WRIGHT v. WATSON et al
Filing
35
ORDER granting in part and denying in part Motions to Dismiss ( 17 , 19 , 21 , 22 ), finding as moot Motions to Stay ( 18 , 20 , 23 ). Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 08/13/2015. (CGC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
ROBERT H. WRIGHT, JR.,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
S/A JERALD WATSON, ASAC SGT.
ROBERT AUSTIN, S/A JON MEMMO,
CPL. JEREMY BOLEN, TFC MARK
BRACEWELL, TFC PAUL WOFFORD,
DEP. JOHN GOODRICH, CPL. MIKE
PITTS, S/A BERINOBIS, S/A DARYL
LASSITER, S/A JAMES BRADLEY
EVANS, DEP. ROGER CARROLL, S/A
LAUREN STINSON, and CAPT. SVEN
ARMBRUST, all in their
individual capacities,
*
Defendants.
*
CASE NO. 4:15-cv-34 (CDL)
*
*
*
*
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff Robert H. Wright, Jr. alleges that Defendants,
who are state or local law enforcement officers, conspired to
search his house even though they did not have probable cause.
Compounding this unlawful infringement on his rights, Wright was
subsequently arrested and prosecuted for drug crimes that he
alleges Defendants knew he did not commit.
Defendants’ pending
motions to dismiss present the question whether Defendants are
immune from liability for this alleged conduct.
For the reasons
set forth below, the Court denies Defendants’ motions to dismiss
(ECF
Nos.
17,
19,
21,
22)
as
to
Wright’s
Fourth
Amendment
unreasonable search and seizure claims against all Defendants,
Wright’s malicious prosecution claims against Defendant Watson,
and his state law claims against all Defendants except Bolen,
Bracewell, and Wofford.
Wright’s malicious prosecution claims
against all Defendants, except Watson, are dismissed; and as he
concedes is appropriate, his state law claims against Bolen,
Bracewell, and Wofford are dismissed.
Defendants’ motions to
stay discovery (ECF Nos. 18, 20, 23) are moot.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
The complaint must include sufficient factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In other words, the factual
allegations must “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims.
Id. at 556.
“Rule
well-pleaded
12(b)(6)
does
not
permit
dismissal
of
a
complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable.’” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556).
2
PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Wright
claims.
alleges
the
following
facts
in
support
of
his
The Court must accept these allegations as true for
purposes of the pending motion.
Defendants
Armbrust,
sheriffs
are
Carroll,
employed
law
enforcement
Goodrich,
by
Harris
officers.
Pitts,
and
County,
Defendants
Watson
Georgia.
are
deputy
Armbrust,
a
captain, and Pitts, a corporal, have supervisory authority over
the other Harris County deputies.
Defendants Austin, Berinobis,
Evans, Lassiter, Memmo, and Stinson are law enforcement officers
employed by the Columbus Consolidated Government and serve on
the
Metro
Narcotics
supervisory
Task
authority
Force.
over
the
Austin,
other
a
sergeant,
Columbus
has
officers.
Defendant Bolen is a law enforcement officer employed by the
Georgia
Bracewell
Department
and
of
Wofford
Natural
are
Georgia
Resources,
state
and
Defendants
troopers.1
Bolen,
Bracewell, and Wofford serve on the Governor’s Task Force for
Drug Suppression.
Goodrich and Pitts work with that Task Force.
On June 27, 2013, members of the Metro Narcotics Task Force
and the Governor’s Task Force for Drug Suppression conducted
aerial surveillance of property in Harris County looking for
marijuana crops.
Wofford and Bracewell conducted the aerial
1
In his Complaint, Wright incorrectly identified Defendant Bracewell
as Mark Bagwell.
3
surveillance in a helicopter, and Bolen, Goodrich, and Pitts
served
as
marijuana
their
crop
ground
on
team.
property
Wright’s wife, Lisa Wright.
by Wright or his wife.
Narcotics
Task
Force,
The
team
found
to
property
adjacent
a
sizeable
owned
by
The crop was not on property owned
After the team contacted the Metro
Austin,
Armbrust,
Berinobis,
Carroll,
Evans, Lassiter, Memmo, Stinson, and Watson responded to the
scene.
The officers determined that the Wrights’ house was the
closest residence to the marijuana crop.
but Mrs. Wright was.
search the house.
Wright was not home,
The officers asked her for permission to
She declined.
The officers on the scene,
including all Defendants, conferred and decided to seek a search
warrant, knowing that they needed to make a sufficient showing
of probable cause to convince a magistrate to issue the warrant.
The
officers
warrant
while
decided
the
that
other
Watson
officers
would
apply
remained
at
for
a
the
search
Wrights’
property.
Watson told the magistrate that the officers had found a
marijuana crop on land adjacent to the Wright property.
affidavit
for
the
warrant,
Watson
falsely
stated
In his
that
the
officers also saw several small marijuana plants growing on the
Wright property.
According to Wright, the officers did not see
any marijuana plants on the Wright property because there were
4
none—and
the
intentionally
officers
misled
knew
the
it.
Wright
magistrate
alleges
into
that
believing
Watson
that
the
officers saw marijuana plants on the Wright property so they
could manufacture probable cause to search the Wright property.
Wright further alleges that all the other officers who were on
the scene conferred with Watson on how to apply for the search
warrant despite having no probable cause for a search.
Relying
on the allegedly false affidavit, a Harris County magistrate
issued a search warrant authorizing the officers to search the
Wright property.
Watson
returned
to
the
scene
with
a
search
warrant.
Several of the Defendants, including Austin, Berinobis, Carroll,
Evans,
Lassiter,
property
while
detained
Mr.
marijuana
the
and
plants
Memmo,
other
Mrs.
or
Stinson,
and
Defendants
Wright.
Watson,
secured
Defendants
seedlings
on
the
the
did
Wright
searched
not
the
scene
and
find
any
property.
But
Defendants did find “small amounts of marijuana and remnants of
marijuana cigarettes among the personal effects of Mrs. Wright.”
Compl. ¶ 56, ECF No. 1.
Wright
for
felony
Defendants arrested both Mr. and Mrs.
manufacture
misdemeanor possession.
of
marijuana,
as
well
as
They also seized vehicles, firearms,
computers, and other items of personal property that belonged to
Wright, contending that these items were instrumentalities used
in the manufacture and sale of illegal drugs.
5
Watson swore out
arrest
warrants
marijuana
related
and
charging
misdemeanor
objects.
Id.
¶¶
Wright
with
possession
65-67.
felony
of
manufacture
marijuana
Watson
also
and
of
drug-
reported
the
seizure to the District Attorney, who filed a civil forfeiture
action against Wright.
pending,
Wright
was
While the civil forfeiture action was
deprived
of
possession
of
his
property
valued at $490,588.
As a result of his arrest, Wright lost his job.
The civil
forfeiture action and criminal charges against Wright remained
pending for more than a year until the Harris County District
Attorney moved the Superior Court to nolle pros them.
Several
months after the civil forfeiture action was dropped, Wright’s
personal property was returned to him.
Wright asserts Fourth Amendment claims against the officers
in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1)
unreasonable search of his property, (2) unreasonable seizure of
person,
(3)
unreasonable
prosecution,
and
constitutional
(5)
rights.2
seizure
civil
of
property,
conspiracy
Wright
alleges
to
(4)
violate
that
all
malicious
Wright’s
Defendants
personally participated in the plan to manufacture evidence to
support
the
search
warrant.
Wright
2
also
alleges
state
law
The State Defendants and the Harris County Defendants mistakenly
construe Wright’s Complaint as alleging Fourth Amendment claims
against them in their official capacities, and thus they assert
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Since Wright only alleges claims against
Defendants in their individual capacities, the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply.
6
claims
for
conversion,
false
imprisonment,
unreasonable
search
malicious
and
seizure,
prosecution,
and
civil
conspiracy.3
DISCUSSION
Defendants attack Wright’s Complaint as an improper shotgun
pleading.
In the alternative, they maintain that it fails to
state a claim.
I.
Wright’s Complaint Is Not an Improper Shotgun Pleading
A
shotgun
pleading
is
a
pleading
that
violates
either
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 10(b).
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office,
No. 13-14396, 2015 WL 4098270, at *4 (11th Cir. July 8, 2015).
“Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Rule 10(b)
requires a party to state his claims “in numbered paragraphs,
each
limited
circumstances.”
as
far
as
practicable
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
to
a
single
set
of
And “each claim founded
on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in
a separate count.”
Id.
The problem with shotgun pleadings “is that they fail to
one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
3
Wright concedes that he may not pursue his state law claims against
Bolen, Bracewell, and Wofford, so those claims are dismissed.
7
grounds upon which each claim rests.”
at *5.
Weiland, 2015 WL 4098270,
It is true that Wright’s Complaint contains “multiple
counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding
counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came
before and the last count to be a combination of the entire
complaint.”
“this
is
parcel
Id.
not
out
materially
a
and
Perhaps he should not have done that.
situation
where
identify
the
increased
the
a
failure
facts
burden
of
allegations underlying each count.”
to
relevant
more
to
precisely
each
understanding
But
the
claim
factual
Id. at *6.
It is not difficult to understand what the Defendants “were
alleged to have done and why they were liable for doing it.”
Id.
Count
I
alleges
that
Defendants’
search
of
the
Wright
property violated the Fourth Amendment because Watson lied in
the affidavit supporting his search warrant application.
Count
I further alleges that all of the other Defendants, who were on
the
scene
with
Watson,
participated
in
the
decision
manufacture evidence to support probable cause to search.
to
Count
XI alleges a similar claim for unreasonable search under Art. I,
Sec. I, Par. XIII of the Georgia Constitution.4
4
Count II alleges
In a footnote of their brief, the Columbus Defendants question,
without citing any authority, whether Wright may bring claims directly
under the Georgia Constitution. It is clear that Wright may not bring
claims against state officers under the Georgia Constitution because
the Georgia Tort Claims Act provides the only avenue for suit against
state officers.
Davis v. Standifer, 275 Ga. App. 769, 772 n.2, 621
S.E.2d 852, 855 n.2 (2005) It is also true that Georgia does not have
8
that Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest Wright,
but they did it anyway or were present on the scene and did not
stop the other officers from unreasonably seizing Wright.
Count
VIII alleges a similar claim for state law false imprisonment,
and Count XI alleges a similar claim for unreasonable seizure
under
the
Georgia
Constitution.
Count
III
alleges
that
Defendants did not have probable cause to believe that Wright’s
personal items were instrumentalities used in the manufacture
and sale of illegal drugs, but they seized it anyway or were
present on the scene and did not stop the other officers from
unreasonably seizing the property.
Count X alleges a state law
conversion claim based on the same facts.
Watson
caused
a
felony
criminal
Count IV alleges that
prosecution
to
be
initiated
against Wright based on Defendants’ false statements.
Count IV
further alleges that all of the Defendants knew there was no
probable cause for the prosecution but allowed it to continue
anyway.
Count
IX
alleges
malicious prosecution.
collaborated
probable
on
cause
the
to
an
analogous
state
law
claim
for
Count V alleges that all the Defendants
idea
search
to
the
manufacture
Wright
evidence
property
and
to
support
that
they
a statute analogous to § 1983. Id. But the Georgia Supreme Court has
analyzed the merits of a claim under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII of the
Georgia Constitution, implying that a plaintiff may bring a direct
action under that provision. See City of E. Point v. Smith, 258 Ga.
111, 112 & n.3, 365 S.E. 432, 434 & n.3 (1988).
As a practical
matter, Wright’s attempted claims under the Georgia Constitution are
virtually identical to his state law claims for false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and conversion.
9
participated
Count
XIII
in
accomplishing
alleges
an
the
analogous
allegedly
state
law
unlawful
claim
search.
for
civil
conspiracy, and Count XII alleges a similar claim based on a
state law joint venture theory.
Count VI alleges that Watson
applied for the search warrant based on a false affidavit, that
all the other Defendants knew he planned to do so but failed to
stop
him,
and
that
all
the
other
officers
knew
the
search
warrant was based on fabricated evidence but participated in the
search anyway.
Count VII alleges that Armbrust, Austin, and
Pitts had supervisory authority over other Defendants and were
present on the scene but did not stop their subordinates from
violating Wright’s Fourth Amendment rights.
In
sum,
the
Court
concludes
that
the
“counts
are
informative enough to permit a court to readily determine if
they state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
2015 WL 4098270, at *7.
Weiland,
“A dismissal under Rules 8(a)(2) and
10(b) is appropriate where ‘it is virtually impossible to know
which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s)
for relief.’”
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of
Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Here, it is not virtually impossible to know which allegations
of fact are intended to support which claims for relief.
The
Court thus declines to dismiss Wright’s Complaint under Rules
8(a)(2) and 10(b).
10
II.
Wright’s Complaint Does Not Fail to State a Claim
Defendants contend that Wright’s Complaint fails to state a
claim because even if his factual allegations are true, they are
entitled to qualified immunity on Wright’s federal claims and
official immunity on his state law claims.
A.
Wright Adequately Alleges Fourth Amendment Violations
1.
Wright
Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claims
alleges
that
Defendants
violated
his
Fourth
Amendment rights by searching his home pursuant to an arrest
warrant they obtained by manufacturing evidence.
Wright further
asserts that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
arresting him for marijuana possession after Defendants found
small
amounts
of
marijuana
in
his
home
pursuant to the allegedly invalid warrant.
during
the
search
Defendants argue
that they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims.
To
be
entitled
to
qualified
immunity
at
this
stage
of
the
litigation, Defendants must show that the Complaint, taken as
true, does not sufficiently allege that Defendants violated a
clearly established constitutional right.
610
F.3d
701,
715
(11th
Cir.
2010)
See Randall v. Scott,
(explaining
qualified
immunity analysis).
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”
11
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
“Generally, a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
when supported by a warrant or when the search fits within an
established
States
exception
v.
Prevo,
to
435
the
warrant
F.3d
1343,
requirement.”
1345
(11th
United
Cir.
2006).
Defendants contend that the warrant was valid and do not argue
that
their
search
of
the
Wright
property
falls
within
an
exception to the warrant requirement, so the key question for
the Court is whether Wright adequately alleges that the warrant
was invalid.
Wright
facts
to
asserts
support
that
Defendants
probable
cause
intentionally
for
the
falsified
search
warrant.
Defendants do not dispute that “falsifying facts to establish
probable cause is patently unconstitutional.”
of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
Kingsland v. City
Defendants also
do not dispute that a search warrant “may be voided if the
affidavit supporting the warrant contains deliberate falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth.”
1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002).
the
allegedly
fabricated
Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d
Defendants argue, however, that
facts
about
the
marijuana
were not necessary to a finding of probable cause.
seedlings
If a search
warrant contains “sufficient content to support a finding of
probable cause” without the falsified facts, then the warrant is
valid.
Id.
at
1235
(addressing
judgment stage).
12
the
issue
at
the
summary
“Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when the
totality of the circumstances allow a conclusion that there is a
fair
probability
particular
of
finding
location.”
United
1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
contraband
States
or
v.
evidence
Brundidge,
at
170
a
F.3d
Defendants contend that probable
cause existed to search the Wright property because officers saw
(1) bags of a single brand of potting soil, (2) similar wire dog
crates, and (3) Solo cups at both the Wright property and the
marijuana grow site.
Wrights
to
the
Defendants argue that these facts tie the
marijuana
grow
site
and
are
sufficient
to
establish probable cause for a warrant to search the Wright
property.
In support of their assertion that these items were at the
Wright property and the marijuana grow site, Defendants rely on
Watson’s
affidavit,
information.
which
Wright
alleges
contains
falsified
Defendants contend that the Court should consider
the affidavit, which is a matter outside the pleadings, without
converting
the
motions
to
dismiss
to
motions
for
summary
judgment because the affidavit is central to Wright’s claims.
“It
is
true
incorporated
that
in
documents
the
complaint
attached
by
to
reference
a
can
complaint
generally
or
be
considered by a federal court in ruling on a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6).”
(11th
Cir.
2014).
Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270
But
Wright’s
13
claims
are
based
on
his
allegation that the affidavit contains falsified information.
Wright did not make any allegations about the potting soil, dog
crates,
or
Solo
cups
in
his
Complaint,
and
Wright
did
not
acknowledge in his Complaint or otherwise that the potting soil,
dog crates, and Solo cups were present at both locations.
The
Court certainly cannot consider the contents of the affidavit as
true in ruling on the motion to dismiss.
See id. (“Where a
civil rights plaintiff attaches a police report to his complaint
and alleges that it is false, . . . the contents of the report
cannot be considered as true for purposes of ruling on a motion
to dismiss.”).
Even
if
the
Court
did
consider
the
contents
of
the
affidavit as true, it is doubtful that the presence of common
items
like
locations
potting
supports
soil,
a
dog
finding
crates,
of
and
probable
Solo
cups
cause.
at
both
Plenty
of
homeowners in Middle Georgia purchase potting soil for innocent
purposes every day; those who have or have had dogs often use
wire crates; and the Solo cup is so ubiquitous that it is the
subject of a popular country music song.5
Defendants do not
contend that there was anything special or unique about these
ordinary, innocuous items such that the presence of the items at
both
locations
“allow
a
conclusion
5
that
there
is
a
fair
Toby Keith, Red Solo Cup, on Clancy’s Tavern (Show Dog-Universal
Music 2011).
14
probability of finding contraband or evidence at” the Wright
property.
Brundidge, 170 F.3d at 1352.
And, if the allegations
in Wright’s Complaint are taken as true (as the Court must do at
the
motion
to
dismiss
stage),
Defendants
themselves
did
not
believe that what they saw at the Wright property gave rise to
probable cause because they thought they had to strengthen their
allegations by lying about seeing marijuana seedlings.
For
all
of
these
reasons,
the
Court
finds
that
Wright
sufficiently alleged that Watson’s false statement regarding the
marijuana plants was necessary to a finding of probable cause.
And since the law is clearly established that “falsifying facts
to
establish
probable
cause
is
patently
unconstitutional,”
Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232, Watson is not entitled to qualified
immunity
search,
on
Wright’s
Wright’s
Fourth
arrest
Amendment
based
on
claims
evidence
based
found
on
the
during
the
search, or the seizure of Wright’s personal property based on
evidence found during the search.
If the search warrant was
invalid, then the officers had no lawful basis for searching the
Wright property.6
Without a lawful search, the officers would
6
The Court notes that if Wright does not ultimately present enough
evidence for a jury to conclude that Watson lied about spotting the
marijuana seedlings on the Wright property, then the search warrant is
valid, so Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity with
regard to the arrest and the property seizure.
It is a crime to
possess any amount of marijuana in Georgia.
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b)
(making it a misdemeanor to possess one ounce or less of marijuana);
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j) (making it a felony to possess more than one
ounce
of
marijuana).
“Possession
may
be
either
actual
or
15
not have found the small amount of marijuana in the house, and
they would not have had probable cause to arrest Wright for
marijuana possession or to seize his belongings.
The next question is whether Wright sufficiently alleged
that the remaining Defendants violated clearly established law.
“Conspiring to violate another person’s constitutional rights
violates section 1983.”
F.3d
1271,
1283
(11th
Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279
Cir.
2002).
Wright
Defendants were on the scene together.
alleges
that
all
He further alleges that
all Defendants conferred with each other and decided to seek a
search warrant, knowing “that they needed to make a sufficient
showing of probable cause to convince a magistrate to issue the
warrant.”
Compl.
Defendants
gathered
¶
35.
on
In
the
sum,
scene
Wright
and
alleges
that
all
in
the
participated
decision to manufacture evidence to support a search warrant
even though they knew they did not have probable cause to search
the
Wrights’
participated
home.
in
And
searching
he
his
asserts
home,
that
all
arresting
Defendants
him,
and/or
seizing his belongings even though they knew the search warrant
constructive.
Constructive possession exists where a person though
not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the
intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a
thing.” Bailey v. State, 294 Ga. App. 437, 439, 669 S.E.2d 453, 456
(2008). A person’s ownership or control of the premises gives “rise
to a rebuttable presumption that the [person] possessed the contraband
found on the premises.” Id. at 440, 669 S.E.2d at 456. Wright admits
that he lived at the Wright property, which could reasonably be
construed as an admission that he controlled the premises and thus had
constructive possession of the marijuana Defendants found there.
16
was
invalid.
Defendants
Thus,
Wright
communicated
sufficiently
with
each
alleges
other
and
that
all
“reached
understanding to violate” his Fourth Amendment rights.
279 F.3d at 1283.
each
Defendant’s
an
Rowe,
Wright must ultimately produce evidence of
role
in
the
alleged
conspiracy,
but
“Rule
12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint
simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable.’”
Watts, 495 F.3d at 1295 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
2.
Malicious Prosecution Claims
In addition to his unreasonable search and seizure claims,
Wright
asserts
Defendants.
The
malicious
Eleventh
prosecution
Circuit
claims
“has
against
identified
all
malicious
prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and a viable
constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983.”
323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003).
Wood v. Kesler,
“To establish a federal
malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must
prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures in addition to the elements of the common
law tort of malicious prosecution.”
“(1)
a
criminal
prosecution
Id.
instituted
Those elements include
or
continued
by
the
present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause;
(3)
that
terminated
in
the
plaintiff
accused’s
(4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.”
17
favor;
Id. at 882.
and
Wright contends that after the allegedly unlawful search
revealed a small amount of marijuana in his house, Watson swore
out an arrest warrant charging Wright with several marijuanarelated offenses and made a report to support a civil forfeiture
action.
Wright contends that Watson took these actions even
though he knew the search that revealed the small amount of
marijuana was illegal and that such evidence would thus not be
admissible in a criminal proceeding against Wright.
asserts
that
actions.
he
suffered
damages
as
a
result
Wright also
of
Watson’s
Wright did not, however, allege facts from which it
can be reasonably inferred that any other Defendant participated
in instituting or continuing the prosecution.7
Therefore, to the
extent Wright makes § 1983 or state law malicious prosecution
claims against Defendants other than Watson, those claims are
dismissed.
Watson
argues
that
he
cannot
be
liable
for
malicious
prosecution because the independent decisions of the prosecutors
broke the chain of causation.
Watson
relies
on
does
not
But the “intervening acts” rule
break
the
chain
of
causation
if
“plaintiff can show that these intervening acts were the result
of
deception
or
undue
pressure
7
by
the
defendant
policemen.”
Wright alleged that all Defendants conferred regarding the search
warrant and either helped with the search, the arrest, or the seizure
of his belongings even though they knew the search warrant was
invalid.
He did not make any similar allegations with regard to
Watson’s decision to swear out arrest warrants.
18
Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added).
Here, Wright alleges that any actions taken by the
prosecutor were based on false statements by Watson and other
Defendants.
Watson
also
fleetingly
suggests
that
there
was
prosecution to support a malicious prosecution claim.
no
Wright
alleges that Watson swore out a warrant against him and that
criminal charges were pending against him in the Harris County
Superior Court until the prosecutor decided not to pursue them.
Drawing
all
reasonable
inferences
in
Wright’s
favor,
Wright
sufficiently alleged a prosecution that terminated in his favor.
See Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1144-45 (11th Cir.
2007) (finding a viable malicious prosecution claim against an
officer who brought false charges against the plaintiff).
B.
Wright’s State Law Claims Are Not Barred
Defendants contend that all of Wright’s state law claims
against them are barred by official immunity.8
official
immunity
‘protects
individual
“The doctrine of
public
agents
from
personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the
scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness,
malice, or corruption.’”
Lagroon v. Lawson, 328 Ga. App. 614,
618, 759 S.E.2d 878, 882 (2014) (quoting McDowell v. Smith, 285
8
Again, Wright concedes that he may not pursue his state law claims
against Bolen, Bracewell, and Wofford, so those claims are dismissed.
19
Ga. 592, 593, 678 S.E.2d 922, 924 (2009)).
It is undisputed
that the challenged actions in this case are discretionary, so
Defendants
“are
immune
from
wilfulness or actual malice.”
“Actual
malice
requires
a
suit
unless
they
acted
with
Id. at 619, 759 S.E.2d at 882.
showing
that
the
actor
had
a
deliberate intention to do wrong,” and “wilful conduct is based
on an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury.”
Id.
Here, Wright alleges that Defendants knew they did not have
probable cause to search the Wright property but colluded with
each
other
warrant.
to
manufacture
evidence
to
support
the
search
These allegations support an inference that Defendants
acted with actual malice.
Cf. Bateast v. DeKalb Cty., 258 Ga.
App. 131, 132-33, 572 S.E.2d 756, 758 (2002) (finding genuine
fact dispute on official immunity because jury could infer that
officers
arrested
commit any crimes).
the
plaintiff
despite
knowing
she
did
not
Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to
official immunity at this stage in the litigation.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
set
forth
above,
the
Court
denies
Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 17, 19, 21, 22) as to
Wright’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims
against all Defendants, Wright’s malicious prosecution claims
against Defendant Watson, and his state law claims against all
Defendants
except
Bolen,
Bracewell,
20
and
Wofford.
Wright’s
Complaint does not state a malicious prosecution claim against
any Defendant except Watson, so his malicious prosecution claims
against the other Defendants are dismissed.
Wright concedes
that his state law claims against Bolen, Bracewell, and Wofford
should be dismissed, so they are dismissed.
Defendants’ motions
to stay discovery (ECF Nos. 18, 20, 23) are moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 13th day of August, 2015.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
21
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