WRIGHT v. WATSON et al

Filing 107

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 71 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 08/25/2016. (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
ROBERT H. WRIGHT, JR.,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

S/A JERALD WATSON, JOHN
GOODRICH, and MIKE PITTS, in
their individual capacities,

*

CASE NO. 4:15-CV-34 (CDL)

*

Defendants.

*
O R D E R

We are all familiar with the English common-law maxim that
“a man’s home is his castle.”

And few of us would disagree with

Justice Louis Brandeis’s observation that the right to be left
alone is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued

by

civilized

men.”1

In

this

case,

law

enforcement

officials certainly did not leave Plaintiff Robert Wright alone.
In fact, they invaded his castle.

More precisely, they hovered

over his rural home in a helicopter, saw what they believed to
be a patch of marijuana on his neighbor’s adjacent property,
trespassed

on

Mr.

Wright’s

property

to

investigate,

snooped

around the shed near his home, searched the inside of his home
pursuant to a search warrant obtained through the use of alleged

1

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).

false information, and then arrested and prosecuted Mr. Wright
based on evidence found inside his home.
The issue to be decided today, however, is not whether this
clear

invasion

of

Mr.

Wright’s

privacy

by

law

officers is generally offensive.

The issue is

invasion

right

violated

Mr.

Wright’s

to

enforcement
whether

be

free

that
from

unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution.
the

law

Specifically, the Court must decide whether

enforcement

officials

whom

Mr.

Wright

has

sued

for

damages because of this conduct violated clearly established law
and

thus

lose

their

qualified

and

official

immunity.

This

inquiry requires that the Court carefully analyze how far Mr.
Wright’s
Court

castle

must

trespassing

extends

also
upon

for

consider
the

Fourth
the

property,

Amendment

conduct

providing

of
the

purposes.
Defendants
magistrate

The
in
with

allegedly false information to obtain a search warrant, and then
arresting

Mr.

Wright

and

prosecuting

him

based

on

evidence

obtained pursuant to the search warrant.
Mr. Wright asserts federal law claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983

against

Defendants

in

their

individual

alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment.

capacities

for

He also asserts

state law claims arising from that same conduct.

Defendants

seek summary judgment on their qualified and official immunity
defenses.

As explained in the remainder of this Order, the

2

Court finds that Defendant Mike Pitts is entitled to qualified
and official

immunity as a matter of law as to all of

Mr.

Wright’s claims against him, and therefore, Defendants’ Motion
for summary judgment (ECF No. 71) is granted in its entirety as
to those claims against Pitts.

The Court finds that Defendants

Jerald Watson and John Goodrich are not entitled to qualified or
official immunity as a matter of law as to Mr. Wright’s claims
against them that the search of his home violated the Fourth
Amendment because they supplied the magistrate with allegedly
false

information

in

support

of

the

warrant

application.

Therefore, their motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 71) is
denied as to those claims.

Watson and Goodrich, however, are

entitled to qualified and official immunity as a matter of law
as

to

Mr.

Wright’s

other

claims,

and

thus

their

summary judgment is granted as to those claims.

motion

Accordingly,

the only claims remaining for trial are

Mr. Wright’s

Amendment

Watson

and

state

law

claims

against

for

and

Fourth

Goodrich

arising from the search of Mr. Wright’s home, which claims are
based on Mr. Wright’s contention that these Defendants supplied
false information in support of the search warrant application.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

3

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).

In determining whether a

genuine

dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

Here, Defendants seek summary judgment on their qualified
immunity defenses.

Thus, the question is whether Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity based on the evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to Mr. Wright, with all reasonable
inferences drawn in his favor
F.3d 1213, 1217

See Perez v. Suszczynski, 809

(11th Cir. 2016)

(explaining that the court

“must review the evidence in this manner ‘because the issues
. . .

concern

not

which

facts

the

parties

might

be

able

to

prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed a
violation of clearly established law.’” (quoting Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002))).

If, taking the evidence

in the light most favorable to Mr. Wright, a Defendant’s conduct
would not amount to a violation of clearly established Fourth
Amendment law, then summary judgment must be granted in that
Defendant’s

favor

based

on

qualified

4

immunity.

See

Lee

(emphasizing that the plaintiff must show the violation of a
constitutional

right

“under

the

plaintiff’s

version

of

the

Wright,

the

facts”).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewed

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

Mr.

record reveals the following.
I.

The Wright Property
Plaintiff Robert H. Wright, Jr. and his wife, Lisa Wright,

live

at

525

Property”).
Highway 116.
approximately

R.D.

Brown

Road

in

Hamilton,

Georgia

(“Wright

R.D. Brown Road is a dirt road located off of
Mrs. Wright owns the Wright Property, which is
nine

and

a

half

acres.

One

acre

immediately

surrounding the house is landscaped, with manicured grass and a
garden area.

The rest of the property has natural vegetation

and is not landscaped.
There is a fence surrounding the north, west, and south
sides of the property; in the summary judgment papers, it is a
black chain-link fence.2

There is a gate in the portion of the

fence that is along the southern border of the property.
is a factual dispute as to whether the gate was locked.

2

There
Compare

See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 11, ECF No. 88 (stating
that the Wright Property “had a black chain-link fence all the way
around it”).
At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, counsel
suggested that the fence along R.D. Brown Road is a split rail fence,
not a chain-link fence, but counsel did not point to any evidence on
this point.
This fact is not material to the issues that the Court
must decide.

5

Binion Dep. 17:3-9, ECF No. 79 (stating that he believed the
gate was “closed” and that officers had to go over it) with
Pitts Dep. 53:10-11, ECF No. 78 (“I want to say there was a gate
or something where we -- it was open.”).

The distance between

the house and the chain-link fence at the southern border of the
Wright Property is not clear from the present record.
A shed is located approximately 100 to 150 yards north of
the

house.

The

shed

is

inside

the

black

chain-link

fence.

Defendants assert that there is only natural vegetation around
the shed.

Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 77,

ECF No. 71-12.

But they also claim that there was a “gardening

area” near the shed.
71-2.

Id. ¶ 12; accord Bracewell Decl. ¶ 6, ECF

It is undisputed that the shed is not visible from the

house, and the house is not visible from the shed.

The shed

itself can be seen from R.D. Brown Road, but there is a factual
dispute as to whether the area around the shed could be seen
from R.D. Brown Road.

Compare R. Wright Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 88-1

(stating that it is not possible to see anything on the ground
near the shed from the road because of dense vegetation between
the

road

and

the

shed)

with

Bolen

Decl.

¶ 7,

ECF

No.

71-3

(stating that the site was visible from R.D. Brown Road).

The

Wrights use the shed as a “a storage shed, tool shed” where they
keep their garden tools.

R. Wright Dep. 41:13-19, ECF No. 92.

The shed also houses the water supply (a well) for the Wrights’

6

house.

R. Wright Dep. 41:13-19.

The parties did not point to

any evidence that the shed could be identified as a well house
without entering it.

See Memmo Dep. 25:22-26:1, ECF No. 87

(testifying, in response to the question whether he went “to the
well house,” that Agent Memmo “went to the -- I don’t know it’s
a well house.· There was, like, a potting shed.”).

L. Wright Dep. Ex. 1, Map of Site, ECF No. 93-1.
Also on the Wright Property is the grave site for Mrs.
Wright’s son, who died in 2007.

The grave site, which predates

the house, is approximately fifty feet northwest of the house.
L.

Wright

Dep.

55:25-56:10,

ECF

7

No.

93.

Based

on

the

description and drawing that was provided to the Court at the
summary judgment hearing, the grave site is located between the
house and the shed.

Before the house was built, Mrs. Wright

permitted her son’s friends to visit the gravesite.

Visits to

the gravesite ceased within a year or two following his death.
Id. at 57:15-24.
II.

The Helicopter Surveillance
On

June

Suppression

27,

2013,

performed

the

Governor’s

aerial

Task

surveillance

in

Force

for

Harris

Drug

County,

Georgia as part of its marijuana eradication operation.3
Georgia
randomly

state

troopers,

canvassed

marijuana.

the

Paul

Wofford

county

in

of

Property.

Mark

helicopter,

Bracewell,
looking

for

Bracewell observed a suspected marijuana grow site

at a property on R.D. Brown Road.
south

a

and

Two

the

black

Neither

chain-link
the

The suspected grow site was

fence

officers

in

surrounding
the

the

helicopter

Wright

nor

the

officers on the ground team knew whether the suspected grow site
was on the Wright Property.

At some point, officers on the

ground team reviewed property tax records and learned that Mrs.
Wright owned the property at 525 R.D. Brown Road, but they did
not determine whether the large suspected grow site was on that
property.

Watson Dep. 87:17-22, 94:24-95:19, ECF No. 83.

3

It is

The parties agreed in their fact statements that the surveillance was
in January, but this appears to have been a typographical error. See
Webb Aff. Ex. 1, Affidavit & Application for a Search Warrant (June
27, 2013), ECF No. 71-1 at 5.

8

not clear from the present record how far the marijuana grow
site was from the house on the Wright Property.
After Wofford confirmed the spotting of the suspected grow
site, Bracewell contacted the ground team via radio and gave the
team GPS coordinates for the suspected grow site.

Bracewell

reported to the ground team that the suspected grow site was in
a clear-cut area near a black chain-link fence.

Bracewell also

reported to the ground team that the house at 525 R.D. Brown
Road was the closest house to the suspected grow site; that
there was a gate in the chain-link fence near the suspected grow
site; and that there were cups, trays, and laid pinestraw at the
suspected

grow

site.

Bracewell

Decl.

¶ 5.

Bracewell

also

stated that he reported to the ground team that there was a path
leading from the house at 525 R.D. Brown Road to the gate near
the suspected grow site.

Id.

But there is also evidence that

there is no path from the gate to the house.

L. Wright Dep.

362:1-10 (stating that there is no trail between the house and
the grow site); R. Wright Dep. 59:4-8 (stating that Mr. Wright
is not aware of a path leading from the house to the grow site).
Bracewell also reported to the ground team that he saw a
gardening area near a utility shed north of the house at 525
R.D. Brown Road.
in

cups

possibly

From the air, Bracewell observed small plants

and

trays

near

be

marijuana.”

the

shed

that

Bracewell

9

appeared

Decl.

¶ 6.

to

him

“to

Bracewell

acknowledged that from the air, he could not tell what type of
juvenile plants were in the cups and trays; he asked the ground
team to investigate to see if the cups contained marijuana.
Bracewell Dep. 61:20-25, ECF No. 82.

Bracewell also reported to

the ground team that he saw cups and trays near the shed “that
resembled what was observed at the large marijuana grow site.”
Bracewell Decl. ¶ 6.

From the air, Bracewell saw what appeared

to be white Styrofoam cups and black seed trays.

Bracewell Dep.

56:3-25.
Defendants assert that Bracewell observed an all terrain
vehicle (“ATV”) “moving locations” near the house at 525 R.D.
Brown Road.

See Bracewell Decl. ¶ 6.

factual dispute on this issue.

But there is a genuine

Mrs. Wright testified that no

one moved the ATV; she was the only person at home at the time
and said that she did not move the ATV on June 27, 2013.
Wright Dep. 183:23-25.

L.

Bracewell stated that he reported to the

ground team that he saw the ATV travel “from near the utility
shed and stop[] just short of the large marijuana grow site.”
Bracewell

Decl.

¶ 6.

But

an

officer

on

the

ground

team

testified that he was told that the ATV was “driving away back
towards the house” from the large suspected grow site.
Dep. 17:12-17.

10

Binion

III. The Initial Warrantless Search
The helicopter crew asked the ground team to search both
the

large

suspected

marijuana

grow

site

south

of

the

black

chain-link fence and the small gardening area near the Wrights’
utility shed.

At some point, the ground team confirmed that the

plants on the large suspected marijuana grow site were, in fact,
marijuana.

Neither party pointed to evidence of when the ground

team made this confirmation, and there is no evidence that the
confirmation

was

done

before

the

helicopter

crew

asked

the

ground team to search the area near the Wrights’ shed.
Michael Binion and Jeremy Bolen, both conservation rangers
with the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, were members
of the ground team that responded to the scene.

According to

Bolen, the helicopter crew stated that the area near the shed
“had items of commonality with those seen at the large marijuana
grow site, including, but not limited to, plastic cups.”
Decl. ¶ 5.
shed

Bolen

Bolen and Binion searched the site near the utility

located

on

the

Wright’s

property.

They

did

not

seek

permission for the search, and they did not have a warrant.
According to Mrs. Wright, the officers had to climb over a gate
in

the

perimeter

114:15-17.

fence

Defendant

to
Mike

reach

the

Pitts,

site.
a

Harris

L.

Wright

County

sheriff, arrived at the scene to help secure the area.

Dep.

deputy
He was

present with Bolen and Binion for part of the time that they

11

searched the site near the shed.
trays

just

outside

illegal in them.

the

shed,

but

The officers found cups and
they

Bolen Decl. ¶ 8.

did

not

see

anything

According to Lisa Wright,

the cups and trays contained flower seedlings, including Queen
Anne’s Lace, cleome, poppies, hydrangeas, and sunflowers.

L.

Wright Dep. 161:22-162:9, 166:9—14.
Bolen asserts that he found plastic trays that contained
between

eight

and

ten

juvenile

plants

under

approximately fifteen yards from the shed.

a

pine

tree

Bolen Decl. ¶ 8.

Based on the description and drawing that was provided to the
Court at the summary judgment hearing, the plastic trays under
the pine tree were between the perimeter fence and the shed.

At

some point, Defendant Jonathan Goodrich, another Harris County
deputy sheriff, arrived on the scene, and Pitts told Goodrich
about the large suspected marijuana grow site and about the
search that had been conducted near the shed.
in the search.

Goodrich joined

Bolen and Goodrich believed that the plants they

found in the trays under the pine tree were marijuana, although
Goodrich was not trained on how to tell the difference between
juvenile

marijuana

plants

and

other

similar

juvenile

plants.

Goodrich Dep. 32:6-16, ECF No. 77; see also Watson Dep. 58:1-3
(“As far as I know, Deputy ·Goodrich is not marijuana examiner
certified, and I don't think -- I don't know if DNR Officer
Bolen is or not.”).

Pitts was “unaware” of whether the plants

12

were marijuana.

Pitts Dep. 85:15-21.

Binion was not sure that

it was marijuana, and the officers did not confiscate the plants
or

photograph

them.

Bolen

Decl.

¶ 9;

Binion

Dep.

9:22-25

(“[Bolen] showed me a plant and asked me what it was.· And I
said ·I don’t know if it’s marijuana or not, I’ve never seen any
that small.”); Goodrich Dep. 35:22-36:9 (acknowledging “debate”
about whether the plants were marijuana).

Mr. Wright disputes

that the officers found juvenile marijuana near the shed because
it is undisputed that when officers later returned to the area
near the shed, there were no plants in the trays under the pine
tree.
that

For purposes of summary judgment, the Court must conclude
no

marijuana

plants

were

found

anywhere

on

the

Wright

Property prior to the issuance of the search warrant for the
search inside the Wrights’ home.
Bolen, Binion, and Goodrich went to the large suspected
grow site that was not on the Wright Property and was outside
the fence surrounding the property.
was

not

involved

enforcement

in

officers.

any
At

Pitts left the scene and

subsequent
the

large

actions
grow

site,

by

the

where

law
other

officers had confirmed that marijuana was growing, Bolen and
Goodrich found items which suggested to them that there was a
connection between the large grow site south of the fence and
the area north of the house near the Wrights’ utility shed,
including bags of the same brand of potting soil, Solo cups, and

13

black potting containers. Officers also found a dog crate at the
large grow site, and the dog crate was similar to a dog crate
box that was found in an open trailer near the Wright’s shed.
See Watson Dep. 84:13-20 (“What I’m saying is that there was a
box that had contained a wire crate that was on the property by
the shed and a similar dog crate was recovered at the second
grow.”).

According to Mrs. Wright, the dog crate box was from a

wire crate she purchased to corral some of her cats.

L. Wright

Dep. 268:5-272:7.
IV.

The Search Warrant, the Search, and the Arrests
Bolen and Goodrich returned to the area near the Wright’s

utility shed, and they were met by Defendant Jerald Watson, a
Harris County deputy sheriff.

It is undisputed that, at that

point, the officers did not see any plants in the containers in
the

area

under

the

pine

tree

near

the

shed.

The

officers

discussed what they had seen, and Goodrich told Watson that he
had

seen

“juvenile

plants

in

Solo

marijuana plants” in that area.

cups

that

appeared

Watson Dep. 57:11-22.

did not see any marijuana near the shed.

to

be

Watson

Id. 60:12-16.

Based on what officers saw at both the large grow site and
the area near the Wrights’ shed, Watson was tasked with seeking
a search warrant for the Wright Property.
10

(stating

that

officers

decided

to

See Watson Dep. 72:5seek

a

search

warrant

“based on the totality of everything that was located on the

14

property, in conjunction with the grow, as far as similar type
cups, similar type potting soil, bamboo stakes, the pine straw,
the well-beaten path from the grow to the house”).
Watson

swore

out

the

search

warrant

application

and

presented it to Harris County Chief Magistrate Judge Jennifer
Webb.

Watson’s affidavit in support of his application for a

search warrant states, in pertinent part:
On 06/27/2013 this deputy along with others were
conducting a joint operation with the Governors Drug
Task Force. The task force was focused on marijuana
eradication. The Georgia State Patrol was flying over
the residence located at 525 R. D. Brown Road.
Troopers observed several containers near a small
building that appeared to have marijuana growing in
them. The ground team was notified of the observation
and responded to the location. Upon arrival the ground
team located approx. six (6) marijuana plants near a
shed, and then they left to check on a larger grow
near the property line of the residence and when they
returned to the six plants had been removed. Located
at the larger grow Agents located bags of potting soil
which matched the same type of potting soil bags
located on the property at 525 R.D. Brown Road. In an
open trailer an empty dog wire crate box matching a
wire crate that was located at the larger grow
containing marijuana seedlings. Several plastic Solo
cups were located at the larger grow that matched Solo
cups found on the property of 525 R.D. Brown Road.
Webb Aff. Ex. 1, Affidavit & Application for a Search Warrant,
ECF No. 71-1 at 5.

Mr. Wright contends that two pieces of

information that Watson included in the warrant application were
not actually within the collective knowledge of the officers.
First, Mr. Wright disputes that there were any marijuana
seedlings near the utility shed.

15

It is undisputed that Watson

did not see any marijuana seedlings near the shed.

And, as

Defendants acknowledge, there were no seedlings near the shed
when Watson arrived on the scene.

Furthermore, the officers did

not photograph or confiscate the seedlings they say they saw.
Mr. Wright thus maintains that it is reasonable to infer that
the other officers, including Goodrich, did not see any small
plants in the trays under the pine tree near the utility shed.
Second, Wright asserts that the officers’ descriptions of
the plant containers at each site were so inconsistent that it
was not within the officers’ collective knowledge that there
were Solo cups at both locations.

All of the officers testified

that the smaller plants were in some type of cup.4

And the

photographs Mr. Wright pointed to in support of this assertion
show two types of containers: black plastic pots and red and
blue Solo-type cups.

Stinson Dep. Exs. 1, 13-15, 27, ECF No.

76.
Mr. Wright did not point to any evidence to dispute that
the officers told Watson that the same type of potting soil bags

4

See Wofford Dep. 44:10-14, ECF No. 81 (stating that he could see “a
little tray of some sort with some little cups that resembled the same
thing that we saw down next to the confirmed site”); Bolen Dep. 33:2434:7 (stating that the helicopter crew wanted two areas checked
“because there was several similar items that were -- like potting
cups, and things like that, that matched the same area with the
confirmed marijuana grow”); Watson Dep. 85:13-86:12 (stating that the
same type of cups were located at both sites); Goodrich Dep. 23:4-7
(stating that he saw “plastic cups”); Stinson Dep. 32:14-19, ECF No.
76 (stating that she saw juvenile plants in “black cups” and in red
and blue “Solo-type cups”).

16

were located at the grow site and on the property at 525 R.D.
Brown Road.

Mr. Wright also did not point to any evidence to

dispute that the officers told Watson that there was an empty
box that had contained a wire dog crate in an open trailer near
the shed that was similar to a wire dog crate that was found at
the grow site.

See Watson Dep. 84:13-20 (“What I’m saying is

that there was a box that had contained a wire crate that was on
the property by the shed and a similar dog crate was recovered
at the second grow.”).
Based

on

Watson’s

search

warrant

affidavit,

Judge

Webb

found that probable cause existed for a search, and she issued a
search warrant for the house and curtilage located at 525 R.D.
Brown Road.

When Watson returned with the search warrant, the

officers executed it.
the

search.

Pitts and Goodrich did not participate in

During

the

search,

the

officers

discovered

approximately 8.9 grams of marijuana in and around the Wrights’
house.

They also located fifty-four marijuana plants at the

large grow site, which was on the neighbor’s lot outside the
black

chain-link

property

from

fence.

the

house

The
and

officers

seized

surrounding

area,

some

personal

including:

a

utility trailer, two laptop computers, a gun collection, and a
Kawasaki “Mule” ATV.
During the search, Mr. Wright arrived home.

Mr. and Mrs.

Wright were both arrested for felony manufacture of marijuana,

17

misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession
of

drug

related

objects.

The

next

day,

arrest warrants on these charges, and

Watson

applied

for

Judge Webb issued

the

arrest warrants.
V.

The Aftermath
In August 2013, a civil forfeiture action was filed against

Mr.

and

Mrs.

Wright.

It

alleged

that

Mr.

and

Mrs.

Wright

possessed more than four ounces of marijuana, that the property
seized

during

the

search

was

in

close

proximity

to

the

marijuana, that the property seized during the search was used
to facilitate the possession of the marijuana, and that
Wright Property was used to grow marijuana.

the

In his answer to

the civil forfeiture action, Mr. Wright asserted that all of the
seized property at issue in the civil forfeiture proceeding—the
ATV, the laptops, the guns, and the house itself—belonged to
Mrs. Wright.

Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. H, Mr. Wright’s

Verified Answer ¶ 3, ECF No. 71-8 at 6-9.
innocent

owner

defense,

averring

that

He also asserted the
he

was

not

legally

accountable for the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, that
he did not know or have reason to know about the conduct giving
rise to the forfeiture, and that he did not hold the property
jointly

“with

forfeiture.”

a

person

Id. ¶ 5(c).

whose

conduct

gave

rise

to

its

Mr. Wright’s answer did not challenge

the legality of the search.

18

Over

the

negotiated

next

with

fifteen
Harris

the

months,
County

the

Wrights’

sheriff

attorney

regarding

the

forfeiture action and the criminal charges against the Wrights.
According to Wright, the sheriff offered to return the seized
property and to agree to a plea deal involving no jail time for
Mrs. Wright if the Wrights agreed to pay $150,000.
¶ 9.

The

offered

Wrights

to

have

rejected
the

that

criminal

offer.
charges

The

Wright Aff.

sheriff

against

Mr.

later
Wright

dismissed if Mrs. Wright pled guilty to marijuana possession and
the Wrights paid $20,000.

Id.

The Wrights ultimately entered a

consent judgment in the civil forfeiture action under which the
lien

on

the

Wright

property

was

returned

$20,000.

After the Wrights reached an agreement in principle on

the

civil

marijuana
criminal

Property

forfeiture
possession

charges

to

was

them

released

and

in

exchange

for

action,

Mrs.

Wright

and

was

sentenced

against

Mr.

Wright

to

were

the
a

pled

personal

payment

of

guilty

probation.
dismissed,

to
The

and

a

consent judgment of civil forfeiture was entered.
As
employer

a

result

of

terminated

his
his

arrest

for

employment.

a

felony,
At

the

Mr.
time

Wright’s
of

his

termination, Mr. Wright was his employer’s company treasurer and
vice president of finance earning an annual base salary of more
than $200,000.00.

19

DISCUSSION
Mr.

Wright

asserts

Fourth

Amendment

claims

under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Watson, Goodrich, and Pitts in their
individual capacities.5

Mr. Wright also asserts state law claims

against these Defendants in their individual capacities.

Mr.

Wright contends that the initial search of the Wright Property
was unreasonable, that the search of the home was unreasonable,
that

his

arrest

was

unreasonable,

that

the

seizure

of

the

personal property was unreasonable, and that Watson’s actions
amounted to malicious prosecution.

Defendants contend that they

are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Wright’s § 1983 Fourth
Amendment Claims and that they are entitled to official immunity
on Mr. Wright’s state law claims.
I.

Fourth Amendment Claims
Section 1983 provides an avenue for individuals to bring

suit against state actors to enforce individual rights secured
by the United States Constitution.
claims

against

Defendants,

claiming

Mr. Wright brought § 1983
that

Defendants,

acting

under color of state law, violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable

searches

and

seizures.”

5

U.S.

Const.

amend.

IV.

Mr. Wright originally sued all of the officers involved in the
searches, including Bolen, Bracewell, and Wofford.
Mr. Wright later
moved to dismiss his claims against these officers, and the Court
granted his motion.

20

“Generally, a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
when supported by a warrant or when the search fits within an
established exception to the warrant requirement.” United States
v. Prevo, 435 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2006).
generally

reasonable

if

Croom

Balkwill,

645

v.

it

(“Traditionally,

the

F.3d

seizures

reasonable
probable

under
cause

to

is

Fourth

believe

supported
1240,

by

by

1246

A seizure is

probable

cause.

Cir.

2011)

enforcement

law

(11th

have

been

Amendment

only

if

that

the

detainee

they

are

entitled

justified
committed

by
a

crime.”).
Defendants

assert

that

immunity on all of Mr. Wright’s § 1983 claims.

to

qualified

“The doctrine of

qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’”

Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
interests—the
they

exercise

need

“Qualified immunity balances two important
to

power

hold

public

irresponsibly

officials
and

the

accountable
need

to

when

shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform

their

duties

reasonably.”

Id.

“The

protection

of

qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government
official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a

21

mistake

based

on

mixed

questions

of

law

and

fact.’”

Id.

(quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
To be entitled to qualified immunity, a public official
must

“prove

that

discretionary
occurred.”

he

was

authority

acting

when

within

the

the

allegedly

scope

of

wrongful

his
acts

Ziegler v. Martin Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 15-11441,

2016 WL 4039667, at *10 (11th Cir. July 28, 2016) (quoting Lee,
284 F.3d at 1194).

Here, it is undisputed that the officers

were

their

acting

searched

the

within
Wright

discretionary

Property

and

authority

arrested

Mr.

when

Wright.

they
Mr.

Wright must therefore establish that Defendants are not entitled
to qualified immunity.

To do this, Mr. Wright must show that

the facts viewed in the light most favorable to him establish “a
violation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional
right was clearly established at the time of [the officers’]
conduct.”

Perez, 809 F.3d at 1218.

immunity

analysis

reasonableness,
motivation.”
Kingsland

v.

is

the

regardless
Ziegler,

City

of

public
of

2016

Miami,

“The essence of qualified

his
WL

382

official’s
underlying

4039667,
F.3d

1220,

at

objective
intent

*10

1231

or

(quoting

(11th

Cir.

2004)).
“For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its
contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

22

would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Id. at *10 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
In the Eleventh Circuit, “the law can be clearly established for
qualified

immunity

purposes

only

by

decisions

of

the

U.S.

Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest
court of the state where the case arose.”
(quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197 n.5).
established
ways:

‘(1)

for

qualified

case

law

immunity

with

Id. at *10 n.12

“A right may be clearly
purposes

in

indistinguishable

one
facts

of

three

clearly

establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of
principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that
clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so
egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even
in the total absence of case law.’”

Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d

948, 979 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lewis v. City of W. Palm
Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir.2009)).
A.

Illegal Search Claim Based on the Pre-Warrant Search

Mr. Wright contends that the initial, pre-warrant search of
the area around the shed on the Wright Property was illegal.
Defendants argue that the initial search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment for two reasons.

First, Defendants argue that

the area searched was an “open field” that is not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.
initial

search

was

justified

Second, Defendants argue that the
by

23

probable

cause

and

exigent

circumstances.

As discussed in more detail below, the Court

finds that it was not clearly established in June 2013 that the
area near the shed was part of the curtilage of the Wrights’
home such that it was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
Thus,

Defendants

are

entitled

to

qualified

immunity

on

Mr.

Wright’s claims based on the initial search, and the Court need
not decide whether the warrantless search was authorized due to
exigent circumstances.6
Mr.

Wright

did

not

point

to

any

case

law

with

indistinguishable facts that clearly establishes that the prewarrant search of the area near the shed was unlawful, and he
does

not

egregious

appear
that

to
a

argue

that

constitutional

the

officers’

right

was

conduct

clearly

was

so

violated.

Thus, Mr. Wright argues that a broad statement of principle in

6

If the Court had to decide whether the exigent circumstances
exception applies, the Court would likely conclude that it does not.
“The exigent circumstances exception allows a warrantless search when
an emergency leaves police insufficient time to seek a warrant.”
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016).
“It
permits, for instance, the warrantless entry of private property . . .
when police fear the imminent destruction of evidence.” Id. A jury
could conclude, based on the Wrights’ testimony, that there was no
path from the house to the grow site and that there was no ATV moving
about on the property.
Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d
1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting “that the ‘presence of contraband
without more does not give rise to exigent circumstances,’ though an
exigent circumstance may arise ‘when there is danger that the evidence
will be destroyed or removed’” (quoting United States v. Tobin, 923
F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
If there was no ATV
moving about the property and if there was no path to the grow site,
it is doubtful that the officers had a reasonable belief to suspect
that evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be secured.
Thus, the Court could not reasonably conclude that the exigent
circumstances exception applies as a matter of law.

24

the case law clearly establishes the constitutional right he
seeks to vindicate.

Under this method of establishing a clearly

established

“the

objectively

right,

salient

reasonable

question

government

is

whether

official

‘every

facing

the

circumstances would know that the official’s conduct did violate
federal law when the official acted.’” D.H. v. Clayton Cty. Sch.
Dist., No. 14-14960, 2016 WL 4056030, at *9–10 (11th Cir. July
29, 2016) (quoting Hill, 797 F.3d at 979).
Mr.

Wright

regarding

has

an

Defendants’

insurmountable

trespass

on

warrantless snooping around his shed.

his

hurdle

to

property

overcome

and

their

It was not clear at the

time of the search that the area near the shed was entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.

In fact, a strong argument could

be made that the law was clear that it was not.

Justice Holmes

first explained more than ninety years ago that “the special
protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in
their ‘persons, houses, papers and effects’ is not extended to
the open fields.

The distinction between the latter and the

house is as old as the common law.”
265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).

Hester v. United States,

This constitutional principle, which is

commonly referred to as “the open fields doctrine,” “permits
police officers to enter and search a field without a warrant.”
Oliver

v.

United

States,

466

U.S.

170,

173

(1984).

Unfortunately for Mr. Wright, the area around his shed likely

25

falls within the definition of “open field” for Fourth Amendment
purposes.
The

discussion

in

case

law

fields”

“open

the

does

regarding

not

always

the

yield

Fourth

Amendment

and

clarity.

Fundamentally, it is important to understand that the

Fourth Amendment makes no mention of “open fields.”

absolute

But the

principle that “open fields” are not afforded Fourth Amendment
protection is derived from the language of the Amendment.

The

Amendment only protects a “person,” his “papers,” his “house,”
and his “effects.”

Thus, the reason an “open field” is not

entitled to Fourth Amendment protection is because it is not a
person’s

“house.”

A

person’s

physical

structure

that

house

shields

him

is

not

from

confined
the

to

the

elements;

it

includes that area immediately adjacent to the structure and
intimately

connected

to

it:

the

curtilage.

But

it

is

well

established that those areas of a person’s property beyond the
curtilage are not part of the house for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.

And those areas are often referred to in short-hand

as “open fields,” even though they may not, upon observation,
appear

to

be

“open”

or

a

“field.”

As

the

Supreme

Court

explained, “open fields do not provide the setting for those
intimate

activities

[that

occur

within

the

home

and

its

curtilage] that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference or surveillance.”

26

Oliver, 466 U.S.

at

179.

Thus,

“the

term

‘open

fields’

may

include

any

unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage.

An

open field need be neither ‘open’ nor a ‘field’ as those terms
are used in common speech.”
294,

304

(1987)

(quoting

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
Oliver,

466

U.S.

at

180

n.11).

Regardless of the physical attributes of the “open field,” the
key question is whether the area is part of a person’s house,
including the curtilage, which is what the Fourth Amendment’s
text envisions.

See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 (noting that this

principle is “founded upon the explicit language of the Fourth
Amendment”).
The

analysis

of

the

open

fields

beyond a mere textual examination.

principle

has

Support for it has also

rested on a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.
v.

United

States,

concurring).

389

U.S.

347,

evolved

361

(1967)

See Katz

(Harlan,

J.,

And there is not the same expectation of privacy

in “open fields” as there is in one’s house.

Thus, such areas

are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Even though the

cases

have

not

always

expressly

compared

the

expectation

of

privacy in a house to that of another area for which protection
is sought, it has been recognized that “[t]he [Fourth] Amendment
does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy,
but

only

those

‘expectation[s]

recognize as “reasonable.”’”

that

society

is

prepared

to

Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 (quoting

27

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).

“[A]n individual may not legitimately

demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields,
except in the area immediately surrounding the home.”
178.

Id. at

The Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is not generally true

that fences or ‘No Trespassing’ signs effectively bar the public
from viewing open fields in rural areas.”

Id. at 179.

For

these reasons, officers do not need probable cause or a warrant
to search open fields or other areas that are generally beyond
the house and its curtilage.
The Court rejects Mr. Wright’s argument that the shed area
is

part

of

his

home’s

Amendment

protects

curtilage

is

Amendment

purposes.”

Taylor,

458

the

curtilage.
curtilage

“considered

F.3d

part

Id.

1201,

at

1206

The

of
of

a

reason

home

home

180;
(11th

for

United

2006)

Fourth

because

itself

accord
Cir.

is

the

Fourth

States

(“The

the

v.

private

property immediately adjacent to a home is entitled to the same
protection against unreasonable search and seizure as the home
itself.”).
protection

“Thus,
to

the

courts

have

curtilage;

extended

and

they

Fourth
have

Amendment

defined

the

curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors
that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that
an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.”
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.

The Supreme Court noted that in the

case of open fields, “the general rights of property protected

28

by the common law of trespass have little or no relevance to the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment.”

Id. at 183-84.

The courts use four factors to answer the question whether
an area of property is curtilage such that a property owner
should reasonably expect the area “to be treated as his home”:
“(1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
home; (2) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; (3)
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
home; and (4) the steps the resident takes to protect the area
from observation.”
U.S. at 301).

Taylor, 458 F.3d at 1206 (citing Dunn, 480

The Supreme Court has noted that “these factors

are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any
given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration—
whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home
itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of
Fourth Amendment protection.”

Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.

Mr. Wright argues that it should have been clear to the
officers in this case that the area near the shed was within the
curtilage of the home and thus off limits.

Mr. Wright argues

that the officers should have known, based on the

perimeter

fence and the vegetation around the shed, that the Wrights had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in that area.

Mr. Wright also

argues that in the case of a large country home, as opposed to a
single-wide trailer or a more modest home on a large rural lot,

29

the curtilage should extend to the perimeter fence because those
who dwell in luxury homes have greater expectations of privacy
than others.
support

his

But Mr. Wright did not cite any case law to
argument

that

it

should

have

been

clear

to

the

officers that the area near the shed was within the curtilage of
the Wrights’ home.

Rather, he cited the dissent in LoGiudice v.

Georgia, 309 S.E.2d 355 (1983) (Smith, J., dissenting), in which
Justice Smith questioned the continued viability of the open
fields doctrine and argued that the searched area must truly be
“open” for the open fields doctrine to apply.

But, as discussed

above, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument in Oliver
and

Dunn—both

of

which

dissent in LoGiudice.

were

decided

after

Justice

Smith’s

See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304 (“[T]he term

‘open fields’ may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area
outside of the curtilage. An open field need be neither ‘open’
nor

a

‘field’

as

those

terms

are

used

in

common

speech.”

(quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11)).
The Court is sympathetic to Mr. Wright’s argument that he
had a general subjective expectation of privacy in the area
enclosed by his perimeter fence, including his shed.

But a

remote outbuilding that serves no purpose other than to cover a
well or store garden materials is simply not a “house” under any
reasonable definition of that term.
the

Fourth

Amendment

does

not

30

As discussed previously,

protect

all

of

a

person’s

property.

Both the text of the Amendment and the case law

construing it make this clear.

At a minimum, the Court cannot

conclude that “every objectively reasonable government official
facing the circumstances” Defendants faced would know, based on
the case law as of June 2013, that the area near the shed was
within the curtilage of the Wrights’ house and thus off limits.
D.H., 2016 WL 4056030, at *9–10 (quoting Hill, 797 F.3d at 979).
Here, the shed was at least one hundred yards from the home.
The courts have concluded that much shorter distances were so
“substantial” that the area should not “be treated as an adjunct
of the house.”
417

S.E.2d

Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302; accord Thomas v. Georgia,

353,

357

(Ga.

Ct.

App.

1992)

(finding

that

a

greenhouse thirty yards from a mobile home on a two acre lot was
not within the curtilage).7

The present record establishes that

the shed was used for storing tools and gardening supplies and
as a well house, although the present record does not establish
that the officers could have known the shed was a well house
unless they entered it.

The shed was inside the perimeter fence

that surrounded the entire property, but a perimeter fence “does
not create a constitutionally protected interest in all the open
fields

on

the

property.”

Taylor,

7

458

F.3d

at

1208;

accord

While only cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit,
and the Georgia Supreme Court can clearly establish the law, “opinions
from other courts can suggest that reasonable jurists would not know
that certain factual situations rise to the level of constitutional
violations, and therefore reasonable officers would not either.”
Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1016 n.16 (11th Cir. 2011).

31

United States v. Nichols, 248 F. App’x 105, 107 (11th Cir. 2007)
(finding that even if “no enclosure clearly delineate[s] the
curtilage of the home,” the property owner “cannot be deemed to
have a reasonable expectation of privacy throughout the entire”
twelve acre plot).

There was no internal fence surrounding both

the shed and the house, the house was not visible from the shed,
and the shed was not visible from the house.

See Taylor, 458

F.3d at 1207 (suggesting that buildings within an internal fence
that also surrounds a home are within the curtilage).

And, the

shed itself was visible from the road; the chain link perimeter
fence (or split rail fence) did not prevent the area from being
seen.
did

See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 303 (finding that livestock fence
not

protect

area

from

observation).

Based

on

this

authority, it was not clearly established in June 2013 that a
shed at least 100 yards from a home, which was not inside an
interior fence that also surrounded the home and which was not
visible

from

the

home

but

was

visible

from

the

street,

was

within the curtilage of the home.
The Court is aware that the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
“[t]he

‘outer

limits

of

the

curtilage’

have

been

expressly

defined to be ‘the outer walls of the extreme outbuildings of
the curtilage.’”

United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1374

(11th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d
451, 454 (5th Cir. 1978)).

In light of the precedent discussed

32

above,

the

Court

is

skeptical

outbuilding of the curtilage.

that

the

shed

is

an

extreme

But even if the Wrights’ shed did

form the edge of the curtilage, the search of the area near the
shed was not clearly unlawful.

In Williams, for example, the

former Fifth Circuit concluded that officers’ search around a
shed that formed the outer limits of a home’s curtilage was not
unlawful because there is no expectation of privacy “as to the
area outside and beyond” such outbuildings.

Williams, 581 F.2d

at 454;8 see also Thomas, 417 S.E.2d at 357 (upholding search of
greenhouse thirty yards from a mobile home on a two acre plot of
land, where there was no internal fence and where a wooded area
separated the greenhouse from the mobile home).

Thus, even if

the shed formed the edge of the curtilage, a reasonable jurist—
and

thus

a

reasonable

officer—could

conclude

that

searching

around the shed was lawful.
In sum, Mr. Wright did not point the Court to any authority
clearly establishing as of June 2013 that a search like the
initial

search

Amendment.

For

Defendants
all

of

undertook

these

reasons,

violates
the

Court

the

Fourth

finds

that

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Wright’s
claims based on the initial, pre-warrant search of the Wright
Property.

Defendants are likewise entitled to official immunity

8

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981)
(en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close
of business on September 30, 1981.

33

on any state law claims Mr. Wright asserts based on the prewarrant search.
B.

Illegal Search Claim Based on the Search of the Home

Mr. Wright asserts that even if Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity based on their initial search of the area
near the shed, they are not entitled to qualified immunity for
Mr. Wright’s claim based on the search pursuant to the search
warrant.

Mr.

Wright

argues

that

Defendants

did

not

have

arguable probable cause to seek the search warrant, even if the
initial search was lawful.

Construing the facts in the light

most favorable to Mr. Wright, as the Court must do at this stage
in

the

litigation,

the

Court

agrees.

“Although

a

jury

may

discredit [Mr. Wright’s] version of events at trial, [the Court
is]

not

at

judgment.”

liberty

to

make

that

determination

on

summary

Mitchell v. Stewart, 608 F. App’x 730, 734 (11th

Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Wright did not point to any
evidence that Pitts was involved in the discussions regarding
the search warrant or the decision to seek the search warrant.
And there is no evidence that he made any statements that were
relied on in the search warrant; as Mr. Wright pointed out,
Pitts was “unaware” of whether the juvenile plants officers say
they saw near the shed were marijuana.

Pitts Dep. 85:15-21.

Mr. Wright did not point to evidence to dispute that Pitts only

34

participated in the initial search, left the scene, and had no
further

involvement.

See

Defs.’

Statement

of

Undisputed

Material Facts ¶¶ 34-35 (stating that Pitts left the scene after
Goodrich arrived and was briefed and that Pitts had no other
involvement with the incident); Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement
of

Material

Facts

¶¶ 34-35,

ECF

No.

88-4

(stating

that

paragraphs 34 and 35 of Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts
are “Not Controverted”).

Thus, based on the present record,

Pitts is entitled to summary judgment on all the claims based on
the search warrant, including the illegal search claim based on
the officers’ search of the house.
It

is

undisputed

that

both

Goodrich

and

Watson

were

involved in the decision to seek the search warrant and that the
search warrant was based, at least in part, on what Goodrich
told Watson.

The Court therefore analyzes this claim against

these two Defendants.
Defendants do not dispute that officers needed a search
warrant

supported

Wrights’ home.

by

probable

cause

to

search

inside

the

“Probable cause to support a search warrant

exists when the totality of the circumstances allow a conclusion
that

there

is

a

fair

probability

evidence at a particular location.”

of

finding

contraband

or

United States v. Brundidge,

170 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).

Defendants also do not

dispute that it was clearly established as of June 2013 that

35

“falsifying

facts

to

unconstitutional.”

establish

probable

cause

Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232.

is

patently

And Defendants

do not dispute that it was clearly established as of June 2013
that

“[a]

search

warrant

may

be

voided

if

the

affidavit

supporting the warrant contains deliberate falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth, see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
155–56 (1978), and this rule includes material omissions, see
United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328–29 (5th Cir. 1980).”
Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002).

A warrant

is only “valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there
remains

sufficient

content

to

support

a

finding

of

probable

cause.” Id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72).
Based on the current record, with all reasonable inferences
drawn in favor of Mr. Wright, a reasonable juror could conclude
that

Watson

and

Goodrich

intentionally

manufactured

probable

cause for the search warrant by stating that officers observed
marijuana plants near the Wrights’ shed.
that

it

is

not

present record.

reasonable

to

draw

this

Defendants contend
inference

from

the

A reasonable juror could certainly believe the

officers’ statements that they saw marijuana near the shed and
that it was later removed.

But a reasonable juror could also

conclude that there were never any marijuana plants near the
shed based on the subsequent absence of marijuana plants plus
the

undisputed

evidence

that

36

officers

did

not

photograph

marijuana, confiscate marijuana, or take other steps to prevent
someone from tampering with
seen.

the

evidence they claim to have

The Court thus finds that a genuine fact dispute exists

on whether the following statement in the warrant application
was a deliberate lie: “the ground team located approx. six (6)
marijuana plants near a shed” on the Wright Property.

Webb Aff.

Ex. 1, Affidavit & Application for a Search Warrant, ECF No. 711 at 5.
In

addition,

a

genuine

fact

dispute

exists

on

whether

Watson, with input from Goodrich, intentionally omitted material
information from the warrant affidavit.
states

that

the

helicopter

team

First, the affidavit

“observed

several

containers

near a small building that appeared to have marijuana growing in
them,” id., even though a reasonable juror could conclude, based
on Bracewell’s testimony, that the helicopter team could not
tell what type of juvenile plants were in the cups.

Second, the

affidavit states that the large grow was “near the property line
of the residence,” id., but did not state that the large grow
site was outside the perimeter fence of the Wright Property or
that it was not actually on the Wright Property.9

9

Neither side pointed to evidence on whether officers could have
determined whether the larger grow site was on the Wright Property
before seeking the warrant. The record does establish, however, that
officers were able to use property tax records to figure out that Mrs.
Wright owned the property at 525 R.D. Brown Road before Watson applied
for the search warrant. See Webb Aff. Ex. 1, Affidavit & Application

37

Without
search

these

warrant

is

alleged
only

misstatements

valid

if

the

and

omissions,

remaining

the

information

supports a finding of probable cause.

Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1235

(citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72).

For the search warrant

affidavit

at

issue

here,

the

remaining

information

is:

(1)

potting soil found at the large grow site “matched the same type
of

potting

soil

bags

located

on”

the

Wright

Property,

(2)

officers found an “open trailer” somewhere—though the affidavit
does not say where—that contained “an empty dog wire crate box
matching

a

wire

crate

that

was

located

at

the

larger

grow

containing marijuana seedlings,” and (3) “[s]everal plastic Solo
cups were located at the larger grow that matched Solo cups
found on the” Wright Property.

Webb Aff. Ex. 1, Affidavit &

Application for a Search Warrant, ECF No. 71-1 at 5.
Defendants argue that these facts clearly tie the Wrights
to the large marijuana grow site and are sufficient to establish
probable cause for a warrant to search the Wrights’ home.

The

Court

the

disagrees.

The

affidavit

simply

establishes

that

Wrights kept potting soil and Solo cups near their potting shed,
that similar items were found at the large grow site, and that a
dog

crate

box

was

found

in

a

trailer

at

some

undisclosed

location while a dog crate was found at the large grow site.

As

for a Search Warrant, ECF No. 71-1 at 5 (stating that property to be
searched belongs to Mrs. Wright).

38

the Court previously observed, potting soil and Solo cups are
common items used by innocent homeowners for innocent purposes
every day.

The affidavit does not establish that there was

anything special or unique about these ordinary, innocuous items
such that the presence of the items at both locations “allow a
conclusion

that

there

is

a

fair

probability

contraband or evidence” in the Wrights’ home.
F.3d at 1352.

of

finding

Brundidge, 170

Nor does the fact that officers found a dog crate

at the large grow site and a matching dog crate box in an open
trailer at some undisclosed location suggest a connection to
contraband.

And,

if

Plaintiffs

are

believed,

Defendants

themselves did not think that the items they saw on the Wright
Property gave rise to probable cause because they thought they
had to bolster the affidavit by allegedly lying about seeing
marijuana seedlings and by omitting material facts about the
location of the large grow site.
Court

concludes

that

without

For all of these reasons, the
the

alleged

misstatements

and

omissions, the remaining information in the affidavit does not
support a finding of probable cause.10
Defendants argue, and the Court recognizes, that magistrate
judges are traditionally entitled to a “high level of deference
10

The Court emphasizes that it is not finding that the
in fact, make material misrepresentations and omissions
warrant affidavit.
The Court is simply finding that
present record viewed in the light most favorable to
jury could find in Mr. Wright’s favor on this question.

39

officers did,
in the search
based on the
Mr. Wright, a

. . . in their probable cause determinations.”

United States v.

Miller, 24 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994).

But here, if Mr.

Wright’s evidence is believed, then Judge Webb’s probable cause
determination

was

based

in

large

part

on

misrepresentation and two material omissions.
that

the

Court

should

also

consider

one

material

Defendants argue

Judge

Webb’s

affidavit

containing a post hoc probable cause analysis, which Judge Webb
prepared
warrant.
have

more

than

three

years

after

she

issued

the

search

The affidavit speculates as to what Judge Webb might

done

if

information.
conclusions

Watson

had

presented

her

with

different

The Court is not convinced that Judge Webb’s legal
on

this

hypothetical

are

entitled

to

deference.

Even if the Court were to consider Judge Webb’s analysis, that
analysis does not address at least one of the material omitted
facts and thus does not establish that Judge Webb would have
found probable cause based solely on the potting soil, Solo
cups, and dog crate box.
for

review

of

an

Furthermore, the “traditional standard

issuing

magistrate’s

probable

cause

determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a
‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that a search would
uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no
more.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).

The key

question

material

for

the

Court

is

whether,

40

without

the

misrepresentation and two material omissions, Judge Webb had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for
a search of the Wrights’ home.
Judge Webb

stated in her affidavit that she

would have

found probable cause even if the search warrant affidavit had
not stated that officers saw marijuana near the shed.
¶ 5.

Webb Aff.

Webb further suggested that it would not have mattered to

her “whether the large marijuana grow site was actually on the
Property or immediately adjacent to the Property.”11
Webb’s

affidavit

also

emphasizes

that

aerial

Id.

But

surveillance

spotted “what appeared to be marijuana in several containers” on
the

Wright

Property.

Id.

As

discussed

above,

there

is

a

genuine fact dispute on whether Watson omitted material facts
related to that statement—namely that the helicopter team could
not tell from the air if the juvenile plants near the shed were
marijuana.

Webb’s affidavit does not establish that she would

have found probable cause for a search of the Wrights’ home
without

some

statement

in

the

affidavit

actually spotted near the Wrights’ shed.

that

marijuana

was

Accordingly, Webb’s

affidavit does not establish that the search warrant affidavit,
11

While it may not be a dispositive factor, it does matter whether the
large grow site was on neighboring property and not the Wright
Property, particularly given the absence of any statement in the
affidavit clearly connecting the site to the Wrights’ home.
Defendants did not cite any authority, and the Court found none,
suggesting that an officer may search a person’s home based solely on
contraband found on a next door neighbor’s property and the presence
of a couple of common innocuous items at both locations.

41

when

stripped

of

one

material

misstatement

and

two

material

omissions, supported a finding of probable cause.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that a
jury could find that Watson, assisted by Goodrich, deliberately
made one material misstatement and two material omissions in the
search warrant application.

Without the misstatement and the

omissions, there was no probable cause for officers to believe
that there was contraband inside the Wrights’ home and thus no
probable

cause

to

support

the

search.

It

was

clearly

established in 2013 that it is a Fourth Amendment violation to
falsify facts to establish probable cause.

Watson and Goodrich

are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity on the illegal
search

claim

Property

based

pursuant

on
to

the

officers’

the

search

allegedly

of

the

falsified

Wright
warrant

application.
C.

False Arrest Claim

Mr. Wright also asserts a claim for false arrest.

“[A]

warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth
Amendment and forms a basis for a section 1983 claim.”

Carter

v. Butts Cty., 821 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996)). “But
where probable cause supports an arrest, it acts as ‘an absolute
bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.’”
Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226).

42

Id. (quoting

“Probable

cause

to

arrest

exists

if

‘the

facts

and

circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person
to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’”
Id. (quoting Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226).

Even if an officer

does not have probable cause to arrest, the officer is entitled
to qualified immunity if arguable probable cause supported the
arrest,

which

means

that

“reasonable

officers

in

the

same

circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendant
could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.” Id.
at 1319-20 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641,
(1987)).
officer

“Arguable probable cause does not require an arresting
to

confession

prove
before

every
making

element
an

of

a

arrest,

crime
which

or

to

would

obtain

negate

a

the

concept of probable cause and transform arresting officers into
prosecutors.”

Lee, 284 F.3d

at

1195

(quoting

Scarbrough v.

Myles, 245 F.3d 1299 at 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2001)).
officers

have

arguable

probable

cause

to

arrest

As long as
for

some

offense, the arrest is valid; the “validity of an arrest does
not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time of
the arrest.”

Id. at 1195-96 (quoting Bailey v. Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs, 956 F.2d 1112 at 1119 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992)).

43

When officers searched the Wright Property pursuant to the
search warrant, they found 8.9 grams of marijuana in and around
the Wrights’ home.

Officers arrested Mr. and Mrs. Wright for

felony

of

manufacture

marijuana,

misdemeanor

possession

of

marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of drug related objects.
Mr. Wright acknowledges that under Georgia law, it is a crime to
possess

marijuana.

See

O.C.G.A.

§

16–13–2(b)

(making

it

misdemeanor to possess one ounce or less of marijuana).

a

Mr.

Wright also acknowledges that the officers found marijuana in
his home.
home.

He acknowledges that he admitted to living in the

And he acknowledges that even if the marijuana would have

been suppressed in a criminal action, “the exclusionary rule
does not apply in a civil suit against police officers.”
v.

Wigington,

Wigington,

811

the

F.3d

Eleventh

1259,
Circuit

1268

(11th

concluded

Cir.
that

Black

2016).
officers

In
who

obtained a warrant to arrest two individuals based on items
found in their trailer could “rely on evidence that they found
in the . . . trailer to prove that the arrest warrants were
supported

by

probable

cause”—even

though

the

evidence

that

provided probable cause “was obtained during an illegal search.”
Id. at 1267-68.

Mr. Wright concedes that based on Wigington,

the officers may rely on the marijuana found in his home to
establish probable cause.

44

Mr.

Wright

argues,

however,

that

Defendants

are

not

entitled to qualified immunity because there is a fact question
on whether he actually possessed the marijuana that the officers
found.

Mr.

Wright

contends

that

he

could

not

have

been

convicted for marijuana possession based solely on his presence
at

the

Wright

premises
had

where

equal

the

access

marijuana

to

the

was

home.

found
See,

because

e.g.,

Mrs.

Sing

v.

Georgia, 458 S.E.2d 493, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining the
equal

access

presumption

doctrine,
that

an

which

may

individual

be

used

to

rebut

constructively

contraband found at a location he owns or controls).
relevant

question

here

is

not

whether

Mr.

Wright

the

possesses
But the
ultimately

could have been convicted for possessing the marijuana found in
and

around

his

home.

The

relevant

question

is

whether

a

reasonable officer “in the same circumstances and possessing the
same

knowledge

as

the

Defendant

could

have

believed

that

probable cause existed to arrest.” Carter, 821 F.3d at 1319-20
(quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).
Mr. Wright appears to contend that the officers should have
concluded that the marijuana officers found in and around the
house belonged solely to Mrs. Wright and not to him.

But Mr.

Wright did not point to any evidence to explain why the only
reasonable inference officers could draw based on the 8.9 grams
of marijuana found scattered in and around his home was that all

45

of it belonged solely to Mrs. Wright.
actual or constructive.”

“Possession may be either

United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342,

1345 (11th Cir. 2006); accord Bailey v. State, 669 S.E.2d 453,
456

(Ga.

Ct.

App.

2008).

Constructive

possession

“can

be

established by either direct or circumstantial evidence and by
inferences arising from the surrounding circumstances,” and it
may be proved if “a defendant maintained dominion or control
over

the

located.”

drugs

or

over

the

premises

where

the

drugs

are

Faust, 456 F.3d at 1345-46 (quoting United States v.

Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 453 (11th Cir. 1994)); accord Bailey, 669
S.E.2d at 456; see also United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d
1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that the presence of drugs
in a shared bathroom of a house “permitted the inference that
[the

defendant]

was

in

joint

constructive

possession

of

the

drugs”).
Mr. Wright admits that he lived in the house, which could
reasonably be construed as an admission that he controlled the
premises and thus had constructive possession of the marijuana
officers found there.
home

where

Mr.

At a minimum, the marijuana found in the

Wright

admitted

that

he

lived

was

enough

to

establish arguable probable cause to believe that he possessed
marijuana.

“If

the

arresting

officer

had

arguable

probable

cause to arrest for any offense, qualified immunity will apply.”
Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010).

46

For these reasons, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
on

Mr.

Wright’s

false

arrest

claim.

For

the

same

reasons,

Defendants are entitled to official immunity on Mr. Wright’s
state law unreasonable seizure and false imprisonment claims.
See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 765 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2014) (noting that an essential element of a false
imprisonment action is an unlawful detention).
D.

Property Seizure Claim

Mr. Wright’s property seizure claim is based on the seizure
of certain personal property, including a utility trailer, two
laptop computers, a gun collection, and a Kawasaki “Mule” ATV.
All

of

this

property

proceeding.

involved

Wright’s

Mr.

was

verified

in

the

answer

civil
to

the

forfeiture
forfeiture

action states that Mrs. Wright owned all of the property that
was at issue in the civil forfeiture proceeding.

Defs.’ Mot.

for Summ. J. Ex. H, Answer to Civil Forfeiture Compl. ¶ 3, ECF
No. 71-8 at 7.

Mr. Wright stated, after being duly sworn, that

the statements in his answer were true and correct.
ECF No. 71-8 at 9.

Id. at 4,

Mr. Wright did not point to any evidence to

contradict his sworn statement that the property belonged to
Mrs. Wright and not him.
has

standing

to

assert

Mr. Wright also did not explain how he
claims

Wright’s personal property.

based

on

the

seizure

of

Mrs.

For these reasons, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Wright’s property seizure

47

claim.

For the same reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on Mr. Wright’s state law conversion claim.

See Hooks

v. Cobb Ctr. Pawn & Jewelry Brokers, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 566, 569
(Ga.

Ct.

App.

1999)

(“To

establish

a

prima

facie

case

for

conversion, plaintiff is required to show title to the property
or the right of possession[.]”).
E.

Malicious Prosecution Claim

Mr.

Wright

against

also

Watson.

alleges

“To

a

recover

malicious

for

prosecution

malicious

claim

prosecution,

a

plaintiff must prove ‘(1) the elements of the common law tort of
malicious

prosecution,

Amendment

right

to

and

be

(2)

free

a

violation

from

unreasonable

Wigington, 811 F.3d at 1266 (quoting
1234.

“The

common-law

elements

of

[his]

Fourth

seizures.’”

Kingsland, 382 F.3d at

include

‘(1)

a

criminal

prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant;
(2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated
in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the
plaintiff accused.’” Id. (quoting Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872,
882 (11th Cir.2003)).

“A police officer who applies for an

arrest warrant can be liable for malicious prosecution if he
should

have

known

that

his

application

‘failed

to

establish

probable cause.’” Id. (quoting Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544,
1553 (11th Cir. 1994)).

An officer can also be liable for

malicious prosecution “if he made statements or omissions in his

48

application

that

were

material

and

‘perjurious

or

false.’” Id. (quoting Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1554).

recklessly

But “a police

officer cannot be liable for malicious prosecution if the arrest
warrant

was

supported

by

probable

cause.”

Id.

Again,

the

exclusionary rule does not apply in civil cases, and Watson may
rely

on

the

evidence

that

establish probable cause.
Watson

sought

the

was

found

during

the

search

to

Id. at 1268.
arrest

warrants

for

Mr.

Wright

for

misdemeanor marijuana possession, misdemeanor possession of drug
related objects, and felony manufacture of marijuana.

Watson

Dep. Ex. 1, Arrest Warrant Affs., ECF No. 83-1 at 27-29.

Mr.

Wright does not seriously dispute that the items found during
the search provide probable cause support the two misdemeanor
charges.

He does contend, however, that Watson did not have

probable cause to seek an arrest warrant for felony manufacture
of marijuana.
any

person

administer,

Under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), “it is unlawful for
to

manufacture,

sell,

or

controlled substance.”

deliver,

possess

with

distribute,

intent

to

dispense,

distribute

any

Under this statute, a reasonable officer

could have probable cause to believe that Mr. Wright committed
the offense of marijuana manufacture if there was evidence that
he was growing marijuana.
688,

692

(Ga.

“conviction

Ct.

for

App.

See Roberson v. Georgia, 540 S.E.2d
2000)

manufacturing

49

(finding

that

marijuana

was

the

defendant’s

supported

by

evidence of the [twenty-four] plants, heat lamps, fertilizer,
and potting soil”).
The marijuana manufacturing charge against Mr. Wright is
based on Watson’s statement that Mr. Wright possessed the fiftyfour

marijuana

plants

found

growing

on

the

large

grow

site

adjacent to the Wright Property.

See Watson Dep. Ex. 1, Arrest

Warrant Aff., ECF No. 83-1 at 29.

Mr. Wright contends that this

assertion is untrue because the fifty-four plants were not his.
But he does not dispute that officers found fifty-four plants
growing at the large grow site, along with marijuana scattered
in and around the Wrights’ home and common items at both sites,
such as the similar Solo cups and the matching potting soil.
Mr. Wright did not point the Court to any authority clearly
establishing

that

a

reasonable

officer

in

Watson’s

position

should not believe he had probable cause to arrest Mr. Wright
for marijuana manufacture based on all of these facts.

Though

the Court concluded that the Solo cups and matching potting
soil,

standing

alone,

were

not

enough

to

link

the

Wright

Property to the grow site, the totality of the circumstances
changed when officers found marijuana in and around the Wrights’
home pursuant to the search warrant.

And under Wigington, this

evidence must be considered even if the search which discovered
it

violated

Wright

did

the
not

Fourth

Amendment.

establish

that

50

The

Court

Watson

finds

violated

that

Mr.

clearly

established law in seeking the arrest warrant, and Watson is
therefore entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim.
official

For the same reasons, Watson is entitled to

immunity

on

Mr.

Wright’s

state

law

malicious

that

Defendants

prosecution claim.
F.
In

Civil Conspiracy Claim
his

conspired
response

Complaint,

to
to

violate

Mr.

his

Defendants’

Wright

Fourth

summary

alleges

Amendment
judgment

rights.

motion,

Mr.

In

his

Wright

clarified that he is not asserting an independent conspiracy
claim; rather, he alleged conspiracy in his original Complaint
to establish liability for all the officers he originally sued.
Mr.

Wright

voluntarily

dismissed

his

claims

against

most

of

those officers, and Mr. Wright acknowledges that he no longer
needs to rely on a conspiracy theory because he can establish
that Watson and Goodrich personally participated in the decision
to seek the search warrant.

The Court thus finds that to the

extent Mr. Wright’s Amended Complaint can be construed to assert
a stand-alone conspiracy claim, Mr. Wright has abandoned it.
II.

State Law Claims
Mr. Wright brought state law claims for false imprisonment,

malicious prosecution, conversion, and unreasonable search and
seizure.
immunity

Defendants contend that they are entitled to official
on

these

claims.

Under

51

Georgia

law,

“an

officer

performing a discretionary act is entitled to official immunity
unless he or she ‘act[ed] with actual malice or with actual
intent to cause injury.’”

Bateast v. Dekalb Cty., 572 S.E.2d

756, 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting
Todd

v.

Kelly,

“[Official]

535

S.E.2d

immunity

540,

protects

542

(Ga.

individual

Ct.

App.

public

2000)).

agents

from

personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the
scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness,
malice or corruption.”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Sommerfield v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., 509 S.E.2d 100,
102

(Ga.

Ct.

App.

1998).

“[A]ctual

malice

as

used

in

the

context of official immunity requires a deliberate intention to
do wrong.” Id. at 758 (citing Merrow v. Hawkins, 457 S.E.2d 336,
337 (Ga. 1996)).
It is undisputed that the challenged actions in this case
are

discretionary,

immunity

unless

so

there

Defendants
is

a

are

genuine

entitled

fact

dispute

to
on

official
whether

Defendants acted with actual malice or with actual intent to
cause injury.

As discussed above, a jury could conclude that

Goodrich and Watson made one material misrepresentation and two
material omissions in the search warrant affidavit.

A

jury

could thus conclude that Goodrich and Watson knew that they did
not have probable cause for a search warrant and manufactured
evidence to support the warrant.

52

From this, a jury could infer

that Goodrich and Watson acted with actual malice when they made
the

decision

to

seek

the

search

warrant.

See

Bateast,

572

S.E.2d at 758 (finding genuine fact dispute on official immunity
because jury could infer that officers arrested the plaintiff
despite knowing that she did not commit any crime).
The Court is not convinced that Mr. Wright has established
a genuine fact dispute on actual malice to support his false
imprisonment/unreasonable seizure claim, his conversion claim,
or

his

malicious

prosecution

claim.

As

discussed

above,

officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Wright; Mr.
Wright did not point to evidence that the property that was
allegedly converted belonged to him; and Watson had arguable
probable cause to seek the arrest warrants.
Defendants

are

entitled

to

official

For these reasons,

immunity

on

all

of

Mr.

Wright’s state law claims, except Watson and Goodrich are not
entitled

to

immunity

on

Wright’s

claim

based

on

the

search

judgment

motion

pursuant to the search warrant.
CONCLUSION
As

discussed

above,

Defendants’

summary

(ECF No. 71) is granted in part and denied in part.
entitled

to

against him.

summary

judgment

on

all

of

Mr.

Pitts is

Wright’s

claims

Watson and Goodrich are not entitled to qualified

immunity or official immunity on the illegal search claims based
on the officers’ search of the Wright Property pursuant to the

53

search warrant, so their summary judgment motion is denied as to
those claims.

They are entitled to qualified immunity on all of

Mr. Wright’s other federal law claims and official immunity on
all of his other state law claims, so their summary judgment
motion is granted as to those claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 25th day of August, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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