LYLES v. LOGAN'S ROADHOUSE

Filing 10

ORDER denying 5 Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 07/02/2015. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
TANESHIA LYLES,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

LOGAN’S ROADHOUSE,

*

Defendant.

CASE NO. 4:15-CV-41 (CDL)

*

O R D E R
Defendant

Logan’s

Roadhouse

filed

Plaintiff Taneshia Lyles’s Complaint.
the motion.1

a

motion

to

dismiss

Lyles did not respond to

The Court reviewed Lyles’s Complaint and Logan’s

Motion to Dismiss and determined that although Lyles framed her
claims as breach of contract claims, her claims were really
personal injury claims and were barred by the applicable statute
of limitations.

Lyles filed a motion to set aside the judgment

(ECF No. 5), which is presently pending before the Court.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), the Court
may

set

aside

a

judgment

because

surprise, or excusable neglect.”

of

“mistake,

inadvertence,

“Relief is available under

Rule 60(b)(1) for mistakes of law or its application.”

Johnson

v. Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, PA, 348 F. App’x 447, 448
1

Lyles emphasizes that “the Court did not issue any order requiring
the plaintiff to answer.” Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Set Aside J.
2, ECF No. 8.
Counsel is encouraged to review Local Rule 7, which
sets forth the deadlines for response briefs in this Court.

(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

Lyles argues that her breach of

warranty claim is not barred by the statute of limitations and
that the Court mistakenly dismissed that claim.
Lyles asserts that the proper statute of limitations is the
four-year

statute

of

limitations

for

actions

for

breach

of

contracts for sale, which is found in O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725(1).
Lyles also points out that consequential damages resulting from
a seller’s breach of contract include “[i]njury to person or
property

proximately

resulting

O.C.G.A. § 11-2-715(2)(b).
chiefly

cites

cases

from

any

breach

of

warranty.”

In support of her arguments, Lyles

against

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

car

manufacturers

under

the

See Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to

Set Aside J. 7 (citing McDonald v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc.,
269

Ga.

App.

62,

603

S.E.2d

456

(2004);

Dildine

v.

Town

&

Country Truck Sales, Inc., 259 Ga. App. 732, 577 S.E.2d 882
(2003)).

These

cases

do

not

establish

which

statute

of

limitations applies to claims for personal injuries due to an
alleged breach of warranty by a restaurant.
Lyles also relies on Chambley v. Apple Restaurants, Inc.,
233 Ga. App. 498, 499, 504 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1998).

In that

case, the plaintiff sued a restaurant for negligence and breach
of implied warranty after the plaintiff suffered injuries when
she found an unwrapped condom in her salad.
that

case

was

whether

the

plaintiff

2

could

The key issue in
recover

emotional

distress

damages

on

her

negligence

claim,

and

the

Court

of

Appeals concluded that a jury would have to decide whether the
plaintiff
physical

“sustained
injury

the

which

distress damages.

requisite

would

allow

‘impact’

her

to

and

resulting

recover”

Id. at 499, 504 S.E.2d at 553.

emotional
Nothing in

Chambley addressed the statute of limitations issue.
The

Court

considered

a

notes

sale

that

under

the

sale

Georgia’s

of

restaurant

Uniform

food

Commercial

is

Code.

O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314(1) (establishing that “the serving for value
of

food

or

drink

to

be

elsewhere is a sale”).
panel

of

the

Georgia

consumed

either

on

the

premises

or

The Court also notes that a three-judge
Court

of

Appeals

allowed

a

breach

of

warranty claim involving a piece of bone in a Wendy’s hamburger
to go to trial.

Mitchell v. BBB Servs. Co., 261 Ga. App. 240,

582 S.E.2d 470 (2003).2

The Court of Appeals did not address the

statute of limitations issue in Mitchell, and it did not address
the

line

of

cases

that

apply

O.C.G.A. §

9-3-33’s

two-year

statute of limitations to all claims for injury to the person,
regardless of how the plaintiff attempts to frame the claims.
As the Court observed in its previous order on the motion
to dismiss, the Georgia Supreme Court held that O.C.G.A. § 9-333 applies to claims for injury to the person.

Daniel v. Am.

Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167, 304 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1983)
2

Neither party cited O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314 or Mitchell.

3

(stating that application of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 “is determined by
the nature of the injury sustained rather than the legal theory
underlying the claim for relief”); accord Smith, Miller & Patch
v. Lorentzson, 254 Ga. 111, 111, 327 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1985)
(holding
action

that

for

O.C.G.A. §

injuries

Appeals

relied

applies

to

on

the

Daniel

actions

warranty theory.

to

9-3-33

for

applied

to

conclude

personal

product

liability

The

person).

to

Georgia

Court

that

injuries

O.C.G.A. §
under

a

of

9-3-33

breach

of

Adair v. Baker Bros., Inc., 185 Ga. App. 807,

808, 366 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1988) (noting that Georgia follows the
general rule that “an action to recover for personal injuries
is, in essence, a personal injury action, and, regardless of
whether
warranty
statute

it
or

is
is

based
based

governing

upon

an

alleged

breach

upon

an

alleged

tort,

actions

for

personal

of
the

an

implied

limitations

injuries

is

controlling”).
Lyles did not point the Court to a Georgia Supreme Court
case overruling Daniel or Adair, and she did not point the Court
to a Georgia Court of Appeals case overruling Adair.
did not find any such cases, either.
apply Daniel and Adair.
applies to Lyles’s claims.

The Court

The Court must therefore

Under those cases, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
Lyles did not file her Complaint

within two years after her claims accrued, so her action is
time-barred.

4

For all of these reasons, Lyles’s motion to set aside the
judgment (ECF No. 5) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of July, 2015.
s/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

5