THOMAS et al v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit et al

Filing 19

ORDER denying 17 Motion for Recusal. Ordered by U.S. District Judge CLAY D LAND on 09/29/2014. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JAMES R. THOMAS, JR. and
SABRINA R. THOMAS,

*
*

Plaintiffs,
*
vs.

CASE NO. 4:14-CV-9 (CDL)
*

CHATTAHOOCHEE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
et al.,
*
Defendants.

*
O R D E R

Plaintiffs

James

R.

Thomas,

Jr.

and

Sabrina

R.

Thomas

allege that superior court judges in the Chattahoochee Judicial
Circuit conspired with others to deprive Plaintiffs of certain
protected rights.

Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16 (ECF No. 1).

Plaintiffs now

assert that the undersigned and Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles
should

be

disqualified

from

this

28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2).
forth below, Plaintiffs’

proceeding

under

For the reasons set

Motion for Recusal (ECF No. 17)

is

denied.
First, Plaintiffs contend that the Court showed “pervasive
bias

in

pauperis,

denying”
so

the

Plaintiffs’
undersigned

petition
and

disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

to

Judge

proceed
Hyles

in

forma

should

be

That section requires a

judge to “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality

might

reasonably

be

questioned.”

As

Plaintiffs

acknowledge, though, “as a general rule, a judge’s rulings in
the same case are not valid grounds for recusal.”

Pl.’s Mot.

for Recusal 2, ECF No. 17; accord Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”).
While

the

“proper

Court’s

grounds

prior

for

rulings

appeal,”

in

this

they

do

that

both

case

not

may

have

warrant

been

recusal.

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
Second,

Plaintiffs

argue

the

undersigned

and

Judge Hyles have a bias in favor of the Defendants in this case
and should be disqualified under both 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and 28
U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).

This argument is based on the fact that the

undersigned and Judge Hyles practiced law in the Chattahoochee
Judicial Circuit before the alleged conduct giving rise to this
action

began

in

practiced

law

December

2001,

late

in

the
and

2011.

Specifically,

Chattahoochee
Judge

Hyles

the

Judicial
practiced

undersigned

Circuit
law

in

until
the

Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit until December 2008 and served as
judge of the Columbus Municipal Court from December 2008 until
June 2010.
“[R]ecusal under § 455(a) turns on whether an objective,
disinterested,
underlying

the

lay

observer

grounds

on

fully
which

2

informed
recusal

was

of

the

facts

sought

would

entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 894 (2014) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
judge

to

disqualify

And 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) requires a

himself

if

“he

has

a

personal

bias

or

prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary
speculate

facts

that

concerning

the

the

undersigned

and

proceeding.”
Judge

Plaintiffs

Hyles

“might

have

participate [sic] in the very conduct that the Thomases allege
in their complaint.”
been

assigned

to

Mot. for Recusal 5.
a

case,

should

not

But “a judge, having
recuse

himself

unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”
755 F.3d at 895 (internal quotation marks omitted).

on

Moody,

Recusal is

not warranted simply because the undersigned practiced law in
the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit until a decade before the
alleged conduct giving rise to Plaintiffs’ Complaint occurred.
Recusal is also not warranted based on the mere fact that Judge
Hyles practiced law in the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit until
2008 and served as a municipal court judge in Columbus until
2010.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that recusal is necessary under
28

U.S.C. §

himself

if

455(b)(2),
“the

judge

concerning” the case.

which
.

.

requires
.

has

a

been

judge
a

to

disqualify

material

witness

Plaintiffs speculate that because the

undersigned practiced law in the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit

3

until December 2001 and because Judge Hyles practiced law in the
Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit until December 2008 and served as
judge of the Columbus Municipal Court from December of 2008
until

June

of

2010,

the

undersigned

“potential witnesses” in this case.
establish
material

that

either

witness

in

the

Judge

Hyles

are

Such speculation does not

undersigned
this

and

case,

or
so

Judge

Hyles

recusal

is

a

under

28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) is unwarranted.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal
(ECF No. 17) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 29th day of September, 2014.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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