LYLES v. LOGAN'S ROADHOUSE

Filing 3

ORDER granting 2 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 05/05/2015. (CGC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
TANESHIA LYLES,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

LOGAN’S ROADHOUSE,

*

Defendant.

CASE NO. 4:15-CV-41 (CDL)

*
O R D E R

Plaintiff Taneshia Lyles is allergic to seafood.

On May

24, 2012, Lyles went to supper at Defendant Logan’s Roadhouse.
Lyles alleges that she told her server that she is allergic to
seafood

and

that

she

should

not

be

served

contained even trace amounts of seafood.

on

a

plate

that

According to Lyles,

Logan’s nevertheless served Lyles’s steak on a plate that had
seafood remnants, and Lyles suffered a severe allergic reaction.
Lyles filed this action against Logan’s on February 11, 2015.
Logan’s now moves to dismiss Lyles’s Complaint, arguing that it
is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The Court

agrees, and Logan’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 2) is granted.
Under Georgia law, personal injury actions must be brought
“within

two

O.C.G.A. §

years

9-3-33.

after
Thus,

the

right

of

the

personal

action
injury

limitations expired in this case on May 24, 2014.

accrues.”
statute

of

Lyles filed

her complaint over eight months later.

Apparently recognizing

that her personal injury claim is barred by this statute of
limitations, Lyles framed her claim as
claim.

a

breach of contract

But Georgia law is clear that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applies

to claims for negligently inflicted personal injuries, no matter
how the plaintiff attempts to frame them.

See Daniel v. Am.

Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167, 304 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1983)
(holding that application of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 “is determined by
the nature of the injury sustained rather than the legal theory
underlying the claim for relief,” so O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applied
to

a

plaintiff’s

claim

for

physical

injuries

based

on

the

failure of his safety glasses); see also, e.g., Adair v. Baker
Bros., Inc., 185 Ga. App. 807, 808, 366 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1988)
(applying O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 to “breach of contract” claim for
wrongful death caused by a defective fan); McLendon v. Henry,
170 Ga. App. 876, 876, 318 S.E.2d 742, 742 (1984) (applying
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 to plaintiff’s “breach of contract” claim for
personal injuries arising out of a car wreck).
O.C.G.A. §

9-3-33

applies

to

Lyles’s

claims.

Accordingly,
Because

Lyles

filed her action more than two years after her claims accrued,
her Complaint must be, and is hereby, dismissed.

2

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of May, 2015.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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