PALM v. CORRCARE INC et al

Filing 31

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 22 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting in part and denying in part 23 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 1/3/2025 (tlp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
GREGORY PALM,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

CORRCARE, INC., et al.,

*

Defendants.

*

CASE NO. 3:24-cv-47 (CDL)

O R D E R
Gregory Palm spent several months as a pretrial detainee in
both the Jones and Baldwin County jails.

Palm alleges that he

experienced pain in his eyes and problems with his vision, but the
jail officials charged with his medical care deliberately allowed
his eye problems to fester in an effort to avoid the financial
costs of providing him with treatment.

Palm asserts that because

of the denied and delayed treatment, he suffered permanent vision
loss in both eyes and is now legally blind.
against

both

counties

and

their

Palm brings claims

respective

jail

officials,

contending that they violated his constitutional right to be free
from deliberate indifference to his medical needs as a pretrial
detainee.

Those government defendants moved to dismiss Palm’s

complaint for failure to state a claim against them.

For the

reasons explained below, the Court grants the motions (ECF Nos. 22
& 23) as to Jones County and Defendants Reese and Massee in their

official capacities and denies the motions as to Baldwin County
and Defendants Reese, Massee, Moody, Skinner, Hart, Adams, and
Glenn in their individual capacities.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).

The

complaint

must

include

sufficient

factual

allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In other words, the factual

allegations must “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims.

Id. at 556.

“Rule

a

12(b)(6)

does

not

permit

dismissal

of

But

well-pleaded

complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable.’”

Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ.,

495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Palm alleges the following facts in support of his claims.
The Court must accept these allegations as true for purposes of
the pending motion.

2

On April 23, 2022, Gregory Palm was arrested and booked into
the Jones County jail.

Unable to make bail, he remained in custody

there for the next several months. In July, Palm began complaining
to the Jones County jail staff about redness and pain in his eyes,
as well as issues with his vision.

He submitted approximately ten

medical requests and four grievances requesting medical treatment
for those problems.

The Jones County jail staff did not arrange

for Palm to be seen by a doctor until October 20.

When Palm

finally did see a doctor, the doctor prescribed eye drops and
“recommended that he be seen by an eye specialist as soon as
possible.”

Am. Compl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 15. 1

After the doctor’s visit, the Jones County jail staff gave
Palm ear drops rather than the prescribed eye drops, a mistake
that was not corrected until two days later.

The ear drops caused

Palm “unbearable pain in his eyes and severe migraine headaches,”
and on October 22 he submitted a grievance complaining that he was
going blind because of the ear drops and asking to see an eye
doctor.

Id. ¶¶ 22-24.

But Jones County jail administrator Shane

Moody, Jones County jail shift commanders Lieutenant Hart and
Lieutenant Skinner, along with Jones County Sheriff Butch Reese,
decided not to send Palm to an eye doctor because they wanted to
In support of their Motions to Dismiss, Defendants point to medical
records which they contend show that Palm’s doctors recommended treatment
different than what Palm alleges.
At the motion to dismiss stage,
however, the Court may not consider materials outside the pleadings
unless they are undisputed—which the medical records are not.

1

3

avoid paying the cost of a specialist.

Instead, they decided to

transfer Palm to Baldwin County jail “so that he would become
someone else’s problem.”
Massee

or

transfer.

a

Baldwin

Id. ¶ 27.

County

jail

Baldwin County Sheriff Bill
administrator

approved

the

Palm does not know whether Baldwin County officials

knew about his eye condition before the transfer.
When he arrived at Baldwin County jail on October 24, 2022,
Palm told the booking officer that he needed to “be taken to an
eye

doctor

immediately

because

his

eyesight

was

getting

progressively worse,” and that he had been referred to an eye
specialist by the doctor he saw in Jones County.

Id. ¶ 30.

Four

days later, on October 28, Palm submitted a grievance, again
complaining about his eye problems and demanding to see an eye
doctor.

A jail medical provider employed by Defendant CorrCare,

Inc., saw Palm on November 1, and Palm was sent directly to the
emergency room at Navicent Baldwin Hospital.

The emergency room

doctors referred Palm to an eye specialist.

Baldwin County jail

officials, including Sheriff Massee, jail administrator Robert
Adams, and jail shift commander Tameka Glenn, “were aware of
[Palm’s] eye problems and repeated requests to see a specialist”
but decided to return him to the jail without further treatment
instead of arranging for him to see an eye specialist.

Id. ¶ 34.

After Palm returned to the Baldwin County jail from Navicent,
he filed sick call requests on November 5 and 7 and a grievance on
4

November 7.

Palm was eventually seen on November 8 by Dr. Paul

Buczynsky, an agent of CorrCare who Palm alleges was also Baldwin
County jail’s “medical director.”

Id.

¶ 58.

Although Palm

insisted that his vision was almost gone, Buczynsky told him that
his condition would eventually clear up and that it was not
necessary for him to see an eye specialist.
Buczynsky’s

“desire

to

avoid

financial

Palm alleges that
responsibility

for

specialist care” motivated his decision not to send Palm to an eye
doctor.

Id. ¶ 61.

Palm’s condition did not clear up, however,

and on December 20 he was taken to an eye specialist in Athens,
Georgia, where he was scheduled to return three days later to be
evaluated for potential surgery.

Instead of taking Palm to Athens

for that evaluation on December 23, Massee, Adams, and Glenn
decided to release him from jail on December 22.

Id. at ¶ 38.

Palm alleges that this decision was motivated by the Defendants’
“intent not to pay for treatment.”

Id.

Shortly after his release, Palm made his own arrangements to
return to the eye specialist in Athens, who referred him to Emory.
Ultimately, Palm “lost 100% of the vision in one eye and 50% from
the other,” rendering him “legally blind.”

Id. ¶ 40.

Palm alleges

he is “suffering from irreversible blindness secondary to uveitic
glaucoma,” and that his condition “could have been prevented with
timely medical treatment.”

Id. ¶ 41.

5

DISCUSSION
Palm

asserts

claims

under

42

U.S.C.

§

1983

against

the

following Defendants: Jones County, Sheriff Butch Reese in his
individual and official capacities, Baldwin County, Sheriff Bill
Massee in his individual and official capacities, Captain Shane
Moody

in

his

individual

capacity,

Lieutenant

Skinner

in

his

individual capacity, Lieutenant Hart in his individual capacity,
Major Robert Adams in his individual capacity, and Lieutenant
Tameka Glenn in her individual capacity. 2

Palm contends that each

Defendant is liable for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The Court
will proceed by analyzing Palm’s individual capacity claims first,
followed by the official capacity claims.
I.

Individual Capacity Claims
Palm alleges that Defendants Reese, Massee, Moody, Skinner,

Hart,

Adams,

and

Glenn

are

all

personally

liable

in

their

individual capacities for their deliberate indifference to Palm’s
serious medical needs.

The individual defendants argue that they

Palm also asserts professional negligence and § 1983 claims against
Buczynsky and CorrCare. Neither party filed a motion to dismiss, so the
Court need not evaluate the claims against them.
3 Palm alleges that he was detained pursuant to his arrest, so his § 1983
claim is under the Fourteenth Amendment as a pretrial detainee rather
than under the Eighth Amendment as a prisoner. “Deliberate indifference
claims made under the Fourteenth Amendment are held to the same standards
as deliberate indifference claims made under the Eighth Amendment.”
Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., 69 F.4th 1277, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2023).
2

6

are each entitled to qualified immunity on the claims brought
against them.
Qualified immunity “protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities
unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”

Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir.

2018) (quoting Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th
Cir. 2007)).

Because Palm does not dispute that the individual

defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary
authority

when

the

challenged

conduct

occurred,

he

must

demonstrate that “qualified immunity is not appropriate” in his
case.

Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1297.

To carry this burden, Palm must

allege facts which, when viewed in the light most favorable to
him,

show

that

(1)

the

defendants’

conduct

violated

a

constitutional right, and (2) that the violated right was clearly
established at the time the alleged violation occurred.

Id.

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “deliberate indifference
to

serious

medical

needs

of”

pretrial

detainees

because

it

“constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); see Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510
F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
7

unusual punishment, governs pretrial detainees.”).

It was clearly

established by 2022 that a jail official violates the Fourteenth
Amendment if he is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of a pretrial detainee by intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care.

The Eleventh Circuit has long held that

“knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to
provide that care constitute deliberate indifference.”
Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir. 1989).

Mandel v.

Additionally, “[e]ven

where medical care is ultimately provided, a prison official may
nonetheless

act

with

deliberate

indifference

treatment of serious medical needs.”

by

delaying

the

McElligott v. Foley, 182

F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999); see Kuhne v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.,
618 F. App'x 498, 504-05 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that a jury
question

existed

as

to

whether

defendants

were

deliberately

indifferent in delaying medical care to plaintiff whose medical
condition caused him to go blind in one eye).
To state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference, Palm
must allege facts demonstrating “(1) [that he had] a serious
medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that
need; and (3) causation between that indifference and [Palm’s]
injury.’”

Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th

Cir. 2009).

Here, the parties do not dispute that Palm had a

serious medical need when he suffered eye pain and progressively
worsening vision loss, so the first element is satisfied.
8

See

King v. Lawson, No. 21-14492, 2024 WL 3355179, at *3 (11th Cir.
July 10, 2024) (“Of course, the need to treat a serious eye
infirmity, let alone blindness is ‘so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize it.’”) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320
F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)).
The individual Defendants do contend, however, that they did
not act with deliberate indifference towards Palm’s eye problems.
To establish that the individual defendants acted with deliberate
indifference,

Palm

“must

prove

three

things:

(1)

subjective

knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk;
(3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence.”

Goebert,

510 F.3d at 1327 (alteration in original) (quoting Bozeman v. Orum,
422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated on
other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 403-04
(2015)).

As to the first element, the Eleventh Circuit recently

clarified

that

“a

deliberate-indifference

plaintiff

must

demonstrate that the defendant was actually aware that his own
conduct

caused

a

substantial

risk

of

serious

harm

to

the

plaintiff.”

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2024)

(en banc).

The individual defendants argue that Palm did not

allege they were subjectively aware that their conduct caused a
substantial risk of serious harm to him.
Palm’s

allegations

against

each

The Court must consider

individual

defendant.

See

Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Each
9

individual Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of
what that person knows.”).
A.

The Jones County Individual Defendants

Palm alleges that he submitted multiple medical requests and
grievances to the Jones County jail staff, asserting that he had
pain in his eyes and problems with his vision.
finally

taken

to

a

doctor

on

October

20,

When Palm was

2022,

the

doctor

immediately prescribed antibiotic eye drops and recommended that
Palm be seen by an eye specialist as soon as possible.

Instead,

jail staff gave Palm the wrong medication that caused significant
pain and additional vision problems. Palm filed another grievance,
which stated that he believed he was going blind and needed to see
an eye doctor.

Palm alleges that Jones County jail officials

Moody, Skinner, Hart, and Reese knew about his serious, worsening
eye condition but decided to transfer him to another jail instead
of getting him additional medical treatment—just to avoid paying
for a specialist—and did not provide any medical treatment while
the transfer was pending.

A reasonable inference from these

allegations is that the individual Jones County Defendants were
subjectively aware that Palm had a serious, rapidly deteriorating
eye condition but intentionally decided on a course of action that
at best would delay critical treatment and at worst would deny it.
See Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327 (“Whether a particular defendant has
subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm is a question of
10

fact

‘subject

inference

to

from

demonstration

circumstantial

in

the

usual

evidence.’”)

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)).

ways,

(quoting

including
Farmer

v.

Thus, Palm sufficiently

alleged that Moody, Skinner, Hart, and Reese acted with deliberate
indifference toward his serious medical needs.

Palm also alleged

that his permanent vision loss could have been prevented with
timely treatment, so he also sufficiently alleged the causation
element of his claim against Moody, Skinner, Hart, and Reese.
Assuming

the

facts

alleged

by

Plaintiff

to

be

true

and

construing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the present
factual record would support the conclusion that these Defendants
violated Palm’s clearly established constitutional right as a
pretrial detainee to be free from deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs.

Therefore, their motion to dismiss is

denied.
B.

The Baldwin County Individual Defendants

Palm alleges that when he was transferred to the Baldwin
County jail, jail officials there learned that he had serious eye
problems and was losing his vision.

He further alleges that after

a Baldwin County jail medical provider sent him to the emergency
room

for

treatment,

Baldwin

County

jail

officials

including

Massee, Adams, and Glenn learned that hospital doctors referred
Palm to an eye specialist and “were aware of his eye problems and
repeated requests to see a specialist” but refused to arrange for
11

Palm to receive treatment from the eye specialist.
34.

Am. Compl. ¶

Instead, they delayed treatment for at least a week, until

after Palm filed sick requests and a grievance stating that his
vision was almost gone.

After the CorrCare doctor saw Palm and

told him that his condition would clear up, Palm continued to
complain for a month and a half that his condition was not getting
better.
20,

When he was finally taken to an eye specialist on December

2022,

the

specialist

scheduled

possible surgery three days later.

Palm

to

be

evaluated

for

At that point, Massee, Adams,

and Glenn decided not to provide any medical treatment for Palm
and instead released Palm from custody to avoid paying for his
treatment.

All of these allegations support the inference that

the individual Baldwin County Defendants were subjectively aware
that Palm had a serious, rapidly deteriorating eye condition but
decided to delay and ultimately deny Palm treatment for it.

The

Court is thus satisfied that Palm sufficiently alleged that Massee,
Adams, and Glenn acted with deliberate indifference toward his
serious medical needs. Palm also alleged that his permanent vision
loss could have been prevented with timely treatment, so he also
sufficiently alleged the causation element of his claim against
Massee, Adams, and Glenn.
Assuming the facts alleged by Palm to be true and construing
all reasonable inferences in his favor, the present factual record
would support the conclusion that these Defendants violated his
12

clearly established constitutional right as a pretrial detainee to
be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Therefore, their motion to dismiss is denied.
II.

Official Capacity Claims
In addition to the individual capacity claims against the

individual

Defendants,

Palm

asserts

official

capacity

§ 1983

claims against Sheriff Reese and Sheriff Massee, as well as claims
against Jones County and Baldwin County.
A.

Claims Against the Sheriffs

Palm’s official capacity claims against Reese and Massee are
claims against the office of the Sheriff. See Kentucky v. Graham,
473

U.S.

159,

165-66

(1985)

(“Official-capacity

suits

.

.

.

‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v.
New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
Both Reese and Massee argue that they acted as an arm of the State
in providing medical care to county jail detainees and so are
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

The Court

agrees.
“Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits brought in federal
court when the State itself is sued and when an ‘arm of the State’
is sued.”

Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003).

“To receive Eleventh Amendment immunity, a defendant need not be
labeled a ‘state officer’ or ‘state official,’ but instead need
13

only be acting as an ‘arm of the State,’ which includes agents and
instrumentalities of the State.”

Id.

To determine whether a

defendant is an “arm of the State,” the Court considers “the
particular function in which the defendant was engaged when taking
the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise.”

Id.

Here, the defendant sheriffs were engaged in the function of
providing

medical

care

when

Palm

alleges

that

they

were

a

county

deliberately indifferent to his eye problems.
The

Eleventh

Circuit

recently

reaffirmed

that

sheriff acts as an arm of the state with respect to the provision
of medical care to pretrial detainees.

McDaniel v. S. Corr. Med.

LLC, No. 24-10722, 2024 WL 4471063, at *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024)
(per curiam) (citing Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., 69 F.4th 1277, 1296
(11th Cir. 2023)). Thus, Reese and Massee are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity on Palm’s official capacity claims against
them.

Accordingly, the official capacity claims against Reese and

Massee are dismissed.
B.

Claims Against the Counties

A county may be liable under § 1983 when its “official policy”
causes a constitutional violation.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.

Although a county’s official policy may be established by the acts
of a county final policymaker, Palm acknowledges that liability
cannot be imputed to a county for acts of a non-county policymaker.
Here, Palm contends that Sheriffs Reese and Massee were final
14

policymakers for their respective counties.

But, as discussed

above, Sheriffs Reese and Massee were arms of the State when they
made the decisions about Palm’s medical treatment.

Accordingly,

neither county is subject to liability based on the conduct of the
Sheriffs.

Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989) (holding that “neither a State nor its officials acting in
their official capacities are ‘persons’ [subject to suit] under §
1983.”).
Palm

contends

that

even

if

he

cannot

state

a

municipal

liability claim against Baldwin County based on the acts of Sheriff
Massee, he states a municipal liability claim against Baldwin
County

based

on

the

acts

of

Buczynsky.

Again,

it

is

well

established that a local government cannot be held liable under §
1983

unless

violation.

its

“official

policy”

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

causes

a

constitutional

Under certain circumstances,

municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision of a final
policymaker.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481

(1986); see Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1352 n.7 (11th
Cir. 2023) (referencing the so-called “final policymaker” avenue
of municipal liability).
Whether

a

person

has

final

policymaking

authority

purposes of a § 1983 claim is a question of state law.

for

The issue

requires an analysis of “the relevant legal materials,” including
“state and local positive law,” “custom or usage having the force
15

of law,” and, where a private entity is alleged to act under color
of law as a contractor for the government, the contract between
that entity and the government.

Viera v. City of Lake Worth, 853

F. App'x 356, 359 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing Jett v.
Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)); Howell v.
Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 724 (11th Cir. 1991) (“As the party at issue
here is a corporation contracting with the state, the relevant
‘state law’ for policymaking determinations are the contracts
between

[the

corporation],

the

state,

and

[the

corporation’s

employees].”).
Here, Palm alleges that Buczynsky “had a contract” with
Baldwin County “to provide medical care in the Baldwin County
Jail.”

Am. Compl. ¶ 66.

Palm further asserts that Buczynsky was

the “medical director for the Baldwin County jail,” and in that
role served as “the policymaker and final decisionmaker with
respect to the provision of medical care to inmates in the county’s
jail.”

Id. ¶ 58. 4

And Palm also contends that Buczynsky, as a

final policymaker for Baldwin County, intentionally denied Palm
medical care in order to avoid the costs of an eye specialist’s
treatment.

Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Palm

adequately alleged that Buczynsky was a final policymaker for
Baldwin County summarily argues that it cannot be liable for the acts
of a medical contractor, but it did not address Palm’s allegation that
Baldwin County appointed Buczynsky as the medical director for the jail
and that his policies would determine the allocation of medical resources
in the jail.
4

16

Baldwin County with regard to the provision of medical treatment
to jail inmates.

If the evidence produced during discovery,

including the contract between Baldwin County and Buczynsky, does
not show that Buczynsky was Baldwin County’s final policymaker,
then Baldwin County may be entitled to summary judgment on this
issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the Motions
to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 22 & 23) as to Palm’s claims against Jones
County and his official capacity claims against Reese and Massee.
The Court denies the Motions to Dismiss as to Palm’s claims against
Baldwin County and his individual capacity claims against Reese,
Massee, Moody, Skinner, Hart, Adams, and Glenn.

Those claims,

along with the claims against CorrCare and Buczynsky, remain
pending.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of January, 2025.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

17