RAMZY et al v. COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT et al

Filing 17

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 10/05/2015. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JUSTIN P. RAMZY and ALICIA Y.
SPEARMAN,

*
*

Plaintiffs,
*
vs.
*
COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED
GOVERNMENT, MUSCOGEE COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, and JOHN T.
DARR, individually and in his
official capacity,

CASE NO. 4:15-CV-2 (CDL)
*
*
*

Defendants.
*
O R D E R
Plaintiffs

Justin

Ramzy

and

Alicia

Spearman

are

employees of the Muscogee County Sheriff’s Department.

former
They

assert that their supervisors discriminated against them because
of

their

race

and

protected activities.
Consolidated

retaliated

against

them

for

engaging

in

Defendants Sheriff John Darr and Columbus

Government

(“CCG”)

filed

a

motion

for

partial

judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c).

As discussed below, the motion (ECF No. 11) is granted

in part and denied in part.1
1

In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs referred to facts that
were not included in their Complaint, and they requested leave to
amend their Complaint to include those additional allegations.
The
Court grants that leave, and Plaintiffs shall electronically file
their Amended Complaint within seven days of today’s Order. In ruling
on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court considered the
allegations to be included in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS STANDARD
“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are
no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774

F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cannon v. City of W.
Palm

Beach,

250

F.3d

1299,

1301

(11th

Cir.

2001)).

In

evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court
must “accept as true all material facts alleged in the nonmoving party’s pleading” and “view those facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.”
the

averments

in

the

competing

Id.

pleadings

“If a comparison of
reveals

a

material

dispute of fact, judgment on the pleadings must be denied.”

Id.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiffs allege the following facts in support of their
claims.

The Court must accept these allegations as true for

purposes of the pending motion.
Ramzy and Spearman worked for CCG and the Muscogee County
Sheriff on the medical team at the county jail.
Spearman are black.
“racial

slurs,

Both Ramzy and

They allege that they were subjected to

racial

segregation,”

harassment by their supervisors.

and

other

“continuous”

Compl. ¶ 59, ECF No. 1.

In

2012, Plaintiffs filed complaints accusing their supervisor of
racial

discrimination.

They

also

complained

to

Sheriff’s

Department leadership and CCG’s human resources department about

2

alleged racial discrimination that led to disparities between
black

and

white

medical

staff

employees

discipline,

promotions,

assignments,

reorganization

decisions.”

Id.

“in

Plaintiffs

filed

a

¶

discrimination

terminations,

overtime,

27.

In

complaint

and

January

with

2013,

the

United

States Justice Department alleging discrimination against black
employees

and

inmates,

as

well

as

“falsification

of

patient

mental health information” and mishandling of inmates’ accounts.
Id. ¶ 28.
In October and December 2012, Ramzy’s pay was docked after
he followed what he contends is a “common practice” of using
photocopied
¶¶ 33-36.
in

March

forms

to

record

patient

vital

information.

Id.

He was later terminated for this alleged infraction
2013.

Id.

¶

37.

Ramzy

alleges

that

outside his protected class used the same practice.

individuals
Id. ¶ 33.

Spearman provided documentation of the practice to an internal
investigator to show that Ramzy was being treated unfairly.

Id.

¶¶ 35, 38.
Spearman

alleges

that

after

she

complained

of

racial

discrimination and retaliation, she was not permitted to apply
for two promotions.

Id. ¶¶ 40-42.

She further alleges that

less qualified white employees were permitted to apply for the
promotions.

Id.

Spearman was terminated on September 30, 2013.

3

Plaintiffs brought the following claims against Defendants:
(1) race discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII
of

the

Civil

Rights

Act

of

1964

(“Title

VII”),

42

U.S.C.

§ 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983/the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) racial
hostile

work

environment

claims

under

Title

VII,

§

1983/the

Equal Protection Clause, and § 1981; (3) § 1983 First Amendment
retaliation

claims,

and

(4)

claims

Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4.

under

the

Georgia

Plaintiffs also invoke

the Thirteenth Amendment and the “State of Georgia Human Rights
Law.”

Compl. ¶¶ 45, 81(a).
DISCUSSION

Defendants Darr and CCG seek dismissal of the following
claims:

(1)

all

Title

VII

claims;

(2)

Equal

Protection

discrimination and First Amendment retaliation claims based on
alleged

adverse

employment

actions

that

occurred

prior

to

January 5, 2013; (3) race discrimination and racial harassment
claims;

(4)

Equal

Protection

retaliation

claims;

(5)

Georgia

Whistleblower Act claim; (6) Thirteenth Amendment claim; and (7)
“State of Georgia Human Rights Law” claim.

The Court addresses

each claim in turn.
I.

Title VII Claims
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims should

be dismissed as untimely.

A person with a Title VII claim may

4

file a civil action after exhausting administrative remedies.
The complaint
receives

a

must be filed

right-to-sue

ninety days

letter

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

from

after the plaintiff

the

Equal

Employment

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

If

the plaintiff does not meet this deadline, his Title VII claims
must be dismissed as untimely.
F.3d

1229,

contests

1233-34

this

(11th

issue,

Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281

Cir.

the

2002).

plaintiff

And

if

a

has

the

“defendant
burden

of

establishing that he met the ninety day filing requirement.”
Id. at 1234.
Ramzy

and

Spearman’s

right-to-sue

letters

from

the

EEOC

both contain a “Date Mailed” of September 30, 2014, and they
were both sent to the same address.

Compl. Attach. 2, Ramzy

Right-to-Sue Letter, ECF No. 1-2; Compl. Attach. 3, Spearman
Right-to-Sue Letter, ECF No. 1-3.

Spearman asserts that the

EEOC actually mailed her right-to-sue letter on October 2, 2014
and that she received it on October 4, 2014.
ECF No. 15-1.

Spearman Aff. ¶ 1,

Thus, she was required to file her Complaint by

January 2, 2015.

She did not, so her Title VII claims are

barred as untimely.
Ramzy did not present any evidence of when he received his
right-to-sue letter.

The letter states that it was mailed on

September 30, 2014, and Plaintiffs filed their Complaint ninetyseven days later, on January 5, 2015.

5

Ramzy appears to argue

that

the

Court

should

Spearman received hers.

presume

he

received

his

letter

when

Even if the Court presumed that Ramzy

received his letter on the same day Spearman received hers, he
was required to file his Complaint by January 2, 2015.

He did

not, so his Title VII claims are barred as untimely.
II.

Claims Based on Adverse Employment Actions that Occurred
Prior to January 5, 2013
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Equal Protection

discrimination and First Amendment retaliation claims based on
alleged

adverse

employment

actions

that

occurred

January 5, 2013 should be dismissed as untimely.

prior

to

The Court

agrees.
The statute of limitations “for all section 1983 claims in
Georgia is the two year period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
for personal injuries.”

Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d

624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986).
January

5,

2015.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on

Therefore,

any

alleged

adverse

employment

action that occurred prior to January 5, 2013 is time-barred.
Plaintiffs

appear

to

argue

that

their

claims

based

on

pre-

January 5, 2013 employment actions are not time-barred because
they are continuing violations that continued after January 5,
2013.

But

for

statute

of

limitations

purposes,

“continuing

violations” do not include “discrete discriminatory acts,” like
failure

to

promote,

that

occurred

6

outside

the

statute

of

limitations.
101,

113-14

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
(2002).

Discrete

discriminatory

acts

“are

not

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts
alleged in timely filed charges.”
discrete

discriminatory

act

charges alleging that act.”
Plaintiffs’

claims

Id. at 113 (2002).

starts

a

new

clock

for

“Each
filing

Id.

based

on

alleged

adverse

employment

actions that occurred prior to January 5, 2013 are dismissed.
These claims include Ramzy’s claims based on his docked pay in
2012 and any promotion Spearman claims she was denied prior to
January 5, 2013.2
III. Race Discrimination and Harassment Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state
a

claim

§ 1981

for
and

race
§

discrimination

1983/Equal

and

racial

Protection

harassment

Clause.

under

Accepting

Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and viewing those facts in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court disagrees.
alleges

that

he

was

disciplined

and

ultimately

fired

Ramzy
for

following a process that similarly situated employees outside
his protected class also followed but were not disciplined for

2

Spearman alleges that she was denied two promotions.
Defendants
pointed to Spearman’s EEOC charge, which alleges that one of the
denied promotions occurred in September 2012. There is no allegation
regarding the other denied promotion, but Spearman asserted in her
opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings that it
occurred on February 19, 2013.
The Court grants Spearman leave to
amend her Complaint to clarify her allegations on this point.

7

following.3

Spearman alleges that she was denied a promotion

while a less qualified white employee was promoted.

Finally,

Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to “racial slurs,
racial segregation,” and other “continuous” harassment by their
supervisors

that

caused

them

extreme

culminated in their terminations.
1.

emotional

distress

and

Compl. ¶¶ 59, 61, 74, ECF No.

These allegations are sufficient to state claims for racial

discrimination and harassment to the extent that they are not
time-barred pursuant to the Court’s preceding ruling.
IV.

Equal Protection Retaliation Claims
Defendants

argue

that

Plaintiffs’

Equal

Protection

retaliation claims should be dismissed because the law does not
recognize such a claim.4

The Court agrees.

The Eleventh Circuit

has concluded that “[a] pure or generic retaliation claim . . .
simply does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause.”

Watkins

v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, “[t]he right to be free from
retaliation is clearly established as a first amendment right
and

as

a

statutory

right

under

3

Title

VII;

but

no

clearly

In the Complaint, Ramzy did not specifically allege that the
similarly situated employees outside his protected class were of a
different race.
In his response to the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Ramzy asserted that the similarly situated employees were
white. Ramzy may amend his Complaint to clarify this claim.
4
Plaintiffs did not respond to this argument. Instead, in response to
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on their Equal
Protection retaliation claim, Plaintiffs cite authority regarding
First Amendment retaliation claims.

8

established right exists under the equal protection clause to be
free from retaliation.”
340 (11th Cir. 1995).

Ratliff v. DeKalb Cty., 62 F.3d 338,
This is not to say that Plaintiffs may

not bring timely § 1983/First Amendment or § 1981 retaliation
claims;

Plaintiffs

simply

may

not

do

so

under

the

Equal

Protection Clause.
V.

Georgia Whistleblower Act Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Georgia Whistleblower Act

claims

are

untimely.5

The

Court

agrees.

Claims

under

the

Georgia Whistleblower Act must be brought “within one year after
discovering the retaliation.”

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(e)(1).

Ramzy

alleges that Defendants retaliated against him by terminating
him on March 8, 2013.

And Spearman alleges that Defendants

retaliated against her by taking various actions against her in
2013.

Accordingly,

Plaintiffs

were

required

Georgia Whistleblower Act claims in 2014.

to

file

their

They did not, so

those claims are time-barred.
VI.

Thirteenth Amendment
Law” Claims

and

“State

of

Georgia

Human

Rights

To the extent Plaintiffs are attempting to assert claims
under
Rights

the

Thirteenth

Law,”

Amendment

Defendants

seek

and
to

“State
dismiss

of

Georgia
those

Human

claims.6

Plaintiffs did not make any factual allegations that they were
5
6

Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendants’ motion on this point.
Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendants’ motion on this point.

9

forced

into

slavery

or

involuntary

servitude,

Thirteenth Amendment claims are dismissed.

so

their

With regard to their

“State of Georgia Human Rights Law” claim, Plaintiffs did not
explain what statute they are trying to invoke.

Defendants

surmise that Plaintiffs are attempting to bring claims under the
Fair Employment Practices Act of 1978, O.C.G.A. § 45-19-20, et
seq.,

which

employees.
exhausted

prohibits
Plaintiffs,

their

racial

discrimination

however,

administrative

do

not

remedies

against

allege
as

public

that

required

they
by

O.C.G.A. § 45-19-36, so their “State of Georgia Human Rights
Law” claim is barred.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, Defendants’ motion for partial judgment
on the pleadings (ECF No. 11) is granted in part and denied in
part.

The Court denies Defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ § 1981 and § 1983/Equal Protection
race

discrimination

claims.

and

Plaintiffs’

§

1981

racial

harassment

The Court grants Defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ (1) Title VII claims; (2) § 1983
Equal Protection and First Amendment retaliation claims based on
alleged

adverse

employment

actions

that

occurred

prior

to

January 5, 2013; (3) Equal Protection retaliation claims; (4)
Thirteenth Amendment claims; and (5) “State of Georgia Human
Rights Law” claims.

10

Plaintiffs shall file their Amended Complaint within seven
days

of

today’s

Order

to

include

the

additional

allegations

regarding the claims that have survived today’s partial judgment
on the pleadings.7
The Court previously stayed discovery pending resolution of
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
lifted.

Within

That stay is

fourteen days of today’s Order, the parties

shall submit a proposed Amended Scheduling and Discovery Order
that complies with the deadlines outlined by the Court in its
docket entry dated May 27, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of October, 2015.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

7

Plaintiffs shall not be permitted to amend their complaint in an
attempt to resurrect claims that have been dismissed by today’s Order.
But they may amend their complaint to include the additional
allegations referred to in their response to Defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings relating to their race discrimination and
racial harassment claims.

11