State Auto Property and Casualty Company v. Matty et al
Filing
36
ORDER granting 26 Motion to Quash. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 05/29/2012. (CGC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
*
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
CASE NO. 4:11-CV-14 (CDL)
*
FRANK GRIFFIN, KAREN GRIFFIN
and RACHEL GRIFFIN,
*
Defendants.
*
O R D E R
This action is the second declaratory judgment action filed
by
State
Auto
Property
and
Casualty
Company
(“State
Auto”)
arising from Rachel Griffin’s collisions with cyclists Matthew
Scott Matty and Michael Davis.
Matty died as a result of his
injuries suffered in the collisions, and Davis suffered serious
personal injuries.
At the time of the collisions, State Auto
insured Rachel Griffin and her parents, Frank and Karen Griffin.
In the first declaratory judgment action, State Auto sought a
declaration that the two collisions should be considered one
accident under the Griffin’s insurance policy, and therefore,
the
total
policy
limits
available
for
both
personal
injury
liability claims was $100,000.
State Auto lost that action, and
it
there
has
$100,000
been
determined
personal
injury
that
liability
were
limits
two
accidents
available
for
with
each
claim.
In this second action, State Auto seeks a declaration
that it did not act in bad faith in addressing the settlement
demands related to the collisions.
contends that
registry
of
Specifically, State Auto
its initial decision to pay $100,000 into the
the
Court
pursuant
to
its
first
declaratory
judgment/interpleader action and its subsequent payment of an
additional
$100,000
into
the
registry
of
the
Court
upon
a
determination that two accidents occurred negate any bad faith
that would be required to hold State Auto legally responsible
for any liability arising from these two accidents in excess of
the $200,000 that it has paid into the registry of the Court.
During
action,
discovery
State
Auto
in
sent
this
second
subpoenas
to
declaratory
the
judgment
attorneys
who
represented Matty and Davis in the first declaratory judgment
action, seeking correspondence regarding that action between the
attorneys for Matty and Davis.
State Auto seeks the documents
in an attempt to discover evidence that the attorneys colluded
to “set up” State Auto for a bad faith claim.
The attorneys for
Matty and Davis filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, claiming
that the subpoenas seek work product that was produced during a
joint
and
produced
common
the
privileged,
defense
responsive
for
in
camera
arrangement.
documents,
inspection.
The
which
attorneys
they
Having
have
claim
are
reviewed
the
documents, the Court finds that they are not relevant to the
2
issues
action.
to
be
decided
in
this
present
declaratory
judgment
For that reason, the subpoenas are quashed.
DISCUSSION
The issue presented in this declaratory judgment action is
whether State Auto acted in bad faith when it failed to settle
the underlying claims of Matty and Davis within its insureds’
liability policy limits.
See Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt,
262 Ga. 267, 268, 416 S.E.2d 275, 276 (1992) (“An insurance
company may be liable for damages to its insured for failing to
settle
the
claim
guilty
of
negligence,
compromise
the
of
an
injured
fraud,
claim.”).
person
or
To
bad
where
the
insurer
is
faith
in
failing
to
determine
whether
an
insurer
engaged in bad faith in its handling of a claim, the standard
applied by the Court (and by the factfinder if a genuine factual
dispute exists) is whether “the insurer, in view of the existing
circumstances,
has
accorded
the
insured
‘the
consideration it gives its own interest.’”
same
faithful
Id. at 269, 416
S.E.2d at 276 (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Exum, 123 Ga. App.
515, 519, 181 S.E.2d 704, 707 (1971)).
“[W]hen the [insurance]
company has knowledge of clear liability and special damages
exceeding the policy limits,” the issue is “whether the insurer
acted
unreasonably
settlement offer.”
in
declining
Id.
3
to
accept
a
time-limited
It is clear that the focus in a bad faith failure to settle
claim is on the conduct of the insurance company.
Consequently,
the Court cannot conceive of how correspondence between counsel
for the injured parties who obtained judgments in excess of the
insured’s policy limits could be relevant to a subsequent bad
faith failure to settle claim against the insurance company by
its insured.
State Auto suggests that such evidence may be
relevant based on the following dicta from the Georgia Supreme
Court’s opinion in Holt, which quoted a federal district court
judge from the district of Oregon as follows:
Nothing in this decision is intended to
rule of law that would mean that a
attorney under similar circumstances could
insurer for an excess judgment merely by
settle within the policy limits and by
unreasonably short time within which the
remain open.
lay down a
plaintiff's
“set up” an
offering to
imposing an
offer would
Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Mot. to Quash Subpoenas to Non-Parties 67, ECF No. 31 (quoting Holt, 262 Ga. at 269, 416 S.E.2d at 276
(quoting Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co, 392 F. Supp. 717, 721
(D. Or. 1975))).
“[c]ollaboration
Griffins]
to
Based on this dicta, State Auto argues that
among
‘set
up’
legitimate discovery.”
Subpoenas
to
counsel
a
bad
for
faith
[Matty,
case
is
Davis,
the
and
the
subject
of
Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Mot. to Quash
Non-Parties
11.
The
differently.
4
Court
interprets
Holt
As previously noted, the issue for determination in a bad
faith failure to settle action is whether the conduct of the
insurance
company,
under
all
of
the
relevant
circumstances,
demonstrates that it acted in bad faith in its handling of the
claims presented to it.
An indicator of that bad faith is the
extent to which the insurer favored its own interest over the
interest of its insured.
district
judge
from
motivation
of
the
resolution
of
this
The Holt dicta, quoting the federal
Oregon,
insured’s
issue.
does
not
counsel
It
indicate
is
simply
that
the
to
the
that
the
pertinent
indicates
imposition of an unreasonably short time within which an offer
to settle would remain open is a relevant factor in evaluating
whether the insurance company acted unreasonably in failing to
accept such an offer.
The Court does not understand how the
insured’s motivation has any bearing on whether the insurance
company
responded
motivation,
relevant.
such
properly.
as
an
Of
course,
unreasonably
the
short
result
of
deadline,
that
may
be
It is relevant not because the insured or its counsel
was attempting to “set up” the insurance company but because the
amount of time that the insurance company was given to respond
to
an
offer
of
settlement
goes
directly
to
the
insurance
company’s conduct and the constraints on its ability to respond.
The Court is unpersuaded that the Holt “set up” dicta means that
the subjective intent of the parties or their attorneys has any
5
relevance to the determination of bad faith on the part of the
insurance company.
Even if the attorneys for Matty and Davis
did have the subjective intent to “set up” State Auto for a bad
faith claim, their intent
simply
is not relevant to whether
State Auto’s response was in bad faith.
State Auto has pointed
the Court to no holding of any Georgia appellate court that
supports State Auto’s “set up” theory.
Moreover, the Court does
not find the authority relied on by State Auto to be persuasive
on the point for which State Auto relies on it. 1
If State Auto
wishes to plow new ground, it will have to wait until the case
gets to the Eleventh Circuit, at which time the Court of Appeals
may have the opportunity to refer the question to the Georgia
Supreme Court.2
CONCLUSION
Because the documents that State Auto seeks through its
subpoenas are not relevant and are not reasonably calculated to
1
Under State Auto’s theory, if a lawyer for an insured drafted a
letter consistent with Holt and part of his motivation in doing so was
his hope that it would be rejected so that he could pursue a bad faith
claim, then his motivation would be relevant in evaluating whether the
insurance company acted in bad faith. The Court is convinced that the
Georgia Supreme Court never envisioned that its quotation of a federal
judge’s dicta would ever be carried to this extreme.
2
This Court recognizes that it has the authority to certify the
question to the Georgia Supreme Court, but it finds the resolution of
the issue to be so clear, even as a matter of first impression, that
referral to the Georgia Supreme Court would be a waste of that Court’s
limited time and resources and would unnecessarily delay the
disposition of this action.
6
lead to the discovery of
admissible
evidence,
the Motion to
Quash those subpoenas (ECF No. 26) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 29th day of May, 2012.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
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