Stewart v. Mentor Corporation et al
Filing
40
ORDER granting 37 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 09/02/2016. (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
IN RE MENTOR CORP. OBTAPE
*
TRANSOBTURATOR SLING PRODUCTS
*
LIABILITY LITIGATION
*
MDL Docket No. 2004
4:08-MD-2004 (CDL)
Case No.
4:13-cv-345 (Stewart)
O R D E R
Defendant
Mentor
Worldwide
LLC
developed
a
suburethral
sling product called ObTape Transobturator Tape, which was used
to
treat
women
with
stress
urinary
incontinence.
Plaintiff
Paula Stewart was implanted with ObTape and asserts that she
suffered injuries caused by ObTape.
liability
action
against
Mentor,
Stewart brought a product
contending
that
ObTape
had
design and/or manufacturing defects that proximately caused her
injuries.
warn
her
Stewart also asserts that Mentor did not adequately
physicians
about
the
risks
associated
with
ObTape.
Mentor seeks summary judgment on several of Stewart’s claims.
For
the
reasons
set
forth
below,
Mentor’s
partial
summary
judgment motion (ECF No. 37 in 4:13-cv-345) is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
In determining whether a
genuine
Fed. R.
dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant
or necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Stewart developed symptoms of stress urinary incontinence
and discussed her treatment options with Dr. Christopher Minott.
On August 17, 2004, Dr. Minott implanted Stewart with ObTape.
Before the procedure, Dr. Minott discussed ObTape with Stewart,
and Stewart reviewed a Mentor ObTape brochure with Dr. Minott.
The brochure discusses serious complications that may occur with
ObTape and states that the patient’s doctor should discuss these
matters with the patient.
38-3.
Stewart Dep. 202:14-203:6, ECF No.
Based on her discussion with Dr. Minott, Stewart was
under the impression that any complications, such as infections
and pain, would occur during the recovery period; she did not
understand that these complications could occur after that.
at 206:9-207:9.
Id.
Stewart was also under the impression based on
her discussion with Dr. Minott and her review of the brochure
that a revision surgery might be necessary, but only to tighten
2
or loosen the sling—not in the event of an erosion.
203:24.
Id. 202:19-
Stewart testified that if Dr. Minott or the brochure
had informed her of certain risks of ObTape—such as the risk of
long-term painful intercourse and the risk of additional surgery
years after the initial implant—she would not have undergone the
ObTape procedure.
Stewart’s incontinence improved for a while but recurred in
2006.
Stewart
asserts
that
she
suffered
adverse
symptoms
related to ObTape, including pelvic pain and dyspareunia.
In
2008 and 2013, Stewart underwent procedures to remove portions
of her ObTape, although she did not realize in 2008 that some of
her ObTape had been removed.
Stewart is a Nevada resident whose
ObTape-related medical treatment occurred in Nevada.
Stewart asserts claims for strict liability (design defect,
manufacturing defect, and failure to warn); negligence; breach
of
express
fraud;
warranty;
constructive
misrepresentation.
strict
liability,
breach
fraud;
of
and
implied
warranty;
negligent
and
common
law
intentional
Mentor seeks summary judgment on Stewart’s
fraud,
and
misrepresentation
claims
to
the
extent that they are based on Stewart’s allegation that Mentor
did not provide adequate or truthful warnings regarding ObTape.1
1
Stewart contends that her fraud and misrepresentation claims are
different from her strict liability - failure to warn claim and that
Mentor only seeks summary judgment on the strict liability claim.
While these claims do have some different elements, Mentor’s present
argument is that Stewart cannot establish causation on any of these
3
Mentor also seeks summary judgment on Stewart’s warranty claims.
Stewart
does
claims,
so
claims.
not
Mentor
contest
is
summary
entitled
to
judgment
summary
on
her
judgment
warranty
on
those
The only issue remaining is whether Stewart presented
enough evidence to create a genuine fact dispute on her failure
to warn claims.
DISCUSSION
On July 12, 2013, Stewart served Mentor with a Complaint
captioned in the Hennepin County District Court of the State of
Minnesota.
Mentor
removed
the
action
to
the
United
States
District Court for the District of Minnesota. The case was later
transferred to this Court as part of a multidistrict litigation
proceeding regarding ObTape.
The parties agree for purposes of
summary judgment that Minnesota law applies to Stewart’s claims.
See Cline v. Mentor, No. 4:10-cv-5060, 2013 WL 286276, at *7
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2013) (concluding that Minnesota law applied
to claims of non-Minnesota ObTape plaintiffs who brought their
actions in Minnesota).
Stewart
asserts
that
Mentor
did
not
provide
Dr.
Minott
accurate information with regard to ObTape’s risks, including
the true risks of complications like erosion, infection, and
inadequate tissue ingrowth.
“Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff
claims.
And causation for these claims rests on the same basic
question: did Mentor’s fraud, misrepresentations, or failure to warn
regarding the true risks of ObTape cause Stewart’s injuries?
4
claiming
a
failure
to
warn
must
show
that
the
lack
of
an
adequate warning caused plaintiff[’]s injuries.” Prairie v. Mio
Mech. Corp., No. 27-CV-12-14077, 2013 WL 3869264, at *6 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. June 25, 2013) (citing Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco
Co.,
377
causation,
F.3d
a
917,
924
plaintiff
(8th
must
Cir.
show
2004)).
that
a
“To
warning
establish
would
have
caused him to act in a way that would have avoided the injury.”
Id.
her
Here, Stewart contends that Mentor, intending to defraud
and
induce
her
misrepresentations
to
to
undergo
Dr.
Minott
the
ObTape
that
procedure,
induced
Dr.
made
Minott
to
recommend ObTape to Stewart.
Stewart’s implanting physician, Dr. Minott, died before he
could testify in this action, and there is no direct evidence
that
different
treated
warnings
Stewart.
would
Stewart
have
changed
nonetheless
how
contends
Dr.
that
Minott
she
can
establish causation because Minnesota courts apply a “heeding
presumption” – “a rebuttable presumption that the injured person
would have heeded an adequate warning, had one been provided.”
Prairie,
2013
WL
3869264,
at
*6.
The
Court
previously
considered this issue in Bromley v. Mentor Corp., Case No. 4:13cv-17, 2015 WL 7313394 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2015).
The Court
noted that “in Prairie, the Minnesota trial court presumed that
a window washer who died after falling from the defendant’s roof
rigger
platform
product
would
5
have
heeded
an
adequate
instruction regarding the proper way to secure the platform had
one been given.”
*6).
Id. at *6 (citing Prairie, 2013 WL 3869264 at
But the Court found that “all Prairie allows the Court to
presume is that Plaintiffs’ physicians would have paid attention
to an additional warning about the risks of ObTape.”
Id.
“In
other
that
the
words,
physicians
Prairie
would
allows
have
the
considered
Court
the
to
presume
infection
and
erosion
rates—among other considerations—in determining which product to
select for their patients.”
Id.
Prairie did “not, however,
permit the Court to speculate about how the physicians would
have weighed the additional warnings.”
Id.
Stewart did not point the Court to any authority suggesting
that the Minnesota courts have expanded the heeding presumption
since the Court decided this issue in Bromley.
The Court again
concludes that it cannot apply the heeding presumption here,
where there is no evidence of how Dr. Minott would have weighed
the
additional
warnings
Mentor provided them.
or
the
true
complication
rates
had
Thus, Stewart cannot establish causation
for her failure to warn, fraud, and misrepresentation claims
under the heeding presumption.
Stewart points out that Mentor provided some information
about
ObTape
directly
to
consumers,
including
her,
via
a
brochure that provides a short description of ObTape’s potential
complications
and
states
that
6
the
patient’s
doctor
should
discuss these matters with the patient.
Stewart argues that the
brochure did not adequately warn her about ObTape’s true risks.
But the record here reveals that Stewart did not rely solely on
the
brochure
in
deciding
to
undergo
the
ObTape
procedure.
Stewart reviewed the brochure and discussed it with Dr. Minott;
her
impressions
about
ObTape
were
based
on
Dr.
Minott’s
explanation of the brochure and his description of the procedure
and potential complications.
As discussed above, there is no
evidence of how Dr. Minott would have weighed the additional
warnings
them.
or
the
true
complication
rates
had
Mentor
provided
There is also no evidence of how Dr. Minott might have
approached his doctor-patient discussion of the brochure had he
been
given
additional
warnings
about
ObTape.
Stewart
thus
cannot establish causation for her failure to warn, fraud, and
misrepresentation claims based on the brochure.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that
Stewart has not presented enough evidence to establish a genuine
fact dispute on causation for her failure to warn, fraud, and
misrepresentation claims.
Mentor’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment
4:13-cv-345)
(ECF
No.
37
in
is
therefore
granted.
Mentor is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Stewart’s
strict
liability,
fraud,
and
misrepresentation
claims
to
the
extent that they are based on Stewart’s contention that Mentor
7
did not provide adequate or truthful warnings regarding ObTape.
Mentor
is
Stewart’s
also
entitled
warranty
to
judgment
claims.
as
a
Stewart’s
matter
of
design
law
on
defect,
manufacturing defect, and negligence claims remain pending for
trial.
This action is now ready for trial.
the
date
of
this
Order,
the
parties
Within seven days of
shall
notify
the
Court
whether they agree to a Lexecon waiver.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of September, 2016.
s/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
8
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