QUASEBARTH et al v. GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC
Filing
71
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 31 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 2/3/2016. (VCP)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JIM QUASEBARTH, and ROBYN
QUASEBARTH,
*
*
Plaintiffs,
*
vs.
CASE NO. 4:14-CV-223 (CDL)
*
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC,
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
The final pretrial conference in this case is scheduled for
tomorrow.
The Court has not yet ruled on Defendant Green Tree
Servicing,
LLC’s
motion
for
summary
judgment.
Although
the
Court has thoroughly studied the pending motion and has reached
a decision on its resolution, the Court is unable to finish a
detailed
written
conference.
order
prior
to
tomorrow’s
final
pretrial
Finding it more important to inform the parties of
the Court’s decision prior to the pretrial conference than to
craft a comprehensive order, the Court enters this abbreviated
order.
BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Quasebarths, the
record reveals the following.
The Quasebarths claim that Green Tree failed to provide
them with an opportunity to cure their default on their mortgage
loan and thus avoid foreclosure on their home.
On October 16,
2012, a law firm retained by Green Tree sent a letter to the
Quasebarths
proceeding.
explaining
that
it
was
commencing
a
foreclosure
The letter instructs the Quasebarths to fill out a
borrower response package so that Green Tree could consider them
for a loan modification.
that
[Green
Tree]
is
The letter also states: “Please note
not
agreeing
at
this
time
to
stop
foreclosure proceedings and is under no obligation to do so,
even if you provide all the requested information to [Green
Tree].”
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 11, Letter to James and
Robyn Quasebarth 2, from Ellis, Painter, Ratterre & Adams, LLP,
(Oct. 16, 2012) ECF No. 31-18.
When Mr. Quasebarth received the
letter, he called Green Tree and asked about the status of a
borrower response package that he had submitted a few months
prior.
was
A Green Tree representative told him that the package
missing
and
that
he
needed
to
submit
Quasebarth Dep. 80:6-13, ECF No. 34.
another
one.
J.
A few days later, on
November 1, the Quasebarths received a letter stating that Green
Tree would sell their home at a foreclosure sale on December 4
if
they
did
not
cure
the
default
on
their
mortgage.
Mr.
Quasebarth then sent a completed borrower response package to
Green Tree on November 8.
Approximately a week later, on November 15, Green Tree sent
a letter to the Quasebarths notifying the couple that it had
2
received
their
borrower
solicitation
package.
The
letter
states:
If your account was prevlously [sic] referred to
foreclosure, we will continue the foreclosure process
while we evaluate your account for a foreclosure
prevention
alternative . . . .
However,
no
foreclosure sale will be conducted and you will not
lose your home if Green Tree is reviewing a completed
borrower response package . . . .
If the borrower
response package was received less than 37 days prior
to a scheduled foreclosure sale, we will evaluate the
account for a foreclosure prevention alternative and
suspend the foreclosure sale, if appropriate.
Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts Ex. P, Letter from Green Tree,
to R. Quasebarth & J. Quasebarth 2 (Nov. 15 2012), ECF No. 4116.
The next day, November 16, Green Tree sent another letter
explaining
that
it
was
missing
three
documents
from
the
Quasebarths’ borrower response package and could not evaluate
the package.
The letter states: “It is your responsibility to
send
[missing]
in
the
documentation
by
12/21/2012.”
Pl.’s
Statement of Material Facts, Ex. Q, Letter from Green Tree, to
R. Quasebarth and J. Quasebarth (Nov. 16, 2012), ECF No. 41-17.
Thus, Green Tree promised to stop a foreclosure sale only if it
was reviewing a
letter
states
complete.
completed
that
the
application.
And the November 16
Quasebarths’
application
was
not
Nevertheless, the Quasebarths assert that they read
the letters and believed that Green Tree was promising to cancel
the December 4 foreclosure sale and give them until December 21
to
submit
the
missing
documents.
3
Green
Tree
called
the
Quasebarths on November 27 and 28 urging them to provide the
missing documents.
The Quasebarths did not send the documents
before the scheduled foreclosure on December 4.
received
a
completed
borrower
solicitation
Having not
package
or
any
payment to cure the default, Green Tree purportedly sold the
home at a foreclosure sale on December 4.
only
bidder,
and
it
bought
the
home.
Green Tree was the
That
same
Quasebarth faxed the missing documents to Green Tree.
day,
Mr.
Stanley
Decl. ¶ 42, ECF No. 31-4 (declaring that Green Tree received
only two of three missing documents); J. Quasebarth Dep. 109:1022
(testifying
that
he
sent
Green
Tree
all
three
missing
documents).
The Quasebarths were surprised to learn that their home was
sold on December 4.
Mr. Quasebarth testified that he could have
borrowed money from a family member to cure the default on the
loan, but did not do so because he was relying on Green Tree’s
alleged promise not to foreclose until it made a decision about
his eligibility for a loan modification.
Mr.
Quasebarth
called
Green
Tree
and
After the foreclosure,
the
firm
handling
the
foreclosure (EPRA) on multiple occasions and was repeatedly told
that the foreclosure sale was final and that there was nothing
he could do to keep the home.
On December 11, EPRA sent the
Quasebarths a letter demanding immediate possession of the home
and ordering the family to vacate the home within three days.
4
EPRA
brought
a
dispossessory
evict the Quasebarths.
proceeding
in
late
December
to
The Quasebarths then agreed to move out
on January 6.
The Quasebarths now contend that Green Tree knew or should
have known that the December sale was not final and that the
Quasebarths were still the rightful owners of the home, for two
reasons.
First, Green Tree never recorded a deed memorializing
the sale.
Stanley Dep. 231:23-232:4, ECF No. 36.
Second, Green
Tree knew as of January 4 that the foreclosure sale was not
final because of an IRS tax lien on the property.
planned
to
“re-foreclose”
Stanley Dep. 211:8-24.
on
the
home
to
clear
Green Tree
the
title.
But the Quasebarths contend that they
were, in the meantime, still the lawful owners of the home.
Green Tree never relayed this information to the Quasebarths.
Instead,
Green
Tree
entered
Quasebarths on January 6.
into
an
agreement
with
the
In the agreement, the Quasebarths
released all their claims to the home in exchange for $1,050.
The Quasebarths signed the agreement in reliance on Green Tree’s
representation that the sale was final.
That same day, the
Quasebarths moved out of their home.
Shortly
received
after
additional
the
Quasebarths
confusing
vacated
letters
the
regarding
home,
the
they
home.
First, they received a letter from EPRA dated January 29, 2013
stating
that
the
Quasebarths’
5
home
would
be
sold
at
a
foreclosure sale on March 5 if they did not cure the default on
the
mortgage.
Of
course,
Tree
Quasebarths
had
already
were
sold
under
the
that
December.
Mr. Quasebarth called EPRA and Green Tree and was
December foreclosure sale was final,
Green Tree simply needed to refile the paperwork.
Dep. 111:19-24; 152:5-11.
home
the
impression
told that the
Green
the
in
and that
J. Quasebarth
Thus, Mr. Quasebarth continued to
believe that he could not save his home.
In February, the
Quasebarths received another letter from EPRA informing them of
alternatives to the March 5 foreclosure.
Green Tree sold the home on March 5, 2013.
recorded
a
foreclosure
Quasebarths
deed
eventually
memorializing
discovered
that
On May 23, EPRA
the
sale.
Green
Tree
misrepresented that the December foreclosure was final.
attorney
sent
a
letter
to
Green
Tree
on
The
September
had
Their
11,
2013
rescinding the contract that the Quasebarths signed releasing
their claims to the home, and returning the $1,050.
DISCUSSION
The
failing
Quasebarths
to
provide
contend
them
that
with
an
Green
Tree’s
opportunity
conduct
to
cure
in
their
default prior to the purported December 4, 2012 foreclosure and
Green
Tree’s
foreclosure
subsequent
sale
was
misrepresentation
final
and
thus
that
again
the
December
preventing
the
Quasebarths from curing the default and avoiding the March 5,
6
2013
foreclosure
Georgia
law
for
provides
fraud,
them
with
tortious
causes
of
interference
action
with
under
property
rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence
per
se,
and
Georgia
RICO
violations.
The
Court
finds
that
factual disputes exist as to the Quasebarths’ claims for fraud,
tortious
interference
with
property
rights,
intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.
Therefore,
Green Tree’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to those
claims.1
Order,
For the reasons explained in the remainder of this
the
Court
does
find
that
Green
Tree
is
entitled
to
summary judgment on the Quasebarth’s RICO claims.
The Quasebarths allege that Green Tree violated Georgia’s
RICO statute by engaging in mail fraud and wire fraud when it
misrepresented that they would have an opportunity for a loan
modification in December and that the December 4 foreclosure
sale was final.
that
the
RICO
See O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a).
claim
fails
as
a
matter
of
Green Tree argues
law
because
the
Quasebarths do not present evidence that Green Tree engaged in a
“pattern of racketeering activity.”
1
Id.
The Court agrees.
The Court is skeptical as to whether Green Tree’s alleged promise to
postpone the December foreclosure, standing alone, would support any
of the Quasebarths claims. But the Court cannot at this stage of the
proceedings find that Green Tree is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law given the connection of that promise to postpone the December
sale to Green Tree’s subsequent representations regarding the finality
of the December foreclosure sale.
The Court also finds that factual
disputes clearly exist as to whether the Quasebarths’ rescission of
their release was timely.
7
“To state a Georgia RICO claim, a plaintiff must identify a
‘pattern
of
racketeering
activity,’
which
is
defined
as
‘engaging in at least two interrelated acts that have the same
or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission
indictable
federal law.’”
under
Martin,
(2008)).
LLP,
“A
categories
of
state
or
Rowe v. U.S. Bancorp, 569 F. App’x 701, 704
(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
&
certain
293
Ga.
pattern
predicate offenses.”
App.
(quoting Smith v. Morris, Manning
153,
requires
165,
at
666
least
S.E.2d
two
683,
695
interrelated
Brown v. Freedman, 222 Ga. App. 213, 217,
474 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1996).
“A pattern of racketeering activity
cannot be based on a single transaction.”
Rowe, 569 F. App’x at
704.
The Court finds that Green Tree’s actions ultimately amount
to
one
extended
transaction—Green
Quasebarths’ home.
that
each
separate
Tree
foreclosing
on
the
The Court rejects the Quasebarths’ argument
act
involved
in
that
process
should
be
considered a separate predicate act for purposes of establishing
a pattern of racketeering activity.
The Court also rejects the Quasebarths’ reliance on Green
Tree’s foreclosure on another home owned by Maxwell and Cynthia
Jones,
as
evidence
of
a
predicate
act
for
establishing a pattern of racketeering activity.
purposes
of
Mr. and Mrs.
Jones contend that they defaulted on their mortgage, and then
8
Green Tree promised not to foreclose on their home if they made
payments to cure the default.
The Joneses allege that they made
the payments, but Green Tree nevertheless foreclosed on their
home.
The Quasebarths further contend that Green Tree committed
mail fraud when it unlawfully sought to collect the deficiency
on the Joneses’ mortgage after the foreclosure sale.
these
acts
Quasebarths.
are
related
to
Green
Tree’s
acts
None of
towards
the
The Quasebarths do not allege that they attempted
to make payments on their mortgage after it went into default,
nor do they contend that
Green Tree unlawfully attempted to
collect payment from them after the foreclosure in March.
Thus,
Green Tree’s actions towards the Joneses are not sufficiently
interrelated to Green Tree’s acts towards the Quasebarths to
demonstrate a pattern of unlawful behavior.2
In
evidence
genuine
sum,
of
the
a
factual
Quasebarths
pattern
of
dispute.
have
not
racketeering
Thus,
2
they
presented
activity
cannot
to
make
sufficient
create
out
a
this
The Quasebarths also point to Green Tree’s consent order with the
Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as
evidence that Green Tree engaged in a pattern of racketeering
activity.
But the consent order does not prove that Green Tree
engaged in any misconduct related to foreclosures because the order
specifically states that “[Green Tree] neither admits nor denies any
of the allegations” brought by the Federal Trade Commission.
Id. at
2. Nor does the record contain evidence that Green Tree has violated
the consent order since it was entered. Finally, the consent order is
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, as it is a statement
made pursuant to settlement.
Therefore, the Court finds that the
consent order is not evidence demonstrating that Green Tree engaged in
a pattern of racketeering.
9
essential
element
of
their
RICO
claim,
and
Green
Tree
is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
CONCLUSION
The Court grants Green Tree’s motion for summary judgment
as to the Quasebarths’ RICO claim.
The Court denies the motion
as to all of the remaining claims (ECF No. 31).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of February, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
10
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