ADAMS v. COLUMBUS GEORGIA POLICE DEPARTMENT et al
Filing
40
ORDER granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment; terminating 28 Motion to Amend/Correct. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 7/22/2016 (esl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JEFFREY ADAMS,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED
GOVERNMENT, COLUMBUS POLICE
DEPARTMENT, MAYOR TERESA
TOMLINSON, TOM BARRON, CHIEF
RICKY BOREN, ALTON BRUNDAGE,
WILLIAM TURNER, TONY COOPER,
JAMES POPE, RALPH DOW, FRED
BLACKMON, LEMUEL MILLER,
JENNIFER GARDNER, SHERMAN
HAYES, JOSEPH BRIDGES, TRICIA
WOLFLEY, JOSHUA BROWNLEE,
JULIUS GRAHAM, DEBRA BAILEY,
and RONNIE HASTINGS,
*
Defendants.
*
*
CASE NO. 4:14-CV-303 (CDL)
*
*
*
*
*
O R D E R
Jeffrey Adams, a Columbus, Georgia police officer, filed
this action pro se alleging that he was subjected to employment
discrimination based on his race and age.
against
Columbus
the
Columbus
Police
Consolidated
Department
He asserts claims
Government
(“CPD”)
for
(“CCG”)
violating
and
the
the
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
(“Title VII”); the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
He
also
asserts
federal
and
state
law
claims
against
municipal officers in their individual capacities.
pending
before
judgment.
the
Court
is
Defendants’
motion
various
Presently
for
summary
For the reasons explained below, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 27).1
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
In determining whether a
genuine
Fed. R.
dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant
or necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to Adams, the relevant
portions of the record reveal the following.
1
Adams filed a motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 28). The Court
considered the allegations contained in his proposed amended complaint
in ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and those
additional allegations do not change the outcome.
2
Adams is a fifty-three-year-old black man.
He was hired by
the Columbus Police Department in December 2005.
Problems arose
several years later, in June 2009, when Adams was assigned to
Sergeant Alton Brundage’s squad.
Adams alleges that, from his
first day on the new squad, Brundage and Captain James Pope had
a plan to undermine him based on his race and age.
About a month after being transferred to Brundage’s squad,
in July 2009, Adams met with Brundage and several other officers
regarding the stigma Adams felt had been put on him since he
joined Brundage’s squad.
Specifically, Adams complained about a
coworker calling him “slow.”
Adams did not complain about race
or age discrimination during this meeting.
Several months later, in November 2009, Brundage and Pope
issued Adams a letter of counsel with constructive criticism.
Adams believes that he did not deserve the criticism.
Adams
never complained to anyone at CPD or CCG about the letter of
counsel being discriminatory.
The following year, on June 24, 2010, Adams complained to
Brundage about a message a coworker posted on Facebook referring
to Adams as a “lazy turd.”
Adams told Brundage that he thought
his coworker made the comment out of age or race-based animus.
Adams asserts that this complaint was protected activity.
Adams
also contends that Brundage, Pope, Captain William Turner, and
3
Lieutenant Ralph Dow did not act in accordance with CCG policy
in responding to Adams’s complaint about the Facebook message.
Several months later, in March 2011, a supervising officer
complained to Brundage about Adams taking an excessive amount of
time to do a task.
According to the officer, the task should
have taken fifteen minutes, but it took Adams over an hour.
Brundage
gave
Adams
a
written
reprimand
unnecessary amount of time on a task.
for
spending
an
Adams contends that he
took a reasonable amount of time to complete the task and that
Brundage
complain
should
to
not
anyone
have
at
reprimanded
CPD
or
him.
CCG
Adams
about
did
not
race
or
age
discrimination in relation to this incident, but he now asserts
that the written reprimand was an act of discrimination.
He
also asserts that Brundage reprimanded him in retaliation for
his
complaint
nearly
nine
months
prior
about
the
Facebook
message referring to him as a “lazy turd.”
A few months later, on May 19, 2011, Adams responded to a
call regarding an altercation involving a group of women.
Adams
arrived at the scene, resolved the altercation, and arrested one
woman.
probable
Brundage then arrived at the scene and determined that
cause
existed
to
arrest
another
woman.
Brundage
explained to Adams why probable cause existed for the arrest and
ordered Adams to seek a warrant.
Adams refused, stating that he
believed there was not probable cause for an arrest and that any
4
arrest
would
constitute
false
imprisonment.
Brundage
ordered Adams to seek a warrant; Adams again refused.
again
Later
that day, Brundage and Pope met with Adams and suspended him for
one day without pay for failing to obey orders.
Adams testified
that during this meeting, Adams tried to explain his actions,
but Pope said: “Be quiet, stop talking, or I’ll up this to three
days [of suspension].”
Pl.’s Dep. 223:16-17, ECF No. 26.
Adams
contends that Pope violated his First Amendment right to free
speech by instructing him to “stop talking.”
Id.
A few days later, on June 2, 2011, Adams filed a Fair
Treatment Report asserting that Brundage and Pope discriminated
and retaliated against him when they suspended him for one day
without pay.
Adams asserts that a few days after he filed the
Report, Turner and Major Julius Graham tried to persuade Adams
to withdraw his Report.
Adams refused.
report writing for the following day.
He was then assigned to
Report writing is a task
that is within Adams’s normal job duties, but he considers the
assignment
a
punishment
for
refusing
to
withdraw
his
Fair
Treatment Report.
On August 31, 2011, CCG Human Resources Director Tom Barron
sent
a
notice
Department
Treatment
had
to
concluded
Report
discriminate
Adams
stating
its
that
the
investigation
and
found
that
against
Adams
or
5
Pope
and
retaliate
Human
into
Resources
Adams’s
Brundage
against
did
him
Fair
not
for
complaining of discrimination.
The Columbus Police Department’s
Office of Professional Standards also conducted an independent
investigation into Adams’s claims and sustained the disciplinary
action against Adams and exonerated Brundage and Pope.
contends
that
the
Office
of
Professional
Standards
Adams
did
an
inadequate investigation.
On
November
1,
2011,
Brundage
completed
Adams’s
annual
performance review and gave him the rating of “meets standards.”
Brundage Aff. Exh. U, Employee Achievement Assessment, ECF No.
27-7 at 71.
highest
Brundage gave this rating, which is one below the
rating,
disciplinary
“exceeds
actions
standards,”
(the
written
due
to
reprimand
Adams’s
and
two
one-day
suspension).
Five
days
later,
complaint
with
the
on
Equal
November
6,
Employment
2011,
Adams
Opportunity
filed
a
Commission
(“EEOC”) alleging race discrimination and retaliation.
Adams contends that his squad retaliated against him for
complaining of discrimination by not being eager to respond to
his request for backup on January 4, 2012.
Adams also claims
that his coworkers retaliated against him by conspiring to have
him
charged
with
committing
a
false
arrest.
Adams
was
exonerated of the false arrest allegations.
Approximately one month later, on February 12, 2012, Adams
participated in a one-day training program.
6
Adams failed to
meet
the
minimum
performance
standards
during
the
training.
Adams was the first person to fail the training program in the
ten
years
it
had
been
in
existence.
Accordingly,
Chief
of
Police Boren decided that Adams needed to repeat the training.
Adams contends that Boren made this decision to discriminate
against him.
Adams had a meeting with Major Freddie Blackmon,
Jennifer Gardner, and Tony Cooper regarding the training class.
Blackmon explained to Adams why he failed the class.
asserts
that
retaliation.
On
Blackmon’s
explanation
was
a
Adams
pretext
for
Adams later repeated the training and passed.
December
18,
2012,
Adams
sent
an
inter-office
communication with the subject line “Fair Treatment Report” to
Chief
Boren.
discriminated
In
the
against
training session.
report,
when
Adams
he
was
complained
required
to
that
he
was
repeat
the
Adams also complained about a comment Cooper
made to him regarding his use of sick days.
Chief Boren found
no violation of CPD policy.
On April 12, 2012, Adams submitted a letter to the EEOC
regarding
ongoing
race
discrimination
and
retaliation
for
engaging in protected activity.
In December 2014, Debra Bailey and Ronnie Hastings prepared
Adams’s annual performance review and gave him a score of “meets
standards.”
Adams contends that this rating was discriminatory
and that he deserved a rating of “exceeds standards.”
7
Adams
also complains that the report said: “since taking over as an
acting supervisor of squad #13 in February I have seen a drastic
improvement
duties.”
in
Corporal
Jeff
Adams
ability
to
perform
Mot. For Leave to Am. Compl. 5, ECF No. 28.
his
Adams
believes that this statement suggests his prior performance was
deficient.
He contends that the comment was an act of racial
discrimination.
Adams filed a Fair Treatment Report complaining
about this performance review.
The next year, in January 2016, Bailey and Hastings gave
Adams a performance review rating of “exceeds standards.”
This
is the highest rating, but Adams complains that the numerical
score associated with the rating
“meets standards” rating.
the
performance
review
was
Id. at 6.
states:
“border
line” with the
Adams also complains that
“Over
the
past
year
I
have
noticed a positive change in Corporal Adams, and the way he
interacts
with
the
squad”
Id.
Adams
contends
that
this
statement implies that his past performance was not positive.
On February 18, 2016, he complained about his performance review
rating.
Bailey and Hastings then raised his score.
Adams,
however, is still unsatisfied with his score.
DISCUSSION
Preliminarily,
the
Court
notes
that
the
Columbus
Police
Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued in this
action.
See, e.g., Lovelace v. Dekalb Cent. Prob., 144 F. App’x
8
793, 795 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of a
§ 1983
action
against
the
DeKalb
County,
Georgia
police
department because it was not a legal entity subject to suit
under
Georgia
law).
Accordingly,
any
claims
against
the
allege
age
Columbus Police Department are dismissed.
It
is
also
undisputed
that
Adams
did
not
discrimination in his charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
See Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 3, Letter from Adams to EEOC (Nov. 6, 2011),
ECF No. 26-3 (alleging race discrimination and retaliation based
on complaints of race discrimination); Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 5, Letter
from Adams to EEOC (Apr. 12, 2012), ECF No. 26-5 (same); Defs.’
Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 12 Letter from Adams to EEOC (June
11, 2013), ECF No. 27-12 (alleging harassment based on race and
“National
origin
established
that,
of
in
New
Jersey”).
order
to
And
bring
an
“[i]t
is
action
firmly
for
age
discrimination or retaliation under the ADEA, a plaintiff must
first file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC or
appropriate state or local agency.”
Servs.,
Inc.,
403
F.
App’x
452,
Sheffield v. United Parcel
454
(11th
Cir.
2010)
(per
curiam) (citing Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1238
(11th Cir. 2004)).
“If a party fails to comply with the charge-
filing requirement, he cannot assert a claim in court.”
2
Id.2
A “plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited to ‘the scope of the
EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
9
Because
Adams
failed
to
comply
with
the
charge-filing
requirement regarding his age discrimination claim, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment as to that claim.
This leaves Adams’s racial discrimination and retaliation
claims.
Those
claims
fail
for
many
reasons,
but
they
are
fundamentally deficient because Adams has failed to produce any
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any of
Defendants’ alleged adverse employment actions were motivated by
race
or
retaliation.
No
direct
evidence
of
race-based
discrimination or retaliation exists, and Adams failed to point
to any circumstantial evidence sufficient to create a genuine
factual dispute.
He pointed to no similarly situated person
outside of his protected class who was treated differently under
similar
evidence
circumstances,
from
which
and
it
he
could
failed
to
reasonably
produce
be
any
inferred
other
that
Defendants had a race-based or retaliatory motive when they took
any of the actions about which Adams complains.3
Accordingly,
charge of discrimination.’” Enwonwu v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 286
F. App'x 586, 600 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mulhall v. Advance Sec.,
Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589 n.8 (11th Cir.1994)).
In his EEOC charges,
Adams claimed that he was discriminated against only because of his
race and in retaliation for complaining of racial discrimination. His
claim of age discrimination could not “reasonably be expected to grow
out of” the EEOC race discrimination charges. Id.
3
The only comparator relied upon by Adams is a fellow employee,
Officer Solt. Solt stopped to help a civilian driver who was on the
side of the road. Solt called his supervisor and requested permission
to call a tow truck for the driver. The supervisor instructed Solt to
ask the driver if they had called a tow truck first.
Solt did not
10
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to all of Adams’
claims.4
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to each of Adams’s claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of July, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
obey and called a tow truck without speaking to the driver first. As
a result, Solt was suspended for “Actions of Insubordination.”
On
appeal, the suspension was reduced to a written reprimand.
Adams, by
contrast, was suspended for “Neglect or Dereliction of Duty” after he
twice refused his superior’s command to seek a warrant for an arrest.
The Eleventh Circuit “require[s] that the quantity and quality of the
comparator’s misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from
second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples
with oranges.”
Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.
1999) (emphasis added). Solt’s misconduct—calling a tow truck before
confirming that the driver had not already called a truck—is not
“nearly identical” to refusing to seek a warrant for an arrest. Id.
Additionally, Adams and Solt were charged with violations of different
portions of CPD policy; Adams was suspended for “Neglect or
Dereliction of Duty” and Solt was punished for “Actions of
Insubordination.”
Based on these facts, the Court concludes that
Adams and Solt are not similarly situated.
As to his retaliation
claim, most of Adams’s complaints do not amount to “materially adverse
actions.” See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
68 (2006) (explaining “materially adverse” standard).
And for those
that may, Adams has not pointed to sufficient evidence to create a
genuine factual dispute that a causal connection exists between any
good faith complaints of discrimination and an adverse employment
action. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517,
2534
(2013)
(explaining
causation
requirement
for
Title
VII
retaliation claims); see also Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536
F.3d 1209, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining what constitutes
protected activity).
4
Other reasons also exist supporting summary judgment, but the Court
finds it unnecessary to discuss every alternative reason for its
ruling given that Adams’s claims are fundamentally flawed because of
the lack of any evidence of unlawful discriminatory or retaliatory
motive on the part of the Defendants.
11
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