WISH ATLANTA LLC v. CONTEXTLOGIC INC
Filing
18
ORDER denying 12 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Ordered by U.S. District Judge CLAY D LAND on 10/09/14 (vac)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
Wish Atlanta, LLC,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
Contextlogic, Inc.,
*
Defendant.
*
CASE NO. 4:14-CV-00051 (CDL)
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff Wish Atlanta, LLC (“Wish Atlanta”) sued Defendant
Contextlogic, Inc. (“Contextlogic”) for trademark infringement,
trademark
dilution,
unfair
competition,
practices.
Presently
pending
Contextlogic’s
motions
dismiss
to
and
before
(1)
the
for
jurisdiction and (2) for improper venue.
deceptive
lack
trade
Court
of
are
personal
In the alternative,
Contextlogic moves to transfer this action to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.
For the
following reasons, the Court denies all three motions (ECF No.
12).
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(2),
when
a
plaintiff seeks to have a court exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, that plaintiff “‘bears the initial
burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out
a prima facie case of jurisdiction.’”
Diamond Crystal Brands,
Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274
(11th
Cir.
2009)).
If
the
defendant
presents
evidence
challenging jurisdiction, “the burden traditionally shifts back
to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.”
Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264,
1269 (11th Cir. 2002).
“Where the plaintiff’s complaint and
supporting evidence conflict with the defendant’s affidavits,
the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff.”
Under
Id.
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(3),
the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that venue is proper.
Delong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 845
(11th Cir. 1988).
“The district court of a district in which is
filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought.”
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The
Court
jurisdictional
permitted
discovery
the
to
parties
ascertain
to
engage
the
full
Contextlogic’s contacts with the state of Georgia.
2
in
limited
nature
of
The present
record
reveals
the
following.
The
material
facts
are
not
disputed.
Contextlogic is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in San Francisco, California.
Contextlogic’s
offices, employees, business records, and computer servers are
all located in the San Francisco Bay Area.
Contextlogic employs
no one in Georgia and has never employed a person to travel to
Georgia
to
conduct
Contextlogic
does
business
not
on
own
behalf
real
of
property
Contextlogic.
in
Georgia.
Contextlogic never registered to conduct business in Georgia nor
had an agent for service of process in Georgia.
Contextlogic facilitates the sale of fashion merchandise
through an online website and smart phone application.
The
website and application work the same way: consumers make “wish
lists” of products they want to purchase and then purchase those
products through Contextlogic.
While Contextlogic facilitates
the sale, Contextlogic does not directly sell the merchandise.
Instead, third-party suppliers sell and ship the merchandise.
In exchange for facilitating the sale between the consumer and
the
third-party
from each sale.
supplier,
Contextlogic
receives
a
10-15%
fee
Originally, Contextlogic conducted business on
a website with the domain name “www.wishwall.me.”
At a later
date
or
disputed
Contextlogic
by
began
the
parties
operating
3
(November
under
2011
the
domain
2012),
name
“www.wish.com.”
Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1; Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s
Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A, Szulczewski Decl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 12-2.
The smart phone application is known as the “WISH app.”
The
website and application are accessible worldwide.
To
eight
facilitate
suppliers
Contextlogic’s
its
business,
located
in
website.
Contextlogic
Georgia
Consumers
to
sell
can
contracts
with
merchandise
register
to
on
use
Contextlogic’s website, and 99,446 registered users reside in
the state of Georgia (0.38% of all users worldwide).
Of those
users, 3,982 reside in the Middle District of Georgia (0.0153%
of
all
users
worldwide).
In
the
past
year,
Contextlogic
facilitated 16,731 transactions with Georgia consumers over its
website and smart phone application.
Of those transactions,
3,765 occurred in the Middle District of Georgia.
transactions
$506,669.58
with
in
Georgia
products
consumers,
(1.005%
derived $26,501.02 in revenue.
of
all
From the
Contextlogic
sales
sold
worldwide)
and
From the transactions with the
Middle District of Georgia alone, Contextlogic sold $139,946.13
in
products
(0.291%
of
all
sales
worldwide)
and
derived
$8,350.23 in revenue.
Wish
Atlanta,
a
Georgia
corporation,
conducts
an
online
fashion merchandise store similar to Contextlogic’s store.
Wish
Atlanta
Wish
owns
a
federal
trademark
to
the
“Wish”
mark.
Atlanta has used the “Wish” mark in connection with its retail
4
store since 2004 and in its online store since February 2010.
Wish Atlanta alleges that Contextlogic operates an online store
that sells goods similar to those sold by Wish Atlanta while
wrongfully using the “Wish” trademark.
DISCUSSION
I.
12(b)(2)
Motion
Jurisdiction
to
Dismiss
for
Lack
of
Personal
To determine whether Contextlogic is subject to personal
jurisdiction
analysis.
Georgia
in
Georgia,
the
Court
engages
in
a
Diamond Crystal Brands, 593 F.3d at 1257.
long-arm
statute
must
permit
jurisdiction over Contextlogic.
the
Court
two-step
First, the
to
exercise
Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P.
v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005).
The Georgia long-arm statute is not coextensive with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Diamond
Crystal
Brands,
593
F.3d
at
1259.
Instead, the long-arm statute “imposes independent obligations
that a plaintiff must establish for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction that are distinct from the demands of procedural
due
process.”
jurisdiction,
whether
the
Id.
the
If
second
step
exercise
of
the
is
long-arm
for
jurisdiction
the
Court
comports
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5
statute
to
with
confers
evaluate
the
Id. at 1257-58.
Due
A.
Georgia’s Long-Arm Statute
Wish Atlanta relies on subsection (1) of the Georgia longarm
statute
for
jurisdiction.
Subsection
(1)
provides
for
jurisdiction if Contextlogic “[t]ransacts any business” within
Georgia.
Atlanta
O.C.G.A.
contends
§
9-10-91(1).
that
In
subsection
the
(3)
alternative,
provides
Wish
jurisdiction.
Subsection (3) permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction if
Contextlogic “[c]ommits a tortious injury in this state caused
by
an
act
feasor . . .
or
omission
derives
outside
this
substantial
revenue
state
from
consumed or services rendered in this state.”
91(3).
if
the
goods
tort-
used
or
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to subsection (1), so
analysis of subsection (3) is unnecessary.
In determining whether subsection (1) confers jurisdiction,
the
Court
literally.
interprets
the
term
Innovative
Clinical
&
“transacts
Consulting
any
business”
Servs.,
LLC
v.
First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 279 Ga. 672, 675, 620 S.E.2d 352, 355
(2005).
The Eleventh Circuit defined “transacts any business”
as “the doing of some act or consummation of some transaction.”
Diamond Crystal Brands, 593 F.3d at 1260.
the
Georgia
courts
provide
further
“[U]nless and until
authoritative
guidance,
courts in this circuit construing the statute literally will
have to delineate the precise contours of the ‘[t]ransacts any
business within this state’ requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9–10–91(1)
6
according to the facts of each case.”
alteration
in
original).
Id. at 1263 (second
Contextlogic
“need
not
enter the state” to transact business in Georgia.
Not
only
is
physical
presence
physically
Id. at 1264.
unnecessary,
but
business
transactions may be “conducted through . . . Internet contacts.”
ATCO Sign & Lighting Co., LLC v. Stamm Mfg., Inc., 298 Ga. App.
528, 534, 680 S.E.2d 571, 576 (2009).
“expressly
depends
on
the
actual
Subsection (1), however,
transaction
of
business.”
Diamond Crystal Brands, 593 F.3d at 1260 (emphasis added).
Contextlogic
transactions
facilitated
with
Georgia
more
consumers
than
in
the
16,000
past
online
year.
But
Contextlogic argues that it did not transact business in Georgia
because
consumers
Contextlogic.
platform
for
do
not
Instead,
purchase
products
Contextlogic’s
third-party
suppliers
to
Contextlogic receives 10-15% of each sale.
directly
website
sell
from
provides
products,
a
and
Neither the Eleventh
Circuit nor any federal court within the circuit has addressed
whether a corporation transacts business pursuant to subsection
(1) when the corporation maintains a website that facilitates
sales through third-party suppliers and the corporation receives
compensation from each sale.
Following
interpret
the
the
words
Georgia
Supreme
“transacts
any
Court’s
instruction
business”
literally,
to
the
Court finds that Contextlogic transacts business in Georgia each
7
time it derives income from Georgia consumers by providing a
service in exchange for compensation.
See Innovative Clinical &
Consulting, 279 Ga. at 675, 620 S.E.2d at 355 (“[W]e must give
the same literal construction to subsection (1) of OCGA § 9–10–
91
that
we
give
to
the
other
subsections.”).
Contextlogic
provides a website that allows Georgia consumers to develop a
list of products they want to purchase, and it facilitates the
purchase
of
those
products
from
third-party
suppliers.
In
exchange for providing this service, Contextlogic retains a 1015%
transaction
Georgia
fee
consumers,
from
from
each
which
sale.
Such
Contextlogic
online
derived
sales
more
to
than
$26,000 in annual revenue, constitute transacting business under
subsection (1).
Contextlogic relies heavily on the Court’s previous order
in Jordan Outdoor Enterprises, Ltd. v. That 70’s Store, LLC, 819
F.
Supp.
2d
1338,
1343-44
(M.D.
Ga.
2011),
where
the
Court
determined that merely maintaining a website does not constitute
transacting
business
in
Georgia
under
subsection
(1).
The
crucial fact in Jordan Outdoor Enterprises, however, was that
“Defendants
did
not
sell
any
products
to
Georgia
residents
through the internet,” and thus “the websites failed to generate
any business for Defendants in Georgia.”
Id. at 1343.
contrast,
facilitated
in
the
past
year
Contextlogic
By
16,731
transactions in Georgia, generated $506,669.58 from those sales,
8
and derived $26,501.02 in revenue from those sales.
It makes no
difference that consumers purchase the products from third-party
suppliers,
rather
Contextlogic
than
derives
Contextlogic
revenue
from
directly,
each
because
sale.
Because
Contextlogic engaged in business transactions over its website,
this action differs from Jordan Outdoor Enterprises.
In
sum,
purposes
of
Contextlogic
subsection
transacted
(1),
so
business
the
in
Court
Georgia
may
for
exercise
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.
B.
Constitutional Due Process
Since the long-arm statute confers jurisdiction, the Court
must next ensure that the assertion of jurisdiction does not
offend
Contextlogic’s
Brands,
593
F.3d
at
due
process
1257-58.
To
rights.
comply
Diamond
with
due
Crystal
process,
Contextlogic must have “‘certain minimum contacts with the forum
such
that
traditional
the
maintenance
notions
of
fair
of
play
the
and
suit
does
substantial
not
offend
justice.’”
Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1220
(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
Minimum contacts exist
if Contextlogic has a “fair warning” that it may be sued in the
forum.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“Once this showing is made,
a defendant must make a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of
9
jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”
Diamond Crystal Brands, 593 F.3d at 1267
(quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477).
The due process analysis differs depending on whether the
Court asserts general or specific jurisdiction.
“A court may
assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations to
hear any and all claims against them” regardless of whether
those
claims
forum.
relate
to
corporation’s
contacts
with
the
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
exists
the
when
the
Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, only
claims
“relate[]
to
defendant’s contacts with the forum.”
or
‘arise[]
out
of’
a
Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. at 414 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
204).
Wish Atlanta argues that the Court may exercise both
general and specific jurisdiction over Contextlogic.
1.
General Jurisdiction
Contextlogic is subject to general jurisdiction in Georgia
only if its contacts are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to
render
[Contextlogic]
Goodyear
Dunlop
(quoting
Int’l
(1945)).
Tires
Shoe
essentially
Operations,
Co.
v.
at
home
S.A.,
Washington,
131
in
the
S.
Ct.
326
U.S.
forum.”
at
2851
310,
317
Wish Atlanta argues that Contextlogic is subject to
general jurisdiction in Georgia “and probably in most, if not
all
50
states”
because
Contextlogic
10
maintains
a
nationwide
website.
Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 5, ECF No. 15.
Specifically, Wish Atlanta argues that Contextlogic’s contacts
with Georgia—including the number of registered users (99,446),
transactions (16,731 per year), and suppliers (8) in Georgia—
subject it to general jurisdiction.
Wish Atlanta vastly overstates the effect of Contextlogic’s
contacts.
Contextlogic’s
contacts
with
the
insufficient to make it “at home” in Georgia.
Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
forum
are
Goodyear Dunlop
In Goodyear, the
United States Supreme Court instructed that the “paradigm bases
for the exercise of general jurisdiction” over a corporation are
the entity’s (1) principal place of business and (2) place of
incorporation.
Id. at 2854 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court recently clarified that general jurisdiction
over a corporation is exclusive to these two bases; calling it
“unacceptably grasping” for a court to “approve the exercise of
general
jurisdiction
in
every
State
in
which
a
corporation
engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of
business.”
(internal
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-61 (2014)
quotation
incorporated
Georgia.
nor
marks
makes
Therefore,
omitted).
its
principal
Contextlogic
jurisdiction in Georgia.
Id.
11
is
Contextlogic
place
not
of
subject
is
neither
business
to
in
general
2.
Specific Jurisdiction
For Contextlogic to be subject to specific jurisdiction,
Contextlogic
Diamond
must
Crystal
Contextlogic’s
subject
Brands,
contacts
matter
requirements
purposefully
of
are
593
met,
F.3d
with
the
avail
itself
at
the
1267.
forum
Id.
assertion
of
the
forum.
Additionally,
must
litigation.
the
of
relate
If
to
the
these
two
jurisdiction
over
Contextlogic will not offend due process because Contextlogic
“‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’”
Oldfield, 558 F.3d at 1221 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
a.
The
Eleventh
PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT OF THE FORUM
Circuit
has
not
decided
“whether
a
non-
resident defendant electronically transmitting, or enabling the
transmission of, information via the Internet subjects himself
to
the
personal
jurisdiction
of
the
forum
encountered the electronic information.”
1219
n.26.
One
influential
standard
where
plaintiff
Oldfield, 558 F.3d at
for
measuring
internet
contacts is set forth in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
Although
the Eleventh Circuit has yet to endorse or reject the Zippo
test, many other circuits have adopted it.
See, e.g., ALS Scan,
Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th
Cir. 2002); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.
12
1999).
Circuits not using the Zippo test use a traditional
contacts analysis instead.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Hemi Grp.
LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2010).
The Court may assert
jurisdiction under both tests, as discussed below.
The Zippo test sets forth a sliding scale for determining
whether internet contacts suffice to create jurisdiction.
On
one end of the scale are “situations where a defendant clearly
does business over the Internet.”
at 1124.
Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp.
In these cases, personal jurisdiction is proper.
Id.
At the other end of the scale are “situations where a defendant
has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is
accessible
to
users
in
foreign
jurisdictions.”
Id.
These
“passive” websites are “not grounds for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.”
Id.
In the middle of these two extremes are
“interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information
with
the
host
jurisdiction
interactivity
computer.
is
and
In
determined
these
by
commercial
cases,
the
examining
nature
information that occurs on the Web site.”
of
the
the
exercise
of
level
of
exchange
of
Id.
This action falls in the first category.
As discussed
above, Contextlogic does business in Georgia over the internet.
Under the test set forth in Zippo, Contextlogic is subject to
jurisdiction here.
13
The
Court
reaches
contacts analysis.
the
same
result
under
a
traditional
The focus, for purposes of this analysis, is
on whether Contextlogic purposefully reached out to the forum
state.
In the context of internet sales, persuasive authority
suggests
that
a
corporation
purposefully
avails
itself
of
a
forum when the corporation derives revenue from the forum state,
even when that revenue represents only a small percentage of the
corporation’s total annual revenue.
See, e.g., Hemi Grp., LLC,
622 F.3d at 755, 757 (finding minimum contacts from an online
purchase of 300 packets of cigarettes, a small percentage of the
defendant’s overall business); Rice v. PetEdge, Inc., 975 F.
Supp. 2d 1364, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (1-2% of annual revenue);
Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 516, 523-24,
631 S.E.2d 734, 736, 740-41 (2006) (0.5% of annual revenue).
In
the
past
year,
Contextlogic
derived
$26,501.02,
or
1.005%, of its revenue from Georgia.
Additionally, Contextlogic
has
and
eight
suppliers
in
Georgia
engaged
in
16,731
transactions in Georgia in the past year.
Because of these
contacts,
anticipate
haled
into
Contextlogic
court’”
in
should
“‘reasonably
Georgia.
Oldfield,
558
F.3d
being
at
1221
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297).
Contextlogic urges the Court to focus on the percentage of
revenue
that
Contextlogic
derived
from
compared to its overall, worldwide sales.
14
the
state
of
Georgia
Because Contextlogic
derived only 1.005% of its revenue from Georgia, Contextlogic
argues that it does not have minimum contacts with Georgia.
In
limited contexts, courts have found that minimum contacts do not
exist when a corporation receives only a small percentage of its
revenue from the forum.
See, e.g., Wolfson v. Houston Post Co.,
441 F.2d 735, 736 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); New York Times
Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1966).
The Court,
however, finds this precedent limited to libel suits against the
press.
In
the
publications,
context
“First
of
libel
Amendment
lawsuits
against
considerations
newspaper
surrounding
the
law of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the
due process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction
over other types of tortious activity.”
572.
Connor, 365 F.2d at
Because of the need for greater contacts in such cases, a
news publication that derives only a small percentage of its
revenue from the forum lacks sufficient contact with the forum.
But Contextlogic is not a news publication, and this is not a
libel
action,
so
the
Court
does
not
hesitate
to
exercise
jurisdiction merely because Contextlogic derives a small amount
of revenue from Georgia compared to its overall sales.
In the same vein, Contextlogic relies heavily on Imageline,
Inc. v. Fotolia LLC, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
Imageline,
a
corporation
to
court
refused
jurisdiction
to
in
15
subject
Georgia
an
solely
In
out-of-state
because
the
corporation
online
derived
sales
a
to
small
Georgia
percentage
consumers.
of
its
Id.
revenue
at
from
1377-78.
Contextlogic, however, has far greater contact with Georgia then
the defendant in Imageline.
In Imageline, the defendant derived
less than one percent of its revenue from sales in Georgia since
its
inception,
whereas
Contextlogic
received
more
than
percent of its revenue from Georgia in the past year.
1370-71, 1377-78.
Georgia
that
one
Id. at
Additionally, Contextlogic has contacts with
simply
did
not
exist
in
Imageline,
including
relationships with eight Georgia suppliers and facilitating more
than 16,000 transactions in Georgia in the past year.
These
contacts suffice to put Contextlogic on notice that it may be
sued in Georgia.
b.
RELATION TO THE SUBJECT MATTER
Since Contextlogic has purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting business in Georgia, the Court next must
decide whether Wish Atlanta’s claims relate to Contextlogic’s
contacts
with
Georgia.
“Unlike
other
courts,
[the
Eleventh
Circuit] ha[s] not developed or adopted a specific approach to
determining relatedness; instead, [the Eleventh Circuit] ha[s]
heeded the Supreme Court’s warning against using ‘mechanical or
quantitative’ tests.”
Oldfield, 558 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Int’l
Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319).
16
Wish
Atlanta
brings
trademark
dilution,
practices.
Each
claims
unfair
claim
for
trademark
competition,
requires
Wish
and
infringement,
deceptive
Atlanta
to
trade
show
that
Contextlogic in some way used the “Wish” mark or a mark closely
resembling the “Wish” mark.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c); O.C.G.A. § 10-1-451; O.C.G.A. § 10-1-452; O.C.G.A.
§ 10-1-372; O.C.G.A. § 10-1-373.
Wish Atlanta contends that
Contextlogic operated its website using the “Wish” mark and, as
a
result,
Georgia
consumers
unsatisfied
with
purchases
made
through Contextlogic’s website mistakenly called Wish Atlanta to
complain.
Wish Atlanta’s infringement claims are based in part
on complaints received from Contextlogic’s confused customers.
Thus, Wish Atlanta’s claims relate to Contextlogic’s contacts
with Georgia.
3.
Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Because
the
Court
finds
that
Contextlogic
has
minimum
contacts with Georgia, the burden now shifts to Contextlogic to
“present
a
compelling
case
that
the
presence
of
some
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477.
other
Burger
The Eleventh Circuit has outlined
five factors to guide determining whether jurisdiction is unfair
to
Contextlogic:
defending
the
(1)
lawsuit,
the
(2)
“‘burden
“‘the
on
forum
the
defendant’”
State’s
interest
in
in
adjudicating the dispute,’” (3) “‘the plaintiff’s interest in
17
obtaining
convenient
and
effective
relief,’”
(4)
the
“‘interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies,’” and (5) “‘the shared
interest
of
the
several
States
substantive social policies.’”
in
furthering
fundamental
Diamond Crystal Brands, 593 F.3d
at 1274 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477).
Contextlogic’s
the first factor.
only
argument
regarding
fairness
concerns
Contextlogic argues that it would face a “not
insubstantial burden” if required to defend itself in Georgia,
which is “more than 2,000 miles away from its San Francisco
offices.”
12.
Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 10, ECF No.
Contextlogic, however, makes no attempt to explain how the
distance poses a burden.
Further, it is not uncommon to require
an out-of-state corporation to defend itself in a forum located
across the country.
See, e.g., Diamond Crystal Brands, 593 F.3d
at 1274 (requiring a California corporation to defend itself in
Georgia).
Thus Contextlogic fails to make a “compelling case”
that “jurisdiction [is] unreasonable.”
Burger King Corp., 471
U.S. at 477.
II.
12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) provides that “[a] civil action may
be brought in . . . a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which
the district is located.”
A corporate defendant resides “in any
18
district
in
sufficient
that
to
State
subject
within
it
to
which
its
personal
district were a separate State.”
contacts
jurisdiction
would
if
be
that
28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).
Wish Atlanta argues that venue is proper in this Court
because
Contextlogic’s
contacts
with
the
Middle
District
of
Georgia, though “not as extensive as they are to the entire
state,” are “still, nonetheless significant.”
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 6.
Pl.’s Resp. to
Contextlogic, by contrast, again
focuses on the percentage of business conducted in the Middle
District of Georgia compared to the company’s worldwide sales.
From that perspective, only 0.291% of Contextlogic’s sales and
0.0153% of its registered users come from this District.
To
be
represent
overall
a
sure,
Contextlogic’s
comparatively
business.
The
small
contacts
with
percentage
contacts,
however,
of
this
District
Contextlogic’s
far
exceed
the
“random, fortuitous, or attenuated” types that require dismissal
for improper venue.
Cir. 1990).
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th
Contextlogic facilitated 3,765 transactions for the
sale of goods in this District over the past year.
Through
these transactions, Contextlogic sold $139,946.13 in merchandise
and derived $8,350.23 in revenue.
Finally, 3,982 registered
users of Contextlogic’s website reside in this District.
Based
on Contextlogic’s contacts with this District alone, the Court
could assert jurisdiction over Contextlogic.
19
Contextlogic thus
resides in this District and the Court denies the motion to
dismiss for improper venue.
III. Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
As an alternative to dismissal, Contextlogic asks the Court
to transfer this action to the United States District Court for
the
Northern
District
of
California.
28
U.S.C.
§
1404(a)
states: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought.”
“The decision to transfer a case to another
district is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”
Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1197 (11th
Cir. 1991).
Federal courts usually give substantial deference
to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, so the movant bears the
burden of persuading the Court that its proposed forum is more
convenient than the current forum.
See In re Ricoh Corp., 870
F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
(explaining the
traditional burden for § 1404(a) transfer).
A.
Where this Action “Might Have Been Brought”
The first issue is whether Wish Atlanta “might have . . .
brought” this action in the Northern District of California.
U.S.C. § 1404(a).
28
Both parties agree that Wish Atlanta could
have originally sued Contextlogic in the Northern District of
California.
The Northern District of California may properly
20
exercise subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and
venue because this action alleges violations of federal law and
Contextlogic’s principal place of business is in San Francisco.
In
sum,
there
is
no
dispute
that
this
action
could
have
originated in the Northern District of California.
B.
Convenience of the
Interest of Justice
Parties
and
Witnesses
and
the
Second, the “convenience of the parties and witnesses” and
the
“interests
§ 1404(a).
of
justice”
must
favor
transfer.
28
U.S.C.
The Court considers nine factors in making this
determination:
(1) [T]he convenience of the witnesses; (2) the
location of relevant documents and the relative ease
of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of
the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the
availability of process to compel the attendance of
unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the
parties; (7) a forum’s familiarity with the governing
law; (8) the weight accorded a plaintiff’s choice of
forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of
justice, based on the totality of the circumstances.
Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir.
2005).
1.
Neutral Factors
Most of the § 1404(a) factors are neutral.
convenience
of
Contextlogic’s
the
witnesses
witnesses
(factor
reside
in
1),
San
the
As to the
majority
Francisco
or
of
the
surrounding area, so the Northern District of California would
be most convenient for them.
Wish Atlanta, however, intends to
21
call witnesses that, if “not in [the Middle District of Georgia]
. . . are in Atlanta, a short drive away.”
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 7.
Pl.’s Resp. to
The Court finds that it may be more
convenient for Wish Atlanta’s witnesses to travel to the Middle
District of Georgia than to the Northern District of California.
Travel
will
inconvenience
some
witnesses
regardless
of
which
venue adjudicates this dispute, so the Court finds this factor
neutral.
For the same reason, the Court finds the convenience of the
parties (factor 3) is also neutral.
adjudicates
this
action,
either
will travel a long distance.
Regardless of which forum
Contextlogic
or
Wish
Atlanta
Because travel will inconvenience
one party either way, the Court finds this factor neutral.
As to the location of relevant documents (factor 2), Wish
Atlanta’s
Georgia
trademark
while
Francisco,
discovery,
registration
Contextlogic’s
California.
the
insignificant.
Due
location
documents
corporate
to
of
the
are
records
prevalence
these
documents
in
Columbus,
are
of
in
San
electronic
is
largely
But, because some documents are located in both
venues, the Court finds factor 2 neutral.
Contextlogic claims the availability of process to compel
the attendance of unwilling witnesses (factor 5) weighs in favor
of
transfer.
Contextlogic
no
longer
employs
some
of
its
witnesses, and so Contextlogic argues that service of process is
22
not
available
District
to
of
compelled
compel
Georgia.
to
travel
them
to
appear
live
But
to
those
witnesses
the
Middle
District
in
who
of
the
Middle
cannot
Georgia
be
can
certainly be compelled to provide testimony by deposition at
their places of residence.
And that deposition testimony for
any unavailable witnesses may be used by Contextlogic instead of
live testimony.
is neutral.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B).
Thus, this factor
Additionally, the parties presumably have similar
relative means (factor 6) and both the Northern District of
California
and
the
Middle
District
of
Georgia
are
equally
familiar with the governing law (factor 7).
2.
Only
Factors Favoring Transfer
the
transfer.
locus
of
operative
facts
(factor
4)
favors
When trademark infringement occurs over the internet,
the operative facts concentrate where the website was created.
“Even if infringement occurred in Georgia as a result of Georgia
residents viewing the infringing marks on Defendants’ websites
. .
.
the
conduct
giving
rise
to
the
infringement
. . . where Defendants created the websites.”
occurred
Jordan Outdoor
Enters., Ltd., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1345; accord Paradise Media
Ventures, LLC. v. Mills, Civil Action file No. 1:13-CV-1003,
2013
WL
6388627,
at
*3
(N.D.
Ga.
Dec.
5,
2013)
(“When
the
tortious conduct occurs over an Internet website, the situs of
this tort is considered to be where the website, or servers
23
which maintain the website, are located.”) (internal quotation
marks
omitted).
Wish
Atlanta
alleges
that
Contextlogic
wrongfully used the “Wish” mark on Contextlogic’s website, which
was created in San Francisco.
is in San Francisco.
So the locus of operative facts
Thus, this factor weighs in favor of
transfer.
3.
Factors Against Transfer
While the locus of operative facts favors transfer, the
weight
accorded
militates
a
against
plaintiff’s
transfer.
choice
of
forum
Traditionally,
(factor
courts
considerable deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d at 573.
8)
give
In
But “this factor is entitled
to less deference when the operative facts are centered outside
of this district and when the plaintiff[] do[es] not reside here
or in close proximity to this district.”
Polyform A.G.P. Inc.
v. Airlite Plastics Co., No. 4:10-CV-43 (CDL), 2010 WL 4068603,
at *7 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2009) (emphasis added).
Wish Atlanta
is located near this District, in Atlanta.
So the Court will
not discount Wish Atlanta’s choice of forum.
Thus, deferring to
Wish Atlanta’s choice of forum, factor 8
weighs
strongly in
favor of adjudicating the dispute in this District.
4.
Summary
In sum, one factor weighs in favor of transfer, and one
factor weighs against transfer.
24
All other factors are neutral.
“[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”
Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), superseded by
statute as recognized in Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S.
443, 449 n.2 (1994).
Though the locus of operative facts is
primarily in San Francisco, in our internet age, the trademark
injury Wish Atlanta complains of occurs nationwide.
nationwide
injury
Wish
Atlanta
claims
to
Due to the
suffer,
and
the
deference the Court must give Wish Atlanta’s choice of forum,
the Court finds that Contextlogic failed to carry its burden of
convincing the Court that the factors weigh “strongly in favor
of the defendant.”
Id.
The Court denies Contextlogic’s motion
to transfer venue.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the Court denies Contextlogic’s motions
to dismiss and motion to transfer venue. (ECF No. 12).
Counsel for the parties shall confer and provide the Court
by October 27, 2014 with a jointly proposed scheduling order
consistent with Rules 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 9th day of October, 2014.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
25
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