FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION v. LUNSFORD

Filing 9

ORDER granting 7 Motion for Reconsideration re Order on Motion to Remand; vacating Text Order dated February 1, 2013 on Motion to Remand; denying 4 MOTION to Remand; setting date for trial on the merits. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 02/15/2013. (CGC) ***

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION,

*
*

Plaintiff,
*
vs.

CASE NO. 4:13-CV-5 (CDL)
*

PAULA LUNSFORD,
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Defendant’s

motion

for

reconsideration

(ECF

No.

7)

is

granted, the Court’s previous order to remand (Text Order, Feb.
1, 2013) is vacated, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No.
4)

is

denied.

The

Court

is

persuaded

by

the

rationale

of

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Matassino, __ F. Supp. 2d
__,

No. 1:11-CV-3895-CAP,

2012 WL 6622607 (N.D.

Ga. Dec. 3,

2012) (Pannell, J.), and the Court adopts this rationale as its
own.1

1

When the Court first made its expedited ruling granting Plaintiff’s
motion to remand, the Court was unaware of Judge Pannell’s decision
and did not fully appreciate Defendant’s basis for subject matter
jurisdiction.
It was only through the Court’s independent research
that this recent and relevant decision came to light.
It is
understandable that the pro se Defendant may not have been able to
locate this ruling, but it is inexcusable that Plaintiff’s counsel, as
an officer of the Court with a duty of candor to the tribunal, failed
to disclose it to the Court, particularly given the fact that
Plaintiff was a party to that case, the ruling addressed the very same
issues presented here, and Judge Pannell unequivocally rejected the
same arguments Plaintiff’s counsel makes to this Court.
While Judge
Pannell’s ruling is certainly not binding precedent and reasonable

The parties shall appear on March 1, 2013 at 9:00 A.M. at
the United States Courthouse in Columbus, Georgia before the
undersigned for a trial on the merits, at which time Plaintiff
shall have an opportunity to demonstrate why it is entitled to
immediate possession of the property in question and Defendant
shall have an opportunity to show why she should not be required
to vacate the premises immediately.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 15th day of February, 2013.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

jurists may differ as to whether this decision reaches the right
result, the Court cannot conceive of any legitimate reason excusing an
officer of the Court from making the Court aware of the ruling.

2