Brantley et al v. Muscogee County School District et al

Filing 204

ORDER granting Defendants' summary judgment motions ( 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96 , 97 , 99 , 100 , 101 , 102 , 103 , 104 ) as to Plaintiffs' federal law claims. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jur isdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion 105 is denied. The Court finds Defendants' Motion to Strike 158 to be moot. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 10/30/2012. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
CARLTON BRANTLEY, LARRY
DOWDELL, MELVIN GRIFFIN,
PONDIEL MABRY, CONNIE MCCOY,
HAYWARD PARHAM, REGINAL
RICHARDSON, JERRY STARKS, LARRY
THOMPSON, WILLIAM MARSHALL,
GODFREY BIGGERS, PATRICK
STROUD, CALVIN WILLIAMS and
HENRY CRAWFORD,
Plaintiffs,

*
*
*
*
*
*

vs.

*

CASE NO. 4:10-CV-77 (CDL)

MUSCOGEE COUNTY SCHOOL
*
DISTRICT, DON A. COOPER, JR.,
KINARD LATHAM, CAROL FRENCH,
*
MARIE STRINGFELLOW, THOMAS M.
SHELLNUTT, SR., and JERRY DUCK, *
Defendants.

*
O R D E R
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs

Godfrey

Biggers,

Carlton

Brantley,

Henry

Crawford, Larry Dowdell, Melvin Griffin, Pondiel Mabry, William
Marshall,
Jerry

Starks,

Williams
plant

Connie

McCoy,

Patrick

Stroud,

(collectively,

services

Hayward

and

Parham,
Larry

“Plaintiffs”)

custodial

Thompson,
are

employees

of

County School District (“School District”).
the

School

District

of

engaging

in

Reginal

a

current

Richardson,
and

Calvin

and

former

Defendant

Muscogee

Plaintiffs accuse
pattern

of

racial

discrimination
modest

that

retirement

relegated

system

certain

called

the

black

employees

Public

School

to

a

Employees

Retirement System (“PSERS”) while manipulating the rules to make
a more generous retirement plan called the Teachers Retirement
System (“TRS”) available to similarly-situated white employees.
Plaintiffs, who are black, assert that they were placed in the
PSERS

because

District’s

of

their

employees

race

and

that

fraudulently

some

prevented

of

them

the

School

from

being

placed in the TRS.
Plaintiffs’
District

employee’s

eligibility
Latham

entire

case

incorrect

requirements.

(“Latham”),

hinges

as

one

understanding

That

served

on

employee,

the

School

services director from 1974 to 1996.

former
of

School

the

TRS

Defendant

Kinard

District’s

plant

Plaintiffs assert that

Latham’s testimony regarding the TRS eligibility requirements
establishes that each Plaintiff was actually eligible for TRS
enrollment

but

was

denied

an

opportunity

to

enroll.

It

is

clear, however, that Latham never had any responsibility for
approving or rejecting TRS applications.

It is also obvious

that Latham’s understanding of the TRS eligibility requirements
was

just

plain

wrong.

Therefore,

Latham’s

testimony

cannot

establish what criteria the TRS used to determine eligibility,
and it cannot establish that Plaintiffs were eligible for TRS
enrollment.

2

Latham’s

misunderstanding

about

the

TRS

eligibility

requirements led to some enrollment application mistakes during
the 1980s.

The evidence suggests that Latham permitted several

employees to cheat on their TRS applications by inflating their
job titles to include the word “manager” or “supervisor.”
on

the

application

mistakes

permitted

by

Latham,

Based

the

TRS

accepted several plant services employees as members even though
they were not qualified for membership.

When Latham tried to

help more employees (including several Plaintiffs) join the TRS
in

1993,

he

used

inflated titles.

the

employees’

actual

titles

instead

of

In response, the TRS found that the employees

were not qualified for TRS membership because they were not
managers

or

supervisors.

The

TRS

also

provided

the

School

District with a clear definition of the terms “supervisor” and
“manager.”
Latham’s
investigations,

mistakes
which

triggered

led

to

process

District’s personnel department.
miscommunication,
employees.

gossip

and

several

School

changes

in

District

the

School

Latham’s mistakes also led to
distrust

among

plant

services

Due to Latham’s mistakes, plant services personnel

who believed that they were unfairly excluded from the TRS made
a series of complaints over the years, including a complaint to
the NAACP in 1998 and a state court lawsuit in 2007.

What is

clear now, however, is that while the TRS permitted a few plant

3

services employees to enroll in the TRS during the 1980s based
on

mistakes

in

their

TRS

applications,

Plaintiffs

were

not

eligible for TRS enrollment based on their job titles and job
duties.
The
Carolyn

School

District

French,1

(collectively,

and

Marie

“School

Defendants

Don

Stringfellow,

District

A.

Cooper,
Jerry

and

Defendants”)

Jr.,
Duck

filed

summary

judgment motions as to each Plaintiff: Godfrey Biggers (ECF No.
88), Carlton Brantley (ECF No. 104), Henry Crawford (ECF No.
90), Larry Dowdell (ECF No. 91), Melvin Griffin (ECF No. 94),
Pondiel

Mabry

(ECF

No.

89),

William

Marshall

(ECF

No.

96),

Connie McCoy (ECF No. 99), Hayward Parham (ECF No. 100), Reginal
Richardson (ECF No. 95), Jerry Starks (ECF No. 93), Patrick
Stroud (ECF No. 92), Larry Thompson (ECF No. 97), and Calvin
Williams (ECF No. 103).

As discussed in more detail below,

these motions are granted as to Plaintiffs’ federal law claims,
and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
state law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice.
Defendant Latham filed a summary judgment motion as to all
Plaintiffs.

As discussed in more detail below, Latham’s summary

judgment

motion

federal

law

(ECF

claims,

No.
and

101)
the

1

is

granted

Court

as

to

declines

Plaintiffs’
to

exercise

French’s first name is Carolyn, not Carol as Plaintiffs alleged.
parties sometimes refer to French by her new last name, Garrett.
the sake of simplicity, the Court refers to her as French.

4

The
For

jurisdiction

over

Plaintiffs’

dismissed without prejudice.
filed

a

summary

discussed

in

judgment

more

detail

state

law

claims,

which

are

Defendant Thomas M. Shellnutt, Sr.

motion

as

to

all

below,

Plaintiffs.

Shellnutt’s

summary

As

judgment

motion (ECF No. 102) is granted as to Plaintiffs’ federal law
claims, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’

state

law

claims,

which

are

dismissed

without

prejudice.
Plaintiffs

also

seek

summary

judgment

on

their

42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the School
District and Defendants Don A. Cooper, Jr., Kinard Latham and
Carolyn French.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’

motion (ECF No. 105) is denied.
Finally, all Defendants (“Defendants”) filed a motion to
strike certain documents filed by Plaintiffs on July 28, 2012
because the filings were untimely and far exceeded the narrow
scope set by the Court for the filings.

Even though Plaintiffs

blatantly disregarded the Court’s order regarding the deadline
and

the

summary

scope

of

judgment

the

supplemental

motions,

the

responses

Court

Defendants’

reviewed

has

to

Plaintiffs’

untimely supplemental filings and concludes that they do not
make

a

motions.

difference

in

Defendants’

the

outcome

Motion

to

therefore moot.

5

of

the

Strike

summary

(ECF

No.

judgment
158)

is

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P.

56(a).

Fed. R.

In determining whether a genuine dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party=s favor.
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

A fact is material if it is relevant or

necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

The summary judgment process requires the attorneys for the
parties to distill the record to an understandable description
of the facts that are relevant to the question whether a genuine
dispute

exists

to

be

tried.

The

process

also

requires

the

attorneys for the parties to explain the law in a cogent manner
to

assist

facts.
the

the

Court

in

applying

it

to

the

alleged

material

Dumping data onto the docket with the expectation that

Court

will

unprofessional.
voluminous

somehow
In

exhibits

decipher

this

case,

without

any

it

is

counsel

both
for

reference

ineffective
Plaintiffs

to

them

in

and

filed
their

briefs or fact statements, filed exhibits beyond the deadlines

6

set by the Court, filed untimely supplemental fact statements
with

their

final

citations

to

required

by

references

the

reply
record

the

in

brief,

supporting

Court’s

their

failed

local

briefs

but

to

their

fact

rules,
did

include

specific

statements

included

not

include

as

footnote

the

actual

footnotes, routinely cited to “deposition highlights” instead of
the

actual

depositions,

and

in

general,

provide clear citations to the record.

regularly

failed

Defendants’ counsel’s

written advocacy also created challenges for the Court.
than

providing

the

Court

with

a

to

coherent

and

Rather

understandable

description of the relevant facts, counsel’s briefing contained
a

voluminous

collection

of

facts

that

lacked

organization,

requiring the Court to piece together the jumbled facts into an
understandable

and

organized

Defendants’ perspective.
a

massive

contrary

record
to

expectations.
attorneys’
reviewed

to

the

ferret

out

advocacy,
record

the

rules,

Notwithstanding

present

of

what

happened

from

Requiring the Court to search through

Court’s

written

the

narrative

to

factual dispute exists to be tried.

7

and

these
the

facts

is

below

ineffective,
the

shortcomings

Court

determine

has

Court’s
in

the

painstakingly

whether

a

genuine

DISCUSSION
I.

Plaintiffs’ Federal Law Claims
Each Plaintiff asserts claims for racial discrimination,

contending that the School District and certain School District
employees denied them access to the more generous pension plan—
the

TRS—because

of

their

race.

These

claims

are

asserted

against the School District and the individual employees who
allegedly

discriminated

42 U.S.C. § 1981

against

(“§ 1981”)

Plaintiffs

pursuant

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(denial of equal protection).

to

(“§ 1983”)

One Plaintiff, Carlton Brantley,

also asserts his racial discrimination claim against the School
District under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”).
record

reveals

that

most

of

these

applicable statute of limitations.
are

timely

are

unsupported

by

A thorough review of the
claims

are

barred

by

the

Moreover, those claims that

sufficient

evidence

of

racial

attempted

to

assert

discrimination to survive summary judgment.
The

Court

additional
briefing.

observes

federal

law

that

Plaintiffs

claims

in

their

summary

judgment

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have made it more

difficult for employees to enter the TRS and that Defendants
took these actions in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ complaints of
discrimination.

Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 3, 7, ECF No. 105.

They also contend that they have a property interest in TRS

8

membership

and

that

Defendants

have

deprived

property interest without due process of law.
Resp.

to

Defs.’

Mots.

for

Summ.

J.

5,

ECF

them

of

this

Pls.’ Mem. in
No.

127.

And

Plaintiffs appear to raise a disparate impact theory in their
reply brief in support of their summary judgment motion, arguing
that

categorical

denial

of

TRS

membership

to

custodial

supervisors has a disparate impact on black employees because
most custodians are black.

Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’

Mot. for Summ. J. 6-7, ECF No. 161.

Plaintiffs did not assert a

retaliation claim, due process claim, or disparate impact claim
in their Second Amended Complaint.

They are not permitted “to

raise new claims at the summary judgment stage.”

Gilmour v.

Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam).

Therefore, the Court declines to consider Plaintiffs’

new retaliation, due process, and disparate impact theories.
II.

Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims: Timeliness Analysis
Before the Court reaches the merits of Plaintiffs’ federal

law claims, the Court must address Defendants’ argument that
Plaintiffs’ § 1981 and § 1983 claims are untimely.2
for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims is two years.
327 F.3d 1181, 1182

The statute

See Lovett v. Ray,

(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (applying

Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury

2

Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff Carlton Brantley’s Title VII
claim is untimely.

9

actions to § 1983 claims).

The statute of limitations begins to

run when “the facts which would support a cause of action are
apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably
prudent regard for his rights.”
marks omitted).

Id. at 1182 (internal quotation

Therefore, Plaintiffs must establish that the

alleged § 1983 violations occurred on or after July 13, 2008 or
that, if they occurred before that date, Plaintiffs could not
reasonably have discovered the violations until on or after July
13, 2008.
The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims is
four years.
369,

382

See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S.
(2004)

(applying

catch-all

four-year

statute

of

limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 1658 to actions arising under § 1981
as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071).

For their § 1981 claims, therefore, Plaintiffs

must establish that the violations occurred on or after July 13,
2006 or that, if they occurred

before

that date, Plaintiffs

could not reasonably have discovered the violations until on or
after July 13, 2006.
The Court will recount the facts relevant to the statute of
limitations inquiry for all Plaintiffs, and then the Court will
address the statute of limitations arguments for each Plaintiff.
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are undisputed.

10

A.

Facts Relevant to Statute of Limitations Inquiry for
All Plaintiffs

Defendant Latham became the School District’s director of
plant services in 1974.

Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Resp. to Pls.’

Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 101, Mem. from N. Patterson to B. Nail
(Feb. 12, 1974), ECF No. 126-1.3
until he retired in 1996.
89.

Latham served in that role

Latham Dep. 13:21-14:2, ECF No. 98-

Latham has had no role with the School District since 1996.

After Latham retired, Leon Bell became plant services director,
and he served in that position until he died in 2000.

Ben

Russell became the School District’s director of plant services
after

Bell,

and

he

served

in

that

role

until

2002.

James

Tanksley became interim director of plant services in 2002 and
director in 2003.

Robert Stansell succeeded Tanksley in the

position and became plant services director in 2010.
TRS membership is open to teachers.

O.C.G.A. § 47-3-60(a).

For purposes of the TRS, the term “teacher” includes full-time
“maintenance managers or supervisors” and “warehouse managers or
supervisors.”

O.C.G.A. §

47-3-1(28)(E).

Therefore,

it

is

undisputed that a plant services employee must be a manager or
supervisor to be eligible for the TRS.

3

Defendants did not point the Court to an authenticated version of
this exhibit (and several others). Plaintiffs also submitted exhibits
that were not authenticated.
Neither party raised an authenticity
objection. The Court finds that both Plaintiffs and Defendants waived
any authenticity objections for purposes of summary judgment.

11

It

was

Latham’s

understanding

that

“supervisor”

person who supervised a person, tool, or task.
28:8-29:13.

As

discussed

in

understanding was incorrect.

more

detail

meant

a

Latham Dep.

below,

Latham’s

Apparently in keeping with his

understanding, Latham tried to help a number of non-supervisor
plant

services

employees

responsibilities

join

whose

the

sometimes unsuccessfully.

roles

encompassed

TRS—sometimes

supervisory

successfully

and

It is undisputed that several plant

services employees were granted membership in the TRS during the
1980s even though they were not managers or supervisors.
Dep. 107:10-109:5, ECF No. 98-97.

Cooper

These employees were admitted

to the TRS because Latham permitted them to “list erroneous job
titles for themselves” on their TRS applications.

Jones Dep.

29:15-24, ECF No. 123-6 (citing previous affidavit testimony).
According

to

Plaintiffs,

the

non-supervisory

plant

employees who were accepted to the TRS were white.

services

Pls.’ Facts

to Which There Are No Genuine Issues ¶¶ 13-15, ECF No. 105 at
22-23.
In 1993, Latham tried to help several more plant services
employees join the TRS, including Plaintiffs Godfrey Biggers,
Larry Dowdell, Melvin Griffin, and Reginal Richardson.

Defs.’

App. of Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 3, Mem. from K.
Latham to G. Wylie 1 (Mar. 8, 1993), ECF No. 98-3 [hereinafter
1993 Latham Mem.].

At Latham’s prompting, the School District

12

wrote

a

letter

employees.

to

That

the

TRS

letter

requesting

contained

the

admission
employees’

for

several

actual

job

titles and stated that the employees were “employed in positions
which encompass supervisory responsibilities.”

Defs.’ App. of

Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 7, Letter from G. Wylie
to P. Rodgers (May 28, 1993), ECF No. 98-7 [hereinafter 1993
Wylie Letter to TRS].

The TRS rejected the School District’s

request,

it

finding

that

did

not

appear

that

employees were eligible for TRS membership.

any

of

the

Defs.’ App. of

Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 6, Letter from P.
Rodgers to G. Wylie (July 8, 1993), ECF No. 98-6 [hereinafter
1993 Letter from Rodgers/TRS].
B.

Godfrey Biggers

Plaintiff Godfrey Biggers (“Biggers”) began his employment
with

the

School

District

in

1960,

and

he

retired

in

2003.

During his tenure with the School District, Biggers worked as a
masonry mechanic.

1993 Wylie Letter to TRS.

Biggers asserts

that his position encompassed some supervisory responsibilities
because he sometimes supervised the work of other employees.
See

Latham

Dep.

97:10-98:8

(stating

that

if

Biggers

and

Plaintiff William Marshall went on a bricklaying job, Biggers
was in charge, but if Biggers and Marshall went on a concrete
job, Marshall was in charge); see also 1993 Wylie Letter to TRS
(stating

that

Biggers

was

employed

13

in

a

position

that

“encompass[ed] supervisory responsibilities.”); Defs.’ App. of
Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 1, Note from L.
Bell, ECF No. 98-4 at 1 (“When Godfrey Biggers and Daryl Shealy
are working together, Godfrey supervises Daryl.”).4
member of the PSERS.

Biggers is a

It is undisputed that Biggers was never

permitted to join the TRS.
When Latham became the School District’s director of plant
services in 1974, Biggers asked Latham about becoming a member
of the TRS.

Biggers Dep. 31:17-25, ECF No. 88-3.

At first,

according to Biggers, Latham responded that he would “get back
with [him].”

Biggers

Dep. 33:10-14;

accord

id.

at 34:17-21

(quoting Latham as saying, “We’ll have to get back with y’all
later” on TRS membership).

As discussed above, in 1993, Latham

did try to help Biggers join the TRS.

Latham wrote a memorandum

to George Wylie in the School District’s personnel department on
behalf of Biggers and several other employees.

1993 Latham Mem.

Wylie, in turn, wrote a letter to the TRS on behalf of Biggers
and several other employees, asking the TRS to consider the
employees for membership.

1993 Wylie Letter to TRS.

4

The TRS,

According to Defendants, Biggers admitted in a 2007 deposition that
he did not have supervisory authority over anyone and that he was not
aware of any other individuals in his position that were members of
the TRS.
Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of Material and Undisputed
Facts ¶¶ 584-90, ECF No. 124.
Based on the Court’s review of
Defendants’ filings—including Defendants’ appendices of documents and
Defendants’ exhibits attached to their summary judgment briefs and
response briefs—Defendants did not submit a copy of the 2007
deposition. The Court therefore cannot consider it.

14

however, rejected Wylie’s requests, finding that the employees,
including Biggers, were not eligible for TRS membership.

1993

Letter from Rodgers/TRS.
It is undisputed that Biggers believed as far back as the
1980s that he was not permitted to join the TRS because of his
race.

When asked in his deposition whether he thought it was

because of his race that he did not become a member of the TRS,
he testified:
Well, I wouldn't say it was a racial thing. But
I would say it like this here: They never did put
a black man on Teachers’ Retirement. Now, what
now, a Caucasian will come in there, they put
them on Teachers’ Retirement time he get in there
and sign his John Henry. Well, why couldn't he do
us like that? I don't see no difference.
* * *
I think it was -- everything was unfair about me
because I was a brick
mason there and I didn’t
get my fair share there. Wasn’t getting it when I
left there [in 2003]. And everything just went
sour with me because we were black people.
Biggers Dep. 32:6-12, 19-23.

Given that it is undisputed that

Biggers believed in the 1980s that the School District did not
permit him to join the TRS because of his race, Biggers’s § 1981
claim accrued before July 13, 2006, and his § 1983 claim accrued
before July 13, 2008, and both claims are untimely.

Defendants

are thus entitled to summary judgment on Biggers’s § 1981 and
§ 1983 claims.

15

C.

Carlton Brantley

Plaintiff Carlton Brantley (“Brantley”) began working for
the School District in May 1999.
mechanic II.5

He was hired as a masonry

Brantley Dep. 14:8-9, Oct. 31, 2007, ECF No. 98-93

[hereinafter Brantley Oct. 2007 Dep.].6

As a masonry mechanic,

Brantley

work,

performs

general

maintenance

such

as

fixing

bricks that are out of order and filling holes in cement.
at 13:15-24.

Id.

It is undisputed that Brantley is not responsible

for hiring, firing, evaluating or supervising other employees.
Brantley has admitted that he does not do supervisory work.
at 15:7-11.
encompasses

Id.

Nonetheless, Brantley asserts that his position
some

supervisory

responsibilities

because

he

“supervises” various tools, such as a wheelbarrow, a hoe, a
shovel, a cutting machine, a demolition hammer, a jackhammer,

5

In his first response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts, Brantley did not dispute this fact.
Pl. Brantley’s Resp. to
Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 2, ECF No. 130-6. In
his supplemental response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed
Material facts, Brantley changed his answer, arguing that he was a
supervisor in the masonry mechanic department because he “supervised
tools, tasks, machine, jackhammer, trowel, etc.”
Pl. Brantley’s
Supplemental Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
¶ 2, ECF No. 139-12.
This assertion does not change the fact that
Brantley’s title was masonry mechanic II, as he admitted in his 2007
deposition and in the Complaint. Brantley Dep. 14:8-9, Oct. 31, 2007,
ECF No. 98-93; 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 463, ECF No. 53.
6
Brantley contends that he is unable to respond to certain fact
statements based on Brantley’s April and October 2007 depositions
because Defendants did not produce the depositions during discovery.
E.g., Pl. Brantley’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts ¶¶ 11, 67, ECF No. 139-12.
Defendants did, however, file the
depositions as exhibits 93 and 94 in support of their summary judgment
motions, so the Court cannot conclude that Brantley had no opportunity
to review them.

16

and a trowel machine.

Brantley Dep. 88:19-24, Oct. 31, 2011,

ECF No. 104-3 [hereinafter Brantley 2011 Dep.].
member of the PSERS.

It is undisputed that Brantley has not

been permitted to join the TRS.
Brantley

is

unaware

Brantley is a

of

any

It is also undisputed that

masonry

mechanic

II

or

masonry

mechanic III who is a member of the TRS.
Brantley first learned about the TRS during his orientation
in 1999.

Brantley Oct. 2007 Dep. 15:12-16:2.

Brantley asked to

become a member of the TRS, but the woman who was conducting the
orientation told Brantley that he was qualified for the PSERS,
not the TRS.

Id. at 16:3-23.

Brantley contends that he did not

discover that he might be considered a “supervisor” for TRS
purposes (under Latham’s incorrect definition) until “April 2009
when Kinard Latham said a man could supervise one man, he could
be

over

a

machine

or

a

tool

eligible for TRS membership].”

or

any

specific

task

[and

be

Brantley 2011 Dep. 87:13-88:19.

There is, however, evidence that Brantley believed well before
April

2009

that

he

was

eligible

for

the

TRS

permitted to join the TRS because of his race.

but

was

not

First, in his

response to the School District’s interrogatories in a prior
action Brantley brought in this Court, Brantley stated:
In May 1999, while being oriented at The Claflin
School for employee benefits and signed-up, I was
joined with another employee that drive the Book
Mobile.
During the session, he was offered the
Teacher's Retirement Fund; I was offered the Public

17

Retirement benefit fund. I questioned this several
times to the lady that was assisting us, but I never
received a direct answer from her. She would only
state that I did not qualify for the TRS. I recently
learned that the TRS fund was set up some 40 years ago
for individuals who held supervisory positions. This
system has historically benefited whites.
Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex.
103, Pl. Brantley’s Answers to Defs.’ 1st Interrogs. 4, ECF No.
126-3 at 4.
2007.

Id.

The interrogatory responses are dated February 28,
at

17.

Second,

Brantley

is

one

of

the

School

District employees who filed suit against the School District in
June of 2007, alleging that the School District discriminated
against the plaintiffs in the administration of TRS eligibility.
See Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 1,
Compl.

¶¶

21-22,

Brantley

v.

Muscogee

Cnty.

Sch.

Dist.,

SU07CV1558-05 (June 6, 2007), ECF No. 98-1 [hereinafter 2007
Compl.]; accord Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for Summ.
J. Ex. 2, Press Release, Whitaker & Whitaker, P.C. (Nov. 15,
2007),

ECF

No.

98-2

[hereinafter

Whitaker

Press

Release].

Finally, Brantley complained to former plant services director
James Tanksley in early 2007 that he was not permitted to join
the TRS but fellow employee Bubba Amon was, even though Amon was
not a supervisor.
that

Brantley

regarding

TRS

Brantley 2011 Dep. 84:24-85:16 (testifying

referenced

Tanksley’s

qualifications

February

during

Tanksley).

18

his

2007

memorandum

discussion

with

Based on this evidence, Brantley cannot seriously dispute
that he believed in 2007, when he complained to Tanksley and
later

joined

the

state

court

lawsuit

against

the

School

District, that the School District was discriminating against
black employees with regard to TRS membership.

Therefore, his

§ 1983 claim accrued before July 13, 2008, and the claim is
untimely.

Brantley’s

§

1981

and

Title

VII

claims

will

be

evaluated on the merits.
D.

Henry Crawford

Plaintiff Henry Crawford (“Crawford”) began working for the
School District in 1976.

When he started, Crawford was a helper

on a truck in the School District’s warehouse.

Crawford Dep.

12:25-13:9, ECF No. 90-3.

Crawford later became a forklift

operator in the warehouse.

Id. at 14:3-22.

Crawford spends

most of his time at work operating the forklift, and he is also
responsible for pulling orders and for cleaning the restroom on
Fridays.

Id. at 15:6-16:4.

Crawford has never applied for

another position with the School District, such as warehouse
supervisor.

Id.

at

14:23-15:5.

Crawford

asserts

that

his

position encompasses some supervisory responsibilities because
he

“supervises”

various

tools

and

machines,

including

a

forklift, a pallet jack, and a handtruck.
It is undisputed that Crawford has not been permitted to
join the TRS.

In fact, when Crawford asked Latham to get him

19

into the TRS, Latham told him no.
undisputed

that

Crawford

believed

Id. at 17:10-20.
during

Latham’s

It is

tenure

as

plant services director, which ended in 1996, that Crawford was
not permitted to join the TRS because of his race.
34:19-35:16.

Id. at

Therefore, Crawford’s § 1981 claim accrued before

July 13, 2006, and his § 1983 claim accrued before July 13,
2008.

Accordingly, both claims are untimely, and Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Crawford’s § 1981 and § 1983
claims.
E.

Larry Dowdell

Plaintiff

Larry

District in 1980.
III.

Dowdell

(“Dowdell”)

joined

the

School

His current job title is masonry mechanic

Dowdell Dep. 9:24-25, ECF No. 91-3.

Dowdell has never

applied for a leaderman or supervisor position.

Id. at 89:3-8.

Dowdell asserts that his position encompasses some supervisory
responsibilities

because

other individuals.

he

sometimes

supervises

the

work

of

Id. at 89:9-12; see also 1993 Wylie Letter

to TRS (stating that Dowdell was employed in a position that
“encompass[ed]
92:11-94:18
supervised).7

supervisory

(listing

responsibilities.”);

individuals

whose

work

Dowdell
Dowdell

Dep.
has

It is undisputed that Dowdell is a member of the

PSERS and that he has not been permitted to join the TRS.
7

According to Defendants, Dowdell admitted in a 2007 deposition that
he was not aware of any other individuals with his job duties that
were members of the TRS.
Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of

20

In 1986, Dowdell attended a meeting regarding the TRS.
the

meeting,

Latham

stated

that

an

employee

could

“be

At
over

wheelbarrows, lawn -- or any kind of equipment, any kind of
tool, or manage one person, and . . . get in that Teachers’
Retirement.”

Dowdell Dep. 48:6-16.

After that meeting, Dowdell

asked Latham to help him enroll in the TRS, but Latham said no.
Id. at 89:24-90:13.
about

becoming

a

After that, Dowdell repeatedly asked Latham
member

of

the

TRS.

Latham

Dowdell that he would “get back with” him.

“always”

told

Id. at 15:10-16:1;

89:24-90:18.
As discussed above, in 1993, Latham did try to help Dowdell
join the TRS.

Latham wrote a memorandum to George Wylie in the

School District’s personnel department on behalf of Dowdell and
several other employees.

1993 Latham Mem.

Wylie, in turn,

wrote a letter to the TRS on behalf of the employees, asking the
TRS to consider the employees for membership.
to TRS.

1993 Wylie Letter

The TRS, however, rejected Wylie’s requests, finding

that the employees were not eligible for TRS membership.

1993

Letter from Rodgers/TRS.
It

is

undisputed

that

Dowdell

believed

during

Latham’s

tenure, which ended in 1996, that the School District did not
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 172, ECF No. 124.
Based on the Court’s
review of Defendants’ filings—including Defendants’ appendices of
documents and Defendants’ exhibits attached to their summary judgment
briefs and response briefs—Defendants did not submit a copy of the
2007 deposition. The Court therefore cannot consider it.

21

permit him to join the TRS because of his race.
57:10-14.

Dowdell Dep.

Therefore, Dowdell’s § 1981 claim accrued before July

13, 2006, and his § 1983 claim accrued before July 13, 2008.
Accordingly,

both

claims

are

untimely,

and

Defendants

are

entitled to summary judgment on Dowdell’s § 1981 and § 1983
claims.
F.

Melvin Griffin

Plaintiff Melvin Griffin (“Griffin”) began working for the
School District in 1976.

When he was first hired, Griffin’s

title was grounds laborer, though Griffin performed the duties
of a tractor drive; in 2001, Griffin officially became a tractor
driver.

Griffin Dep. 39:25-40:11, 41:4-13, ECF No. 94-3.

It is

undisputed that Griffin never applied for a promotion and that
he never applied to be crew chief or leaderman.

Griffin asserts

that his position encompasses some supervisory responsibilities.
See 1993 Wylie Letter to TRS (stating that Griffin was employed
in

a

position

that

“encompass[ed]

supervisory

responsibilities.”); Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for
Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 9, Note from M.H., ECF No. 98-4 at 9 (“Melvin
Griffin is in charge of the tractors, and also two workers.”).
It is undisputed that Griffin is a member of the PSERS and that
he has not been permitted to join the TRS.
Griffin

attended

a

meeting

regarding

Latham’s tenure as plant services director.

22

the

TRS

during

Griffin Dep. 11:23-

12:4.

At the meeting, Latham stated that an employee had to be

a supervisor of a person or a piece of equipment to be eligible
for the TRS.

Id. at 11:23-13:2.

Several years later, Griffin

told Latham that he wanted to enroll in the TRS.
15:8.

Id. at 14:21-

As discussed above, in 1993, Latham tried to help Griffin

join the TRS.

Latham wrote a memorandum to George Wylie in the

School District’s personnel department on behalf of Griffin and
several other employees.

1993 Latham Mem.

Wylie, in turn,

wrote a letter to the TRS on behalf of Griffin and several other
employees,

asking

membership.

the

1993

TRS

Wylie

to

Letter

consider
to

TRS.

the
The

employees
TRS,

for

however,

rejected Wylie’s requests, finding that the employees were not
eligible for TRS membership.

1993 Letter from Rodgers/TRS.

When Latham received the response from TRS, he informed
Griffin
enroll.

that

the

TRS

had

turned

Griffin Dep. 15:9-15.

down

Griffin’s

request

to

It is undisputed that Griffin

believed when his TRS request was rejected in 1993 that the
request was rejected because of Griffin’s race.

Id. at 35:5-23.

Therefore, Griffin’s § 1981 claim accrued before July 13, 2006,
and his § 1983 claim accrued before July 13, 2008, and both
claims are untimely.

For these reasons, Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on Griffin’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims.

23

G.

Pondiel Mabry

Plaintiff

Pondiel

Mabry

(“Mabry”)

District as a custodian in 1987.
1996.

joined

the

School

He became a security guard in

In 2004, Mabry joined the plant services department as a

roofer.

According

to

Mabry’s

colleague,

Plaintiff

Calvin

Williams, who is also a roofer, most of Mabry’s time at work is
spent doing physical labor.
3.

Williams Dep. 24:2-10, ECF No. 103-

Mabry contends that he became eligible for TRS in 2004 when

he took the roofer position because his job encompasses some
supervisory responsibilities.

Though Mabry has not applied for

a leaderman position, he testified that he supervises Williams
and has been appointed “second in charge” to the leaderman, Tony
Dent.

Mabry Dep. 86:9-88:11, ECF No. 89-3.

It is undisputed

that Mabry is a member of PSERS and that he has never been
permitted to join the TRS.
Mabry was aware of the TRS issue as early as 1998, when he
attended an NAACP meeting about the issue and told Plaintiff
Patrick Stroud that the NAACP could help both of them with TRS.
Stroud Dep. 78:21-79:21, ECF No. 92-3.

It is undisputed that

once

began

he

joined

membership.

plant

services,

Mabry

requesting

TRS

In February 2007, Mabry received a memorandum from

James Tanksley explaining that non-supervisory employees were
not eligible for TRS membership.

24

Mabry Dep. 15:15-20; see also

Cooper Dep. Ex. 39, Mem. from J. Tanksley to All Plant Services
Employees (Feb. 19, 2007), ECF No. 98-97 at 289.
Mabry is one of the School District employees who filed
suit against the School District in June of 2007, alleging that
the School District discriminated against the plaintiffs in the
administration of TRS eligibility.
Whitaker Press Release.

See generally 2007 Compl.;

It is undisputed that Mabry believed in

2007, when he joined the lawsuit against the School District,
that

the

School

District

was

discriminating

employees with regard to TRS membership.

against

black

Therefore, Mabry’s

§ 1983 claim accrued before July 13, 2008, and the claim is
untimely.

Accordingly,

Defendants

judgment on Mabry’s § 1983 claim.

are

entitled

to

summary

Based on the present record,

Mabry’s § 1981 claim is timely, and the Court will evaluate that
claim on the merits.
H.

William Marshall

Plaintiff William Marshall (“Marshall”) was employed by the
School District as a plasterer from 1960 until he retired in
2002.

Marshall

supervisory

asserts

that

his

responsibilities.

position

See

Latham

encompassed
Dep.

some

97:10-98:8

(stating that if Marshall and Biggers went on a bricklaying job,
Biggers was in charge, but if Biggers and Marshall went on a
concrete job, Marshall was in charge).

25

It is undisputed that

Marshall

is

a

member

of

the

PSERS

and

that

he

was

never

permitted to join the TRS.
While Latham was director of plant services, Marshall asked
Latham several times about joining the TRS.
26:11, 28:3-21, ECF No. 96-3.

Each time, Latham responded that

he would “get back with” Marshall.
Marshall

believed

during

Marshall Dep. 25:2-

Id.

Latham’s

It is undisputed that

tenure

that

the

School

District did not permit Marshall to enroll in the TRS because of
his race.

Id. at 28:3-10, 29:13-30:3.

Therefore, Marshall’s

§ 1981 claim accrued before July 13, 2006, and his § 1983 claim
accrued before July 13, 2008.

Accordingly, both claims are

untimely, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
Marshall’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims.
I.

Connie McCoy

Plaintiff

Connie

District since 1972.

McCoy

has

been

employed

by

the

School

McCoy works at the public library, not at

a school building, and her supervisor is the director of public
libraries.

Muller Aff. ¶¶ 2-3, ECF No. 98-78; Stansell Aff.

¶¶ 7-9,

No.

ECF

supervised

and

126-17
evaluated

(stating
by

that

library

library
staff

and

custodians
not

by

are

plant

services staff).
McCoy alleged in the Complaint that she “has performed the
duties of a Head Custodian” since 1978.

26

2d Am. Compl. ¶ 58, ECF

No. 53.

McCoy testified in her deposition, however, that her

official job title is “supervisor”:
Q. Now, you are a head custodian?
* * *
A.

I'm a supervisor.

Q. What is your official title?
A.

I'm a supervisor.

Q. What is the title on your job description?
* * *
A. On my job description?
Q.

Yes.

A. A supervisor.
Q. Okay. Were you ever a head custodian?
A. Lady, excuse me. I was a supervisor.
Q. Okay. Did
custodian?
A.

you

ever

have

the

job

title

of

head

Not that I know of.

McCoy Dep. 28:9-29:4, ECF No. 99-3.

McCoy cannot seriously

dispute that she is a custodial supervisor.

Id. at 40:17-21;

McCoy Dep. Pl.’s Ex. 2, Emergency Call List, ECF No. 99-3 at 20
(listing

C.

McCoy

as

“Custodial

Supervisor”).

There

is

no

evidence that any public library custodian, supervisor or not,
is enrolled in the TRS.8

Muller Aff. ¶ 5; Stansell Aff. ¶ 11.

8

In her first response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts, McCoy did not dispute that there are no public library
custodians enrolled in the TRS. Pl. McCoy’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement

27

McCoy asked her supervisor, Gary Wortley, if she could join
the TRS.

McCoy Dep. 15:14-17.

She received a response letter

in 2007 stating that she was not qualified for the TRS and that
she “didn’t hire or fire.”

Id. at 14:11-17:4.

McCoy is one of the School District employees who filed
suit against the School District in June of 2007, alleging that
the School District discriminated against the plaintiffs in the
administration of TRS eligibility.9
Whitaker Press Release.

See generally 2007 Compl.;

It is undisputed that McCoy believed in

2007, when she joined the lawsuit against the School District,
that

the

School

District

was

discriminating

employees with regard to TRS membership.

against

black

Therefore, McCoy’s

§ 1983 claim accrued before July 13, 2008, and the claim is
untimely.
judgment

Accordingly,
on

McCoy’s

§

Defendants
1983

claim

are
based

entitled
on

the

to

summary

statute

of

of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 130-10. McCoy now contends
that Curtis Dukes is (1) responsible for custodial services at the
public libraries and (2) enrolled in the TRS.
Pl. McCoy’s
Supplemental Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
¶ 1, ECF No. 139-4. McCoy, however, did not provide any citations to
the record in support of either assertion, so the Court need not
consider them.
9
According to Defendants, McCoy testified in a 2007 deposition that
was aware that the School District was racially discriminating
regarding TRS in October 2006 and was unaware of any School District
custodian who was a member of the TRS.
Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 265-66, ECF No. 124. Based
on the Court’s review of Defendants’ filings—including Defendants’
appendices of documents and Defendants’ exhibits attached to their
summary judgment briefs and response briefs—Defendants did not submit
a copy of the 2007 deposition.
The Court therefore cannot consider
it.

28

limitations.

Based on the present record, McCoy’s § 1981 claim

is timely, and the Court will evaluate that claim on the merits.
J.

Hayward Parham

Plaintiff Hayward Parham (“Parham”) began working for the
School District as a school custodian in 1971.

Parham became

lead custodian in 1977, although his title has changed over the
years and has included “head custodian,” “custodian III,” and
“coordinator.”
No. 100-3.

Parham Dep. 10:11-11:4, 21:12-24, 32:4-8, ECF

Since 1977, Parham has performed custodial work and

also supervised other custodians.

It is undisputed that Parham

is a member of the PSERS and that he has never been permitted to
join the TRS.
Parham is one of the School District employees who filed
suit against the School District in June of 2007, alleging that
the School District discriminated against the plaintiffs in the
administration of TRS eligibility.10

Defs.’ App. of Docs. in

Supp. of Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 82, Mot. for Leave to Amend
¶¶ 1, ECF No. 98-82; see also Whitaker Press Release.
10

According to Defendants, Parham testified in a 2007 deposition that
he
believed
in
2004
that
the
School
District
was
racially
discriminating regarding TRS.
Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 308, ECF No. 124. Defendants also assert
that Parham testified that the principal of his school assigns
specific areas for each custodian to clean and that he is not aware of
any custodian, including a head custodian, who is a TRS member.
Id.
¶¶ 301, 305-306. Based on the Court’s review of Defendants’ filings—
including Defendants’ appendices of documents and Defendants’ exhibits
attached to their summary judgment briefs and response briefs—
Defendants did not submit a copy of the 2007 deposition.
The Court
therefore cannot consider it.

29

It is undisputed that Parham believed in 2007, when he
joined the lawsuit against the School District, that the School
District was discriminating against black employees with regard
to TRS membership.

Therefore, Parham’s § 1983 claim accrued

before July 13, 2008, and the claim is untimely.

Accordingly,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Parham’s § 1983
claim.

Based on the present record, Parham’s § 1981 claim is

timely, and therefore, the Court will evaluate that claim on the
merits.
K.

Reginal Richardson

Plaintiff Reginal Richardson (“Richardson”) began working
for the School District in 1982.

He worked in the food services

warehouse for approximately two years, and then he moved to the
maintenance department and became a roofer.

Richardson Dep.

17:11-24, 18:20-25, Apr. 17, 2007, ECF No. 98-95 [hereinafter
Richardson 2007 Dep.].11

As a roofer, Richardson was responsible

for maintaining and repairing roofs and gutters.

Id. at 20:24-

21:3.

an

In

1996

or

1997,

Richardson

became

assistant

leaderman, but he relinquished that position because he “felt it
was too much responsibility.”

Id. at 19:1-21.

11

Richardson also

Richardson contends that he is unable to respond to certain fact
statements.
E.g., Pl. Richardson’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 43-44, 47-69, 72-73, ECF No. 139-11.
Richardson does not explain why he cannot respond to these facts,
which are supported by his April 2007 deposition.
Defendants filed
the deposition as exhibit 95 in support of their summary judgment
motion, so the Court cannot conclude that Richardson had no
opportunity to review it.

30

testified that he served as leaderman during the 1990s after
Defendant
position.

Thomas

Shellnutt

Richardson

Dep.

was

suspended

70:22-71:17;

from

the

87:18-88:10,

leaderman
Nov.

2011, ECF No. 95-3 [hereinafter Richardson 2011 Dep.].

1,

When

Shellnutt returned to work, Richardson was no longer leaderman.
Id. at 89:21-90:7.
August of 2004.

Richardson was terminated from his job in

Richardson was a member of the PSERS, and it is

undisputed that he was never permitted to join the TRS.
Richardson asserts that he should have been placed in the
TRS when he served as assistant leaderman and interim leaderman
during the 1990s.

Richardson also contends that his roofer

position encompassed some supervisory responsibilities because
he sometimes supervised other employees.

1993 Latham Mem. 1

(stating that he had a signed statement from the employees’
“supervisor indicating that they do oversee other employees that
work under them); accord Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Supp. of Mots.
for Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 2, Note from L. Bell, ECF No. 98-4 at 2
(stating, “Reginal Richardson supervises Greg Whiting and Thomas
Griffin in the Roofing Department in the absence of Anthony
Dent”); see also Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for
Summ.

J.

Richardson

Ex.
was

7,

1993

employed

Wylie
in

Letter
a

supervisory responsibilities.”).

31

to

position

TRS
that

(stating

that

“encompass[ed]

As

discussed

above,

in

Richardson join the TRS.

1993,

Latham

did

try

to

help

Latham wrote a memorandum to George

Wylie in the School District’s personnel department on behalf of
Biggers and several other employees.

1993 Latham Mem.

Wylie,

in turn, wrote a letter to the TRS on behalf of Richardson and
several

other

employees,

employees for membership.

asking

the

TRS

to

consider

1993 Wylie Letter to TRS.

the

The TRS,

however, rejected Wylie’s requests, finding that the employees
were

not

eligible

for

TRS

membership.

1993

Letter

from

Rodgers/TRS.
Richardson believed as far back as 2000 that he was not
permitted to join the TRS because of his race.
Dep. 26:2-27:19.

Richardson 2007

This belief was based on Richardson’s request

to join the TRS while he was serving as assistant leaderman.
Id.

Richardson’s supervisor, Rocky Jones, told him that he was

not qualified.

Id.

Richardson told Jones at that time that he

believed the denial of his TRS request was discriminatory.

Id.

Therefore, Richardson’s § 1981 claim accrued before July 13,
2006, and his § 1983 claim accrued before July 13, 2008, and
both claims are untimely.

Defendants are therefore entitled to

summary judgment on Richardson’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims.
L.

Jerry Starks

Plaintiff Jerry Starks (“Starks”) has been employed by the
School District since 1992.

Starks has worked on a grounds crew

32

since he began with the School District, and he contends that he
has had the responsibilities of a crew chief since he started
with

the

School

District

in

1992.

Starks

was

officially

promoted to crew chief in 2007, and it is undisputed that Starks
enrolled in the TRS in March 2008.
was a member of the PSERS.

Prior to March 2008, Starks

It is undisputed that Starks has had

no problems with the School District regarding the TRS since he
was able to join the TRS in March 2008.
In 1993, Starks attended a meeting during which Latham said
that everyone “over a wheelbarrow should get in TRS.”
Dep. 24:4-8, ECF No. 93-3.

Starks

Therefore, Starks contends that he

should have been permitted to enroll in the TRS when he began
performing the responsibilities of crew chief in 1992.

Starks

asked to be enrolled in the TRS a number of times over the
years.

When Starks was hired, Starks believed that Latham “was

going to hook [him] up” with the TRS because Latham had been
Starks’s

principal

at

Daniel

Junior

High.

Id.

at

21:6-15.

According to Starks, Latham told French to give Starks a TRS
application.
application
application.

Id.
and
Id.

at

then

21:6-25.

French

said

had

she

gave

given

Starks
him

TRS

wrong

Starks replied that he wanted to be in the

TRS, and French asked, “Well, are you a teacher?”
22.

the

a

Id. at 21:16-

Starks replied no, so French gave him an application for

the PSERS.

Id.

When Starks told Latham that French had not

33

given him a TRS application, Latham asked Starks to give him six
months and he would get Starks into the TRS.

Id. at 21:23-22:2.

When Starks asked Latham again about joining the TRS, Latham
told Starks that he had to be a leaderman or supervisor.
23:4-20.

Starks pointed out to Latham that he was the nighttime

supervisor
position

Id. at

at

met

Hardaway
the

TRS

High

School

criteria.

responded, “just give me some time.”

and

Id.

asked

at

whether

23:12-15.

that
Latham

Id. at 23:16-18.

By the

time Latham retired in 1996, Starks knew that Latham was not
going to get Starks enrolled in the TRS.
Starks

spoke

with

Guy

Sims,

who

Id. at 27:18-21.
served

as

the

School

District’s superintendent from 1997 to 2001, about getting on
the TRS.

Id. at 29:23-25.

Sims told Starks that there was

nothing he could do and that Starks would have to go through his
supervisor for TRS enrollment.

Id. at 30:17-25.

Starks also spoke with Leon Bell during Bell’s tenure as
personnel director (1997 to 2000) regarding the TRS.
Starks

that

if

his

direct

supervisor,

Dale

Parks,

Bell told
did

not

recommend him for the TRS, then there was nothing Bell could do
about it.

Id. at 31:9-32:6.

Starks approached Bell again to

ask if Bell would speak with Parks on his behalf, and Bell said
he did not have time.
Sometime

during

Id. at 32:23-33:15.
David

Jackson’s

tenure

as

personnel

director (1995 to 2003), Starks spoke with Jackson about getting

34

on the TRS.

Id. at 14:17-24.

Starks explained that Craig

Farrell, a white employee, was on the TRS.

Id. at 15:2-7.

Starks also explained that he had supervisor duties and asked
why he could not enroll in the TRS.
that

he

“deserve[d]

something.”

Id.

Id.

approved a “25 cent raise” for Starks.

Starks told Jackson
In

response,

Jackson

Id. at 15:8-10.

It is undisputed that Starks learned in 2001 that Farrell,
a white employee, was on the TRS.

According to Starks, Farrell

was a tractor mechanic who did not supervise any employees in
2001.

It is also undisputed that Starks believed in 2001 that

Farrell was permitted to join the TRS because he was white and
Starks was denied TRS enrollment because he was black.
17:4-20.

Id. at

Therefore, Starks’s § 1981 claim accrued before July

13, 2006, and his § 1983 claim accrued before July 13, 2008.
Accordingly,
entitled

to

both

claims

summary

are

judgment

untimely,
on

Starks’s

and
§

Defendants
1981

and

joined

the

§

are
1983

claims.
M.

Patrick Stroud

Plaintiff

Patrick

Stroud

(“Stroud”)

District as an electrician in 1990.12

12

School

Stroud Dep. 16:6-12, ECF

In his first response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts, Stroud did not dispute this fact. Pl. Stroud’s Resp.
to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 18, ECF No. 131-1.
In his supplemental response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed
Material facts, Stroud changed his answer, arguing that Stroud
received the job of “Supervisor.” Pl. Stroud’s Supplemental Resp. to
Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 18, ECF No. 139-7. In

35

No.

92-3.

Stroud

“industrial
installing

type

is

work,”

receptacles,

now

an

electrician

which

includes

adding

circuits,

III,

“high

and

he

mode

replacing

does

voltage,
lighting,

dealing with more of a high voltage area, like adding panel
boxes, stuff like that.”

Id. at 80:12-18.

of his workday doing this type of work.
asserts

that

his

position

Stroud spends 100%

Id. at 81:3-8.

encompasses

some

Stroud

supervisory

responsibilities because he supervised his truck and tools.

It

is undisputed that Stroud is a member of the PSERS and that he
has not been permitted to join the TRS.
In 1990, Stroud asked French about joining the TRS, and
French referred him to the plant services director and told him
that the TRS was open to supervisors. Id. at 31:3-16, 33:9-17.
In 1990, Latham told Stroud that he had to be a supervisor to
become

a

member

of

the

TRS

and

that

a

supervisor

somebody who “supervised” a truck and tools.

could

be

Id. at 59:9-14.

It is not clear from the evidence cited by the parties whether
Stroud asked Latham if he could help Stroud join the TRS.

When

Leon Bell became director of plant services, Stroud told Bell

support of this assertion, Stroud cites testimony of Myles Caggins.
Plaintiffs list the deposition of Mr. Caggins as Exhibit 87 in support
of their Reply Brief. Reply Exhibit List, ECF No. 188-1. Plaintiffs
did not, however, file an Exhibit 87 with their Reply Brief, so the
Court cannot verify Caggins’s testimony. Even if Plaintiffs had
submitted the deposition of Caggins, they represent that he testified
that tradespeople exercise independent judgment as to particular
tasks.
Such testimony would not change the fact that Stroud’s title
was electrician, as he stated in his deposition. Stroud Dep. 16:6-12.

36

that other individuals in his position were members of the TRS,
and Stroud asked if he could join the TRS.

Id. at 37:9-15.

Bell told Stroud that he could not help Stroud enroll in the TRS
because the TRS was only open to supervisors.

Id.

Stroud knew that certain white employees who did not have a
title

of

supervisor

were

permitted

to

join

the

TRS,

and

he

believed that it was unfair that he, as a black employee, was
not permitted to join the TRS.

Id. at 43:8-13.

Stroud knew

about this issue while Latham was still plant services director,
and Stroud raised these concerns to Leon Bell in approximately
1996.

Id. at 38:14-17, 42:16-22.

He also raised the issue to

an assistant superintendent named Mr. Griffin in 1995 or 1996.
Id. at 45:19-46:13.
Based on the undisputed evidence, Stroud believed by 1996
that the School District did not permit him to join the TRS
because of his race.

Therefore, Stroud’s § 1981 claim accrued

before July 13, 2006, and his § 1983 claim accrued before July
13, 2008.

Accordingly, both claims are untimely, and Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on Stroud’s § 1981 and § 1983
claims.
N.

Larry Thompson

Plaintiff Larry Thompson (“Thompson”) worked for the School
District from 1986 until 2009.

Thompson worked as a custodian.

See Thompson Dep. 24:16-18, ECF No. 123-14 (when asked whether

37

Thompson

could

do

his

regular

injury, Thompson said no).
custodian,
point.13

though

he

did

job

as

a

custodian

after

an

Thompson contends that he was a lead
not

point

to

any

evidence

on

this

It is undisputed that Thompson was a member of the

PSERS and was never permitted to join the TRS.
Thompson is one of the School District employees who filed
suit against the School District in June of 2007, alleging that
the School District discriminated against the plaintiffs in the
administration of TRS eligibility.
Whitaker Press Release.

See generally 2007 Compl.;

The 2007 Complaint alleged that the

plaintiffs, “directly and through counsel on their behalf, have
made numerous inquiries over a substantial period of time in
order to determine any valid reason for their omission from the
[TRS].”

2007 Compl. ¶ 24.

It is undisputed that Thompson believed in 2007, when he
joined the lawsuit against the School District, that the School
District was discriminating against black employees with regard
to TRS membership.

Therefore, Thompson’s § 1983 claim accrued

before July 13, 2008, and the claim is untimely.

Accordingly,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Thompson’s § 1983

13

According to Defendants, Thompson testified about his job duties as
a custodian during a 2007 deposition. Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 481-504, ECF No. 124.
Based on the
Court’s review of Defendants’ filings—including Defendants’ appendices
of documents and Defendants’ exhibits attached to their summary
judgment briefs and response briefs—Defendants did not submit a copy
of the 2007 deposition. The Court therefore cannot consider it.

38

claim.

Based on the present record, Thompson’s § 1981 claim is

timely, and the Court will evaluate that claim on the merits.
O.

Calvin Williams

Plaintiff Calvin Williams (“Williams”) began working for
the School District as a custodian in 1980.
Williams

became

head

custodian

at

Eastway

Williams Dep. 21:21-22:9, ECF No. 103-3.

In 1984 or 1985,
Elementary

School.

Williams held that job

until 2006, when he applied for and received the job of roofer.14
Id. at 22:7-9, 23:8-17.

As a roofer, Williams’s job is to do

“patch work, clean gutters, down pipes, spud gravel, a lot of
caulking and shingles, modified rubber. You know, stuff like
that.”

Id. at 23:18-23.

It is undisputed that the majority of

Williams’s time as a roofer is spent doing physical labor.
Williams asserts that his custodial position encompassed
supervisory responsibilities because he supervised three people
and

also

machines

and

tools.

14

Id.

at

24:16-25:5.

It

is

In his first response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts, Williams did not dispute this fact.
Pl. Williams’s
Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 21, ECF No.
130-5.
In his supplemental response to Defendants’ Statement of
Undisputed Material facts, Williams changed his answer, arguing that
Williams received the job of “Roofer/Supervisor.”
Pl. Williams’s
Supplemental Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶
21, ECF No. 139-10.
In support of this assertion, Williams cites
testimony of Myles Caggins that roofers exercise independent judgment
as to particular tasks. Plaintiffs list the deposition of Mr. Caggins
as Exhibit 87 in support of their Reply Brief.
Reply Ex. List, ECF
No. 188-1. Plaintiffs did not, however, file an Exhibit 87 with their
Reply Brief, so the Court cannot verify Caggins’s testimony. Even if
Plaintiffs had submitted the deposition of Caggins, his testimony that
roofers exercise independent judgment as to certain tasks would not
change the fact that Williams’s title was roofer, as he admitted in
his deposition. Williams Dep. 23:8-17.

39

undisputed that Williams is not aware of any custodians that are
members of the TRS.

Williams first believed that he might be

eligible to participate in the TRS when he became a roofer in
2006.

Id.

Williams also asserts that his roofer position is a

supervisory position because it sometimes requires the exercise
of independent judgment and because Williams and Mabry supervise
each other.

Id. at 39:11-23.

Williams does not evaluate other

employees.

Id. at 40:9-21.

Williams has not applied for a

supervisor position.
a member of the PSERS.

Id. at 22:10-23:9, 24:11-15.

Williams is

It is undisputed that he has never been

permitted to join the TRS.
Defendants pointed to evidence that Williams believed in
2006 that he was eligible to join the TRS.

Defendants did not,

however, point to evidence that Williams believed as of that
date—or

at

any

time

before

July

13,

2008—that

permitted to join the TRS because of his race.

he

was

not

Therefore, based

on the present record, Williams’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims are
timely, and the Court will evaluate those claims on the merits.
III. Plaintiffs’ Timely Federal Claims: Analysis on the Merits
The following federal law claims are timely and must be
evaluated on the merits: Plaintiff Calvin Williams’s § 1981 and
§ 1983 claims; the § 1981 claims of Plaintiffs Brantley, Mabry,
McCoy, Parham, and Thompson; and Plaintiff Brantley’s Title VII
claim.

All of these claims are based on Plaintiffs’ assertion

40

that the School District and its employees denied Plaintiffs
access

to

the

TRS

while

permitting

employees to join the TRS. 15
have

not

pointed

to

similarly

situated

white

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs

evidence

of

any

intentional

racial

discrimination.
“In the employment context, §§ 1981 and 1983 claims require
the

same

elements

of

proof

and

framework as Title VII claims.”

involve

the

same

analytical

Bush v. Houston Cnty. Comm’n,

414 F. App’x 264, 266 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); accord
Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Plaintiffs

must

prove

Therefore, to prevail on these claims,

that

the

School

District

discriminated against them based on their race.
F.3d at 767.

intentionally
Vessels, 408

Where, as here, a plaintiff attempts to prove

15

Brantley’s Title VII claims are based on his allegation that the
School District denied him “equal terms and conditions of employment,”
failed to promote him, and deprived him “of his rights based on Race.”
2d Am. Compl. ¶ 570, ECF No. 53.
The School District asserts that,
other than the claim related to TRS membership, any other Title VII
claims are barred because they were litigated in a prior action before
the Court. See Brantley v. Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 4:06-CV-89
(CDL), 2008 WL 794778, at *5-*10 (Mar. 20, 2008) (granting summary
judgment against Brantley on all Title VII claims), aff’d, 325 F.
App’x 754, 754 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Brantley did not
respond to the School District’s arguments on this point. The School
District also argues that any discrimination claims based on issues
with Brantley’s workers’ compensation are barred by the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act. Brantley
did not respond to this argument, either.
Therefore, to the extent
Brantley is attempting to assert Title VII claims based on grounds
other than the TRS membership issue, those Title VII claims are deemed
abandoned.
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599
(11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[T]he onus is upon the parties to
formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied
upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”).

41

discriminatory intent by circumstantial evidence, the courts use
the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

Vessels, 408 F.3d at 767-68.

Under this framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination.

Id. at 768.

Plaintiffs’ claims are

analogous to two typical disparate treatment claims: disparate
pay

and

failure-to-hire.

In

the

disparate

pay

context,

a

plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing

that

“(1)

he

belongs

to

a

protected

class;

(2)

he

received low wages; (3) similarly situated comparators outside
the protected class received higher compensation; and (4) he was
qualified to receive the higher wage.”

Tucker v. Fulton Cnty.,

Ga., 470 F. App’x 832, 835 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

In

the failure-to-hire context, a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that “(i) he or she
belonged to a protected class; (ii) he or she was qualified for
and applied for a position that the employer was seeking to
fill; (iii) despite qualifications, he or she was rejected; and
(iv) the position was filled with an individual outside the
protected class.”
establishes

a

Vessels, 408 F.3d at 768.

prima

facie

case,

the

burden

If the plaintiff
shifts

to

the

employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
its employment action.

Id.

If the employer meets this burden,

42

then the plaintiff must establish that each proffered reason is
pretext for discrimination.

Id.

None of the Plaintiffs pointed to evidence that they were
actually eligible to join the TRS or that similarly situated
white employees were permitted to join.

Therefore, Defendants

are

these

entitled

to

summary

judgment

on

claims.

An

examination of the nature of the two retirement systems and the
background of how the confusion over TRS eligibility arose makes
this clear.
A.

Georgia’s Public School Retirement Systems

The State of Georgia established two retirement systems for
employees of the State’s public schools: the TRS and the PSERS.
See

O.C.G.A. § 47-3-20 (establishing TRS); O.C.G.A. § 47-4-20

(creating PSERS).
1.

Teachers Retirement System

TRS membership is open to teachers.

O.C.G.A. § 47-3-60(a).

For purposes of the TRS, the term “teacher” includes not only
“Classroom

teachers”

and

“Persons

employed

capacity,”

O.C.G.A. §

47-3-1(28)(A),

but

also

in

a

clerical

school

nurses,

school librarians and administrative officials, O.C.G.A. § 47-31(28)(B)-(D).
time

public

The term “teacher” also includes specified fullschool

managers

or

supervisors

who

elect

to

participate in the TRS: (1) “lunchroom managers or supervisors,”
(2) “maintenance managers or supervisors,” (3) “transportation

43

managers

or

supervisors”

supervisors.”

(4)

“warehouse

O.C.G.A. § 47-3-1(28)(E).

maintenance,
supervisors

and

transportation
may

elect

and

to

managers

Full-time lunchroom,

warehouse

become

O.C.G.A. §§ 47-3-63(a), 47-4-40(d).

or

managers

members

of

the

or
TRS.

If these employees do not

elect to become members of the TRS, then they are members of the
PSERS.

O.C.G.A. § 47-4-40(a).

The TRS statute does not define

the terms “manager” and “supervisor.”
While

the

TRS

statute

provides

that

the

term

“teacher”

includes maintenance and warehouse managers or supervisors, it
does not make a similar provision for custodial managers or
supervisors.

Plaintiffs

appear

to

assert

that

custodial

managers or supervisors should be considered to be maintenance
managers

or

supervisors.

differentiated
personnel.”
employee”

The

“maintenance

Georgia

legislature,

personnel”

from

however,

“custodial

See O.C.G.A. § 47-4-2(20) (defining “public school

as

including

“school

bus

drivers,

school

lunchroom

personnel, school maintenance personnel, and school custodial
personnel”).

Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that the term

“teacher”

the

in

TRS

statute

includes

custodial

managers

or

supervisors.
According

to

Plaintiffs,

“any

employee”

of

the

School

District was eligible for the TRS prior to 1980, but after 1980
only

supervisors

and

managers

could

44

participate

in

the

TRS.

This assertion is based on the testimony of Kinard Latham, who
served as the School District’s plant services manager from 1974
to 1996.

Latham Dep. 25:9-26:17, 27:7-20.

misunderstood the law.

Latham, however,

Ever since the TRS was established by

the Georgia General Assembly, the TRS has always been open only
to “teachers.”

Teachers Retirement System Act, 1943 Ga. Laws

640, 645 § 3(1) (“Any person who becomes a teacher after January
1, 1944, shall become a member of the retirement system as a
condition

of

his

employment[.]”);

accord

id.

at

641

§

1(5)

(including teachers, supervisors of teachers, and administrative
officials

who

“teacher”).
include

The

definition

teachers

definition

lunchroom,

supervisors.

lunchroom

supervise

of

maintenance,

in

the

“teacher”
and

definition

did

not

warehouse

of

originally

managers

or

In 1976, the Georgia General Assembly modified the

of

“teacher”

managers

or

to

include

supervisors,

“full-time

public

school

full-time

public

school

maintenance managers or supervisors and full-time public school
warehouse

managers

or

supervisors”

who

opt

in

to

the

TRS.

Public School Employees’ Retirement System Act Amended, 1976 Ga.
Laws 577, 579 § 3.
2.

Public School Employees Retirement System

PSERS membership is open to any “public school employee”
who is not eligible for the TRS or does not elect to participate
in the TRS.

O.C.G.A. § 47-4-40(a); accord O.C.G.A. § 47-4-2(20)

45

(stating that for purposes of PSERS, “public school employee”
does not include teachers or other school personnel covered by
the TRS).
bus

The term “public school employee” includes “school

drivers,

school

lunchroom

personnel,

school

personnel, and school custodial personnel.”

maintenance

O.C.G.A. § 47-4-

2(20).
B.

TRS Eligibility Determinations

No School District employees have the authority to approve
or

reject

TRS

membership

applications.16

Rather,

the

School

District can request that employees be considered for the TRS,
and it is the responsibility of the TRS board of trustees to
“determine in doubtful cases whether any person” is a “teacher”
for purposes of becoming a member of the TRS.

O.C.G.A. § 47-3-

1(28).
As discussed above, lunchroom, maintenance, transportation
and

warehouse

purposes

of

the

employees
TRS

if

O.C.G.A. § 47-3-1(28)(E).

may

be

considered

they

are

“managers

“teachers”
or

for

supervisors.”

Although the TRS statute does not

define the terms “manager” and “supervisor,” the TRS provided
the School District with guidance on the meaning of those terms.
When the School District requested TRS membership for several
16

Plaintiffs contend that School District employees do have authority
to approve or reject TRS applications. In support of this assertion,
Plaintiffs cite the deposition testimony of Kinard Latham.
Latham
Dep. 25:9-26:11.
The cited testimony, however, does not establish
that Latham or any other School District employee had authority to
approve or reject TRS applications.

46

plant services employees in 1993 (including Plaintiffs Biggers,
Dowdell, Griffin, and Richardson), the TRS denied the request
because the TRS concluded that the employees were not managers
or supervisors.
plant services

The TRS informed the School District that a
employee must be “designated (by title) as a

manager or supervisor” to be eligible for TRS membership.
Letter from Rodgers/TRS.

The TRS

1993

further stated that plant

services employees who are not managers or supervisors are not
eligible for TRS membership “even though the positions encompass
supervisory responsibilities.”

Id.

Plaintiffs nonetheless assert that TRS membership is open
to any employee who supervised a person, tool, or task.

This

assertion is based on the deposition testimony of Latham, who
testified that it was his understanding that a “supervisor . . .
is a person that supervises somebody or a person in charge of
something that they are supervising.”

Latham Dep. 28:8-29:13.

Latham’s understanding, however, is just plain wrong.
Latham’s

understanding,

the

TRS

statute’s

Under

limitation

of

membership to maintenance “managers” and “supervisors” would be
discarded as meaningless because every plant services employee
has some responsibility for supervising at least a tool or a
task.

Moreover, Latham’s understanding directly contradicts the

TRS’s own definition of “manager” and “supervisor.”

The TRS

statute gives the TRS—not an employee of the School District

47

such as Latham—the power to “determine in doubtful cases whether
any person” is a “teacher” for purposes of becoming a member of
the

TRS.

O.C.G.A. §

definition

of

those

47-3-1(28).

terms

Therefore,

controls,

not

the

Latham’s

TRS’s

mistaken

understanding.
C.
It

TRS Enrollment of Unqualified Employees
cannot

significant

be

seriously

confusion among

(particularly

Latham)

disputed

several

regarding

that

there

has

been

School District employees

TRS

eligibility.

During

Latham’s tenure, if a plant services employee asked to join the
TRS,

Latham

application.

provided

that

Once

employee

the

employee

with

requested

a

the

membership
application,

Latham’s assistant, Carolyn French, completed the TRS paperwork
for Latham to sign.

Once Latham signed the paperwork, he sent

it to the School District’s personnel department.

As discussed

in more detail below, that process has since been changed, and
the School District’s human resources department now processes
TRS membership requests.
As discussed above, Latham believed that “supervisor” meant
a person who supervised a person, tool, or task, and Latham
tried

to

help

a

number

of

non-supervisor

plant

services

employees whose roles encompassed supervisory responsibilities
join the TRS.

It is undisputed that several plant services

employees were granted membership in the TRS during the 1980s

48

even though they were not managers or supervisors.
107:10-109:5.

According

to

Plaintiffs,

the

Cooper Dep.

non-supervisory

plant services employees who were accepted into the TRS were
white.

Pls.’ Facts to Which There Are No Genuine Issues ¶¶ 13-

15, ECF No. 105 at 22-23.
D.

1993 TRS Enrollment Attempt

In 1993, Latham tried to help several more plant services
employees join the TRS.

Those plant services employees included

Plaintiffs Biggers, Dowdell, Griffin, and Richardson.

Latham

wrote

School

a

memorandum

to

George

Wylie,

who

was

the

District’s assistant superintendent for personnel at the time.
1993 Latham Mem.
received

In that memorandum, Latham stated that he

requests

from

eligible” for the TRS.
had

a

“signed

several

employees

Id. at 1.

statement

from

“who

feel

they

are

Latham also stated that he
[the

employees’]

supervisor

indicating that they do oversee other employees that work under
them.”

Id.; accord Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Supp. of Mots. for

Summ. J. Ex. 4, Note from L. Bell 1, ECF No. 98-4 at 1 (“When
Godfrey Biggers and Daryl Shealy are working together, Godfrey
supervises Daryl.”).

Wylie, in turn, wrote a letter to the TRS

on behalf of the employees.

In the letter, Wylie listed the

employees and their titles, and he stated that the employees
were

“employed

responsibilities.”

in

positions

which

encompass

1993 Wylie Letter to TRS.

49

supervisory
Wylie further

stated:

“Your

consideration

in

granting

Teachers

System status would be greatly appreciated.”
Paul

Rodgers

of

the

TRS

Retirement

Id.

responded

to

Wylie’s

letter,

stating that it did not appear that any of the employees were
eligible for membership in the TRS “even though the positions
encompass

supervisory

Rodgers/TRS.

Rodgers

responsibilities.”
further

stated

1993

that

“if

Letter
a

from

person

is

designated (by title) as a manager or supervisor, he would be
eligible for TRS membership,” and the person’s application would
have to state that he “is a manager or supervisor).
E.

Id.

School District Investigations Regarding TRS

In 1995, David Jackson, the School District’s director of
personnel
employees”

services
who

“became

worked

under

aware

of

Latham

a

limited

that

were

number

of

“erroneously

permitted to apply for participation in TRS, even though they
did not have the classification titles and did not perform the
duties of a supervisor.”

Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Resp. to Pls.’

Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 102, Jackson Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 126-2.
After

the

error

was

discovered,

the

employees

who

were

erroneously permitted to join the TRS “were permitted to remain
in TRS because a mistake was made and the employees had relied
upon that error.”

Id.

Jackson “undertook to prevent additional

errors in processing applications to TRS.”

Id.

Accordingly,

after 1995, the School District did not process TRS admission

50

requests

for

employees

requirements of TRS.”
In

2000,

the

“who

did

not

meet

the

statutory

Id.

School

District’s

treasurer,

Fred

Jones,

concluded an investigation regarding TRS applications of plant
services employees.
6.

Jones

Jones Dep. 29:15-24, 31:6-17, ECF No. 123-

initiated

employees

who

complaint

in

were
1998

the

not

investigation

permitted

regarding

TRS

to

after

join

plant

the

eligibility,

TRS

services
lodged

contending

a

that

some ineligible plant services employees were permitted to join
the

TRS

while

others

were

not.

Id.

at

31:21-32:14;

accord

Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 116
Attach. 1, Letter from G. Hughley to G. Gilbert (May 4, 1998),
ECF No. 126-16 at 2 (discussing complaints made to the NAACP
following

a

1998

meeting

between

Jones

and

plant

services

employees regarding TRS eligibility).
During

his

investigation,

Jones

reviewed

a

list

of

employees who were enrolled in the TRS, he reviewed their job
descriptions, and he considered the TRS regulations.
38:5-18.
as

Jones concluded that employees with a job title such

“supervisor,”

“leaderman,”

“clerical,”

“manager” were properly enrolled in the TRS.
16, 52:1-8.

“director,”

and

Jones Dep. 49:3-

If those terms were not included in an employee’s

title, that “raised a question” in Jones’s mind.
10.

Jones Dep.

Id. at 54:8-

As a result of the investigation, Jones concluded that in

51

the 1980s Latham “permitted some Muscogee County School District
plant services workers to fill out TRS applications and list
erroneous job titles for themselves.”
previous

affidavit

testimony).

Id. at 29:15-24 (citing

Jones

also

concluded

that

“Latham’s conduct was inappropriate and would not be tolerated.”
Id.

at

30:7-15.

incident

and

Jones

that

determined

“the

proper

that

it

was

procedures

were

prohibit the conduct from occurring again.”

Id.

an
in

isolated
place

to

In addition,

Jones concluded that there are no employees who are not enrolled
in the TRS but should be.
The
Jones’s

employees

Id. at 55:25-56:2.

who

investigation

lodged

asked

that

the
the

complaint

that

ineligible

prompted

employees

be

removed from the TRS, but Jones concluded that he did not have
authority to do that.

Id. at 54:11-25.

Jones presented his

findings to the superintendent and the school board, and they
did

not

elect

to

seek

removal

of

the

employees

erroneously been permitted to join the TRS.

who

had

Id. at 57:5-19;

Cooper Dep. 109:12-22 (stating that School District made the
decision to permit three employees to remain in the TRS even
though they were not eligible).

Later, when Don Cooper joined

the School District, he consulted with the superintendent and
with

counsel

employee,

and

regarding
the

remain in the TRS.

the

school

TRS

board

membership
decided

to

of

one

let

the

Cooper Dep. 184:20-185:7, 187:2-8.

52

ineligible
employee

It

appeared

to

Jones

that

the

fundamental

problem

the

employees complained of—being denied admission to the TRS—“could
only be fixed by the Georgia legislature who enacted the laws
that created the two different retirement systems.”
55:7-12.

Jones Dep.

Therefore, Jones’s objective was to “find a remedy

that would be acceptable to the group who made the complaint and
would be acceptable to the school district.”

Id. at 54:25-55:4.

Accordingly, Jones proposed that the School District “acquire
and provide . . . a supplemental retirement plan” for employees
who were not eligible to enroll in the TRS.

Id. at 55:5-7.

The

school board accepted the proposal and voted to implement a
Supplemental Retirement Plan, a 403(b) defined contribution plan
to which employees could contribute a percentage of their income
and receive a matching contribution from the School District.
Id. at 61:24-63:13, 98:12-99:2.
F.

School District “Supervisor” Policy

At some point, the School District promulgated a policy on
the definition of “supervisor.”

Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Resp.

to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 108, MCSD Policy on Definition of
“Supervisor,” ECF No. 126-8.
used

for

purposes

of

Among other things, the policy is

recommending

TRS

enrollment.

Id.

In

determining whether an employee is a “supervisor,” the School
District’s human resources department “looks at the actual job
duties of the position.”

Id.

“Job title does not determine an

53

employees’

[sic]

supervisory

status[,

and]

employees

are

not

considered supervisors merely because their job duties encompass
some

supervisory

activities.”

Id.

Under

the

policy,

in

determining whether an employee is a “supervisor,” the School
District evaluates a number of factors, including whether the
employee has authority to recommend the promotion of another
employees, responsibly directs other employees, has the duty to
assign

shifts

and

duties

to

other

workers,

and

exercises

authority that requires the use of independent judgment.
According

to

Cooper,

the

School

District’s

definition

Id.
of

“supervisor” is based on several sources, including the TRS and
PSERS statutes, TRS and PSERS guidelines, and letters to the
School District from TRS and PSERS.

Defs.’ App. of Docs. in

Supp. of Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 76, Cooper Aff. ¶ 19, ECF No.
98-76; Defs.’ App. of Docs. in Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J.
Ex. 102, Jackson Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 126-2 (stating that School
District follows TRS statutory requirements “by examining both
the titles of the job classification as well as the actual job
duties of the classification”).
G.

2007 TRS Requests

In 2007, several additional plant services employees asked
to join the TRS.

In response, then-director of plant services

James Tanksley sent the employees a memorandum explaining that
non-supervisory employees were not eligible for TRS membership

54

and that the issue was, at that time, the subject of litigation
brought by plant services and custodial employees.

Cooper Dep.

Ex. 39, Mem. from J. Tanksley to All Plant Services Employees
(Feb. 19, 2007), ECF No. 98-97 at 289.

Tanksley encouraged the

employees to contact their state representatives in support of a
new law that would “open teacher retirement to all employees of
school districts,” and he offered to provide assistance with
such correspondence.
H.

Id.

Analysis of Timely Federal Claims

Plaintiffs’ federal law claims fail for three independent
reasons.

First,

Plaintiffs

failed

to

point

the

Court

to

evidence demonstrating that they were qualified to participate
in the TRS.

In both the discriminatory compensation context and

the failure-to-hire context, a plaintiff must establish that he
was qualified for the desired wage or job.
at 835; Vessels, 408 F.3d at 768.

Tucker, 470 F. App’x

It is undisputed that only

“maintenance managers or supervisors” and “warehouse managers or
supervisors” are eligible to join the TRS.

Here, Plaintiffs

pointed to no evidence that Brantley, a masonry mechanic, and
Williams, a roofer, met the TRS’s definition of “maintenance
manager

or

supervisor”

or

“warehouse

manager

or

supervisor.”

While Plaintiffs pointed to evidence that Mabry, a roofer, is
“second in charge” and that his job thus sometimes encompasses
supervisory responsibility, Plaintiffs pointed to no evidence

55

that the TRS considers “second in charge” maintenance employees
to be “supervisors” within the meaning of the TRS statute.

And,

as discussed above, though the TRS statute provides that the
term “teacher” includes maintenance and warehouse supervisors,
it does not make a similar provision for custodial supervisors
like

McCoy,

Parham,

and

Thompson.

Therefore,

there

is

no

evidence that McCoy, Parham, and Thompson were eligible to join
the TRS.
Second,
that

although

similarly

Plaintiffs

situated

white

make

conclusory

employees

were

allegations

permitted

to

participate in the TRS, Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to point to
actual

evidence

treated
black

in

similarly

employees

systems.

the

record

situated

with

demonstrating

white

regard

to

employees

that

Defendants

differently

enrollment

in

the

than

retirement

Plaintiffs have the burden to establish that they were

“similarly situated in all relevant respects” to white employees
who were permitted to join the TRS.

Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of

Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010).

The Court cannot

discern from the evidence Plaintiffs cited which employees were
accepted into the TRS, and it is also difficult to discern the
race,

job

While

some

others,

title,

and

employees

Plaintiffs

job
may

did

duties
have

not

of

been
point

each

accepted

treated
to

employee.

differently

evidence

that

than
these

employees were “similarly situated in all relevant respects” to

56

Plaintiffs,
supporting

and
an

Plaintiffs

inference

disparate treatment.
For

these

failed

to

race

was

that

point
the

to

evidence

basis

for

the

Id.

two

reasons,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintiffs

failed to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’

§

1981,

that

§

the

1983,

and

Title VII

claims

fail.
To

the

evidence

extent

supporting

a

prima

present

facie

record

case

but

contains

that

some

Plaintiffs’

counsel simply did a poor job of directing the Court to that
evidence,

the

Court

finds

that

Defendants

summary judgment for a separate reason.
evidence

demonstrating

that

the

reason

are

entitled

to

Defendants produced
that

employees

were

treated disparately, if they were in fact so treated, is that
the

School

District

and

its

employees

did

a

poor

job

administering the retirement system eligibility process.
sometimes
allowed

haphazard

some

administration

employees

to

game

of

the

that

system,

process
and

it

of

Their

may

have

may

have

resulted in some employees being treated unfairly compared to
others.

However,

Plaintiffs

pointed

to

no

evidence

in

the

record showing that Defendants’ explanation was a pretext for
racial discrimination.

Again, once an employer articulates a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action,
then

the

plaintiff

has

the

burden

57

to

establish

that

each

proffered reason is pretext for discrimination.
F.3d at 768.

Vessels, 408

Without some evidence that Plaintiffs were denied

an opportunity to participate in the TRS based on their race and
that they were otherwise qualified to participate in it, their
federal law claims fail.

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ federal law claims.
IV.

Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims
Plaintiffs also asserted state law claims for fraud, breach

of contract, and tortious interference with contract.
claims involve unique issues of state law.

These

Also, it appears

from the record that some of these claims may have already been
litigated, or are presently being litigated, in state court.

In

2007, several School District employees filed suit against the
School District, alleging that the School District discriminated
against the plaintiffs in the administration of TRS eligibility.
2007

Compl.;

Whitaker

“discrimination”
discrimination).

Press

alleged

in

Plaintiffs

Release
the
in

(making

2007

the

2007

clear

Complaint
state

that
was

court

the
race

action

include Biggers, Brantley, Dowdell, Griffin, Mabry, Marshall,
McCoy, Parham, Richardson, Starks, and Thompson.
did

not

provide

the

Court

with

any

documents

The parties
from

the

2007

action other than the Complaint, and it is therefore not clear
from the present record how (or if) the case was resolved.

58

Given that today’s Order disposes of all of Plaintiffs’
federal law claims and given the nature of the remaining state
law

claims,

the

Court

jurisdiction

over

them.

district

courts

jurisdiction
district

may

over

court

a

has

declines
See

28

decline

[state

to

exercise

U.S.C. §
to

original jurisdiction[.]”).

all

1367(c)(3)

exercise

law] claim

dismissed

supplemental

.

.

claims

.

supplemental
if .

over

(“The

.

which

.

the

it

has

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law

claims are dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Regarding

the

federal

law

claims,

the

Court

grants

the

School District Defendants’ summary judgment motions as to each
Plaintiff: Godfrey Biggers (ECF No. 88), Carlton Brantley (ECF
No. 104), Henry Crawford (ECF No. 90), Larry Dowdell (ECF No.
91), Melvin Griffin (ECF No. 94), Pondiel Mabry (ECF No. 89),
William

Marshall

(ECF

No.

96),

Connie

McCoy

(ECF

No.

99),

Hayward Parham (ECF No. 100), Reginal Richardson (ECF No. 95),
Jerry Starks (ECF No. 93), Patrick Stroud (ECF No. 92), Larry
Thompson (ECF No. 97), and Calvin Williams (ECF No. 103).

The

Court likewise grants the summary judgment motions of Defendant
Kinard Latham (ECF No. 101) and Defendant Thomas M. Shellnutt
(ECF

No.

denies

102)

regarding

Plaintiffs’

the

summary

federal
judgment

59

law

claims.

motion

(ECF

The

Court

No.

105).

Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 158) is moot.

The Court

dismisses Plaintiffs’ state law claims without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 30th day of October, 2012.

S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

60