RAMZY et al v. COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT et al

Filing 64

ORDER granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 47 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 2/1/2017. (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JUSTIN P. RAMZY and ALICIA Y.
SPEARMAN,

*
*

Plaintiffs,
*
vs.
*
COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED
GOVERNMENT, MUSCOGEE COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, and JOHN
DARR, individually and in his
official capacity,

CASE NO. 4:15-CV-2 (CDL)
*
*
*

Defendants.
*
O R D E R
Plaintiffs worked at the Muscogee County jail and prison
medical

clinics.

They

claim

that

they

were

discriminated

against because they are black and that they were retaliated
against because they complained about racial discrimination and
inmate conditions in the clinics.
action

against

their

alleged

They brought the present
employers,

the

Columbus

Consolidated Government (“CCG”) and Muscogee County Sheriff John
Darr.1

They

retaliation

1

assert

claims

their

pursuant

race-based
to

42

U.S.C.

discrimination
§§ 1981

and

and
1983

Plaintiffs assert claims against Darr in his official and individual
capacities. Plaintiffs’ claims against the “Muscogee County Sheriff’s
Office” shall be treated as claims against Sheriff Darr in his
official capacity. See Robinson v. Hogansville Police Dep’t, 159 F.
App’x 137, 138 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“Sheriff’s departments
and police departments are not usually considered legal entities
subject to suit.”).

(Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection) and Title VII, of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq.

They assert their speech-based retaliation claims pursuant

to § 1983 (First Amendment).

The Court previously dismissed

Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims because they were untimely.

Ramzy

v. Columbus Consol. Gov’t, No. 4:15-CV-2 (CDL), 2015 WL 5838484,
at *2 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 5, 2015).

Defendants now seek summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

As discussed in this

Order, Defendants’ motions (ECF Nos. 37 & 47) are granted.
I.

Plaintiffs’ Claims
It

is

not

entirely

clear

who

employed

Plaintiffs

for

purposes of the pending motions—Sheriff Darr, CCG, or both.

The

Muscogee County Sheriff’s office operated the medical clinics at
the Muscogee County jail and the Muscogee County prison until
both clinics were privatized in 2013.

During the timeframe

relevant to this action, Defendant John Darr was the Muscogee
County Sheriff; he was the top of the chain of command for the
jail,

and

he

had

the

final

say

over

hiring,

promotion,

termination decisions regarding jail employees.

and

The Muscogee

County prison is separate from the jail and is under the CCG
mayor’s

chain

medical

clinic

responsibility.

of

command,

staff

at

although

the

prison

Darr
was

testified
still

the

Darr Dep. 140:22-141:5, ECF No. 44.

2

that

the

Sheriff’s

Defendants
Plaintiffs

were

preliminarily
employees

capacity

claims

Eleventh

Amendment

Darr

was

acting

against
to

as

of

must

United

arm

that

Sheriff

Darr

the

an

contend

of

Darr,

be

the

their

dismissed

States

the

to

extent
official

under

Constitution

state

when

he

the

because

made

the

decisions complained of in this action and is thus entitled to
immunity.

CCG argues that Darr was not a final policymaker for

CCG, and therefore, CCG cannot be held legally responsible for
any of his decisions or conduct.

As explained in the remainder

of this Order, Plaintiffs’ claims fail for more fundamental,
easier to decide, issues—issues that the Court must examine to
decide

the

claims

against

Darr

in

his

individual

capacity.

Thus, the Court does not need to decide the Eleventh Amendment
and municipal liability issues.
Plaintiff Justin P. Ramzy is a black man who worked as a
medical technician in the Muscogee County jail clinic.
claims

that

B.T., a

white

female

who

became

health

Ramzy
service

administrator on February 29, 2012, gave him more difficult work
assignments than she gave white employees.2

Ramzy also claims

that his suspension and termination, which Defendants maintain
were

justified

due

to

his

practice

2

of

prefilling

and

The Court finds it unnecessary to refer to certain non-parties by
their
full
names.
Therefore,
throughout
this
order,
several
individuals are identified using only their initials.

3

photocopying

inmate

intake

forms,

were

discriminatory

and

retaliatory.
Plaintiff Alicia Y. Spearman is a black woman who worked as
a

licensed

practical

nurse

prison medical clinics.

in

the

Muscogee

County

jail

and

When she was hired in the jail clinic

on January 3, 2008, her mother was the jail clinic’s director of
nursing, and her sister also worked at the jail clinic.
family

connections

prompted

complain of nepotism.
18, ECF No. 46.

other

jail

clinic

These

employees

to

C.B. June 2, 2016 Dep 65:4-66:15, 73:14-

Before the events giving rise to this action,

Spearman was transferred from the jail clinic to the prison
clinic.

During the timeframe relevant to this action, Spearman

worked primarily at the prison clinic, although she sometimes
worked overtime at the jail clinic.
Spearman claims that (1) she was denied an opportunity to
apply

for

retaliation

three
for

open
her

positions
protected

because
activity,

of
(2)

her
she

race
was

and

in

denied

proper compensation because of her race, (3) she was subjected
to internal investigations and counseling in retaliation for her
protected activity, and (4) she was terminated because of her
race and in retaliation for her protected activity.
Both Ramzy and Spearman claim that they were subjected to a
racially hostile work environment based on the following:

4

 Their supervisor, B.T., was friendlier to white employees
than to black employees; took breaks and socialized with
white employees but not black employees; and discussed
clinic operations with white employees but not black
employees.
 B.T. commented, on one occasion, that G.R., a black
employee could learn to pass medications because B.T.
could teach a monkey how to do it.
 When the clinic was short staffed, B.T. required
employees to work double shifts.
On one occasion, she
“asked” a white employee to stay over but “told” several
black employees to stay over.
 On
one
occasion,
B.T.
treated
a
black
employee
differently than she treated a white employee with regard
to funeral leave requests.
 B.T. once bought white employees pizza when they stayed
late to help cover another shift, but she did not buy
pizza for black employees who did the same thing.
 Under B.T.’s leadership, black employees started arguing
with white employees about changes to the clinic.
 A white nurse commented once that a monkey could do a
vital signs check.
 A white nurse stated that she
celebration of Black History Month.

did

not

like

the

 Clinic
manager
R.B.
told
three
medical
records
technicians that he wished they could go “back to the
days when we shackled you to get the work done.”
Spearman Aug. 25, 2016 Dep at 126:5-14.
R.B. was
promptly suspended.
As

explained

in

the

remainder

of

this

Order,

some

of

Plaintiffs’ claims were brought too late and are barred by the
statute

of

limitations;

some

fail

because

Plaintiffs

cannot

establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation;
and

others

fail

because

Defendants

5

articulated

a

legitimate,

non-discriminatory/non-retaliatory

reason

for

their

decisions

and Plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to create a
genuine factual dispute as to whether Defendants’ reasons were a
pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

Finally, Plaintiffs’

hostile work environment claims fail because Plaintiffs did not
present enough evidence to create a genuine factual dispute as
to whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of their employment.
II.

Claims Brought Too Late
The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims

as untimely.

Ramzy, 2015 WL 5838484, at *2.

The Court also

dismissed as untimely Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Equal Protection and
First Amendment claims based on adverse employment actions that
occurred before January 5, 2013.

Id. at *3.

See McNair v.

Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (“All constitutional
claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the
statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the
state where the § 1983 action has been brought.”); O.C.G.A. § 93-33

(establishing

personal

injury

a

claims

two-year
in

statute

Georgia).

of
These

limitations
claims

for

include

(1) Justin Ramzy’s Equal Protection claim that he was, because
of

his

race,

(2) Alicia

given

Spearman’s

difficult
Equal

work

Protection

assignments
and

First

in

2012;

Amendment

claims that she was, because of her race and protected activity,

6

not given a promotion to health service administrator in 2012;
and (3) Spearman’s Equal Protection and First Amendment claims
that she was, because of her race and protected activity, not
given a promotion to clinic manager in 2012.
Spearman’s

§ 1981

discrimination

claim

based

on

her

allegation that she was denied an opportunity to apply for the
health service administrator position in 2012 is also subject to
a

two-year

statute

of

limitations

and

is

time-barred.

The

health service administrator was employed by Corizon, Inc., an
independent
Spearman’s

agency,
claim

is

not

the

that

Sheriff

she

was

or

CCG.

prevented

Therefore,

from

making

employment contract with Corizon because of her race.

an

This type

of claim was actionable under the pre-1991 version of § 1981.
Patterson

v.

McLean

Credit

Union,

491

U.S.

164,

185

(1989)

(superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166
§ 101,

105

Stat

1071).

Thus,

it

is

subject

to

a

two-year

statute of limitations, not the four-year statute of limitations
that applies to § 1981 claims made possible by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.
382

(2004)

28 U.S.C. §

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369,
(noting
1658

that

“leaves

the
in

Supreme
place

Court’s

the

construction

‘borrowed’

periods for pre-existing causes of action”).

of

limitations

The claim accrued

in February 2012 when Spearman learned that a white woman had
been selected for the position.

She waited more than two years

7

to file this action.

Accordingly, that claim is barred by the

statute of limitations.
III. Claims Lacking Evidence to Establish a Prima Facie Case
Plaintiffs

rely

on

circumstantial

evidence

to

support

claims of discrimination and retaliation; thus, they must create
an inference that the employer’s conduct was motivated by an
improper discriminatory or retaliatory motive.
presenting

evidence

to

establish

a

prima

This is done by
facie

case.

To

establish a prima facie case for a discrimination claim, an
employee must point to evidence that creates a genuine factual
dispute on the following elements to avoid summary judgment: (1)
she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified to
do

the

job,

employment
situated

(3)

action,

her

employer

and

individuals

(4)

subjected

her

outside

of

employer
her

her

to

an

treated

protected

adverse

similarly

class

more

favorably. Trask v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d
1179, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining the standards in the
context of a Title VII case); accord Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d
1281, 1296 n.20 (11th Cir. 2009) (Discrimination claims “brought
under the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or Title
VII . . . are subject to the same standards of proof and employ
the same analytical framework”).

To create a prima facie case

of race-based retaliation, an employee must show that “(1) he
engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an

8

adverse employment action; and (3) he established a causal link
between the protected activity and the adverse action.”
1307-08.

Id. at

To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, the

employee

must

speech;

(2)

demonstrate
the

that

defendant’s

“(1)

he

conduct

engaged

adversely

in

protected

affected

the

protected speech; and (3) a causal connection exists between the
speech

and

the

defendant’s

retaliatory

actions.”

Bailey

v.

Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016).
The Court finds that several of Plaintiffs’ claims fail
because

Plaintiffs

establish

a

prima

did
facie

not

point

case.

to

The

sufficient
Court

evidence

describes

each

to
of

Plaintiffs’ deficient claims in turn.
A.

Ramzy

Work

Assignments.

Ramzy

contends

that

his

supervisor,

B.T., discriminated and retaliated against him by assigning him
more

work

evidence

than

Ramzy

she

assigned

pointed

to

on

to

white

his

work

employees.
assignment

The

only

claims

is

evidence that he was assigned the most difficult medicine cart
on his shift three times and was assigned to distribute medicine
to female inmates twice during 2012.3

As discussed supra § II,

any Equal Protection and First Amendment claims based on 2012
conduct are time-barred.

Only Ramzy’s § 1981 claims remain.

3

To the extent that Ramzy is asserting a disparate work assignment
claim based on other assignments, he did not point to what they were
or how they differed from assignments to individuals outside his
protected class.

9

Ramzy did not point to any evidence that Darr knew about or
was involved in these assignments.
fail for this reason.

His work assignment claims

See Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1299 (“It is well

established that liability in § 1983 cases cannot be premised
solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.”).

Ramzy also did

not point to any evidence that these assignments constituted a
serious

and

material

change

in

the

terms,

conditions,

or

privileges of his employment or that they would have dissuaded a
reasonable employee from engaging in activities protected under
§ 1981.

Moreover,

as

to

his

retaliation

claim,

he

did

not

produce evidence that he engaged in protected activity that a
decisionmaker knew about before he received the assignments, and
thus he produced no evidence to support the causation prong of
the prima facie case.
to

base

his

claims

Therefore, to the extent Ramzy attempts
on

his

work

assignments,

he

failed

to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.
Suspension

and

Termination.

Ramzy

claims

that

he

was

suspended and later fired because of his race and protected
activity.
terminated

Defendants
because

his

maintain

that

supervisor

he

was

discovered

suspended
that

he

and

had

a

practice of prefilling and photocopying inmate intake forms and
because of his previous disciplinary record.

Although the Court

finds for purposes of summary judgment that Ramzy made out a
prima facie case for his retaliation claims arising from his

10

suspension and termination, the Court concludes that he did not
make out a prima facie case that his suspension and termination
were racially discriminatory.
Ramzy’s supervisor, B.T., discovered Ramzy’s practice of
using

intake

forms

with

prefilled

sometime in the fall of 2012.

vital

sign

information

On October 22, 2012, B.T. placed

Ramzy on administrative leave pending an internal investigation
of his alleged falsification of inmate medical records.

Ramzy

was terminated in March 2013.
Ramzy

does

information

on

not
the

dispute

jail

that

medical

he

prefilled

screening

forms,

vital

sign

photocopied

them, and used them when he conducted medical screenings on
inmates.

See Ramzy May 26, 2016 Dep. Ex. 12, Letter from Justin

Ramzy to Capt. Schaffer et al. 1 (Oct. 22, 2013), ECF No. 62-12
(“Oct. 22 Letter”).

Ramzy does not know of any other employees

who used forms with prefilled vital sign information.

No one

taught Ramzy to use prefilled forms; it was his own idea.
Ramzy admits that he prefilled a respiration rate of 18,
temperature of 98.6, pulse oximeter of 100%, and fasting blood
sugar N/A.
limits”

He also admits that he prefilled “within normal

for

the

following

assessments:

general

appearance,

behavior, state of consciousness, ease of movement, breathing,
and skin.
signs

for

And Ramzy admits that he used the prefilled vital
the

majority

of

inmates

11

he

assessed,

although

he

asserts

that

he

only

used

the

prefilled

form

if

the

inmate

appeared to be asymptomatic, did not complain of symptoms, and
appeared to him to be within normal limits for each assessment.
Ramzy did not alter the prefilled respiration rate of 18 if
the inmate appeared to be breathing normally and he estimated
that the inmate’s respiration rate was within normal limits.
E.g., Ramzy May 26, 2016 Dep. 176:16-24.

Ramzy did not alter

the prefilled temperature of 98.6 degrees if the inmate had a
temperature below 98.6 and appeared to be within normal limits.
Id. at 188:10-189:11.

Ramzy also did not alter the prefilled

temperature of 98.6 degrees if the clinic’s equipment showed an
unusually

low

body

temperature

of

94

or

95

degrees

and

the

inmate appeared to be within normal limits; in such cases, Ramzy
assumed that the equipment had malfunctioned and that the inmate
had a temperature of 98.6 degrees.
inmate

did

not

report

having

Id. at 228:5-17.

chronic

obstructive

If an

pulmonary

disease or a history of breathing difficulties and the inmate’s
pulse

oximeter

reading

measured

between

96%

and

100%

oxygen

saturation, Ramzy did not alter the prefilled pulse oximeter
value of 100%.
was

not

Oct. 22 Letter 1.

working,

Ramzy

did

not

If the pulse oximeter machine
alter

the

prefilled

pulse

oximeter value of 100% if the patient appeared to be within
normal limits.

Ramzy May 26, 2016 Dep. 183:9-24; id. at 215:7-

10 (“I’d try the machinery, if it didn’t work, I’d put down -- I

12

had -- I had my pre -- -- pre -- prephotocopied forms to say
they were within normal limits, you know, and move on.”).
Sheila Haden, an investigator with the sheriff’s office of
professional standards, conducted an investigation into Ramzy’s
prefilled forms.

During the investigation, Ramzy admitted that

he used prefilled, photocopied medical intake forms.
265:1-19.

According

investigation,

Haden

to

told

Ramzy,
Ramzy

during

that

Darr

told

Haden

that

using

forms

Haden’s

using

forms “seems to be a common practice.”

Id. at
initial

prefilled

intake

Id. at 281:6-15.

prefilled

with

vital

But
sign

information was not a common practice, and Haden conducted a
supplemental investigation.

In her supplemental investigation,

Haden concluded that two medical staff members other than Ramzy
“sporadically”

used

prefilled

forms

but

‘common practice’ as had been suggested.”

that

it

“was

not

a

Forbus Aff. Ex. 3, IA

12-010 Supplement 1 (Dec. 10, 2012), ECF No. 37-6 at 9.

Medical

technicians G.R. and A.T. admitted that they used photocopied
forms with the signature and date prefilled.
at 9-10.

Id., ECF No. 37-6

Haden found that Ramzy “was the only member of the

nursing staff who regularly used photocopied medical forms that
had been prefilled with medical vital sign information” and that
“he used them on a daily basis.”
Haden

concluded

that

the

Id., ECF No. 37-6 at 10.

“prefilled

13

signature

and

dates

And
on

intake

forms

was

the

more

‘common

practice’

interviewed, not vital sign documenting.”

of

those

Id.

As a result of Haden’s investigation, G.R., a black woman,
and A.T., a white man, received written reprimands for using
pre-signed and pre-dated intake forms.
pending

permanent

prefilled

vital

dismissal,

sign

for

information.

discuss the situation.

Ramzy was suspended,

using

intake

Ramzy

met

forms

with

with

Darr

to

During the March 4, 2013 meeting, Ramzy

attempted to compare his situation to K.R., a white nurse who
was accused of having inappropriate relations with an inmate at
the Muscogee County prison.
Based on Haden’s investigation, Darr believed that Ramzy
used the prefilled intake forms without actually assessing the
inmates’

vital

signs.

Darr

166:22-167:9, 168:13-15.
prior

disciplinary

Dep.

125:20-126:8,

128:16-129:5,

And, Ramzy admits that he had several

issues,

including

two

suspensions

for

insubordination and a recent suspension for failure to perform
his suicide watch duties.
terminated

Ramzy’s

By letter dated March 13, 2013, Darr

employment,

effective

March

6,

2013,

for

falsifying inmate information on medical intake forms and due to
his

disciplinary

history.

Ramzy

May

26,

2016

Dep.

Ex.

16,

Letter from John Darr to Justin Ramzy (Mar. 13, 2013), ECF No.
62-16.

Darr stated that Ramzy had not provided him with “any

information to indicate termination was not appropriate.”

14

Id.

The letter stated that Ramzy could appeal the termination by
contacting Captain Larry Tew or by going directly to CCG’s human
resources department.

Ramzy did not point to evidence that he

appealed.
As to Ramzy’s prima facie case, there is no dispute that
Ramzy was a member of a protected class, was qualified to be a
medical technician, and was subjected to an adverse employment
action when he was suspended and terminated.
produce
similarly

evidence

that

situated

he

was

comparator

treated
or

that

But Ramzy did not

differently
there

is

from

any

a

other

evidence to suggest that his suspension and termination were
motivated by his race.
In disparate discipline cases, the key question is whether
the

plaintiff

and

his

comparators

are

“similarly

situated,”

meaning that they were “involved in or accused of the same or
similar

conduct

and

[were]

disciplined

in

different

ways.”

Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir.
2006) (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.
1999)).

The

“quantity

and

quality

of

the

comparator’s

misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent courts from
second-guessing

employers’

apples with oranges.”

reasonable

decisions

and

confusing

Id. (quoting Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368).

Here, Ramzy, a medical technician, admitted that he used
prefilled medical intake forms and that he did not change the

15

prefilled values even if he was not able to get a reading from
the

machines.4

clinic’s

Ramzy

contends

that

three

white

employees “committed falsehoods and engaged in deceit” but were
not terminated.
No. 56.

Pls.’ Resp. to CCG’s Mot. for Summ. J. 5, ECF

Ramzy points to K.R., a white female nurse who was

accused of an inappropriate relationship with a prison inmate.
Ramzy contends that K.R. lied during the investigation of the
incident because she denied the allegations.
that

the

engaged

investigation
in

the

investigation.

was

inconclusive

inappropriate

activity

as
or

Darr concluded
to
lied

whether

K.R.

during

the

And Ramzy did not point to evidence that K.R.

had any prior disciplinary history.

For these reasons, K.R. is

not similarly situated to Ramzy and is not a valid comparator.
Ramzy

asserts

that

R.B.,

a

white

male

clinic

manager,

failed to retain employee time cards for the required amount of
time.

Ramzy

did

not

point

to

any

evidence

of

what

the

investigation revealed, whether R.B. intentionally destroyed the
time cards before he should have, or whether R.B. lied during
the investigation.

And Ramzy did not point to evidence that

R.B. had any prior disciplinary history.

Therefore, R.B. is not

similarly situated to Ramzy and is not a valid comparator.
4

Ramzy argues that there was a common practice of using prefilled
screening forms. Although it is undisputed that two other employees,
including a white man, were disciplined for using pre-signed and predated intake forms, Ramzy did not point to any evidence that any other
employee prefilled the vital sign information as he did.

16

Finally,

Ramzy

asserts

that

P.Mo.,

a

white

male

health

service administrator, certified that clinic psychiatrists were
on-site at the clinics even though they were off-site and on
call for part of the time.

As a result of the investigation,

P.Mo. was suspended for five days.

Ramzy did not point to

evidence of anything else regarding the investigation that would
permit the Court to understand precisely what P.Mo. did, why he
did it, or what Darr concluded.

Ramzy also did not point to

evidence that P.Mo. had any prior disciplinary history.

For

these reasons, P.Mo. is not similarly situated to Ramzy and is
not a valid comparator.
Without a valid comparator, evidence that he did not engage
in

the

misconduct

for

which

he

was

disciplined,

or

other

evidence to suggest that his suspension and termination were
motivated

by

his

race,

Ramzy

cannot

establish

suspension and termination were discriminatory.

that

his

Defendants are

therefore entitled to summary judgment on Ramzy’s discrimination
claims based on his October 5, 2017 suspension and termination.5
B.

Spearman

Defendants
following

claims

are

entitled

asserted

by

to

summary

Spearman

5

judgment

because

she

on

the

failed

to

Ramzy’s
retaliation
claim
arising
from
his
suspension
and
termination, for which the Court has found a prima facie case, is
dismissed for other reasons as discussed infra § IV.A.

17

point to sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual dispute
on the elements of her prima facie case for these claims.
March 2012 Internal Investigation.

Spearman claims that

she was subjected to an internal investigation in retaliation
for

complaining

prison.
had

about

discrimination

and

conditions

at

the

In March 2012, B.T. complained that one of the nurses

told

her

that

a

clinic

employee

used

a

prison

computer to access personal information about her.

clinic

During an

internal investigation, Spearman admitted that she had used a
prison

clinic

information
websites.

computer

via

the

to

Georgia

check
and

B.T.’s
Alabama

nursing
board

of

license
nursing

No disciplinary action was taken against Spearman as

a result of the investigation.
As discussed above, any § 1983 First Amendment retaliation
claims based on this 2012 investigation are time-barred.

And

Spearman’s § 1981 retaliation claim fails because she did not
point to any evidence that Darr was involved in or knew about
the investigation.

Spearman cannot proceed against Darr or CCG

solely based on respondeat superior, and these claims thus fail.
Moreover,

Spearman

did

not

point

to

any

evidence

that

she

engaged in protected activity that B.T. knew about before B.T.
initiated the investigation, which means that Spearman did not
establish a causal connection to support her retaliation claims
based on the March 2012 internal investigation.

18

Even if she

had, Spearman did not establish that merely being subjected to
an

internal

investigation

under

the

circumstances

here

would

have dissuaded a reasonable worker from engaging in activities
protected under § 1981.
are

entitled

to

For all of these reasons, Defendants

summary

judgment

on

Spearman’s

retaliation

claims based on the March 2012 internal investigation.
Fall

2012

Counseling

and

Investigation.

Spearman

also

claims that she was unlawfully retaliated against when she was
verbally counseled on one occasion and when she was questioned
on another occasion about inmate care.

In October 2012, B.T.

verbally counseled Spearman for placing a sticky note on another
employee’s timecard.

Spearman does not dispute that she placed

a sticky note on another employee’s timecard.

Spearman did not

face any formal discipline as a result of the incident.
November

2012,

B.T.

questioned

Spearman

gotten insulin to a diabetic patient.

on

why

she

had

In
not

Once Spearman and a guard

explained that several security guards prevented Spearman from
reaching the patient, the investigation was dropped.
As discussed above, any § 1983 First Amendment retaliation
claims based on these 2012 employment actions are time-barred.
And, even if Spearman engaged in protected activity prior to
these two incidents, she did not point to any evidence that Darr
was involved in or knew about either incident.

Spearman cannot

proceed against Darr or CCG solely based on respondeat superior,

19

and this claim thus fails.

Moreover, Spearman did not point to

any evidence that she engaged in protected activity that B.T.
knew about within the two or three months before B.T. counseled
her and investigated the diabetic patient incident, which means
that Spearman did not establish a causal connection to support
her retaliation claims based on these two incidents.

Even if

she had, Spearman did not establish that verbal counseling under
the circumstances here or an investigation into the diabetic
patient incident would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
engaging in activities protected under § 1981.
reasons,

Defendants

are

entitled

to

For all of these

summary

judgment

on

Spearman’s retaliation claims based on the October 2012 verbal
counseling and the November 2012 diabetic patient investigation.
Discriminatory compensation.

Spearman also claims that she

was denied proper compensation because of her race.

This claim

fails because she did not establish a prima facie case.
establish

a

prima

facie

case

of

intentional

“[T]o

compensation

discrimination based on race, the plaintiff must establish that:
(1) [s]he belongs to a racial minority; (2) received low wages;
(3) similarly situated comparators outside the protected class
received higher compensation; and (4) [s]he was qualified to
receive the higher wage.” Lee v. Mid-State Land & Timber Co.,
285 F. App’x 601, 606 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
undisputed

that

Spearman

belongs

20

to

a

racial

It is

minority,

but

Spearman did not point to any evidence to support the other
elements of a compensation discrimination claim.

She did not

even point to any evidence on what compensation she was denied.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on her compensation
discrimination claim.
Termination.

Spearman also failed to establish prima facie

cases for her discrimination and retaliation claims arising from
her termination.

Spearman was terminated when the clinics were

privatized in 2013.

From 2009 to 2013, the sheriff’s office

exceeded its budget.

An audit revealed an overage for jail

clinic wages and salaries, largely due to overtime pay.

Darr

believed that privatizing the clinic would fix the overtime pay
issues, and he proposed privatizing jail clinic services.

It is

not

began

clear

from

the

present

record

when

Darr

first

contemplating privatization, but Spearman understood that he had
made remarks about privatizing the clinic by April 2012.
Darr did not select the vendors for the jail and prison
clinics.

Rather,

committees

composed

of

CCG

employees

and

sheriff’s office employees made the decision, with input from
CCG’s human resources department.
mid-February

2013

to

inform

Darr met with clinic staff in

them

privatized later in the year.

that

the

clinics

would

be

As part of the privatization

process, all clinic medical staff members were terminated from
their positions in September 2013.

21

All clinic medical staff

members were advised that they needed to apply for a clinic job
through the new vendors and were not guaranteed employment with
the new vendors.

Spearman did not apply for a job with the

vendors.
Spearman appears to assert that she was terminated because
of her race, although the undisputed evidence establishes that
every clinic medical staff member was terminated as part of the
privatization.

Spearman points out that P.Ma., a white woman,

remained clinic manager as a CCG employee after the clinics were
privatized.

But Spearman did not present any evidence that she

was similarly situated to P.Ma.

Spearman does not dispute that

the clinic manager was not considered part of clinic medical
staff.

She

does

not

dispute

that

the

clinic

manager

was

responsible for human resources functions, not medical duties.
And Spearman, a licensed practical nurse, does not dispute that
all

other

privatized.

nurses

were

terminated

when

the

clinics

were

For these reasons, the Court finds that Spearman

failed to point to any valid comparator who was not terminated
or to any other evidence that her termination was discriminatory
or retaliatory.
case,

and

Accordingly, she did not make out a prima facie

Defendants

are

entitled

to

summary

judgment

on

Spearman’s discrimination and retaliation claims arising from
her termination.

22

To the extent that Spearman contends that Darr privatized
the clinics to retaliate against her because he thought she was
“[c]lose to revealing money fraud” sometime in 2013, Spearman
Aug. 29, 2016 Dep. 163:19-24, ECF No. 41, the Court observes
that Spearman does not assert that she actually did reveal fraud
in the clinics—which might amount to First Amendment protected
activity.
it.”

She simply asserts that she was “close to revealing

Spearman also did not point to any evidence that Darr’s

decision to recommend privatization of the clinic was related to
anything that Spearman did.6

This claim fails.

Spearman further complains that Darr should have helped her
find another job after she was terminated and that he refused to
do so to retaliate against her.

But Spearman did not point to

any evidence that she asked Darr for help finding a new job.

It

is undisputed that Spearman did not apply for a job with the new
clinic vendors, and she did not point to any evidence that Darr
did anything to keep her from applying.
Spearman suggests that Darr “could have given [her] that
job

[Darr]

convinced

undisclosed time.

CCG

to

give

Id. at 164:19-22.

to

his

wife”

at

some

Or she “could have got

[sic] the job [Darr’s] daughter got with the Sheriff Department”
at some undisclosed time.

Id. at 165:2-6.

6

Spearman did not

It is undisputed that Darr contemplated recommending privatization of
the clinics for at least a year and that he told employees about the
decision in mid-February 2013, well before the EEOC received
Spearman’s EEOC charge on February 28, 2013.

23

point to evidence of (1) what either position was, (2) whether
Spearman

was

positions

qualified

were

for

available

either

in

position,

2013,

or

(3)

(4)

expressed an interest in either position.

whether

whether

the

Spearman

For all of these

reasons, Spearman has failed to establish a retaliation claim
arising from Darr’s failure to help her find a job after she was
terminated.
IV.

Claims Unsupported by Evidence of Pretext
Although

Plaintiffs

pointed

to

sufficient

evidence

to

create a prima facie case as to some of their claims, these
surviving

claims

ultimately

fail

because

Plaintiffs

did

not

produce sufficient evidence to show that Defendants’ proffered
reasons

for

the

employment

discrimination or retaliation.

actions

were

pretext

for

Failure to produce such evidence

requires summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

See Trask,

822 F.3d at 1191 (noting that if an employer proffers legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision, then the plaintiff
must “produce evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons are
a pretext for discrimination”).
A.

Ramzy

For purposes of the pending motions, the Court finds that
Ramzy established a prima facie case of § 1981 retaliation with
regard

to

termination.

his

October

2012

suspension

and

his

subsequent

But the record also establishes that Darr offered

24

a

legitimate,

non-retaliatory

reason

for

his

decision

to

terminate Ramzy: Ramzy admitted to using medical intake forms
with prefilled vital signs information, and he had several prior
disciplinary issues, including a recent suspension for failure
to perform his suicide watch duties.

Ramzy did not present

sufficient evidence to establish that this proffered reason is a
pretext to mask retaliatory intent.

Ramzy argues that he did

not commit the violation for which he was suspended and fired
and that this is evidence of retaliatory intent and pretext.

He

contends that even though he used prefilled intake forms, he did
assess all of the inmates.

“The law is clear that, even if a

[plaintiff] did not in fact commit the violation with which he
is charged, an employer successfully rebuts any prima facie case
of disparate treatment by showing that it honestly believed the
employee committed the violation.”
1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989).

Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d

But Ramzy admits that he did not

change the prefilled temperature value or the prefilled pulse
oximeter value, even if he was not able to get a reading from
the

clinic’s

machines.

From

this,

it

was

certainly

not

unreasonable for Darr to conclude that Ramzy did not conduct
complete assessments on all of the inmates for whom he used
prefilled intake forms.
Ramzy also argues that K.R., R.B., and P.Mo., who did not
participate in protected activity, engaged in similar misconduct

25

but

were

disciplined

differently.

As

the

Court

previously

explained, K.R., R.B., and P.Mo. were not similarly situated to
Ramzy, so evidence regarding them does not establish pretext.
See supra § III.A.
of

pretext,

Ramzy’s

Given Ramzy’s failure to produce evidence

Defendants

retaliation

are

entitled
arising

claims

to

summary

from

his

judgment
October

on

2012

suspension and subsequent termination.7
B.

Spearman

For

purposes

of

summary

judgment,

the

Court

finds

that

Spearman made out a prima facie case for the following claims:
First Amendment retaliation claim arising from the decision not
to

appoint

her

health

service

administrator

in

2012,

discrimination and retaliation claims arising from the denial of
an

opportunity

to

apply

for

clinic

manager

position,

and

discrimination and retaliation claims arising from the denial of
an

opportunity

position

in

to

2013.

apply
The

for

health

Court

further

service
finds

administrator

that

Defendants

articulated non-discriminatory/non-retaliatory reasons for their
decisions

and

that

Spearman

failed

to

produce

sufficient

evidence that those reasons were pretext for discrimination or
retaliation.

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on these claims.
7

The Court observes that while it found that Ramzy’s discrimination
claim arising from his suspension and firing fails because Ramzy
failed to establish a prima facie case, see supra § III.A, that claim
also fails because of Ramzy’s failure to show pretext.

26

2012 Health Service Administrator Decision. In late 2011,
the health service administrator, who had been in that position
since

the

1990s,

administrator
prison

and

vacated

oversaw
was

the

the

position.

clinics

responsible

for

directors, doctors, and nurses.

at

The

both

health

the

jail

supervising

service
and

the

the

medical

Corizon, Inc., an independent

agency, was tasked with filling the vacant position because the
new

health

Corizon.
with

one

service

would

be

an

employee

of

Corizon filled the health services administrator role
of

its

registered nurse.
29, 2012.

administrator

existing

employees,

B.T.,

a

white

female

She started work at the clinics on February

According to R.B., the jail’s clinic manager at the

time, B.T. was understood to bring “many years as a [director of
nursing]

and

[health

correction sites.”

service

administrator]

in

half

a

dozen

Haden Dep. Ex. 11, Email from R.B. to Tom

Barron (Apr. 5, 2012), ECF No. 47-10 at 172.
Spearman does not dispute that she did not apply for the
health service administrator position.

But she complains that

the position was never posted; if it had been posted, she would
have applied for it.

Spearman Aug. 25, 2016 Dep 47:1-12, ECF

No. 61.
Based on the present record, it is not clear what role Darr
played in the 2012 health service administrator decision.

It is

undisputed that Corizon, not Darr, made the decision to hire

27

B.T. and that B.T. was employed by Corizon, not Darr.

Spearman

appears to argue that Darr should have recommended Spearman for
the position over Corizon’s existing employees.

Spearman did

not point to any evidence that she engaged in activity protected
under § 1981 before Darr made the decision.

Spearman did point

to evidence that she met with Darr on December 14, 2011 to
complain that the family of a deceased coworker barred her from
the coworker’s funeral.

During that meeting, Spearman told Darr

that she had made P.Mo., then the health service administrator,
aware

of

“continuous

violations”

“putting patients in danger.”
7.

at

the

clinics

that

were

Spearman Aug. 25, 2016 Dep. 16:3-

The Court presumes that Spearman is attempting to assert a

First Amendment retaliation claim based on her December 2011
complaints

to

Darr.

The

Court

assumes

a

causal

connection

between Spearman’s comments during the December 2011 meeting and
Darr’s

February

health

service

2012

decision

not

administrator

to

recommend

position,

her

though

for

the

the

causal

connection is based solely on temporal proximity and is weak.
Even

if

retaliation,

Spearman
Darr

made

out

articulated

a

a

prima

facie

legitimate

case

of

non-retaliatory

reason for his decision not to overrule Corizon’s choice for the
position.
experience

Corizon’s
working

for

choice

was

Corizon

and

a

registered
experience

nurse

working

with
as

a

director of nursing and as a health service administrator at

28

several other correction sites.

In addition, Darr noted that

Spearman had been the subject of nepotism complaints and that
she had conflicts with other employees that led a coworker’s
family to bar Spearman from the coworker’s funeral.
Spearman

did

not

present

any

to

for

decision

Darr’s

non-retaliatory

recommend

Spearman

position.

“In the context of a promotion, ‘a plaintiff cannot

the

health

his

rebut

legitimate

for

reasons

evidence

service

not

to

administrator

prove pretext by simply arguing or even by showing that [s]he
was better qualified than the [person] who received the position
[s]he

coveted.’”

Springer

v.

Convergys

Customer

Mgmt.

Grp.

Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cty., 446
F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006)).

Rather, “a plaintiff must

show that the disparities between the successful applicant’s and
[her] own qualifications were ‘of such weight and significance
that

no

judgment,

reasonable

person,

could

chosen

have

in
the

the

exercise

candidate

of

selected

impartial
over

the

plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732
(11th

Cir.

2004),

overruled

on

other

grounds,

Ash

evidence

that

v.

Tyson

Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006)).
Here,

Spearman

did

not

point

to

she

was

better qualified for the health service administrator position
than B.T., much less to evidence of such disparities between

29

Spearman’s qualifications and B.T.’s that no reasonable person
could have chosen B.T. over Spearman.

Without some evidence of

pretext, Spearman’s retaliation claims based on the 2012 health
service administrator decision fail.
2012 Clinic Manager Decision.

Spearman next contends that

she was, because of her race and due to retaliation, denied an
opportunity

to

apply

for

the

clinic

manager

position,

which

became open in August 2012 when R.B., the prior clinic manager,
retired.

Failing to point to any evidence of pretext, Spearman

cannot avoid summary judgment as to these claims.
The clinic manager acted as head of human resources for the
jail

clinic

payroll.

and

handled

billing,

accounts

receivable,

and

The clinic manager position was not advertised or

opened for applications, and no one applied for the position.
When

the

clinic

manager

position

became

open,

then-jail

commander Dane Collins suggested to Darr that P.Ma., a white
woman, be given the job.

Collins told Darr that P.Ma. knew how

to do the job because she filled in for R.B. when he was out of
the office.
job

needed

somebody

Darr Dep. 145:19-146:3.
to

be

filling

didn’t get paid.”

filled

in,

then

quickly
bills

According to Collins, the
because

didn’t

get

“if

there

paid

and

Collins Dep. 67:15-17, ECF No. 45.

wasn’t
people
Collins

testified that P.Ma. was the “only fit for that spot that we saw
at the time” because P.Ma. had filled in for R.B. when he was

30

“out of work for quite a bit,” had experience “on the human
resource side,” and “had an extensive knowledge of the payroll
system.”

Id. at 67:11-22.

Before P.Ma. became clinic manager,

she was the human resources technician at the jail.
69:22-70:1.

In

that

role,

P.Ma.

handled

approximately 200 jail security employees.

Id. at

payroll

for

Id. at 72:4-9.

Spearman asserts that she made Darr aware of her skills and
of

her

desire

to

fill

the

clinic

manager

role.8

She

also

contends that she was qualified for the clinic manager position
because she had been performing some of R.B.’s clinic manager
duties at the prison.
facie

case,

Darr

Even if Spearman established a prima

offered

a

legitimate

nondiscriminatory/non-

retaliatory reason for offering the job to P.Ma.: P.Ma. knew how
to do the job because she had been filling in as clinic manager
while R.B. was out on leave, P.Ma. had experience performing
human resources functions, and P.Ma. had extensive knowledge of
the payroll system.

Although Spearman argues that she had been

performing some of the clinic manager functions at the prison,
it

is

undisputed

that

Spearman

was

“not

familiar

with

the

payroll system.” Darr Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. O, Email from Alicia

8

Before Spearman worked at the clinics,
Reserves and served on active duty for
military service, Spearman worked in the
credit card processor, for a number of
March 2007.

31

she served in the U.S. Army
several months.
After her
call center at TSYS, a large
years until she resigned in

Spearman to P.Ma. (Jan. 15, 2013), ECF No. 47-17.

Darr further

noted Spearman’s nepotism and employee conflict issues.
Spearman

presented

no

evidence

that

Darr’s

reasons

for

choosing P.Ma. for the clinic manager position were pretext for
discrimination or retaliation.

She did not point to evidence

that she was better qualified for the clinic manager position
than P.Ma., much less to evidence of such disparities between
Spearman’s qualifications and P.Ma.’s that no reasonable person
could have chosen P.Ma. over Spearman.
present

any

evidence

to

establish

Because Spearman did not
pretext,

Defendants

are

entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
2013
service

Health

Service

administrator

Administrator

position

2013 when Corizon fired B.T.
because

of

her

race

and

in

became

Decision.
open

The

again

in

health

February

Spearman contends that she was,
retaliation

for

her

protected

activity, denied an opportunity to apply for the position.

Darr

rehired P.Mo., a white male registered nurse who had previously
served in that position from the late 1990s through 2011.

Darr

maintains that P.Mo, who had performed the job for more than ten
years, was better qualified for the position than Spearman, a
licensed practical nurse who had not held a management position
in the clinics.
The Court assumes for purposes of summary judgment that
Spearman established a prima facie case of race discrimination

32

with regard to the 2013 health service administrator decision.
But she failed to produce any evidence that Darr’s decision was
a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

She did not point

to any evidence to establish that she was better qualified for
the

position

than

P.Mo.,

much

less

to

evidence

of

such

disparities between Spearman’s qualifications and P.Mo.’s that
no

reasonable

Because
pretext,

person

Spearman

could

did

Defendants

have

are

P.Mo.

present

not

chosen
any

evidence

to

summary

entitled

over

Spearman.

to

establish

judgment

on

Spearman’s claims arising from this decision.
V.

Hostile Work Environment Claims
As with all of their other claims, Plaintiffs failed to

produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual dispute
as to the essential elements of their hostile work environment
claims.

“To establish a hostile work environment claim under

the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an employee
(or former employee) must show harassing behavior ‘sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his or her]
employment.’”

Bryant,

575

F.3d

at

1296

Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004)).

(quoting

Pa.

State

In other words, an

employee must show (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he
was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was
based

on

a

protected

characteristic,

such

as

race,

(4)

the

harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

33

terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily
abusive working environment,” and (5) some basis for holding the
employer liable.

Id. (quoting Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan,

Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)).

“In evaluating the

objective severity of the harassment,” the courts consider “(1)
the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct;
(3)

whether

the

conduct

is

physically

threatening

or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the
conduct

unreasonably

interferes

with

the

employee’s

job

performance.” Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276.
Defendants

argue

that

Plaintiffs

did

not

point

to

sufficient evidence to establish that they were subjected to
harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the

terms

and

conditions

of

their

employment.

Plaintiffs’

entire response to that argument: “There is [sic] sufficient
facts in record to support Plaintiffs [sic] claims of a Hostile
Work [sic].” Pls.’ Resp. to CCG’s Mot. for Summ. J. 5.
Court

spent

considerable

time

combing

through

the

The

parties’

citations to the record for facts that may be relevant to a
claim for hostile work environment and set those out in Section
I, supra.

Most of the activity was not even directed toward

Ramzy and Spearman.

Moreover, it was not frequent, and it was

not severe or pervasive as those terms have been defined by the
courts in this context.

Much of it could be classified as non-

34

threatening offensive utterances.
pointed

to

evidence

that

with their job performance.

the

Neither Ramzy nor Spearman

conduct

unreasonably

interfered

For all of these reasons, the Court

finds that Plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to
create a genuine fact dispute on their hostile work environment
claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained in this Order, the Court grants
Defendants’ summary judgment motions (ECF Nos. 37 & 47).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 1st day of February, 2017.
s/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

35