King v. ANDREWS & COMPANY et al

Filing 43

ORDER denying 41 Motion for Attorney Fees. Ordered by U.S. District Judge CLAY D LAND on 03/03/2015. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
LAWRENCE EDWARD KING,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

ANDREWS & COMPANY,

*

Defendant.

CASE NO. 4:13-CV-398 (CDL)

*
O R D E R

Plaintiff

Lawrence

King

brought

discrimination

claims

against his former employer Defendant Andrews & Company under
Title

VII

of

the

42 U.S.C. § 2000e,

Civil
et

Rights

seq.,

Act

and

the

of

1964

Age

(“Title

VII”),

Discrimination

in

Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.

The Court

granted

judgment,

Andrews

&

Company’s

motion

for

summary

concluding that King had not established that he suffered an
adverse employment action when he was transferred to a different
duty station and had not presented any evidence to rebut Andrews
& Company’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing him.
Order (Feb. 11, 2015), ECF No. 38.

Andrews & Company now seeks

$13,940.00 in attorney’s fees from King, who has a fourth grade
education and is pro se and indigent.

See Mot. for Leave to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2 (stating that King has no
income and four years of education).

Under

limited

circumstances,

the

Court

may

allow

a

prevailing defendant to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee in a
Title VII or ADEA case.

In ADEA cases, such an award is only

available if the Court finds “that the plaintiff litigated in
bad faith.”

Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428,

1437

Cir.

(11th

defendant

may

‘plaintiff’s

(11th

recover

action

foundation.’”
929

1998).

was

In

Title

VII

attorney’s

cases,

fees

frivolous,

a

prevailing

“only

unreasonable,

when
or

the

without

Richardson v. Bay Dist. Sch., 560 F. App’x 928,

Cir.

2014)

(per

curiam)

(quoting

Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).

Christiansburg
This means that

“‘the plaintiff’s action must be meritless in the sense that it
is groundless or without foundation.’” Id.

(quoting Busby v.

City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 787 (11th Cir. 1991).

“It is not

enough for the prevailing defendant to show that the plaintiff's
claim was ‘markedly weak,’ or even ‘exceedingly weak.’” Id. at
930

(internal

citations

omitted).

“Instead,

the

plaintiff's

case must be so patently devoid of merit as to be frivolous”—
which

means

that

factual support.”

it
Id.

is

“devoid

of

arguable

legal

merit

or

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Andrews & Company does not argue that King litigated this
action in bad faith.

Rather, Andrews & Company contends that

King’s claims were frivolous.

The Court disagrees.

It is true

that King’s claims were weak, but the Court does not find that

2

they were “devoid of arguable legal merit or factual support.”
Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

While

the

Court

ultimately concluded that King did not point to any evidence in
support of his claims, his failure to do so appeared to be based
in

large

part

unrepresented.

on

the

fact

that

he

is

uneducated

and

Had King submitted an affidavit that contained

the facts set forth in his response brief, he arguably would
have established a prima facie case of discrimination on both of
his claims.

Under these circumstances, the Court declines to

find that King’s claims were frivolous, and Andrews & Company’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 41) is denied.1

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of March, 2015.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

1

Even if attorney’s fees were warranted here, the Court would have to
consider King’s ability to pay. Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace,
833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). King made $10 per
hour at his job with Andrews & Company. And, according to his Motion
for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, King had no income when he
filed his Complaint and could not afford to pay the Court’s $400
filing fee.
He certainly does not have the ability to pay nearly
$14,000 in attorney’s fees.

3