BATES v. J P MORGAN CHASE BANK N A

Filing 97

ORDER terminating 44 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 60 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting 61 Motion for Summary Judgment; terminating 83 Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 10/23/2013. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
SHAWNA BATES, a.k.a.
SHAWNA SMITH,

*
*

Plaintiff,
*
vs.

CASE NO. 4:12-CV-43 (CDL)
*

J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff
Defendant

J.P.

Shawna
Morgan

Bates

defaulted

Chase

Bank,

on
N.A.

her

mortgage

Chase

with

initiated

foreclosure proceedings but never actually foreclosed on Bates’s
property.

Bates brought this action against Chase, contending

that she suffered emotional distress and other damages because
Chase mishandled her account and published a foreclosure notice
regarding her property.

Presently pending before the Court are

Bates’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 60) and
Chase’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

(ECF

No.

61).

For

the

reasons set forth below, Chase’s motion is granted, and Bates’s
motion is denied.1

1

Also before the Court is Chase’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(ECF No. 44). The Court finds that this action should be decided on
the summary judgment record, not the pleadings, and therefore
terminates the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as moot.
The
Court also terminates as moot Chase’s motion to amend its answer to
add the affirmative defense of mortgage fraud (ECF No. 83).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

In determining whether a

genuine

Fed. R.

dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed
for purposes of summary judgment.
Bates,

along

with

her

then-boyfriend

Jeffrey

Smith,

obtained a home loan from Synovus Mortgage Corporation in May
2008.2
Chase

Smith was the borrower, and Bates was the co-borrower.
obtained

the Note and Security Deed by assignment and

2

Bates identified herself as “Shawna M. Smith” on the loan
application, and she used the surname Smith in much of her
correspondence with Chase.
Bates contends that she maintained a
common-law marriage with Smith.
Georgia only recognizes common-law
marriages entered into prior to January 1, 1997. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-1.1.
There is no evidence that Bates and Smith entered a common-law
marriage prior to January 1, 1997, so the Court cannot find that Bates
and Smith were married.

2

became the owner and servicer of Bates’s loan.

The promissory

note (“Note”) Bates signed provides that the borrower “defaults
by failing to pay in full any monthly payment.”
Summ. J. Ex. B, Note ¶ 6(B), ECF No. 61-3.

Def.’s Mot. for
The Note further

states that in the case of a payment default, the lender may
“require

of

the

remaining due and all accrued interest.”

Id.

(“Deed”)

immediate

Bates

payment

signed

in

full

likewise

provides

principal

balance

The security deed

that

the

lender

may

accelerate the debt if the borrower “defaults by failing to pay
in full any monthly payment . . . prior to or on the due date of
the next monthly payment.”
Security Deed ¶ 9(a)(i).

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C,

The Note references regulations issued

by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and
states, “In many circumstances regulations issued by the [HUD]
Secretary

will

limit

Lender’s

rights

to

require

payment in full in the case of payment defaults.
not

authorize

regulations.”

acceleration

when

not

immediate

This Note does

permitted

by

HUD

Note ¶ 6(B).

Bates does not dispute that she fell behind on her loan
payments.3

Chase considered Bates’s loan to be in default as of

April 1, 2011 because she owed two mortgage payments plus late
fees.

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. F, Letter from Chase to J.

3

At some point, Smith moved out of the house and stopped helping with
the bills. It is unclear when.

3

Smith (May 6, 2011) at CHASE0000052-CHASE0000054, ECF No. 61-7
at 12-14; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. G, Notice of Intent to
Foreclose (May 31, 2011) at CHASE0000059, ECF No. 61-8 at 3.
Although Bates asserts that she made up her May payment in July,
it is undisputed that she also missed her June and July 2011
mortgage payments

and remained in default.

Def.’s Mot. for

Summ. J. Ex. H, Notice of Intent to Foreclose (July 29, 2011) at
CHASE0000079, ECF No. 61-9 at 4.

It is also undisputed that

Bates missed her August 2011 payment.
In July 2011, Chase sent a Notice of Intent to Foreclose to
Bates’s address.4

Id.

In that notice, Chase informed Bates and

Smith that they were two payments behind and had thirty-two days
to cure the default.

Id. ¶ 3.

The notice also stated that if

the default was not cured with certified funds within thirty-two
days, then Chase would commence foreclosure proceedings without
further notice to Bates and Smith.

Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.

Under the Deed, the lender “may inspect the Property if the
Property is vacant or abandoned or the loan is in default.”

4

Bates asserts that neither she nor Smith received approximately ten
notices Chase sent to their residence between October 2010 and July
2011 to alert them that their account was in default and that they
were
facing
foreclosure.
Bates
acknowledges
receiving
other
correspondence from Chase during that timeframe.
Chase presented
evidence that its vendor mailed the letters “Return Service Requested”
and that the letters were not returned undelivered.
Def.’s Resp. in
Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. AA, Conley Decl. ¶¶ 6-9, ECF No.
85-3.
Even if a genuine factual dispute exists as to whether Bates
received the notices, it is undisputed that her account was in
default.

4

Deed ¶ 5.

The July Notice of Intent to Foreclose states that

Chase would conduct property inspections while the loan remained
in default and that Bates would have to pay the cost of the
inspections.
ECF

No.

Notice of Intent to Foreclose at CHASE0000080 ¶ 8,

61-9

at

5.

Chase

conducted

monthly

inspections of the property beginning in July 2011.5

occupancy
Def.’s Mot.

for Summ. J. Ex. J, Inspection Detail Reports, ECF No. 61-11 at
5-26.
During the summer of 2011, Chase attempted to contact Bates
and Smith by telephone on many occasions.

Bates Dep. 83:14-

84:10, ECF No. 69 (acknowledging telephone calls from Chase).
Chase sent a representative to the couple’s home on August 6,
2011, but no one was home at the time.

A. Smith Dep. 136:1-

137:4, ECF No. 55-1; A. Smith Dep. Ex. 37, Door Knock Visit
Reports at CHASE0000278, ECF No. 55-3 at 101.

Chase asserts

that it also sent a representative to the home on August 9, 2011
and actually spoke with Bates, who accepted documents regarding
her mortgage.

A. Smith Dep. 137:7-15; A. Smith Dep. Ex. 37,

Door Knock Visit Reports at CHASE0000278, ECF No. 55-3 at 101.
Bates, however, denies meeting with anyone from Chase about her

5

Bates asserts that she did not receive the July notice and that Chase
did not notify her that its inspectors would be conducting
inspections.
It is undisputed that Bates saw inspectors on her
property on three occasions and that they left when she saw them and
asked them to leave.

5

mortgage.

Bates Dep. 88:9-12 (stating that Bates did not recall

anyone coming to her home to talk with her about her mortgage).
On September 7, 2011, Chase received a personal check from
Bates

in

the

amount

of

$3,495.00,

which

Bates

contends

sufficient to cover her June, July, and August payments.

was

Bates

does not dispute that she also owed late fees for June, July,
and August and that her check was not sufficient to cover them.
Bates Dep. 148:18-149:2; accord Note ¶ 6(A) (stating that if
full payment is not received within fifteen days of the due
date, the lender may collect a late charge in the amount of 4%
of the overdue payment).

The check was also not enough to cover

the property inspection fees.
check on September 7.
on

September

7,

2011

Bates’s bank did not honor the

Chase initiated foreclosure proceedings
and

referred

foreclosure counsel on September 8, 2011.

the

loan

to

outside

Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n

to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [hereinafter Def.’s Resp.] Ex. Z,
House Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, ECF No. 85-2; accord Def.’s Resp. Ex. FF,
System Screen Shot, ECF No. 85-8.
When a loan is in foreclosure, Chase only accepts certified
funds, and Chase will not accept payments that are not enough to
bring the account current.

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. K,

Wilkerson Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 61-12; accord Notice of Intent to
Foreclose at CHASE0000080 ¶ 6, ECF No. 61-9 at 5.
sent

Chase

an

electronic

funds

6

transfer

in

Bates’s bank

the

amount

of

$3,495.00 on behalf of Bates on September 8, 2011.

On September

12, 2011, Chase sent Bates a letter stating that it could not
accept

her

$3,495.00

required.”

payment

because

“Certified

funds

are

A. Smith Dep. Ex. 1, Letter from Chase to J. Smith

(Sept. 12, 2011), ECF No. 55-2 at 1.
Bates insists that Chase retained her $3,495.00 payment,
but the record establishes that Chase attempted to return the
payment by sending Bates a

check for $3,495.00

in September

2011.

When Bates failed to negotiate the check and it was about

to

stale,

go

Chase

sent

undisputedly received.
order

granting

4:12-CV-43
2012).

(CDL),

a

replacement

check

that

she

The Court reached this conclusion in its

Chase’s

conversion claim.

Bates

summary

judgment

motion

on

Bates’s

Bates v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
2012

WL

5389923,

at

*2

(M.D.

Ga.

Nov.

5,

As the Court previously found, on September 15, 2011,

Chase issued a check for $3,495.00 payable to Bates and Smith.
Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Ex. 1, Yarmesch
Decl.

¶ 11,

ECF

No.

24-1;

9000017336, ECF No. 24-4.

Yarmesch

Decl.

Ex.

C,

Check

No.

A Chase employee placed the check in

an envelope and directed Chase’s outgoing mail department to
mail the check to Bates.

Yarmesch Decl. ¶¶ 13-15.

After the

employee placed the check in the outgoing mail collection box,
it was not returned to him.

Id. ¶ 17.

In March of 2012, the

Chase employee realized that the September 15, 2011 check had

7

not been cashed, and Chase issued a new check and mailed it to
Bates.

Id. ¶¶ 18-27.

March 2012 check.

It is undisputed that Bates received the

Based on this evidence, which Bates did not

rebut, Chase did not retain Bates’s September 2011 payment.
When Chase rejected Bates’s September 2011 check, Bates’s
account remained in default.

Bates did not make another payment

in September, and she did not make a payment in October.

A

Chase representative went to Bates’s home on October 14 and 15,
2011, but no one was home at the time.

A. Smith Dep. Ex. 37,

Door Knock Visit Reports at CHASE0000240, ECF No. 55-3 at 97.
The

representative

left

packets

of

information

door, id., but Bates did not receive them.

at

the

front

Bates Dep. 87:8-19

(hypothesizing that if Chase’s representative left a package,
Bates’s dog may have eaten it).
Bates owed Chase at least $7,388.14 in mortgage payments,
late fees, and property inspection fees by the end of October
2011.

House Decl. ¶ 23.

On November 7, 2011, Bates sent Chase

a personal check for $4,660.00.

Bates believed that this amount

was sufficient to cover her payments for September, October,
November, and December 2011.

It is undisputed that the amount

did not include late fees for September and October and that it
did not include property inspection fees.

Bates claims that she

repeatedly asked Chase to provide her with the amount of late
fees due and that Chase never did so.

8

Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. 4, Bates Supplemental Decl.
¶ 121,

ECF

No.

77-4.

Chase

rejected

the

November

because it was not sufficient to cure the default.

7

check

A. Smith

Dep. Ex. 4, Letter from Chase to J. Smith (Nov. 9, 2011), ECF
No. 55-2 at 6.
On November 22, 2011, after she received the returned check
for $4,660.00, Bates called Chase.

Bates explained that she had

made a payment for $3,495.00 in September and that the payment
had not been applied to her account.

The Chase representative

asked Bates to fax a copy of her bank statement so that Chase
could research the issue.

In response to the November 22, 2011

telephone call, Chase researched Bates’s account and determined
that the $3,495.00 payment had been returned because the check
was not sufficient to cure the default.

A. Smith Dep. Ex. 6,

Letter from L. Hardy to S. Smith (Nov. 30, 2011), ECF No. 55-2
at 12.

Chase also determined that the $4,660.00 payment had

been returned because the check was not sufficient to cure the
default and was not certified funds.

Id.

After that, Bates

tried twice more to submit a payment for $4,660.00, but Chase
rejected both payments.
The Deed requires that if Chase invokes the power of sale,
Chase must give a copy of the notice of sale to Bates via first
class

mail.

Deed

¶¶ 13,

18.

According

to

Bates,

Chase

published a notice of sale on December 8, 2011 advertising a

9

sale date of January 2012 but did not notify her.

Chase’s

foreclosure attorney sent Bates a letter dated December 21, 2011
and included a copy of the notice of sale scheduled for February
7, 2012.

A. Smith Decl. Ex. 14, Letter from Barrett Daffin to

S. Smith (Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 55-2 at 32-35.
On December 22, 2011, Bates sent Chase a letter.

A. Smith

Dep. Ex. 15, Letter from S. Smith to Chase (Dec. 22, 2011), ECF
No. 55-2 at 36-37.

In that letter, Bates explained her belief

that Chase had received and retained her September payment in
the amount of $3,495.00 but had not applied it to her account.
Id.

Bates also detailed her attempts to make the $4,660.00

payment in November and December.

Id.

She also expressed her

frustration with Chase’s telephone customer service department.
Id.

Finally, Bates asked Chase to straighten out her account

and let her know what she needed to do to stay in her home.
Chase

responded

to

Bates’s

letter

on

January

25,

Id.
2012.

Chase explained that it had returned the $3,495.00 check because
the amount was not sufficient to cure the default.

A. Smith

Dep. Ex. 17, Letter from Chase to J. Smith (Jan. 25, 2012), ECF
No. 55-2 at 54-55.

Chase further explained that it had rejected

the attempted payments for $4,660.00 because the funds were not
sufficient to cure the default.
only

certified

funds

would

Id.
be

10

Chase also stated that

accepted

for

the

full

reinstatement amount.

Id.

Chase instructed Bates to contact

its foreclosure attorney for a reinstatement quote.

Id.

Chase published foreclosure notices regarding Bates’s house
in December 2011, January 2012, and March 2012.

Chase, however,

never actually foreclosed on Bates’s property.
Bates filed this action on February 21, 2012.
2012, Bates sent Chase another letter.

On March 29,

A. Smith Dep. Ex. 24,

Letter from S. Smith to Chase (Mar. 29, 2012), ECF No. 55-2 at
74.

In that letter, Bates acknowledged receipt of the $3,495.00

refund check and asked why Chase returned it.

Id.

Bates also

stated that her account was only behind because Chase returned
her checks.
account.

Id.

Bates again asked Chase to straighten out her

Chase did not respond to the March 29, 2012 letter.
DISCUSSION

I.

Breach of Contract & Attempted Wrongful Foreclosure Claims
Bates’s

breach

of

contract

and

attempted

wrongful

foreclosure claims are based on Chase’s rejection of Bates’s
September 2011 payment, Chase’s alleged failure to comply with
certain

HUD

regulations

before

initiating

foreclosure,

and

Chase’s alleged failure to send Bates notice of the scheduled
foreclosure sales.
A.

The Court addresses each issue in turn.

Claims Based on September 2011 Payment Rejection

Bates claims that Chase breached its contract with her when
it rejected her September 2011 payment, which was three months

11

late and admittedly not enough to cover the full amount due.
Bates

further

contends

that

this

wrongful attempted foreclosure.
that

Chase

breached

application
payment.
a

late

of

the

payments

breach

Specifically,

provision

when

caused

it

of

the

rejected

the

Bates contends
Deed

her

alleged

regarding

September

2011

Nothing in the deed, however, requires Chase to accept
partial

payment

when

a

loan

is

in

default.

Bates

maintains that Chase actually accepted the payment and declined
to

apply

it

to

her

account,

but,

as

discussed

above,

rejected the payment and sent Bates a refund check.

Chase

Therefore,

the record does not support a breach of contract claim based on
Chase’s rejection of the September 2011 payment.6
Bates’s

account

was

in

default

when

Chase

And because

published

the

foreclosure notices, the record does not support an attempted
wrongful foreclosure claim.
B.
Bates

Claims Based on Failure to Have Face-to-Face Meeting
also

asserts

breach

of

contract

and

attempted

wrongful foreclosure claims based on Chase’s alleged failure to
have a face-to-face meeting with her as required by 24 C.F.R. §
6

To the extent Bates attempts to base her breach of contract and
attempted wrongful foreclosure claims on a violation of the HUD
regulation that requires lenders to accept partial mortgage payments
under certain circumstances, that argument fails.
As discussed in
more detail below, a borrower may not base a damages claim on a
violation of HUD regulations.
Also, Chase had initiated foreclosure
proceedings by the time it rejected Bates’s September 2011 payment, so
even if Bates could base a claim on the HUD regulation, it would fail.
See 24 C.F.R. § 203.556(d)(4) (permitting return of partial payment if
foreclosure has been commenced).

12

203.604(b).

The

Note

states

that

it

“does

not

authorize

acceleration when not permitted by HUD regulations.”
6(B).

Note ¶

“HUD requires this language to be incorporated into deeds

of trust which secure its federally insured loans.”

Mathews v.

PHH Mortg. Corp., 724 S.E.2d 196, 202 (Va. 2012) (citing 24
C.F.R § 203.17(a)).

And, under 24 C.F.R. § 203.604(b), a lender

“must have a face-to-face interview with the [borrower] or make
a reasonable effort to arrange such a meeting.”
factual

dispute

exists

as

to

whether

Chase

efforts to arrange a face-to-face interview.

Id.

A genuine

made

reasonable

The issue to be

decided here is whether Bates may recover damages for breach of
contract

and

attempted

wrongful

foreclosure

based

on

alleged failure to comply with 24 C.F.R. § 203.604(b).

Chase’s
She may

not.
Bates pointed the Court to no authority in support of her
assertion that a violation of the HUD regulations supports a
claim

for

damages.

Contrary

to

Bates’s

argument,

binding

precedent in this Circuit, as well as authority from the Georgia
courts,

establishes

that a borrower has no private right of

action for damages against her mortgage servicer for a violation
of HUD regulations.

Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356,

360-61 (5th Cir. 1977);7 Krell v. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 214 Ga.

7

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981)
(en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all

13

App. 503, 504, 448 S.E.2d 248, 249 (1994).

Some courts have

recognized that a violation of HUD regulations may provide an
equitable

shield

against

foreclosure

comply with those regulations.

proceedings

that

do

not

Mathews, 724 S.E.2d at 202-03

(allowing borrowers to seek a declaration that foreclosure would
be

void

based

on

the

lender’s

failure

to

comply

with

HUD

regulations); accord Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (same).

But

those courts did not hold that a borrower could recover damages
based on a violation of the HUD regulations.

In fact, the

Pfeifer court specifically considered the issue and found that
although

the

HUD

injunctive

relief,

support

claim

a

regulations

could

a

of

for

wrongful foreclosure.

violation
damages

based

the
on

support

a

claim

regulations
breach

of

for

does

not

contract

or

Id. at 698-99 & n.17; see also, e.g.,

Mitchell v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-2099K, 2008 WL 623395, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2008) (citing cases
holding that HUD regulations create no private right of action
for damages).

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes

that Bates may not base her breach of contract and attempted
wrongful foreclosure claims on Chase’s alleged failure to meet
the HUD face-to-face interview requirements.

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close
of business on September 30, 1981.

14

C.

Claims Based on Failure to Send Foreclosure Notice

Bates

also

bases

her

breach

of

contract

and

attempted

wrongful foreclosure claims on Chase’s alleged failure to send
adequate notice to Bates before the foreclosure sale scheduled
for January 2012.

The Deed requires that if Chase invokes the

power of sale, Chase must give a copy of the notice of sale to
Bates via first class mail.

Deed ¶¶ 13, 18.

Bates acknowledges

that Chase complied with that requirement by sending her a copy
of the notice of sale for the scheduled February sale, which did
not take place.

And even if the Deed required Chase to send a

notice for the scheduled January sale that did not take place,
Bates pointed to no evidence that she suffered damages because
of Chase’s failure to do so.

Therefore, the record does not

support a breach of contract or attempted wrongful foreclosure
claim

based

on

Chase’s

failure

to

send

Bates

notice

of

the

scheduled January sale that did not take place.
II.

RESPA Claim
Bates asserts claims under § 2605(e) of the Real Estate

Settlement

Procedures

Act

(“RESPA”),

12

U.S.C.

§

2605(e),

contending that Chase did not adequately respond to her December
22, 2011 and March 29, 2012 letters.
stated

her

belief

that

Chase

had

In both letters, Bates

received

and

retained

her

September 2011 payment for $3,495.00 but had not applied it to

15

her account, and she detailed her attempts to make the $4,660.00
payment in November and December 2011.
Chase
explained

responded
that

it

to

the

returned

December
the

22,

$3,495.00

2011
check

amount was not sufficient to cure the default.

letter

and

because

the

Chase further

explained that it rejected the attempted payments for $4,660.00
because

the

funds

were

not

sufficient

to

cure

the

default.

Chase instructed Bates to contact its foreclosure attorney for a
reinstatement quote.

Bates contends that this response does not

satisfy RESPA because Chase did not respond by crediting her
account

with

the

$3,495.00

payment.

Notwithstanding

Bates’s

current protestations to the contrary, Chase had no obligation
to credit that amount to Bates’s account.

Bates’s subjective

view of her account status does not rebut the evidence that
Chase

rejected

refund check.

the

September

2011

payment

and

sent

Bates

a

Bates’s RESPA claim based on the December 22,

2011 letter thus fails.

The March 29, 2012 letter asks the same

questions Chase already answered in response to the December 22,
2011 letter.

The Court rejects Bates’s suggestion that Chase is

subject to RESPA liability for failing to respond to a letter
that

simply

repeats

questions

to

which

provided complete and correct responses.

16

Chase

had

already

III. Trespass Claim
Bates’s trespass claim is based on the visits from Chase’s
property inspectors.

Bates acknowledges that the Deed permits

Chase to inspect her property if the loan is in default.
discussed

above,

fabricate

the

the

loan

default.

was

in

Rather,

default.

the

Chase

default

Bates did not make timely mortgage payments.

existed

did

As
not

because

Chase thus had the

right to inspect the property and is not liable for trespass.
CONCLUSION
As

discussed

above,

Bates’s

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 60) is denied, and Chase’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 61) is granted.

Chase’s Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings (ECF No. 44) and Chase’s motion to amend its
answer to add the affirmative defense of mortgage fraud (ECF No.
83) are terminated as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of October, 2013.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17