Green v. Value Place Property Management LLC et al
Filing
29
ORDER granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 12/27/2011. (CGC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
STANTON GREEN,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
VALUE PLACE PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, LLC,
CASE NO. 4:10-CV-66 (CDL)
*
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff Stanton Green (“Green”) was employed by Defendant
Value
Place
Property
property attendant.
Management,
LLC
(“Value
Place”)
as
a
Green, who is black, claims that Value
Place terminated his employment in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(“Title VII”).
Plaintiff appears to contend that Value Place
terminated him because of his race and in retaliation for his
complaints to the NAACP and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
(“EEOC”).
Presently
pending
before
the
Value Place’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27).
Court
is
For the
reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R.
Civ. P.
56(a).
In determining whether a genuine dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party=s favor.
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
A fact is material if it is relevant or
necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In
accordance
with
Local
Rule
56,
Value
Place
filed
a
statement of material facts to which Defendants contend there is
no genuine dispute. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. § II, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No.
28.
Pursuant
to
Local
Rule
56,
each
of
Value
Place’s
fact
statements is supported by a specific citation to the record.
Green did not respond to Defendants’ statement of material facts
as he was required to do under Local Rule 56.
In fact, he did
not respond to Value Place’s summary judgment motion at all.
For
these
reasons,
Value
Place’s
statement
of
undisputed
material facts is deemed admitted under Local Rule 56. M.D. Ga.
R. 56.
The Court has reviewed those citations to “determine if
there is, indeed, no genuine issue of material fact.” Reese v.
Herbert,
527
F.3d
1253,
1269
2
(11th
Cir.
2008)
(internal
quotation marks omitted). Based on the Court’s review of Value
Place’s statement of material facts and record citations, the
undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Green,
are as follows.
Value Place is an extended stay lodging company.
Value
Place hired Green in July 2008 to work as a property attendant
at its Columbus, Georgia location.
Green’s
duties
included
As a property attendant,
maintenance,
check-ins, and security.
housekeeping,
laundry,
Property attendants must enter and
check guest rooms periodically to make sure that they are clean.
Unless
they
are
on
approved
leave
or
vacation,
property
attendants are on call for guest services and emergencies.
In January 2009, Value Place assistant manager Tammy Wells
reported that Green had stolen money from the office cash drawer
and said that there was a video to prove it.
Based on these
allegations, Green was terminated on January 10, 2009.
Green
contacted the NAACP, and a representative of the Columbus NAACP
chapter
contacted
Value
Place,
claiming
that
Green
had
stolen any money and that he had been unfairly treated.
an
investigation,
Value
Place
determined
that
Green
not
After
had
not
taken any money but that he had improperly accessed the cash
drawer.
Based
on
these
findings,
Green’s
employment
was
reinstated, and his termination was converted to a suspension
with pay.
3
At some point in 2009, Green was reassigned from property
attendant
to
studio
attendant.
Green
believed
that
he
was
reassigned because he took two days off without a doctor’s note
and
he
got
behind
attendant
his
cleaning
Green
reassignment,
on
made
the
same
position
was
hourly,
duties.
wages,
while
After
though
the
the
property
the
studio
attendant
position was salaried.
During 2009, Green had a series of disciplinary issues.
February
2009,
Green
disrespectful
to
instructions
from
conduct
could
received
a
a
received
co-worker
a
in
written
who
manager.
result
written
a
warning
attempted
Green
was
termination.
In
warning
for
poor
for
being
relay
to
told
In
Green
that
March
performance
similar
2009,
Green
because
he
damaged company property by attempting to open a guest room door
with a crow bar.
Also during March, Green received a written
warning for failure to meet cleaning standards, and he was told
by his supervisors that he would be terminated if he did not
meet
expectations
Columbus
Value
housekeeping
for
Place
room
became
employees
cleaning.
understaffed
quit,
and
the
Later
in
because
existing
2009,
one
of
the
the
employees,
including Green, were asked to take on additional housekeeping
and cleaning duties, but Green failed to meet expectations for
cleaning.
Specifically, Green noted on his daily room cleaning
schedule that he had cleaned guest room 325 even though he had
4
not; that guest room became infested with bugs and had to be
fumigated.
October
In addition, Plaintiff received a written warning in
2009
for
making
a
personal
guest’s room without authorization.
Place
terminated
Green
for
long
distance
call
in
a
In December 2009, Value
dereliction
of
duties
and
falsification of company records with regard to Room 325, for
violating company policies by borrowing $20 from a guest, for
taking an unauthorized break, and for unauthorized use of a
guest’s phone.
Green filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on
September 7, 2009, alleging that he was discriminated against
because of his race and in retaliation for filing a complaint
with the NAACP.
In his EEOC charge, Green alleged that he had
been demoted to housekeeping, subjected to harassment and had
his hours and wages changed in retaliation for his complaint to
the NAACP.
He also claimed that his work environment had gotten
worse since his reinstatement.
DISCUSSION
I.
Discrimination Claim
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against
any
individual
conditions,
or
with
respect
privileges
to
of
his
compensation,
employment,
individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
because
terms,
of
such
Where, as here,
there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the Court uses
5
the burden shifting approach established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Springer v.
Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
Green must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.
The burden then shifts to Value Place to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action.
Id.
Finally, the burden returns to Green to prove that the
articulated reasons are pretext for discrimination. Id.
Though
it
is
not
clear
from
the
present
record,
Green
appears to contend that Value Place discriminated against him
because of his race by (1) suspending him with pay for the cash
drawer
incident,
performance,
(3)
(2)
giving
him
reassigning
him
written
from
warnings
property
for
poor
attendant
to
studio attendant, (4) giving him extra housekeeping work when
Value
Place
employment.
subjected
became
understaffed,
and
(5)
terminating
his
In other words, Green appears to assert that he was
to
disparate
discipline
because
of
his
race.
To
establish a prima facie case of disparate discipline, Green must
establish that he “was a qualified member of a protected class
and was subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast to
similarly
situated
employees
outside
the
protected
class.”
Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264
6
(11th Cir. 2010).1
There is no evidence that Green did not
violate the work rules for which he was disciplined.
did
not
point
protected
class
to
any
evidence
engaged
lighter discipline.
in
that
similar
a
person
misconduct
Green also
outside
but
the
received
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Green
has not met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discriminatory discipline.
that
Green
discipline,
had
he
Furthermore, even if the Court found
established
has
not
a
prima
presented
facie
any
case
evidence
of
to
disparate
rebut
the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons Value Place articulated for
the discipline: Green did a poor job cleaning rooms and violated
a variety of work rules.
For these reasons, Value Place is
entitled to summary judgment on Green’s discrimination claims.
II.
Retaliation Claim
Value Place is also entitled to summary judgment on Green’s
retaliation
claims.
To
establish
a
prima
facie
case
of
retaliation, Green must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily
protected
activity,
(2)
he
suffered
a
materially
adverse
employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the
two.
2010).
Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir.
Though it is not clear from the present record, Green
1
An employee may also establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge by showing that he was a qualified member of a protected
class, was terminated and replaced by someone outside the protected
class. Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir.
2004).
There is no evidence in the present record that Green was
replaced by someone outside the protected class after he was
terminated.
7
appears
to
contend
that
Value
Place
retaliated
against
him
because he asked the NAACP to help him challenge his termination
in
January
September
2009
2009.
and
because
Green
he
appears
filed
to
an
EEOC
assert
complaint
that
Value
in
Place
retaliated against him by (1) giving him written warnings for
poor performance, (2) reassigning him from property attendant to
studio attendant, (3) giving him extra housekeeping work when
Value
Place
employment.
a
became
sufficient
and
(4)
terminating
his
Green has not, however, pointed to any evidence of
connection
retaliatory
understaffed,
between
actions.
evidence
his
complaints
Moreover,
even
create
prima
to
a
and
if
he
facie
the
had
of
allegedly
pointed
to
retaliation,
Green did not point to any evidence to rebut the legitimate nonretaliatory reasons Value Place articulated for the discipline:
Green did a poor job cleaning rooms and violated a variety of
work
rules.
For
these
reasons,
Value
Place
is
entitled
to
summary judgment on Green’s retaliation claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Value Place’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 27th day of December, 2011.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
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