Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation v. SOWEGA Motors Inc et al

Filing 65

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 62 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) and for Injunction. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 10/24/2012.(CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION,

*
*

Plaintiff,
*
vs.

CASE NO. 4:10-CV-111 (CDL)
*

SOWEGA MOTORS INC., ROBERT W.
DOLL and SANDRA W. DOLL,
Defendants.

*
*

O R D E R
Presently
Motor

pending

Acceptance

Final Judgment
Through

III

before

the

Corporation’s

Court

(“NMAC”)

is

Plaintiff

Motion

for

Against Defendant Robert W. Doll

and

for

Injunction

Transfers (ECF No. 62).

Nissan

Entry

of

Counts I

Further

Prohibiting

On

Pretrial

For the reasons set forth below, the

motion is granted in part and denied in part.

NMAC is entitled

to a final judgment as to Counts I through III of its Complaint,
but NMAC is not entitled to the injunctive relief it seeks.
DISCUSSION
I.

Background
NMAC

filed

this

action

seeking

to

enforce

personal

guaranties made by Defendant Robert W. Doll (“Mr. Doll”) in
connection
businesses.

with

NMAC’s

loans

to

Mr.

Doll’s

car

dealership

The Court previously granted summary judgment to

NMAC on its claims for enforcement of the personal guaranties.
Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Sowega Motors Inc., No. 4:10CV-111 (CDL), 2012 WL 3987417, at *7-*9 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 11,
2012).

The Court concluded that Mr. Doll is liable to NMAC in

the amount of $1,418,059.73.

Id. at *11.

NMAC also asserts that Mr. Doll fraudulently transferred
certain property to his wife, Defendant Sandra W. Doll (“Mrs.
Doll”), in order to keep NMAC from collecting sums due under the
loan agreements.

The Court previously found that a genuine fact

dispute exists as to whether Mr. Doll fraudulently transferred
the property to Mrs. Doll.
would

be

a

“factually

Id. at *9.

intensive

The Court noted that it

exercise”

to

reconcile

disputed evidence—an exercise “best left to a jury.”
II.

the

Id.

NMAC’s Rule 54(b) Motion
NMAC

seeks

guaranty claims.
Robert

W.

Doll

entry

of

a

final

judgment

on

the

personal

Pl.’s Mot. for Entry of Final J. Against Def.
on

Counts

I

Through

III

and

for

Injunction

Prohibiting Further Pretrial Transfers, ECF No. 62 [hereinafter
Pl.’s Rule 54(b) Mot.].

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b), “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one
or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

Mr. Doll represents that he cannot

assert that there is reason for delay, and he does not object to

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the entry of final judgment against him.

Accordingly, NMAC’s

motion for entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) is granted.
III. NMAC’s Motion for Injunction
NMAC also seeks an order enjoining Mr. and Mrs. Doll from
transferring or otherwise encumbering their assets during the
pendency of this action.
preliminary
65(a).

injunction

NMAC contends that it is entitled to a
under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

“A preliminary injunction may be granted to a moving

party who establishes (1) substantial likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the
injunction

issues;

(3)

the

threatened

injury

to

the

movant

outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the
opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be
adverse to the public interest.”

Ga. Latino Alliance for Human

Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012)
(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

NMAC

has

not,

however,

established that it has a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of its fraudulent transfer claim or that it will
suffer

an

irreparable

injury

unless

the

injunction

issues.

Therefore, the balance of equities weighs against the requested
injunction, and the requested injunction would not be in the
public interest.

For the same reasons, NMAC is not entitled to

an injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 and the
Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, NMAC’s Motion for Entry of
Final Judgment Against Defendant Robert W. Doll
Through

III

and

for

Injunction

Prohibiting

On

Counts I

Further

Pretrial

Transfers (ECF No. 62) is granted in part and denied in part.
NMAC’s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

NMAC’s

motion for entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) is granted.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter final judgment in
favor

of

NMAC

and

against

Mr.

Doll

in

the

amount

of

$1,418,059.73.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of October, 2012.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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