JONES v. St. Francis Hospital Inc

Filing 74

ORDER denying 26 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 08/13/2015. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
MARGARET JONES,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL, INC.,

*

Defendant.

CASE NO. 4:13-CV-446 (CDL)

*
O R D E R

Plaintiff Margaret Jones was a radiologic technologist at
Defendant St. Francis Hospital, Inc.
Francis

discriminated

against

her

Jones claims that St.

because

of

her

race

by

suspending her and ultimately firing her, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

Jones also asserts

that St. Francis took these two actions in retaliation for her
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.

As discussed below, genuine fact disputes exist on

Jones’s claims, so St. Francis’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 26) is denied.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

In determining whether a

genuine

Fed. R.

dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to Jones, the record
reveals the following.
Jones is a black woman.
radiologic technologist.

She worked at St. Francis as a

For the most part, she got along with

her colleagues during the first couple years of her employment.
But things went downhill in 2012, and Jones complained to her
supervisors

about

perceived

racial

discrimination

by

her

colleagues and then filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on September 18, 2012.
Jones’s supervisors were notified about the charge that month.
In October 2012, Jones’s supervisors developed a plan to
terminate Jones.

Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ.

J. Ex. 5, Email Chain between D. Landrum and D. Robinson (Oct.
3, 2012, 16:09 EDT and 16:11 EDT), ECF No. 53-9.

They decided

to pull reports to determine how many x-rays Jones performed

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compared to her coworkers.

Id.; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 6, Email from D. Robinson to E. Tippins
(Oct. 4, 2012), ECF No. 53-10.

The reports, however, revealed

that Jones “worked just as much as anyone else,” so her work
volume, “[u]nfortunately,” was not a valid basis for terminating
her.

Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7, Email from

D. Landrum to D. Saylor (Oct. 5, 2012), ECF No. 53-11.

Jones’s

supervisors noted that they had been advised against terminating
Jones for being “disruptive” and that they could not fire her
for allegedly sleeping on the job because then they “have to
fire everyone who has been sleeping.”

Id.

Jones’s supervisors

continued to look for reasons to fire her.

See, e.g. Pl.’s

Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 10, Email from E.
Tippins to D. Robinson (Oct. 20, 2012), ECF No. 53-14.
In February 2013, a doctor realized that an x-ray in her
patient’s file
supervisor,
Robinson,

was

Lisa

of the wrong

Tippins,

investigated

the

and

patient.
Tippins’s

incident.

Jones’s immediate
supervisor,

Three

Deanna

employees—Jones,

Marc Kent, and Kassidy Moore—were involved in the x-ray of the
patient.

Kent and Moore are white.

Kent and Jones were with

the patient, and Moore manned the portable x-ray machine.
Dep. 49:4-50:3, ECF No. 41.

Kent

Jones called the patient’s name and

the patient responded, then Moore checked the patient’s name on

3

the requisition form, said they had the correct patient, and
completed the x-ray.
Based

on

warning

and

received

a

the

a

It was not the correct patient.

incident,

two-day

final

without pay.
for

the

Id.

Jones

suspension

written

warning

received
without
and

a

a

final

pay.

written

Kent

two-day

also

suspension

According to Kent, Tippins told him to “take one

team”

and

“keep

[his]

mouth

closed

and

take

the

suspension” because she and Robinson were “trying to get a paper
trail” on Jones and “somebody had to go down with her.”
50:13-17,

51:8-11.

Tippins

also

told

Kent

that

Id. at

his

final

written warning did not mean that he would actually be fired in
the event of another incident, as it typically would for other
employees (and as it did for Jones).
was not disciplined at all.1

Id. at 51:12-24.

Moore

According to Kent, Tippins decided

not to discipline Moore because Moore had been written up the
week before and would have to be terminated based on the second
incident.

Id. at 50:17-21.

In January 2014, another doctor complained about an x-ray
in the wrong patient’s file.
in the incident.
suggested

Both Jones and Moore were involved

Each blamed the other for the mistake.

questions

for

Tippins

investigation of the incident.

to

ask

Moore

during

Moore
the

Based on their investigation,

1

St. Francis argues that Moore was not disciplined because she did not
do anything wrong.
But Kent’s testimony creates a genuine fact
dispute on this point.

4

Tippins and Robinson concluded that Jones, not Moore, was to
blame

for

the

incident.

After

consulting

with

an

attorney

regarding the investigation, St. Francis terminated Jones.
DISCUSSION
I.

Jones’s Discrimination Claim
Jones claims that St. Francis suspended her without pay and

then terminated her because of her race.2
unlawful
Servs.,

under
Inc.,

Title
161

VII

F.3d

and

1318,

Such discrimination is

§ 1981.
1330

Standard

(11th

Cir.

v.

A.B.E.L.

1998).

Both

statutes “have the same requirements of proof and use the same
analytical framework.”

Id.

Jones did not point to any direct

evidence of race discrimination, so the Court must analyze her
claim under the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, (1981).
that

framework,

discrimination.

Jones

must

establish

a

Id. at 1331.
prima

facie

Under

case

of

Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610

F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010).

Jones may do that by showing

that she was a member of a protected class who was qualified for
her position and was subjected to an adverse employment action
while similarly situated employees outside her protected class
were not.

Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of the Div. of Univs. of

the Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
2

Jones does not claim that St. Francis took action against her because
of any other protected characteristic, like gender or national origin.

5

If Jones establishes a prima facie case, then St. Francis may
articulate
actions.

a

legitimate

non-discriminatory

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264.

reason

for

its

If St. Francis articulates

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, then Jones must produce
evidence

that

St.

discrimination.

Francis’s

proffered

reason

is

pretext

for

Id.

Here, there is no serious dispute that Jones was a member
of a protected class who was qualified for her job and was
subjected to adverse employment actions when she was suspended
and then

terminated.

The

remaining

question is whether the

evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Jones would allow
a

reasonable

favorably

juror

than

protected class.

a

to

conclude

similarly

that

she

situated

The answer is yes.

was

employee

treated
outside

less
her

With regard to the final

written warning, Jones pointed to evidence that while she and
Kent were disciplined for the exact same infraction, Tippins
told Kent that he was only receiving a suspension and a warning
because she and Robinson were “trying to get a paper trail” on
Jones and “somebody had to go down with her.”
50:13-17,

51:8-11.

Tippins

also

told

Kent

Kent Dep. at
that

his

final

written warning did not mean that he would actually be fired in
the event of another incident, as it typically would for other
employees

(and

as

it

did

Moreover,

based

on

Kent’s

for

Jones).

testimony,

6

a

Id.

at

reasonable

51:12-24.
factfinder

could also conclude that Moore was equally or more to blame for
the incident, that Tippins knew it, and that Tippins decided not
to discipline Moore because she had just been written up and
would have to be fired for the second infraction.
21.

Id. at 50:15-

With regard to Jones’s termination, a reasonable factfinder

could conclude that while Jones was terminated for a second
patient identification error, white employees—including Kent and
Moore—were not.
In sum, based on the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to Jones, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
Jones was disciplined more harshly than her white counterparts
for the same conduct,

and

St. Francis

offered no legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for doing so.

Although St. Francis

vigorously disputes that it engaged in discriminatory conduct,
there is a fact question on this point, and summary judgment is
thus inappropriate.
II.

Jones’s Retaliation Claims
In

addition

to

her

race

discrimination

claim,

Jones

contends that St. Francis retaliated against her for filing a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
§ 1981.
employer

Such retaliation is unlawful under Title VII and

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (making it unlawful for an
to

discriminate

against

an

employee

because

the

employee “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in

7

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under”
Title

VII);

(2008)

CBOCS

W.,

(concluding

claims”).

Inc.

that

v.
§

Humphries,
1981

553

U.S.

“encompasses

442,

446

retaliation

To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII

or § 1981, Jones must prove that she “engaged in statutorily
protected activity,” “suffered a materially adverse action, and
there

was

some

causal

relation

between

the

two

events.”

Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (2008).

If

Jones establishes these elements, St. Francis may “articulate a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged employment
action.”

Id.

If

St.

Francis

articulates

a

legitimate,

nonretaliatory reason for its decision, Jones must show that
“the reason provided by the employer is a pretext for prohibited
retaliatory conduct.”

Id.

St. Francis cannot seriously dispute that Jones engaged in
protected activity when she filed an EEOC charge and that she
suffered

materially

adverse

actions

without pay and then terminated.

when

she

was

suspended

St. Francis contends, however,

that Jones cannot establish a causal connection because Jones
filed her EEOC charge in September 2012 and the first adverse
employment action did not occur until February 2013.
Jones, however, produced evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that her supervisors started looking
for reasons to fire her within a few weeks after learning of

8

Jones’s EEOC charge.
that

her

supervisors

Jones also produced evidence suggesting
knew

that

they

retaliatory discipline look legitimate.

needed

to

make

any

She proffered evidence

that Tippins and Robinson were “trying to get a paper trail” on
her, Kent Dep. 50:13-17, and she pointed to pages and pages of
text messages suggesting that Moore worked with Tippins to find
problems with Jones’s work, e.g., Jones Dep. Ex. 87, ECF Nos. 46
& 47.

From this evidence, a jury could infer that Jones’s

supervisors had a retaliatory animus that led to the adverse
employment

actions.

And,

a

jury

could

conclude

that

St.

Francis’s non-retaliatory reasons for its decisions (that Jones
committed patient ID errors) were pretext for retaliation in
light of the evidence that Jones was disciplined more harshly
than similarly situated employees who did not complain of racial
discrimination.

Summary judgment is thus not appropriate on

Jones’s retaliation claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, St. Francis’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 13th day of August, 2015.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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