QUASEBARTH et al v. GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC

Filing 71

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 31 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 2/3/2016. (VCP)

Download PDF
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION JIM QUASEBARTH, and ROBYN QUASEBARTH, * * Plaintiffs, * vs. CASE NO. 4:14-CV-223 (CDL) * GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, * Defendant. * O R D E R The final pretrial conference in this case is scheduled for tomorrow. The Court has not yet ruled on Defendant Green Tree Servicing, LLC’s motion for summary judgment. Although the Court has thoroughly studied the pending motion and has reached a decision on its resolution, the Court is unable to finish a detailed written conference. order prior to tomorrow’s final pretrial Finding it more important to inform the parties of the Court’s decision prior to the pretrial conference than to craft a comprehensive order, the Court enters this abbreviated order. BACKGROUND Viewed in the light most favorable to the Quasebarths, the record reveals the following. The Quasebarths claim that Green Tree failed to provide them with an opportunity to cure their default on their mortgage loan and thus avoid foreclosure on their home. On October 16, 2012, a law firm retained by Green Tree sent a letter to the Quasebarths proceeding. explaining that it was commencing a foreclosure The letter instructs the Quasebarths to fill out a borrower response package so that Green Tree could consider them for a loan modification. that [Green Tree] is The letter also states: “Please note not agreeing at this time to stop foreclosure proceedings and is under no obligation to do so, even if you provide all the requested information to [Green Tree].” Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 11, Letter to James and Robyn Quasebarth 2, from Ellis, Painter, Ratterre & Adams, LLP, (Oct. 16, 2012) ECF No. 31-18. When Mr. Quasebarth received the letter, he called Green Tree and asked about the status of a borrower response package that he had submitted a few months prior. was A Green Tree representative told him that the package missing and that he needed to submit Quasebarth Dep. 80:6-13, ECF No. 34. another one. J. A few days later, on November 1, the Quasebarths received a letter stating that Green Tree would sell their home at a foreclosure sale on December 4 if they did not cure the default on their mortgage. Mr. Quasebarth then sent a completed borrower response package to Green Tree on November 8. Approximately a week later, on November 15, Green Tree sent a letter to the Quasebarths notifying the couple that it had 2 received their borrower solicitation package. The letter states: If your account was prevlously [sic] referred to foreclosure, we will continue the foreclosure process while we evaluate your account for a foreclosure prevention alternative . . . . However, no foreclosure sale will be conducted and you will not lose your home if Green Tree is reviewing a completed borrower response package . . . . If the borrower response package was received less than 37 days prior to a scheduled foreclosure sale, we will evaluate the account for a foreclosure prevention alternative and suspend the foreclosure sale, if appropriate. Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts Ex. P, Letter from Green Tree, to R. Quasebarth & J. Quasebarth 2 (Nov. 15 2012), ECF No. 4116. The next day, November 16, Green Tree sent another letter explaining that it was missing three documents from the Quasebarths’ borrower response package and could not evaluate the package. The letter states: “It is your responsibility to send [missing] in the documentation by 12/21/2012.” Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts, Ex. Q, Letter from Green Tree, to R. Quasebarth and J. Quasebarth (Nov. 16, 2012), ECF No. 41-17. Thus, Green Tree promised to stop a foreclosure sale only if it was reviewing a letter states complete. completed that the application. And the November 16 Quasebarths’ application was not Nevertheless, the Quasebarths assert that they read the letters and believed that Green Tree was promising to cancel the December 4 foreclosure sale and give them until December 21 to submit the missing documents. 3 Green Tree called the Quasebarths on November 27 and 28 urging them to provide the missing documents. The Quasebarths did not send the documents before the scheduled foreclosure on December 4. received a completed borrower solicitation Having not package or any payment to cure the default, Green Tree purportedly sold the home at a foreclosure sale on December 4. only bidder, and it bought the home. Green Tree was the That same Quasebarth faxed the missing documents to Green Tree. day, Mr. Stanley Decl. ¶ 42, ECF No. 31-4 (declaring that Green Tree received only two of three missing documents); J. Quasebarth Dep. 109:1022 (testifying that he sent Green Tree all three missing documents). The Quasebarths were surprised to learn that their home was sold on December 4. Mr. Quasebarth testified that he could have borrowed money from a family member to cure the default on the loan, but did not do so because he was relying on Green Tree’s alleged promise not to foreclose until it made a decision about his eligibility for a loan modification. Mr. Quasebarth called Green Tree and After the foreclosure, the firm handling the foreclosure (EPRA) on multiple occasions and was repeatedly told that the foreclosure sale was final and that there was nothing he could do to keep the home. On December 11, EPRA sent the Quasebarths a letter demanding immediate possession of the home and ordering the family to vacate the home within three days. 4 EPRA brought a dispossessory evict the Quasebarths. proceeding in late December to The Quasebarths then agreed to move out on January 6. The Quasebarths now contend that Green Tree knew or should have known that the December sale was not final and that the Quasebarths were still the rightful owners of the home, for two reasons. First, Green Tree never recorded a deed memorializing the sale. Stanley Dep. 231:23-232:4, ECF No. 36. Second, Green Tree knew as of January 4 that the foreclosure sale was not final because of an IRS tax lien on the property. planned to “re-foreclose” Stanley Dep. 211:8-24. on the home to clear Green Tree the title. But the Quasebarths contend that they were, in the meantime, still the lawful owners of the home. Green Tree never relayed this information to the Quasebarths. Instead, Green Tree entered Quasebarths on January 6. into an agreement with the In the agreement, the Quasebarths released all their claims to the home in exchange for $1,050. The Quasebarths signed the agreement in reliance on Green Tree’s representation that the sale was final. That same day, the Quasebarths moved out of their home. Shortly received after additional the Quasebarths confusing vacated letters the regarding home, the they home. First, they received a letter from EPRA dated January 29, 2013 stating that the Quasebarths’ 5 home would be sold at a foreclosure sale on March 5 if they did not cure the default on the mortgage. Of course, Tree Quasebarths had already were sold under the that December. Mr. Quasebarth called EPRA and Green Tree and was December foreclosure sale was final, Green Tree simply needed to refile the paperwork. Dep. 111:19-24; 152:5-11. home the impression told that the Green the in and that J. Quasebarth Thus, Mr. Quasebarth continued to believe that he could not save his home. In February, the Quasebarths received another letter from EPRA informing them of alternatives to the March 5 foreclosure. Green Tree sold the home on March 5, 2013. recorded a foreclosure Quasebarths deed eventually memorializing discovered that On May 23, EPRA the sale. Green Tree misrepresented that the December foreclosure was final. attorney sent a letter to Green Tree on The September had Their 11, 2013 rescinding the contract that the Quasebarths signed releasing their claims to the home, and returning the $1,050. DISCUSSION The failing Quasebarths to provide contend them that with an Green Tree’s opportunity conduct to cure in their default prior to the purported December 4, 2012 foreclosure and Green Tree’s foreclosure subsequent sale was misrepresentation final and thus that again the December preventing the Quasebarths from curing the default and avoiding the March 5, 6 2013 foreclosure Georgia law for provides fraud, them with tortious causes of interference action with under property rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence per se, and Georgia RICO violations. The Court finds that factual disputes exist as to the Quasebarths’ claims for fraud, tortious interference with property rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. Therefore, Green Tree’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to those claims.1 Order, For the reasons explained in the remainder of this the Court does find that Green Tree is entitled to summary judgment on the Quasebarth’s RICO claims. The Quasebarths allege that Green Tree violated Georgia’s RICO statute by engaging in mail fraud and wire fraud when it misrepresented that they would have an opportunity for a loan modification in December and that the December 4 foreclosure sale was final. that the RICO See O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a). claim fails as a matter of Green Tree argues law because the Quasebarths do not present evidence that Green Tree engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity.” 1 Id. The Court agrees. The Court is skeptical as to whether Green Tree’s alleged promise to postpone the December foreclosure, standing alone, would support any of the Quasebarths claims. But the Court cannot at this stage of the proceedings find that Green Tree is entitled to judgment as a matter of law given the connection of that promise to postpone the December sale to Green Tree’s subsequent representations regarding the finality of the December foreclosure sale. The Court also finds that factual disputes clearly exist as to whether the Quasebarths’ rescission of their release was timely. 7 “To state a Georgia RICO claim, a plaintiff must identify a ‘pattern of racketeering activity,’ which is defined as ‘engaging in at least two interrelated acts that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission indictable federal law.’” under Martin, (2008)). LLP, “A categories of state or Rowe v. U.S. Bancorp, 569 F. App’x 701, 704 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) & certain 293 Ga. pattern predicate offenses.” App. (quoting Smith v. Morris, Manning 153, requires 165, at 666 least S.E.2d two 683, 695 interrelated Brown v. Freedman, 222 Ga. App. 213, 217, 474 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1996). “A pattern of racketeering activity cannot be based on a single transaction.” Rowe, 569 F. App’x at 704. The Court finds that Green Tree’s actions ultimately amount to one extended transaction—Green Quasebarths’ home. that each separate Tree foreclosing on the The Court rejects the Quasebarths’ argument act involved in that process should be considered a separate predicate act for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity. The Court also rejects the Quasebarths’ reliance on Green Tree’s foreclosure on another home owned by Maxwell and Cynthia Jones, as evidence of a predicate act for establishing a pattern of racketeering activity. purposes of Mr. and Mrs. Jones contend that they defaulted on their mortgage, and then 8 Green Tree promised not to foreclose on their home if they made payments to cure the default. The Joneses allege that they made the payments, but Green Tree nevertheless foreclosed on their home. The Quasebarths further contend that Green Tree committed mail fraud when it unlawfully sought to collect the deficiency on the Joneses’ mortgage after the foreclosure sale. these acts Quasebarths. are related to Green Tree’s acts None of towards the The Quasebarths do not allege that they attempted to make payments on their mortgage after it went into default, nor do they contend that Green Tree unlawfully attempted to collect payment from them after the foreclosure in March. Thus, Green Tree’s actions towards the Joneses are not sufficiently interrelated to Green Tree’s acts towards the Quasebarths to demonstrate a pattern of unlawful behavior.2 In evidence genuine sum, of the a factual Quasebarths pattern of dispute. have not racketeering Thus, 2 they presented activity cannot to make sufficient create out a this The Quasebarths also point to Green Tree’s consent order with the Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as evidence that Green Tree engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. But the consent order does not prove that Green Tree engaged in any misconduct related to foreclosures because the order specifically states that “[Green Tree] neither admits nor denies any of the allegations” brought by the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 2. Nor does the record contain evidence that Green Tree has violated the consent order since it was entered. Finally, the consent order is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, as it is a statement made pursuant to settlement. Therefore, the Court finds that the consent order is not evidence demonstrating that Green Tree engaged in a pattern of racketeering. 9 essential element of their RICO claim, and Green Tree is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. CONCLUSION The Court grants Green Tree’s motion for summary judgment as to the Quasebarths’ RICO claim. The Court denies the motion as to all of the remaining claims (ECF No. 31). IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of February, 2016. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 10

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?