or physically incapacitated by being a
resident of the facility.”

Gee Dep. Ex. 11, Warrant No. 2022-

2001, ECF No. 20-11; Gee Dep. Ex. 12, Warrant No. 2022-2000, ECF
No. 20-12.

In the first affidavit, Gee stated that Rose-Burrell

deprived Doe of “essential services by not providing [Doe with]
psychiatric medicine,” and that because she failed to provide Doe
with “prescribed psychotic medication,” Doe “was caused mental
anguish.”

Warrant No. 2022-2001.

In the second affidavit, Gee

stated that Rose-Burrell deprived Doe of “medical care by depriving
[him] of prescribed medication” and that because Rose-Burrell
failed

“to

provide

prescribed

psychotic

medication,

[Doe]

developed suicidal thoughts.” Warrant No. 2022-2000. A magistrate
judge

determined

that

the

facts

set

forth

in

the

affidavits

supported probable cause for the charged offenses, and she signed
the arrest warrants without eliciting testimony from Gee.
12

Gee

later

warrants.

arrested

Rose-Burrell

pursuant

to

the

arrest

She was booked into the county jail, where she stayed

until she was released on bond following an initial appearance
before a magistrate judge.

The State later dismissed the charges

without prejudice for insufficient evidence.
dismissal,

the

assistant

district

In the notice of

attorney

stated,

“The

investigation done by the Monroe Police Department was incomplete,
and did not provide sufficient evidence to support an arrest
warrant, let alone a conviction.”

Gee Dep. Ex. 13, Notice of

Warrant Dismissal, ECF No. 20-13.
DISCUSSION
Rose-Burrell asserts claims against Gee and Silverberg under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the officers violated her Fourth
Amendment

rights.

Gee

and

Silverberg

contend

that

they

are

entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims.
“Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability for
civil damages when their conduct does not violate a constitutional
right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged
action.” Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1156 (11th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2019)).
Where, as here, it is undisputed that an officer was acting within
his discretionary authority at the time of the challenged actions,
the

plaintiff

appropriate.”

must

show

that

“qualified

immunity

is

not

Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir.
13

2019).

Officers are “entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983

unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional
right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly
established at the time.’”

Williams, 965 F.3d at 1156 (quoting

Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018)).
Rose-Burrell argues that Gee and Silverberg violated her
clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment to be free
from an unreasonable seizure as a result of malicious prosecution. 2
To establish such a claim, Rose-Burrell “must prove both ‘(1) the
elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution and (2)
a violation of [her] Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures.’” Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102, 1111 (11th
Cir. 2023) (quoting Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir.
2018)).

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity to a Fourth

Amendment malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must prove
seven elements: (1) a criminal prosecution instituted by the

In her complaint, Rose-Burrell states that her Fourth Amendment claims
are for false arrest and false imprisonment, but she acknowledges that
because she was arrested pursuant to a warrant, her Fourth Amendment
claim should be construed as a malicious prosecution claim.
See
Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158 (“A claim of false arrest or imprisonment
under the Fourth Amendment concerns seizures without legal process, such
as warrantless arrests. . . . Malicious prosecution, in contrast,
requires a seizure ‘pursuant to legal process.’”) (quoting Black v.
Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016)). Despite Rose-Burrell’s
characterization of her claims in the complaint, the Court is satisfied
that Rose-Burrell alleged facts that put Defendants on notice that she
was asserting a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim—which
Defendants acknowledged by construing her Fourth Amendment claims as a
malicious prosecution claim. Her motion for leave to amend the complaint
to add a malicious prosecution claim (ECF No. 25) is terminated as moot.
2

14

present defendant, (2) the defendant acted with malice and without
probable cause, (3) the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff
accused’s favor, (4) the prosecution caused damage to the plaintiff
accused, (5) the legal process justifying the plaintiff accused’s
seizure was constitutionally infirm, (6) the seizure would not
otherwise be justified without legal process, and (7) the law was
clearly established.

Id. at 1111-12.

The only elements that are seriously disputed here are (2)
and (5), which “effectively” merge together, so the Court may focus
simply on whether the legal process justifying Rose-Burrell’s
seizure “was constitutionally infirm.”
Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165).

Id. at 1112 (quoting

A plaintiff can prove that the arrest

warrant was “constitutionally infirm” by demonstrating that the
officer

“intentionally

omissions

necessary

to

or

recklessly

support

Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165).

the

made

misstatements

warrant.”

Id.

or

(quoting

It “was and is clearly established

that intentionally or recklessly omitting material information
from a warrant affidavit violates the Fourth Amendment.”

Id..

The Court must determine whether Rose-Burrell pointed to enough
evidence to create a genuine fact dispute on whether Gee made
material

misstatements

or

omissions

in

the

arrest

warrant

affidavit.
A warrant affidavit must contain truthful statements that
establish probable cause for an offense, and an “affidavit’s
15

omissions

may

lead

to

an

unreasonable

and

unconstitutional

warrant-based arrest if information that the affiant knew about
but intentionally or recklessly disregarded negates a finding of
probable cause.”

Paez, 915 F.3d at 1287.

But officers are

entitled to qualified immunity if they had arguable probable cause
for an arrest.

“The arguable-probable-cause standard asks whether

a ‘reasonable officer[] in the same circumstances and possessing
the same knowledge as the Defendant[] could have believed that
probable cause existed.’”
original) (quoting

Butler, 85 F.4th at 1116 (alteration in

Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220,

1232 (11th Cir. 2004)).

This standard “protects officers who

‘reasonably

but

present.’”

Id. (quoting Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079

(11th

2003)(quotations

Cir.

“exists

when

mistakenly

the

facts,

conclude

marks

that

probable

omitted)).

considering

the

cause

Probable
totality

is

cause

of

the

circumstances and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable
officer,

establish

‘a

probability

or

substantial

chance

of

criminal activity.’” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898–99
(11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57).

“Probable cause

does not require conclusive evidence and ‘is not a high bar.’”
Id. at 899 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57).

The Court “must simply

ask ‘whether a reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there
was a substantial chance of criminal activity.’” Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 60).
16

In evaluating whether arguable probable cause existed for
purposes of a malicious prosecution claim based on an allegedly
misleading arrest warrant, the Court may “consider only (1) the
information that was before the magistrate [in Officer Gee’s search
warrant affidavit] . . . minus (2) any material misstatements that
[Gee] might have made, plus (3) any material information that [Gee]
omitted from [his] affidavits.”

Butler, 85 F.4th at 1113.

If the

affidavit, with the omitted material information and without any
material misstatement, would have established probable cause, then
the malicious prosecution claim fails.

Paez, 915 F.3d at 1288.

Given the summary judgment posture, the Court must credit RoseBurrell’s evidence and draw factual inferences in her favor, but
the

Court

is

not

permitted

to

draw

inferences

that

are

not

supported by the undisputed facts.
Here, Rose-Burrell does not argue that the arrest warrant
affidavits, on their face, fail to establish probable cause for
abuse and exploitation of a disabled person.

She also does not

appear to dispute that Doe was a disabled person, that she had
immediate charge, control and custody of Doe, or that she was
obligated to provide Doe with psychiatric medication.

And, she

does not deny that arguable probable cause would exist to arrest
her on the two charges if the officers had evidence to support the
conclusion that she deprived Doe of his psychiatric medicine and
he suffered suicidal thoughts as a result.
17

She contends, though,

that these statements were material misrepresentations because no
reasonable officer could have concluded that she deprived Doe of
his psychiatric medication.
According to Rose-Burrell, if the officers had conducted a
reasonable investigation of her side of the story and reviewed
readily discoverable evidence, they would have learned facts that
undermined their probable cause determination.

She suggests that

the officers should be charged with knowledge of these facts and
that the arrest warrant affidavits would not have established
probable cause with the omitted facts.

Specifically, Rose-Burrell

contends that the officers should be charged with knowledge of
what she would have said, had the officers interviewed her in
person and what the officers would have seen, had she been given
an opportunity to show them Doe’s medical file.
argues

that

with

this

additional

information,

Rose-Burrell
no

reasonable

officer or magistrate would have concluded that there was probable
cause to arrest her for exploitation or neglect of a disabled
person.
Rose-Burrell asserts that Gee unreasonably omitted from his
arrest warrant affidavit (1) her statement that Doe was getting
his medication, (2) her statement that she was willing to come to
the Home to find Doe’s medication and medical chart, (3) evidence

18

that

Rose-Burrell

tried

to

refill

Doe’s

medication,

and

(4)

evidence that Doe only missed a day or two of medication. 3
Regarding the first omission—Rose-Burrell’s statement that
Doe was getting his medication—Gee did not include the statement
in his affidavit because he did not believe it.
whether

probable

cause

exists,

an

arresting

In deciding

officer

is

“not

required to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of
credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances present
a

sufficient

committed.”

basis

for

believing

that

an

offense

has

been

Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Dahl v. Holley, 312

F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002)).

“So long as it is reasonable

to conclude from the body of evidence as a whole that a crime was
committed, the presence of some conflicting evidence or a possible
defense will not vitiate a finding of probable cause.”
the

information

that

the

officers

gathered

Id.

Here,

supported

their

conclusion that Doe was not receiving his required medication,
despite Rose-Burrell’s statement to the contrary.

Moreover, as

discussed in more detail below, the evidence Rose-Burrell insists
the officers should have reviewed supports the conclusion that Doe

Rose-Burrell also argues that the affidavit should have stated that
Doe had schizophrenia and had been transferred to the Home from a
psychiatric facility with a history of suicidal ideation.
From this
information, it is reasonable to conclude that it was critical for Doe
to receive psychiatric medication and that failing to give it to him
could result in harm.
Thus, it is not clear to the Court how this
information would militate against a finding of probable cause for
exploitation and neglect of a disabled person.
3

19

did not actually receive all of his required medication during his
stay at the Home. 4
Rose-Burrell argues that if the officers had interviewed her,
she would have (1) shown them Doe’s medications and the medical
charts documenting that Doe received his required medications, (2)
told

them

that

she

personally

administered

Doe’s

psychiatric

medications on July 1 and July 2, and (3) stated that she did not
know that Doe was out of his psychiatric medications but that she
had tried to get him more medication.

Rose-Burrell did not point

to any evidence that she would have been able to show the officers
any psychiatric medication for Doe.

Based on her own testimony,

she believes she gave Doe the last pills on July 2.
Dep. 57:24-59:12.

Rose-Burrell

As to the medication records which Rose-Burrell

says the officers should have inspected, they do not show that Doe
received all his required medications while he was at the Home.
When Doe was discharged from the hospital and sent to the
Home

on

June

8,

2022,

Rose-Burrell

filled

a

fifteen-day

prescription for his two psychiatric medicines—an antipsychotic
medicine with two doses per day (30 pills) and an antidepressant
with one dose per day (15 pills).

Rose-Burrell Dep. 25:24-26:24,

Rose-Burrell appears to argue that the officers should have credited
her statement over Dent’s statement because if the officers had
interviewed her, she would have told them that Dent was lying when she
said she did not know about Doe’s medications.
Without any other
evidence about Doe’s medications, this information might have caused a
reasonable officer to doubt Dent’s credibility. But this information
did not exist in a vacuum.
4

20

37:2-14, 40:8-23; accord Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. I, Prescription
Record, ECF No. 17-7.

According to Rose-Burrell, Doe received his

medication from that prescription from June 8 to June 22.

Rose-

Burrell Dep. 26:7-11; accord Rose-Burrell Dep. Ex. 17 at RoseBurrell-000199, Medicine Administration Record, ECF No. 19-8 at 2
(showing initials “RN” for one morning dose and one evening dose
of the antipsychotic medication and one dose of the antidepressant
each day between June 8 and June 22).

Based on the prescription

information, the medication chart, and Rose-Burrell’s testimony
(citing the medication chart), Doe received all of his required
psychiatric medication from June 8 to June 22.
But for June 23 to July 3, there are obvious discrepancies
between the medication charts and the available number of pills.
It is undisputed that Rose-Burrell did not procure any additional
medication for Doe after she got his prescriptions filled on June
8.

Doe

received

the

last

of

the

medication

from

those

prescriptions on June 22.

According to Rose-Burrell, beginning on

June

used

23,

the

caregivers

the

two

bottles

of

psychiatric

medication that Doe received from the hospital, each of which
contained a five-day supply.

Rose-Burrell Dep. 37:2-14, 40:16-

23; accord Rose-Burrell Dep. Ex. 17 at Rose-Burrell-000213, Photo
of

Prescription

antipsychotic

Label,

ECF

medication);

No.

19-8

Rose-Burrell

at

16

Dep.

(ten

Ex.

17

pills
at

of

Rose-

Burrell-000214, Photo of Prescription Label, ECF No. 19-8 at 17
21

(five pills of antidepressant).

That would have provided enough

medication for Doe’s required doses through June 27.
According to the medication chart, “R.N.” signed to indicate
that Doe received the daily dose of the antidepressant for each
day from June 23 to June 30—even though there were only five pills
available for those eight days.

Rose-Burrell Dep. Ex. 17 at Rose-

Burrell-000200, Medication Chart, ECF No. 19-8 at 3.

“R.N.” also

signed the chart for the morning dose only of the antipsychotic
medicine for June 23 to June 30, with no initials for the evening
dose for those dates.

Rose-Burrell Dep. Ex. 17 at Rose-Burrell-

000200, Medication Chart, ECF No. 19-8 at 3. Rose-Burrell contends
that the lack of initials does not mean that the medication was
not given: “It just means they did not sign.”
23:15-24:2.

Rose-Burrell Dep.

She also testified that it was not her experience to

give half the daily dosage if the patient was running low on a
medication.

Id. at 24:3-7.

But there were simply not enough pills

for R.N. to have given Doe both antipsychotic pills every day
between June 23 and June 30.
If “R.N.” gave both doses of the antipsychotic medicine (but
only signed for the morning dose), the ten pills would have lasted
through June 27.

If “R.N.” only gave the morning dose from June

23 to June 30, there would have been two pills left by July 1.
But Rose-Burrell testified—and presumably would have told the
officers—that she gave Doe his morning and evening doses of the
22

antipsychotic medication on July 1 and 2 (four pills), as well as
his evening dose of the antidepressant (two pills).

Rose-Burrell

Dep. 24:17-25:1; accord Rose-Burrell Dep. Ex. 17 at Rose-Burrell000201, Medication Chart, ECF No. 19-8 at 4 (showing initials “LR”
for one morning dose and one evening dose of the antipsychotic
medication and one dose of the antidepressant on July 1 and July
2).

She also testified that when she went to give Doe his

medication

on

July

1,

there

were

only

three

tablets

of

the

antipsychotic medicine and two tablets of the antidepressant, so
the bottles were empty as of July 2.

Rose-Burrell Dep. 57:24-

59:12.
The takeaway: even if a reasonable officer believed RoseBurrell’s statement that she gave Doe his medication on July 1 and
July 2, simple arithmetic shows that there were not enough pills
for Doe to have received all the required doses of his psychiatric
medicine during his stay at the Home.

If Rose-Burrell gave Doe

four pills of the antipsychotic medication on July 1 and July 2,
then the other caregivers could have only provided him with six of
the sixteen required doses between June 23 and June 30.

If she

gave Doe two pills of the antidepressant on July 1 and July 2,
then the other caregivers could have only provided him with three
of the eight required doses between June 23 and June 30.

And Rose-

Burrell admits that Doe was out of psychiatric medication by July
2.

So, even considering the omitted facts, Doe’s and Dent’s
23

statements to the officers on July 3 were objectively true.

Doe

did not get all of his required psychiatric medication, and the
Home was out of his medication.
Rose-Burrell also suggests that if she had been interviewed,
she would have explained that she did not know Doe was running low
on

his

medication

medication.

and

that

she

was

trying

to

get

him

more

See Rose-Burrell Aff. ¶ 12, ECF No. 23-3 (“I was

unaware of any claim that he was out of his medications.”).

Again,

though, Rose-Burrell testified that the pills were out by July 2,
which she knew because she personally gave Doe the last few pills.
Rose-Burrell Dep. 57:24-59:12.

From that, a reasonable officer

would not have been required to believe Rose-Burrell’s contention
that she did not know that Doe was running low on or was out of
medication.

As to Rose-Burrell’s assertion that she was trying to

get Doe more medicine, it is undisputed that Rose-Burrell was the
person responsible for getting Doe’s medication.

Based on the

medication records that she says the officers should have reviewed,
Rose-Burrell

knew

that

medication for five days.

after

June

22,

Doe

only

had

enough

Rose-Burrell asserts that she called a

mobile medical service two times before the end of June to ask for
a doctor to come see Doe and prescribe additional medication, but
she did not hear back from the service, and no doctor was scheduled
to come see Doe.

Rose-Burrell Dep. 52:21-54:15.

In summary, the

evidence supports the conclusion that Rose-Burrell knew that Doe
24

needed more psychiatric medication, made two phone calls to try to
schedule a doctor’s appointment for Doe, then took no further
action. 5

These omitted facts do not vitiate probable cause.

Finally, Rose-Burrell faults the officers for not trying to
review Doe’s medical records.

Had the officers been able to get

a

records

copy

of

Doe’s

medical

from

his

most

recent

hospitalization, they would have learned that he was admitted to
the hospital after cutting himself with a razor in a suicide
attempt, he had a history of self-injurious behavior with razors,
he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and he was discharged with
one antipsychotic medication to be taken twice a day and one
antidepressant to be taken at bedtime.

Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex.

G, Hospital Discharge Summary 1-2, ECF No. 17-5.

The officers

would have also learned that Doe was scheduled for a “follow up”
with a “medication management provider” on June 15, 2022 and a
therapist on June 13, 2022.

Id. 6

It is undisputed that no one

According to Rose-Burrell, there was “no other option” but to wait for
the mobile medical service to schedule an appointment for Doe because
she had no insurance information for him, although she did not clearly
explain why she only called twice if it was the only option for making
sure that Doe got his required psychiatric medications. Rose-Burrell
Dep. 55:4-57:12.
6 Although Rose-Burrell contends that the officers should have reviewed
a copy of this record, she asserts that she did not receive it or know
about the two appointments. Rose-Burrell Aff. ¶ 13. The Court notes
that Exhibit 17 to Rose-Burrell’s deposition contains a different,
handwritten discharge summary that states that Doe was being discharged
to the Home. Rose-Burrell Dep. Ex. 17 at ROSE-BURRELL-000209, ECF No.
19-8 at 12. The document lists the two follow-up appointments for Doe.
Id. It is not clear from the present record whether Bates No. ROSEBURRELL-000209 was a page from Doe’s medical records at the Home, though
other pages of Exhibit 17 are from the Home’s files.
5

25

took Doe to the two follow-up appointments. This information would
not have militated against a probable cause determination.
In summary, Rose-Burrell did not point to any “concrete
evidence

that

obviously

and

definitively

rules

out

probable

cause.”

Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1343 (11th Cir.

2023); id. at 1336 (noting that officers are not required to
believe a suspect’s exculpatory statements that conflict with
other evidence).

Based on what Doe, Dent, and Rose-Burrell told

them, Gee and Silverberg reasonably believed that Doe had a history
of suicidal ideation, had come to the Home from a psychiatric
hospital, had attempted suicide a few months prior, was supposed
to be on daily psychiatric medication, and had threatened to cut
himself with a knife shortly before officers arrived at the Home.
They also reasonably believed that Rose-Burrell, as the operator
of the home, was responsible for ensuring that Doe had a supply of
medication so the caregivers could provide it.

Although the

officers received conflicting reports about whether Doe received
his medication, they reasonably believed that Doe had not received
his psychiatric medication and that is what caused him to threaten
suicide on July 3.

The medication charts and medical records that

Rose-Burrell says the officers should have reviewed do not refute
this reasonable conclusion.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Gee

and Silverberg had at least arguable probable cause to pursue the

26

arrest warrants, so they are entitled to summary judgment based on
qualified immunity on Rose-Burrell’s § 1983 claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Gee
and Silverberg are entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983
Fourth Amendment claims against them.

The Court therefore grants

their summary judgment motions as to the § 1983 claims (ECF Nos.
14 & 17). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over

Rose-Burrell’s

state

law

dismissed without prejudice.

claims,

and

those

claims

are

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).

Rose-Burrell’s

motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 25) is terminated as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 12th day of March, 2025.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

27