COLUMBUS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL A EDDINGS PC et al
Filing
208
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 33 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 176 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 181 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 184 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 190 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 191 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 192 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 193 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 195 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 196 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 198 Motion for Summary Judgment.Ordered by US Mag Judge Stephen Hyles on 8/12/13. (AGH)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
COLUMBUS BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a division of Synovus Bank,
Petitioner,
v.
LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL A.
EDDINGS, P.C., et al.,
Respondents.
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CASE NO. 4:11-cv-184-MSH
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court are Respondents’ cross-motions for summary
judgment. (ECF Nos. 33, 176, 181, 184, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 198.) The parties
agree on the relevant facts in this interpleader action, but disagree as to how the interpled
funds should be distributed. As explained below, the funds shall be distributed on a pro
rata basis to those persons or entities who deposited funds into the Law Office of Michael
A. Eddings’ trust account on October 27, 2011.
BACKGROUND
Columbus Bank and Trust (“CB&T”) initiated this interpleader action in the
Superior Court of Muscogee County on October 28, 2011. (Notice of Removal Ex. A at
1, ECF No. 1-1.) The Law Office of Michael A. Eddings, P.C. (“Eddings”) had an
IOLTA Trust Account at CB&T (hereinafter “Trust Account”). (Id. at 3.) CB&T was
informed that there was “considerable uncertainty as to the specific ownership of the
funds on deposit in said account and that there [was] a risk of the funds in question being
delivered to persons other than those who have legitimate claims for said money.” (Id. at
4.) Consequently, pursuant to an order of that court granting the petition for interpleader,
CB&T interplead the funds into the registry of the Superior Court of Muscogee County.
(Id. at 7.) The funds deposited with the clerk totaled $472,949.34. (Id. at 8.) On
November 23, 2011, the United States removed this action to this Court. (Notice of
Removal 1.) Respondents in this action who seek a portion of the interpled funds have
moved for summary judgment.
The Respondents agree that this action is properly
brought as an interpleader action and that equitable principals govern, but they disagree
as to how the interpled funds should be distributed. Respondents’ motions for summary
judgment are ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact
exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party=s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A
factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
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II.
Undisputed Facts
On October 27, 2011, the Trust Account had an opening balance of -$14,669.44.
(Mem. of Law in Supp. of Wells Fargo’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A at 18, ECF No. 1762.)1 That day $563,412.86 in deposits and $75,794.08 in debits were made on the Trust
Account.
(Trust Account Statement 2, 8, 9, 13, 17.)
The remainder balance of
$472,949.34 was deposited into the registry of the court.
The following claims are made on the $472,949.34 through motions for summary
judgment:
Jerome Rogers -- $89,498.90 deposited into the Trust Account on October 27,
2011;
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. -- $227,722.30 deposited into the Trust Account on
October 27, 2011;
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. -- $1,198.25 deposited into the Trust Account on
October 27, 2011;
Lachone Trice -- $50,774.51 for a dishonored check dated October 25, 2011;
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company -- $158,837.67 in proceeds owed
from a closing on October 18, 2011;
FBMC Mortgage Corporation -- $7,161.61 in proceeds owed from a closing on
October 27, 2011;
William Rembert -- $3,100.00 deposited into the Trust Account on October 26,
2011;
Gregory Watkins -- $3,210.72 for a dishonored check from a closing on or
around September 19, 2011;
1
Exhibit A to Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment is a certified copy of the October
2011 Statement of Account for the Trust Account. It will hereinafter be cited as “Trust Account
Statement.”
3
Crescent Mortgage Company -- $197,137.49 deposited in the Trust Account on
October 27, 2011;
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) -- $37,600.25 in
proceeds owed from a closing on October 21, 2011;
Fannie Mae -- $174,825.20 in proceeds from a closing on October 27, 20112;
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as trustee for
Certificate holders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC, Asset
Backed Certificate Series 2007-AC3 -- $56,499.60 deposited into the Trust
Account on October 7, 2011;
Ike A. Nwaobi -- $9,800.00 deposited in the Trust Account on October 27,
2011
In total, the Respondents seek $1,017,366.50 from the Trust Account through their
motions for summary judgment. In addition, Respondent Primary Residential Mortgage,
Inc., moved for disbursement of the funds on December 9, 2011 (ECF No. 8), claiming
that it is entitled to $582,779.23 for deposits made into the Trust Account between
August 26, 2011 and October 24, 2011. Of the requests for payment, only seven are for
funds that were deposited into the account on October 27, 2011—Jerome Rogers, Wells
Fargo, FBMC Mortgage, Crescent Mortgage, Fannie Mae, and Ike Nwaobi. The October
27, 2011 requests total $532,518.55.
III.
Analysis
An interpleader action is an action in equity “designed to bring into one court all
of the claimants to a particular fund so that it could be equitably divided among all rather
than being a race to the swift[.]” United States v. Sentinel Fire Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 217,
2
Crescent Mortgage deposited these funds in the Trust Account on October 27, 2011. Crescent
Mortgage also makes a claim to the same funds, but Crescent Mortgage received a mortgage
from the purchaser of the property. (See Br. in Supp. of Fannie Mae’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D.)
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225 (5th Cir. 1950)3; see also Sanders v. Carney, 117 Ga. App. 645, 645 (1986);
O.C.G.A. § 23-4-31.
“[A] district court has broad and significant powers in an
interpleader action.” Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Tien, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1284 (S.D. Fla.
2007). At the second stage in an interpleader action, the court must determine the
respective rights of each claimant to the property, or in this case, funds. Ohio Nat’l Life
Assurance Corp. v. Langkau ex. Rel. Estate of Langkau, 353 F. App’x 244, 248 (11th Cir.
2009). “[E]ach [Respondent] occupies the position of a plaintiff and must state his own
claim and answer that of the other.” Tien, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
Those Respondents who deposited their funds into the Trust Account on October
27, 2011 (the “October 27 Respondents”) argue that equitable tracing must be used by
this Court. Furthermore, because the Trust Account opened with a negative balance on
October 27, they argue that any money deposited in the Trust Account before October 27
was misappropriated or distributed. Contrarily, those Respondents who deposited funds
into the Trust Account prior to October 27 argue that the interpled funds are the result of
comingled contributions of all Respondents. The pre-October 27 Respondents further
argue that tracing is not equitable in this case because all Respondents have the same
legal claim to the interpled funds. The Court agrees with the October 27 Respondents
and finds that they have a greater claim to the funds than the pre-October 27
Respondents.
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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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The funds in question in this case all involved real estate closings performed by
attorney Michael Eddings. “The attorney participating in the closing is a fiduciary with
respect to the closing proceeds, which must be handled in accordance with the trust
account and IOLTA provisions in Rule 1.15(II).”4 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1,
280 Ga. 227, 228 (Ga. 2006). “Closing proceeds from a real estate transaction which are
nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time . . . must be deposited into
an IOLTA.” Id. On the other hand, “[f]unds that are not nominal in amount or funds, no
matter what amount, that are not to be held for a short period of time are ineligible for
placement in an IOLTA and must be placed in an interest-bearing trust account, with the
net interest generated paid to the client.” Id. (citing Ga. Rule of Professional Conduct
1.15(II)(c).) It is consequently questionable as to whether several of the deposits in the
Trust Account should have been in that account pursuant to the Georgia Rules of
4
Rule 1.15(II) states, in relevant part:
c. All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account with the interest
being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account with the interest being
paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.
1. With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a
short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain
an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule
1.15(III)(c)(1), with the interest to be paid to the client. No earnings from such an
account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.
2. With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short
period of time, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and
maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) in
compliance with the following provisions:
i.
No earnings from such an IOLTA account shall be made available to a
lawyer or law firm.
ii. The account shall include all clients' funds which are nominal in amount
or which are to be held for a short period of time.
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Professional Conduct. Regardless, the deposits made into that account are deposits of
client’s funds which Michael Eddings was holding in trust for those clients. Despite
being deposited into the Trust Account, those funds continue to belong to the depositors
or clients and not to Mr. Eddings.
Since the funds belong to the client, those funds that were withdrawn prior to
October 27, 2011, and were not used for the purpose for which they were provided to
Eddings have been misappropriated, converted, or outright stolen by Eddings or its
employees and agents. Unfortunately for the pre-October 27 Respondents, their funds are
gone. The funds that are currently in the registry of the court are clearly funds which
belong to those who deposited them on October 27, 2011. Those who deposited their
funds on October 27, 2011 are likewise the victim of theft because they will not recover
the full amount of their funds.
A case cited by some of the pre-October 27 Respondents, S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953
F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1992), does not require a different result in this case. In Elliott, the
Eleventh Circuit declined to apply tracing rules because “each of the creditors occupied
the same legal position as other creditors[.]” 953 F.2d at 1570. Thus, “equity would not
permit [one creditor] a preference; for equality is equity.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Here, each of the Respondents does not occupy the same legal
position as the others. The funds deposited by the October 27 Respondents are still
owned by them despite being deposited into the IOLTA account. Those are the only
funds that were frozen in the account and deposited with the court since the Trust
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Account had a negative balance. Thus, the October 27 Respondents have a greater claim
to the funds than the pre-October Respondents.
The outcome in this case would likely have been different had the Respondents’
money not been given to Eddings in trust and deposited in an IOLTA account. The
ownership of Respondents’ money was never given to Mr. Eddings unlike in S.E.C. v.
Elliott where the appellants were trying to use equitable tracing to find securities which
they had transferred to Elliott. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the legal effect of the
transfer was “a change in ownership” and that the appellants “had no security interest in
the securities they had transferred to Elliott.” 953 F.2d at 1569. Because of this change
in ownership, “all of the former securities owners occupied the same legal position, [and]
it would not be equitable to give some of them preferential treatment in equity.” Id. at
1570. Here, for the Court to divide the frozen funds pro rata among all the claimants, the
Court would be forcing individuals and entities to give up their own property (which
never changed ownership) to satisfy claims of others. The equities weigh against such an
outcome.
III.
Division of the interpled funds
The October 27 Respondents make claims to the funds in the amount of
$532,518.55. Only $472,949.34 is in the registry of the court. The interpled funds come
to 88.8% of the amount requested. Thus, each of the October 27 Respondents will
receive 88.8% of his deposited amount:
Jerome Rogers -- $79,487.17
Well Fargo Bank, N.A. -- $203,293.60
8
FBMC Mortgage Corporation -- $6,371.66
Crescent Mortgage Company -- $19,825.445
Fannie Mae -- $155,256.89
Ike A. Nwaobi -- $8,714.55
It is therefore ORDERED that the funds be distributed as provided above.
CONCLUSION
The facts underlying the instant action show that a series of calculated breaches of
trust have occurred to the detriment of individual depositors and public confidence. The
language of law is too often sterile in nature; its usage in orders, opinions, and pleadings
bereft of the pain occurring in the underlying, very human, transaction upon which it
passes. Invariably, the law works best when it speaks plainly. How can it be more
simply said than “Thou shalt not steal”?
The Law Office of Michael A. Eddings, P.C. by and through the acts of its agents,
officers, and employees—whose identities and culpabilities are not yet determined—
committed plan theft from persons individual and corporate who trusted them. No party
to this litigation leaves it made whole, but no party leaves it without other remedies
available. Applied in a context broader than an interpleader action, the law may offer
further redress to all of the Respondents who, by this final order, regrettably receive less
than that to which they are entitled.
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The Court is convinced by Fannie Mae’s argument that the $174,825.20 deposited in the Trust
Account for their benefit should be paid to Fannie Mae and not returned to Crescent Mortgage
which received a mortgage for the property sold.
9
For the reasons explained above, Jerome Rogers, Wells Fargo, FBMC Mortgage,
Crescent Mortgage, Fannie Mae, and Ike Nwaobi’s motions for summary judgment (ECF
Nos. 33, 176, 190, 193, 195, 198) are granted in part and denied in part. The remaining
motions for summary judgment are denied (ECF Nos. 181, 184, 191, 192, 196).
SO ORDERED, this the 12th day of August, 2013.
S/ Stephen Hyles
UNTED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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