Cline v. Mentor Corporation
Filing
65
ORDER denying 58 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 01/24/2013. (CGC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
IN RE MENTOR CORP. OBTAPE
*
TRANSOBTURATOR SLING PRODUCTS
*
LIABILITY LITIGATION
*
MDL Docket No. 2004
4:08-MD-2004 (CDL)
Case Nos.
4:10-cv-5060 (C. Cline)
4:11-cv-5065 (I. Morey)
*
O R D E R
The summary judgment motions of Defendant Mentor Worldwide
LLC (“Mentor”) as to the actions filed by Plaintiffs Carol Cline
(“Cline”) and Irene Morey (“Morey”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
present choice of law issues that are dispositive of the pending
motions.
Both
of
these
product
liability
actions
were
originally filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota before being transferred to this Court for
pretrial
proceedings
Litigation.
In
both
by
the
cases,
Judicial
Panel
Plaintiffs,
who
on
Multidistrict
were
surgically
implanted with Mentor’s suburetheral stress urinary incontinence
sling
product,
ObTape
Transobturator
Tape
(“ObTape”),
allege
that ObTape was defectively designed and/or manufactured, that
it proximately caused their injuries, and that Mentor did not
adequately warn their physicians about the risks associated with
ObTape.
Plaintiffs contend that Mentor has a strong connection
to Minnesota and that Minnesota law applies to their claims.
Mentor seeks summary judgment on the issue of which state’s
law is applicable to each Plaintiff’s claims.
Mentor argues
that Ohio substantive law governs Cline’s claims because she is
an
Ohio
resident
who
was
implanted
relevant medical treatment in Ohio.
with
ObTape
and
had
all
Mentor contends that if the
Court grants Mentor’s summary judgment motion on the choice of
law
issue,
prejudice
then
Cline’s
because
she
action
failed
should
to
be
dismissed
the
reference
without
Product
Ohio
Liability Act in her Complaint.
Mentor
maintains
that
Washington
law
applies
to
Morey’s
claims because that is where she was implanted with ObTape and
where she received treatments related to the alleged failure of
the
product.
Mentor
contends
that
if
the
Court
applies
Washington substantive law to Morey’s claims, then it must also
apply
Washington’s
statute
of
limitations,
which
would
bar
Morey’s claims.
For
Minnesota
the
law
reasons
applies
set
to
forth
below,
the
the
claims
of
Court
Cline
finds
and
that
Morey.
Therefore, Mentor’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Cline
(ECF No. 58 in 4:10-cv-5060) is denied, as is Mentor’s Motion
for Summary Judgment against Morey (ECF No. 51 in 4:11-cv-5065).
In addition, Morey’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 36 in 4:11-cv5065) is granted.
2
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
In determining whether a
genuine
Fed. R.
dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant
or necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
DISCUSSION
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred
Plaintiffs’ diversity actions from the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota to this Court for pretrial
proceedings.
Therefore, the Court must apply the choice-of-law
rules of Minnesota, the transferor forum, to determine which
state
law
controls.
In
re
Gen.
Am.
Life
Ins.
Co.
Practices Litig., 391 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2004);
Sales
accord
Murphy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 208 F.3d 959, 965 (11th Cir.
2000) (“Our system contemplates differences between different
states’
laws;
thus
a
multidistrict
3
judge
asked
to
apply
divergent
state
positions
on
a
point
of
law
would
face
a
coherent, if sometimes difficult, task.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Under Minnesota law, the Court must first determine whether
there
is
an
forums.”
actual
conflict
“between
the
laws
of
[the]
two
Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604
N.W.2d 91, 93-94 (Minn. 2000).
If there is no actual conflict
regarding substantive law or if the law at issue is procedural,
then the Court may apply Minnesota law.
Christian v. Birch, 763
N.W.2d 50, 58 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
If there is an actual
conflict, then the Court must determine “whether the law of both
states can be constitutionally applied.”
Jepson v. Gen. Cas.
Co. of Wis., 513 N.W.2d 467, 469-70 (Minn. 1994).
Finally, if
there is an actual conflict but no constitutional impediment
exists for the application of either state’s law, the Court must
apply the “significant contacts test,” which consists of five
“choice-influencing factors.”
at 94.
Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d
At this stage of the proceedings, the facts are viewed
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.
I.
Mentor’s Connection to Minnesota
Mentor distributed ObTape in the United States between 2003
and 2006.
Pl.’ Cline’s Statement of Additional Facts Relevant
to Mentor’s Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. 8, Wyatt Decl. ¶ 41, ECF
No.
59-8
in
4:10-cv-5060.
It
4
is
undisputed
that
“Mentor
Corporation” was incorporated in Minnesota from 1969 to 2009.
It is also undisputed that, “for regulatory purposes, Mentor
Minnesota
was
the
designated
manufacturer
ObTape and ObTape introducer needles.”
and
distributor
of
Def.’s Resp. to Pl.
Morey’s Statement of Additional Facts Relevant to Mentor’s Mot.
for Summ. J. ¶ 17, ECF No. 59-2 in 4:11-cv-5065.
Mentor’s 2003
510(k) Premarket Notification submission to the Food and Drug
Administration lists “Mentor Minneapolis” as the “Manufacturer”
of
ObTape
with
an
address
in
Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
Pl.
Cline’s Statement of Additional Facts Relevant to Mentor’s Mot.
for
Summ.
J.
Attach.
7,
510(k)
Premarket
Notification
at
MENTOR/OBTAPE CONFIDENTIAL_058373, ECF No. 59-7 in 4:10-cv-5060.
The 510(k) also lists Analytic Biosurgical Solutions (ABISS) in
France as the “Contract Manufacturer.”
It
is
responsible
undisputed
for
specifications.
that
Mentor’s
assuring
Id.
Minnesota
employees
were
ObTape
conformed
to
that
Specifically, a quality inspection manager at
“Mentor Minnesota” reviewed certificates of conformity provided
by the contract manufacturer and made sure that “[n]o ObTape was
shipped
unless
conformity.
[it]
was
accompanied
Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 17-19.
by
a
certificate
of
It is further undisputed
that Mentor’s product evaluation department was in Minnesota and
was
responsible
for
investigating
complaints
associated
with
ObTape, making adverse consequences reports to the United States
5
Food
and
Drug
Administration
(“FDA”),
and
representatives regarding adverse events.
ObTape
training
sales
Mentor’s 510(k) for
states that any complications from the use of ObTape
should be reported to Mentor’s quality assurance department in
Minneapolis,
explanted
Minnesota
and
devices.
that
510(k)
Mentor
would
MENTOR/OBTAPE CONFIDENTIAL_058409 to 058410.
any
Notification
Premarket
analyze
at
Mentor admits that
complications associated with ObTape that were known to Mentor
were subject to internal investigations at Mentor’s facilities
in
Minnesota.
related
to
Mentor
ObTape
contends
was
not
that
limited
investigation
to
Mentor’s
of
issues
Minnesota
location, but Mentor did not point to any evidence in support of
this contention.
Mentor
asserts
that
“Mentor
Corporation”
merged
into
“Mentor Worldwide LLC” in 2009 and is now a citizen of New
Jersey.
Def.’s Resp. to Pl. Cline’s Statement of Additional
Facts Relevant to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 1, ECF No. 63-3.
II.
Cline’s Action
Cline is a resident of the State of Ohio.
All medical
treatment related to Cline’s claims occurred in Ohio.
Cline
experienced symptoms of urinary incontinence and was referred to
a urologist in 2004.
The urologist implanted Cline with ObTape
in
In
November
urologist
2004.
because
she
April
was
2006,
Cline
experiencing
6
returned
pain,
to
the
bleeding,
and
discharge.
The urologist conducted an examination and found an
erosion of the ObTape.
He removed the exposed portion of ObTape
and sent it to pathology.
Cline filed her action in the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota on September 24, 2010.
asserts
claims
for
strict
liability,
negligence,
Cline
breach
of
warranty, failure to warn, and punitive damages.
Cline contends
that
manufacturing,
Mentor
“was
negligent
in
designing,
marketing, labeling, packaging, and selling the Ob[]Tape and in
failing to warn [Cline] of the defective nature of its product.”
Cline Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1 in 4:10-cv-5060.
III. Morey’s Action
Morey
medical
is
a
resident
treatment
Washington.
In
of
related
2003,
the
to
Morey
State
Morey’s
consulted
of
Washington.
claims
her
occurred
urologist,
All
in
Dr.
Kathleen Kobashi, regarding bladder prolapse, urge incontinence,
and stress urinary incontinence.
Dr. Kobashi implanted Morey
with ObTape on December 29, 2004.
Following the surgery, Morey
suffered
from
several
complications,
vaginitis, and extrusion of the ObTape.
including
discharge,
On June 14, 2005, Morey
was examined by Dr. Fred Govier, who told Morey that she had an
erosion and that he needed to remove as much of the ObTape as
possible.
Dr.
Govier
told
Morey
that
experienced were because of her sling.
7
the
problems
she
had
Dr. Govier also told
Morey that he and Dr. Kobashi had stopped using ObTape by that
point.
Neither Dr. Govier nor Dr. Kobashi specifically told
Morey that they believed ObTape was defective.
Morey contends
that she first learned that her sling might be defective in
2011, when her son-in-law saw something on television regarding
sling products.
Morey Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 55 in 4:11-cv-5065.
Morey filed her action in the United States District Court
for
the
District
of
Minnesota
on
May
11,
Complaint asserts a claim for negligence.
Mentor
“failed
designing,
to
exercise
manufacturing,
ordinary
testing,
and
2011.
Morey’s
She contends that
reasonable
marketing,
care
in
labeling,
packaging, selling and/or distributing the Mentor ObTape vaginal
sling [and] negligently failed to provide adequate warnings and
instructions
to
[Morey]
and
Mentor ObTape vaginal sling.”
4:11-cv-5065.
to
her
physicians
regarding
the
Morey Compl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 1 in
Morey also contends that Mentor was negligent “by
failing to promptly and adequately notify [Morey, her] doctors,
the medical community, and the public at the earliest possible
date of known defects in the Mentor ObTape vaginal sling.”
¶ 24.
Id.
Morey also seeks to add a claim for punitive damages.
See Pl. Morey’s Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 36 in 4:11-cv-5065.
8
IV.
Application of Minnesota Choice of Law Principles
A.
Is There an Actual Conflict Between Minnesota Law and
the Law of Ohio and Washington?
An actual conflict of law “exists if the choice of one
forum’s law over the other will determine the outcome of the
case.”
Nodak
Mut.
Ins.
Co.,
604
N.W.2d
at
94.
Regarding
Cline’s claims, it is undisputed that Minnesota permits common
law product liability claims, while product liability claims in
Ohio are governed by the Ohio Product Liability Act (“OPLA”),
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2307.71-2307.80.
The OPLA was “intended
to abrogate all common law product liability claims or causes of
action.”
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.71(B).
Although Cline and Mentor appear to agree that an actual
conflict exists between Ohio law and Minnesota law, the Court is
skeptical as to whether this difference is outcome determinative
as
contemplated
by
Minnesota’s
choice
of
law
rules.
It
is
undisputed that Minnesota permits common law product liability
claims
couched
in
terms
of
strict
liability
and
negligence,
while Ohio has abrogated such claims, replacing them with a
statutory cause of action for product liability.
It is unclear,
however, that the differences in these types of causes of action
would
make
any
difference
in
the
outcome
of
this
lawsuit.
Neither party pointed to any outcome determinative differences
between the product liability law in Minnesota and Ohio.
9
As the
Court
understands
differences
in
application
of
Minnesota
the
law
the
choice
are
law
not
from
of
law
sufficient
the
principles,
to
non-forum
differences must affect the outcome.
mere
authorize
state.
the
Those
The present record does
not demonstrate how Cline’s proof and Mentor’s defenses would be
different, as a practical matter, if Cline’s claims are pursued
under
Minnesota’s
common
law
product
liability
instead of under Ohio’s product liability statute.
principles
Although the
Court doubts that any practical outcome determinative difference
has
been
demonstrated
by
the
present
record,
the
Court
nevertheless assumes for purposes of the remainder of this Order
that such a difference does exist given the fact that Cline has
made no effort to contest that assumption.
Regarding
Morey’s
action,
product
liability
claims
in
Washington are governed by the Washington Product Liability Act
(“WPLA”),
Wash.
Rev.
Code
§
7.72.010,
et
seq.
Like
Ohio’s
product liability statute, the WPLA preempts common law product
liability remedies.
Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec.
Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Wash. 1989) (“[T]he WPLA creates a
single cause of action for product-related harms that supplants
previously existing common law remedies.”).
liability
negligence.
claim”
includes
any
claim
A WPLA “product
previously
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.010(4).
based
on
If a plaintiff
brings product liability claims under both the WPLA and a common
10
law negligence theory, the “the negligence theory is subsumed
under the WPLA product liability claim.”
Macias v. Saberhagen
Holdings, Inc., 282 P.3d 1069, 1074 (Wash. 2012).
differences
law,
the
certainly
parties,
exist
like
between
the
Minnesota
parties
in
and
Cline,
Although
Washington
failed
to
demonstrate how those differences will affect the outcome based
on the facts presented by the present record.
Court
is
skeptical
exists.
Mentor’s
that
Nevertheless,
argument
that
an
outcome
given
that
an
outcome
Accordingly, the
determinative
Morey
did
not
determinative
difference
challenge
difference
exists, the Court assumes that such a difference does exist for
purposes of this Order and moves to the next step of the choice
of law analysis.
B.
Can Minnesota Law Be Constitutionally Applied?
The next question is whether the law of each state can be
constitutionally applied.
It is undisputed that the law of Ohio
can be constitutionally applied to Cline’s claim and that the
law of Washington can be constitutionally applied to Morey’s
claim.
Mentor contends, however, that Minnesota law cannot be
constitutionally applied.
For Minnesota’s law to be selected in
a constitutionally permissible manner, Minnesota “must have a
significant
contact
or
significant
aggregation
of
contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”
11
Jepson, 513 N.W.2d at 469.
In support of its argument that Minnesota law cannot be
constitutionally
applied
here,
Mentor
cites
an
unreported
federal district court case, Newman v. Stryker Sales Corp., Civ.
No.
09-2866
2010).
(JRT/JJK),
2010
WL
3926200
(D.
Minn.
Sept.
30,
In Newman, the plaintiff was an Ohio resident who was
implanted with the defendant’s product in Ohio.
Id. at *1.
The
defendant was a Michigan corporation whose only contact with
Minnesota
was
that
plaintiff there.
Id.
it
conducted
business
unrelated
to
the
When the defendant argued that it would
be arbitrary and fundamentally unfair to apply Minnesota law
under these circumstances, the plaintiff did not oppose that
assertion.
Id.
at
*10.
Therefore,
the
court
found
Minnesota law could not be constitutionally applied.
that
Id.
Newman is readily distinguishable from the facts in this
action.
Here, Mentor’s significant contacts with Minnesota at
the time of the events giving rise to both Cline’s and Morey’s
actions are sufficient to render application of Minnesota law
constitutionally
Corporation”
was
permissible.
incorporated
It
is
undisputed
in
Minnesota
that
until
“Mentor
2009.
As
discussed above, it is also undisputed that Mentor completed
several key manufacturing tasks in Minnesota, including ObTape
quality control, and that Mentor represented to the FDA that
ObTape was manufactured by Mentor in Minnesota.
It is further
undisputed that Mentor’s Minnesota employees were responsible
12
for evaluating any complaints regarding ObTape and for making
adverse consequences reports to the FDA.
employees
were
representatives
also
responsible
regarding
adverse
Mentor’s Minnesota
for
events.
training
Finally,
sales
it
is
undisputed that any explanted ObTape was to be sent to Mentor in
Minnesota for analysis and that complications associated with
ObTape
were
subject
facilities.
to
investigation
at
Mentor’s
Minnesota
Thus, when Mentor marketed ObTape to Plaintiffs’
physicians and provided warnings about the product, Mentor was a
Minnesota
company.
When
ObTape
was
manufactured,
quality
controlled, distributed, and implanted into Plaintiffs’ bodies,
Mentor was a Minnesota company.
And when Plaintiffs experienced
complications with ObTape and the ObTape had to be explanted,
Mentor
was
a
Minnesota
company.
Accordingly,
it
is
constitutionally permissible for Minnesota law to be applied to
Plaintiffs’ claims.
Minnesota
law
could
See Jepson, 513 N.W.2d at 470 (finding that
constitutionally
be
applied
to
dispute
regarding application of a North Dakota insurance policy to a
car accident that occurred in Arizona because of the plaintiff’s
sufficient contacts with Minnesota).
C.
Choice-Influencing Factors
Having assumed for purposes of this Order that there is an
actual conflict between Minnesota law and the law of Ohio and
Washington and having found no constitutional impediment to the
13
application of the law of any of these states to the respective
claims, the Court next evaluates the five choice influencing
factors employed by the Minnesota courts: “(1) predictability of
result; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order;
(3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the
forum’s governmental interest; and (5) application of the better
rule of law.”
1.
“This
Id.
Predictability of Result
factor
addresses
whether
the
choice
of
law
was
predictable before the time of the transaction or event giving
rise to the cause of action.”
Schumacher v. Schumacher, 676
N.W.2d 685, 690 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
This factor is not
usually considered in tort cases because many tort cases, such
as car accident cases, result from accidental encounters and not
consensual transactions.
Neither
Plaintiff’s
Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d at 94.
action
resulted
from
an
accidental
encounter; Plaintiffs (or their surgeons) intentionally selected
Mentor’s product to treat their symptoms.
law
to
product-liability
cases
“Applying Minnesota
involving
a
Minnesota
manufacturer enables the manufacturer . . . to know the rules
that will govern [its] transactions.”
Kolberg-Pioneer, Inc. v.
Belgrade Steel Tank, 823 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)
(finding that predictability of results favored application of
Minnesota
law
in
an
action
by
14
a
seller
against
a
Minnesota
manufacturer for indemnity related to a product failure that
occurred in Montana).
Mentor cannot seriously dispute that it
was reasonably aware that its connection to Minnesota at the
time
Cline
authorize
and
the
Morey
were
application
implanted
of
with
Minnesota
its
product
substantive
claim brought in the state of Minnesota.
law
would
to
a
The Court finds that
the first factor weighs in favor of applying Minnesota law.
2.
In
Maintenance of Interstate and International Order
evaluating
this
factor,
the
courts
“are
primarily
concerned with whether the application of Minnesota law would
manifest disrespect for [another state]’s sovereignty or impede
the interstate movement of people and goods.
at 471.
Jepson, 513 N.W.2d
“An aspect of this concern is to maintain a coherent
legal system in which the courts of different states strive to
sustain, rather than subvert, each other’s interests in areas
where their own interests are less strong.”
Id.
Here, both Cline and Morey’s claims have genuine contacts
with Minnesota because their ObTape was manufactured and sold by
Mentor while Mentor was a Minnesota corporation.
Even though
they received ObTape in their home states and allegedly suffered
injury there, the Court cannot find that application of the law
of the state where the product was manufactured in an action
filed in that state would thwart the legitimate interest of any
other
state
in
having
its
law
15
applied
to
such
an
action,
particularly when the plaintiff voluntarily files her claim in
Minnesota and rejects any protections that may be available to
her under the law of her home state.
Therefore, the Court
concludes that this second factor does not weigh in favor of
applying Ohio law to Cline’s claim or Washington law to Morey’s
claim.
3.
Simplification of the Judicial Task
The Court finds that the judicial task is not complicated
by the application of either state’s law.
This third factor is
neutral.
4.
Advancement of the Forum’s Governmental Interest
“The fourth choice influencing factor is which choice of
law most advances a significant interest of the forum.”
513 N.W.2d at 472.
Jepson,
“This factor is designed to ensure that
Minnesota courts do not have to apply rules of law that are
inconsistent with Minnesota’s concept of fairness and equity.”
Schumacher,
676
N.W.2d
omitted).
“In
governmental
interest
at
691
considering
of
which
has
law
Minnesota,”
“the public policy of both forums.”
Minnesota
(internal
“weighty
the
quotation
will
Court
advance
must
marks
the
consider
Id.
interest
in
compensating
tort
victims” and also “a clearly expressed public policy in holding
a
product’s
product.”
maker
responsible
Kolberg-Pioneer,
for
the
costs
Inc.,
823
N.W.2d
16
of
at
a
defective
675.
In
enacting
their
product
liability
statutes,
both
Ohio
and
Washington, like Minnesota, expressed an interest in vindicating
the
rights
of
those
defective product.
who
have
been
legitimately
harmed
by
a
Even though Ohio and Washington may take a
different approach than Minnesota, the Court cannot find based
on the present record that Minnesota law is in conflict with the
public
policy
underlying
liability statutes.
the
Ohio
and
Washington
product
The Court finds that the fourth factor
favors application of the law of the forum in which the actions
were filed—Minnesota.
5.
Application of the Better Rule of Law
The fifth and final choice influencing factor “is whether,
in an objective sense, [Ohio/Washington] or Minnesota has the
better rule of law.”
Jepson, 513 N.W.2d at 472.
In general,
“this factor is addressed only when the other four factors are
not dispositive as to which state’s law should be applied.”
Schumacher,
676
N.W.2d
at
691-92.
Mentor
appears
to
misunderstand this factor and argues that the better rule of law
is applying the law of Plaintiffs’ home states to their claims.
The factor, however, is intended to inquire into which state’s
substantive law provides the better rule.
473.
Jepson, 513 N.W.2d at
Here, the relevant question is whether it is better to
have remedies available only within the framework of a product
liability statute or to permit common law claims in product
17
liability cases.
Neither party offers a compelling explanation
of which approach is the better rule.
“Sometimes different laws
are
an
neither
different.”
better
Id.
nor
worse
in
objective
way,
just
For these reasons, the Court concludes that
the final factor is neutral.
6.
The
factors
Summary of Choice Influencing Factors
Court
finds
establishes
that
that
an
evaluation
Cline’s
claim,
of
the
Morey’s
influencing
claim,
and
Mentor’s activities have sufficiently significant contacts with
the forum state to support the application of Minnesota law.
Accordingly, Mentor’s summary judgment motion against Cline (ECF
No. 58 in 4:10-cv-5060) is denied, and Cline’s claims are not
subject
to
dismissal.
Similarly,
Mentor’s
summary
judgment
motion against Morey (ECF No. 51 in 4:11-cv-5065) is denied.
V.
Morey’s Motion to Amend
As the Court previously noted, Morey seeks to add a claim
for punitive damages.
Mentor’s only argument in opposition to
Morey’s proposed amendment is that Morey’s claim is time-barred
under Washington law.1
The Court has concluded that Minnesota
law, not Washington law, applies.
1
Mentor did not argue that
Under Minnesota’s borrowing statute, Washington’s three-year statute
of limitations applies to claims based on Washington substantive law.
Minn. Stat. § 541.31 subdiv. 1(a)(1); Wash. Rev. Code. § 7.72.060(3).
But here, the Court has concluded that Minnesota substantive law
applies to Morey’s claims, so Minnesota’s six-year statute of
limitations applies. Minn. Stat. § 541.31 subdiv. 1(b); id. § 541.05
subdiv. 1(5). Morey’s claims are timely under Minnesota law.
18
Morey’s
proposed
punitive
damages
claim
is
time-barred
under
Minnesota law, and Mentor did not advance any other argument in
opposition to Morey’s proposed amendment.
Therefore, the Court
grants Morey’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 36 in 4:11-cv-5065).
Morey shall file her amendment to her complaint within 7 days of
today’s order.
CONCLUSION
As
discussed
above,
the
Court
finds
that
Minnesota
should be applied to the claims of Cline and Morey.
law
The Court
therefore denies Mentor’s Motion for Summary Judgment against
Cline
(ECF
No.
58
in
4:10-cv-5060)
and
Mentor’s
Motion
for
Summary Judgment against Morey (ECF No. 51 in 4:11-cv-5065).
The Court grants Morey’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 36 in 4:11-cv5065).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of January, 2013.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19
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