RICHARDSON et al v. QUITMAN COUNTY, GEORGIA
Filing
117
ORDER denying 90 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 91 Motion for Judgment NOV; granting 92 Motion for New Trial; and denying 93 Motion for Remittitur to the extent set forth in the Order. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 07/01/2013 (jcs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
DENISE RICHARDSON and CALVIN
RICHARDSON,
*
*
Plaintiffs,
*
vs.
CASE NO. 4:11-CV-124 (CDL)
*
COREY MASON,
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
INTRODUCTION
Trial by jury is one of the hallmarks of our justice system
and one of the bedrock principles upon which our Nation was
founded.
It is embedded in our Constitution. 1
Our founders
believed it to be more than a judicial procedure; they viewed it
as a safeguard against tyranny. 2
It is therefore not surprising
that the judiciary has long recognized the deference to be paid
to jury verdicts. 3
1
But that deference is not absolute.
Juries
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . .
shall be by Jury . . . .”); U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
2
In 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to Thomas Paine describing
trial by jury as “the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a
government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” Letter
from T. Jefferson to T. Paine (July 11, 1789), in III The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson: Being His Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports,
Messages, Addresses, and Other Writings, Official and Private 69, 71
(H.A. Washington ed., Taylor & Maury 1853).
3
See Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (“Courts
are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict
are not immune from human fallibility, and they sometimes get it
wrong.
In those exceptional cases where they get it terribly
wrong, the Court is as duty bound to correct the error as it is
to
decline
to
disturb
a
jury
verdict
based
personal disagreement with the outcome. 4
solely
upon
its
This is one of the
exceptional cases.
The
jury
here
Georgetown-Quitman
returned
County
a
$5,000,000
deputy
sheriff
verdict
in
his
against
a
individual
capacity for violating the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights
to be free from unreasonable searches.
The reading of the jury
verdict was not the first indication that the trial had not gone
well for the Defendant.
direct
examination,
During Plaintiff Denise Richardson’s
she
embellished
her
description
of
Defendant’s conduct by volunteering that “God don’t like ugly,”
as she preached to the jury that she was a “God-fearing woman”
who lived by “the Good Book.”
Two audible “Amens” could be
heard from the jury box in response to her mini-sermon.
Whether
this public display of affirmation reflected an impassioned jury
incapable
of
rendering
a
verdict
based
on
the
evidence
and
merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or
conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more
reasonable.”); accord Spurlin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, 620
(5th Cir. 1976) (“[F]acts once found by a jury in the context of a
civil trial are not to be reweighed and a new trial granted lightly.”)
4
See Spurlin, 528 F.2d at 620 (stating that the standard for
disregarding a jury verdict and granting a new trial is generally
whether the verdict is “against the great weight of the evidence.”)
2
consistent with the law cannot be determined; but it certainly
foreshadowed the ultimate result.
As
searches
explained
were
in
more
admittedly
detail
later
invasive,
but
in
this
they
Order,
were
based
the
on
reasonable suspicion, lasted no longer than five minutes, and
resulted in no significant or lasting physical injury.
Yet, the
jury awarded each Plaintiff $2,500,000 in compensatory damages
for what they endured. 5
Defendant now seeks judgment as a matter
of law based on qualified immunity, or, in the alternative, a
new trial and/or remittitur of the verdict (ECF Nos. 91, 92,
93).
For the reasons alluded to at the opening of this Order,
deciding whether to disregard the wisdom of a panel of fair and
impartial jurors is never an easy task.
one is not too hard.
stand.
is
But quite frankly, this
It is obvious that these verdicts cannot
As explained in the remainder of this Order, Defendant
entitled
to
qualified
immunity
as
to
Denise
Richardson’s
claim and to a new trial on Calvin Richardson’s claim.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Upon receiving a tip from a confidential informant that a
vehicle
being
driven
by
Plaintiff
5
Calvin
Richardson
(“Mr.
Although the Court has not conducted an exhaustive nationwide verdict
search, the Court is unaware of any jury verdict from the Middle
District of Georgia in a Fourth Amendment search claim brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that comes close to the award of
compensatory damages in this case. And the Court would be surprised
to find a comparable verdict anywhere in the country that has been
upheld.
3
Richardson”)
(“Mason”),
contained
a
Sheriff’s
illegal
sergeant
Office,
drugs,
with
stopped
the
Mr.
Defendant
Corey
Georgetown-Quitman
Richardson’s
vehicle
Mason
County
at
the
Liberty Food Mart on U.S. Highway 82 in Georgetown, Georgia to
conduct
an
investigatory
stop.
Plaintiff
Denise
Richardson
(“Mrs. Richardson”) was a passenger in the vehicle.
During the
stop, Mr. and Mrs. Richardson were allegedly subjected to strip
searches that included examination, exposure, and touching of
their
body
parts
and
cavities.
The
invasive
body
searches
yielded no contraband, but they have produced this lawsuit. 6
Claiming that the searches, investigatory stop, and their
ultimate arrests violated their Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, Plaintiffs sued
the persons who participated in the stop, searches, and arrests
in
their
official
and
individual
capacities,
the
Georgetown-
Quitman County Sheriff in his official and individual capacity,
and
Georgetown-Quitman
constitutional
County.
violations
They
pursuant
sought
to
42
damages
for
U.S.C.
§
(“§ 1983”) and also asserted various state law claims.
6
the
1983
Prior to
The label given to the type of search a person is subjected to is of
no legal significance.
It is the nature and specific factual
circumstances of the search that are important. However, for purposes
of a written order, it is sometimes expedient to use a shorthand
reference to the particular search being analyzed.
In this Order,
“strip search” and “body cavity search” refer to a non-consensual
search for contraband on a person’s body that includes the
examination, exposure, and/or physical touching of parts of the body
that are typically covered with clothing in public settings.
4
trial, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants
on several claims.
Richardson v. Quitman Cnty., Ga., No. 4:22-
CV-124 (CDL), 2012 WL 6569283 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2012).
As a
result,
Mrs.
the
only
claims
that
remained
for
trial
were
Richardson’s Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Mason,
Mr.
Richardson’s
Fourth
Amendment
strip
search
claim
against
Mason, and Mr. Richardson’s Fourth Amendment and state law false
arrest claims against Mason.
Based on rulings during the trial,
the only surviving claims submitted to the jury were Mr. and
Mrs.
Richardson’s
strip
individual capacity.
search
claims
against
Mason
in
his
These remaining claims did not encompass
whether the decision to stop and search Plaintiffs was initially
authorized
but
were
restricted
to
the
reasonableness
of
the
strip searches allegedly performed.
The jury returned a verdict as follows.
Regarding both Mr.
and Mrs. Richardson’s claims, the jury specifically found that
“Defendant
federal
intentionally
constitutional
unreasonable
search[;
committed
right
that]
not
the
acts
to
that
be
violated
subjected
Defendant’s
acts
[their]
to
were
an
the
proximate or legal cause of damages sustained by [them; and that
they] should be awarded damages to compensate [them].”
Verdict
and Special Interrogatories to the Jury at 1-2, ECF No. 82.
jury then awarded each Plaintiff “$2.5 million.”
5
Id. at 2.
The
The jury made the following specific factual findings in
response to special interrogatories submitted by the Court to
assist
the
Court
in
immunity defense.
making
its
ruling
on
Mason’s
qualified
Regarding Mrs. Richardson’s claim, the jury
found that Mason directed another government agent, who was a
female
emergency
medical
technician,
to
search
under
Mrs.
Richardson’s clothing; that Mason’s instructions to the agent
could “reasonably be interpreted to include directions to search
Denise Richardson’s vaginal and/or rectal areas;” that Mason had
“a reasonable suspicion that Denise Richardson had illegal drugs
hidden under her clothing in the areas that he directed she be
searched;”
that
the
female
government
agent
did
search
for
illegal drugs under Mrs. Richardson’s clothing; that the female
agent visually inspected Mrs. Richardson’s breasts during the
search;
and
that
the
female
Richardson’s
body
during
the
agent
physically
search
but
did
touched
not
Mrs.
probe
her
vaginal or rectal areas and did not touch her unclothed breast
area.
Id. at 3-5.
The jury found that the search did not last
more than five minutes.
Id. at 5.
The evidence at trial also
established that the search was conducted inside the convenience
store restroom.
Regarding Mr. Richardson’s claim, the jury found that Mason
searched for illegal drugs under Mr. Richardson’s clothing; that
Mason
visually
inspected
Mr.
Richardson’s
6
“buttocks,
groin
(testicles)”
during
the
search;
that
Mason
had
a
reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Richardson had drugs hidden in the areas that
he
searched;
that
Mason
physically
probed
Mr.
Richardson’s
testicles and rectal areas during the search; that the search
was not done in a manner that reasonably shielded the search of
Mr. Richardson from public view; and that the search did not
last
more
than
five
minutes.
Id.
at
6-7.
Evidence
was
presented at trial that the search of Mr. Richardson occurred in
the parking lot of the convenience store on one of the busiest
roads in the county in view of members of the public.
DISCUSSION
I.
Qualified Immunity and Judgment as a Matter of Law
Qualified
immunity
protects
officers
acting
within
the
scope of their discretionary authority from liability as long as
they
did
not
violate
“clearly
established”
law.
Rehberg
v.
Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 838 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct.
1497 (2012).
his
Once Mason established that he was acting within
discretionary
authority,
Plaintiffs
had
the
burden
of
showing that (1) Mason committed a constitutional violation and
(2) the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the
time of the incident.
(11th Cir. 2003).
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358
“[T]his two-pronged analysis may be done in
whatever order is deemed most appropriate for the case.”
7
Grider
v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009)).
In determining whether a constitutional right is “clearly
established,” the Court looks to whether a reasonable officer
would have fair and clear notice “that his conduct was unlawful
in the situation he confronted.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d
1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This
standard
can
be
met
in
a
number
of
ways.
First,
the
conduct may be “so egregious” as to violate the Constitution on
its face absent clarifying case law, id. at 1350-51, but this is
considered a narrow exception, Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts,
323 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003).
Second, a broad principle
in case law may apply to a specific set of facts “with obvious
clarity
to
the
point
that
every
objectively
reasonable
government official facing the circumstances would know that the
official’s
official
conduct”
acted.
violated
Vinyard,
federal
311
F.3d
law
at
at
1351.
the
time
Because
the
most
precedents are tied to particularized facts, such decisions are
rare.
1287
Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. Decosta, 587 F.3d 1280,
(11th
precedents
Cir.
can
2009)
clearly
(per
curiam).
establish
a
Third,
right
when
fact-specific
the
specific
conduct currently at issue is “not fairly distinguishable” from
that already held to violate a federal right.
at 1352.
8
Vinyard, 311 F.3d
It
is
undisputed
that
Mason’s
conduct
falls
within
the
scope of his job functions and thus his discretionary authority.
Therefore, Plaintiffs had the burden of showing Mason is not
entitled to qualified immunity.
Harland,
370
F.3d
1252,
1267
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
(11th
Cir.
2004).
The
Court
previously ruled that Mason was entitled to qualified immunity
for conducting the stop of Plaintiffs’ vehicle, for searching
the vehicle, and for the pat down and pocket search of Mr.
Richardson.
found
that
Richardson, 2012 WL 6569283 at *10-*12.
a
conflict
in
the
evidence
as
to
The Court
what
happened
regarding the strip and cavity searches precluded judgment as a
matter
of
law
on
those
claims
determinations by the jury.
and
required
Id. at *12-*13.
certain
factual
The jury made
various fact determinations, and the Court applies the law to
those
findings
to
determine
whether
based
on
those
facts
a
reasonable government official would have known that the conduct
violated clearly established law.
Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d
1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002). 7
7
The Court submitted special interrogatories to the jury on several
disputed factual issues that were essential to Mason’s qualified
immunity defense. Mason contends that the Court should have submitted
additional and more specific questions. While it is clear that it is
the Court’s duty to apply the law to the factual findings made by the
jury to determine whether a government defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity, the procedure for making this determination can be
cumbersome during a jury trial, often requiring the jury to make
detailed factual findings without fully understanding the consequences
of those findings. Moreover, since those factual findings must be
unanimous, the Court must balance the need to obtain the essential
9
The Court begins its analysis with a determination of the
clearly
established
law
regarding
the
constitutionality
of
searches that involve the removal of clothing, the exposure of
sensitive body parts, the examination of body cavities, and the
touching of body parts that are typically covered with clothing.
The Court has located no binding precedent directly on point
that sets forth the parameters of searches of persons who are
stopped because of probable cause that the vehicle in which they
are riding contains contraband and who are searched prior to
being
arrested.
The
Eleventh
Circuit,
however,
has
clearly
described the constitutional parameters for searches of persons
after
they
reasonable
have
law
been
arrested.
enforcement
officer
The
Court
would
finds
that
any
understand
that
the
constitutional requirements for such searches of a person who
has been arrested would at a minimum apply to a person who has
not
yet
been
arrested.
Therefore,
the
Court
must
examine
whether the facts found by the jury and construed in favor of
Plaintiffs violate the clearly established minimum standard for
such searches.
The Eleventh Circuit, in an en banc decision, stated that
for
a
“post-arrest
investigatory
strip
search,”
a
law
enforcement officer must have “at least a reasonable suspicion”
information with the risk of propounding
interrogatories that could lead to a hung jury.
10
unnecessary
detailed
that the person to be searched possesses contraband in the area
of the body to be searched.
1279-80
(11th
standard
may
includes
touching
this
Cir.
be
decision
by
2005)
higher
Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272,
(en
“especially
genitalia
the
banc)
and
Eleventh
(noting
where
a
the
actual
.
.
penetrating
Circuit,
that
the
search
.
anuses”).
After
reasonable
officer
would be on fair notice that in order to conduct the type of
strip/body cavity search conducted here, he needed reasonable
suspicion or else he would run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
For
both
searches,
the
jury
found
that
Mason
had
a
reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs had illegal drugs hidden
under
their
Therefore,
clothing
Mason
is
in
the
clearly
areas
that
entitled
to
were
searched.
qualified
immunity
regarding his decision to search the areas that were searched.
But
even
if
the
initial
decision
to
search
those
areas
was
authorized, the manner of the search must still be reasonable.
See
id.
at
1281
(“While
searches
need
not
be
delicately
conducted in the least intrusive manner, they must be conducted
in a reasonable manner.”).
In determining the reasonableness of
a search, the law is clearly established that a law enforcement
officer
must
invasion
of
balance
personal
the
need
privacy.
for
Id.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
the
at
search
1279;
against
accord
Bell
the
v.
This determination requires
consideration of several factors, including “‘the scope of the
11
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted.’”
Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188,
192 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Bell and stating that the Supreme
Court
set
out
this
test
of
reasonableness
for
“instances
requiring less than probable cause”).
Based on the jury’s answers to the special interrogatories,
the facts regarding Mrs. Richardson are as follows.
Mason had
reasonable suspicion that Mrs. Richardson had drugs hidden in
the areas that he directed the female agent to search.
directed
clothes.
the
female
agent
to
search
under
Mrs.
Mason
Richardson’s
The search was performed in a bathroom inside the
convenience store.
During the search, the female agent viewed
Mrs. Richardson’s breast area, but she did not touch or probe
Mrs. Richardson’s vaginal, rectal, or unclothed breast areas.
Under
these
factual
circumstances,
the
Court
finds
that
a
reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would not have known
under clearly established law that the manner of this search
violated Mrs. Richardson’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Therefore,
Mason is entitled to qualified immunity on Mrs. Richardson’s
Fourth Amendment claim. 8
8
The Court observes that when it denied Mason’s motion for summary
judgment as to this claim, it found that the record at summary
judgment, when construed in Mrs. Richardson’s favor, would support a
denial of qualified immunity if the jury made certain factual findings
that were supported by the summary judgment record. Richardson, 2012
12
Based on the jury’s special interrogatory responses, the
facts regarding Mr. Richardson’s claim are as follows.
Mason
had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Richardson had illegal drugs
in the areas that he searched.
During the search, Defendant
Mason made Mr. Richardson lower his pants.
He then probed Mr.
Richardson’s testicles and rectal area, all in public view in
the parking lot of a busy convenience store located along a
well-travelled
highway
with
members
of
the
proximity to the location of the search.
presented
that
the
probing
created
public
in
close
Evidence was also
some
degree
of
physical
injury to Mr. Richardson’s rectal area that lasted for several
months after the search.
The evidence and factual findings,
with reasonable inferences construed in favor of Mr. Richardson,
essentially establish that Mr. Richardson was subjected to an
involuntary
prostate
and
testicular
exam
performed
by
non-
medical personnel for all the public to see with no exigent
circumstances requiring that the exam be conducted in the public
parking lot.
It is hard to imagine a more invasive violation of
one’s personal privacy.
Under these circumstances, the Court
finds that a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
have known that the manner in which this particular search was
conducted
was
clearly
unreasonable
and
a
violation
of
Mr.
WL 6569283 at *13.
The jury did not make those findings, however,
which partially explains why Mason is entitled to qualified immunity
post-trial when he was not entitled to qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage.
13
Richardson’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.
See Evans, 407
at 1283 (noting that while a general reasonableness standard
seldom puts officers on notice, certain facts “take the manner
of the search[] well beyond the ‘hazy border’ that sometimes
separates lawful . . . from unlawful conduct”). 9
A contrary
holding would convert qualified immunity to absolute impunity,
at least as it relates to strip searches conducted in public
view.
Accordingly, Mason is not entitled to qualified immunity
and likewise not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to
Mr. Richardson’s Fourth Amendment claim.
II.
New Trial and Remittitur
In
the
remittitur
alternative,
regarding
against him.
Mr.
Mason
moves
Richardson’s
for
a
new
Fourth
trial
Amendment
and/or
claim
In support of his motion for new trial, Mason
points to rulings made by the Court during the trial that he
considers erroneous.
He also argues that the amount of damages
awarded is grossly excessive and not supported by the evidence,
thus
requiring
a
new
trial
or
9
remittitur
of
the
amount
of
Mason relies on an unpublished decision where a female officer
searched a female in a parking lot by using the clothed suspect’s
underwear to “floss” her private areas after a dog alerted to the
presence of contraband in her pelvic area. The Court notes that the
Court of Appeals panel held only that there was sufficient
justification for the search and that the officer was entitled to
qualified immunity on an excessive force claim.
Dominguez v. Metro.
Miami-Dade Cnty., 167 F. App’x 147, 150 (11th Cir. 2006).
That
holding would not reassure a reasonable officer that the public cavity
search performed here was reasonable and compliant with the Fourth
Amendment. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1283.
14
damages.
The Court rejects Mason’s arguments that the Court’s
rulings during the trial regarding the admissibility of certain
evidence
and
relating
reversible error. 10
to
the
jury
instructions
constitute
The generous damage award in this case,
however, causes some pause.
A new trial is appropriate when the verdict is “against the
great weight of the evidence.”
Watts v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 842 F.2d 307, 311 (11th Cir. 1988).
may
be
required
if
the
damages
awarded
Moreover, a new trial
by
the
jury
are
so
grossly excessive that the jury was likely swayed by passion or
prejudice.
Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435,
1447 (11th Cir. 1985).
The Court has previously found that
Mason had probable cause to stop the Richardson vehicle, and the
jury specifically found that Mason was justified in searching
Mr. Richardson in the areas that were searched.
embarrassment
or
stress
associated
with
the
Therefore, any
actual
stop
and
being subjected to a search under his clothes was not caused by
a
Fourth
Amendment
violation.
Rather,
the
Fourth
Amendment
violation found by the jury was based on the manner of the
10
Mason also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint because of alleged
perjury by Plaintiffs and their witnesses (ECF No. 90).
That motion
is essentially mooted by the Court’s other rulings today, but to the
extent that today’s rulings do not fully moot the motion, the Court
denies it.
Mason had a full opportunity to impeach Plaintiffs and
their witnesses on the issues raised by the motion, and the Court
instructed the jury on its duty to assess the credibility of witnesses
and to evaluate attempts at impeachment of their testimony. Dismissal
of the Complaint is not the appropriate remedy under the circumstances
presented here.
15
search.
Construing the evidence in Mr. Richardson’s favor, the
search consisted of probing into the rectum and testicle areas
of Mr. Richardson in a public parking lot for less than five
minutes, which obviously would be extremely uncomfortable and
highly embarrassing.
Although Mr. Richardson testified that he
continued to experience discomfort in the area of his rectum for
several
months
after
the
incident,
he
presented
no
medical
testimony as to the nature and extent of any physical injury he
suffered or any significant changes in his lifestyle as a result
of the search.
Mr. Richardson also produced no evidence of any
out of pocket expenses he incurred because of the search; he did
testify
that
he
purchased
an
over
the
counter
medication
to
relieve the aggravation of his hemorrhoids.
Mr. Richardson was entitled to recover compensatory damages
for the emotional pain and mental anguish that were proximately
caused by the manner of the search.
No punitive damages claim
was asserted, and the jury was not permitted to award damages as
punishment to penalize Mason.
While the standard for recovering
such intangible compensatory damages is purposefully indefinite
and typically left to the enlightened conscience of fair and
impartial jurors, the amount awarded must have some relationship
to
the
actual
compensate.
substitute
injury
The
its
Court
judgment
for
is
for
which
the
hesitant,
the
16
award
and
wisdom
is
not
of
designed
to
permitted,
to
the
jurors;
but
appropriate
deference
allegiance to them.
to
jury
verdicts
does
not
mean
blind
Just as the Court must not unduly intrude
upon the province of the jury, it is a dereliction of duty to
allow a verdict to stand that is not authorized by the evidence.
Juries are remarkably right most of the time, but they are not
infallible.
An award of $2,500,000 for the injury suffered by
Mr. Richardson is unreasonably excessive and not supported by
the evidence.
Accordingly, it cannot be allowed to stand.
For
this reason, Mason is granted a new trial as to the Fourth
Amendment claim asserted by Mr. Richardson. 11
CONCLUSION
For
qualified
the
reasons
immunity
on
discussed
Mrs.
above,
Mason
Richardson’s
is
claim,
entitled
and
to
Mason’s
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (ECF No. 91) is
granted as to that claim. 12
immunity
on
Mr.
Mason is not entitled to qualified
Richardson’s
claim,
and
Mason’s
motion
judgment as a matter of law is denied as to that claim.
for
Mason’s
motion for new trial (ECF No. 92), however, is granted as to Mr.
11
The Court is not comfortable simply reducing the amount of the
damages award. Although the jury in this case was far too generous,
the Court is confident that a new jury will be in a better position
than a single judge to determine the appropriate resolution of this
claim in a second trial.
12
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(c)(1), the Court
conditionally grants Mason’s motion for new trial as to Mrs.
Richardson’s claim if the Court’s judgment as a matter of law is later
vacated or reversed. The ground for conditionally granting the motion
for new trial is that the jury’s damages award of $2,500,000 is
grossly excessive and contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
17
Richardson’s claim.
Mason’s motion for remittitur (ECF No. 93)
is denied as to that claim.
ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO ALL OTHER CLAIMS
After today’s Order, all claims in this action have been
adjudicated except for Mr. Richardson’s Fourth Amendment strip
search claim against Mason in his individual capacity for which
the
Court
has
qualified
ordered
immunity
a
new
defense
trial.
Since
Mason
asserts
to
claim
which
the
as
that
a
Court
rejected, it is likely that he has the right to appeal that
ruling
immediately
rather
than
waiting
until
after
his
new
trial.
Given the likelihood of such an appeal, the Court finds
no just reason to delay entry of final judgment as to the other
claims
in
this
action
which
have
been
finally
adjudicated.
Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to enter final judgment as
follows: (1) in favor of Defendant Corey Mason as to all claims
asserted
against
him
in
his
individual
capacity
by
Denise
Richardson pursuant to today’s Order, the Court’s rulings at
trial, and the Court’s summary judgment order, Richardson, 2012
WL 6569283; (2) in favor of Defendant Corey Mason as to all
claims asserted against him in his individual capacity by Calvin
Richardson
(except
for
Calvin
Richardson’s
§
1983
Fourth
Amendment manner of search claim for which a new trial has been
ordered)
pursuant
to
today’s
Order,
the
Court’s
rulings
at
trial, and the Court’s summary judgment order, id.; (3) in favor
18
of Defendant Unified Government of Georgetown-Quitman County and
Defendants Steve Newton, Corey Mason, Jamie Ming, and Tammye
Atkinson in their official capacities as to all of Plaintiffs’
claims pursuant to the Court’s summary judgment order, id.; (4)
in favor of Defendant Steve Newton in his individual capacity as
to all of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Court’s summary
judgment order, id.; (5) in favor of Defendant Jamie Ming in his
individual capacity as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to
the Court’s summary judgment order, id.; and (6) in favor of
Defendant Tammye Atkinson in her individual capacity as to all
of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Court’s summary judgment
order, id.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 1st day of July, 2013.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?