PORTER v. WILLIAMS et al
Filing
14
ORDER granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment and remanding state law claims to the State Court of Muscogee County, Georgia. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D. LAND on 6/28/2016 (tlf).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
MICHELLE PORTER,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
CASE NO. 4:15-CV-93 (CDL)
J. LEN WILLIAMS and HOUSING
*
AUTHORITY OF COLUMBUS, GEORGIA,
*
Defendants.
O R D E R
Michelle Porter, who proceeds pro se, brings this action
against her former employer, the Housing Authority of Columbus,
Georgia (“Housing Authority”), and the Chief Executive Officer
of the Housing Authority, J. Len Williams, for allegedly denying
her
overtime
compensation
in
violation
of
the
Fair
Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
Labor
Porter
also brings numerous state law fraud claims against Defendants.
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
(ECF No. 10).
For the reasons discussed
below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
as to Porter’s FLSA claim and declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Porter’s state law claims.
Accordingly, this
action is remanded to the State Court of Muscogee County for
resolution of those state law claims.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
In determining whether a
genuine
Fed. R.
dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant
or necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to Porter, the record
reveals the following.
Porter began working at the Housing Authority in February
2011.
of
The Housing Authority is an entity created by the state
Georgia
Housing
to
provide
Authority
housing
initially
network coordinator.
to
hired
low-income
persons.
Porter
a
as
The
neighborhood
Porter learned of the neighborhood network
coordinator position through an advertisement that represented
the job as earning “$30,000 plus” annually.
50:9, ECF No. 8.
Pl. Dep. 49:11-
The advertisement also represented that the
2
job paid $13.78 per hour and was part time.
Porter asserts that
the Housing Authority defrauded her because the advertisement
stated
that
“$30,000
network
the
plus”
neighborhood
and
Porter’s
coordinator
acknowledges,
network
annual
never
however,
that
coordinator
income
exceeded
the
as
a
could
neighborhood
$30,000.
Housing
earn
Porter
Authority
paid
her
$13.78 per hour, as advertised.
Approximately two years later, in May 2013, the Housing
Authority made Porter its family self-sufficiency coordinator.
This position was full time and provided limited benefits.
position
paid
position
was
$19.57
funded
per
by
hour.
grant
a
The
from
family
the
The
self-sufficiency
U.S.
Department
of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).
Porter claims that she worked overtime without compensation
while employed as a family self-sufficiency coordinator.
Porter
worked
worked
over
forty
hours
a
week
on
one
occasion:
forty-two hours the week of December 9, 2013.
she
Pl. Dep. Ex. 3,
Pl.’s Timesheets, ECF No. 8-3 at 75; Pl. Dep. 33:8-19, 42:17-20;
Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 3, ECF No. 12
(stating that Porter does not dispute that the only week that
she worked overtime was the week for December 9, 2013).
Housing
Authority’s
time
sheets
and
pay
stubs
reflect
The
that
Porter was compensated with three hours of paid time off during
the
following
week.
Nevertheless,
3
Porter
contends
that
the
Housing Authority denied her overtime pay because it did not—
with the exception of the week of December 9—allow her to work
over forty hours a week.
For example, Porter testified that if
she worked ten hours on a Monday, her supervisor would require
her to work only six hours another day that week.
42:21-43:8.
Pl. Dep.
Thus, with the exception of the week of December 9,
Porter never worked more than forty hours in a workweek.
Porter
several
also
ways
coordinator.
made
contends
while
she
that
Defendants
was
a
defrauded
family
her
in
self-sufficiency
First, Porter claims that the Housing Authority
fraudulent
misrepresentations
regarding
Porter’s
eligibility for benefits such as a cell phone stipend and travel
mileage reimbursement.
Porter testified that when she began
working as a family self-sufficiency coordinator, she asked her
immediate
director
supervisor,
Susan
McGuire
mileage reimbursement.
Beverly
for
a
LaMee,
cell
and
phone
human
stipend
permission
and
travel
LaMee and McGuire initially told Porter
that she was not eligible for these benefits.
received
resources
from
Housing
Authority
Later, LaMee
Chief
Executive
Officer J. Len Williams to give Porter a cell phone stipend and
travel
mileage
Authority
gave
reimbursement.
reimbursement.
Porter
a
From
cell
phone
then
on,
stipend
the
and
Housing
travel
It also awarded her these benefits in arrears to
cover the entire time that she was employed as a family self-
4
sufficiency coordinator.
Id. at 85:6-17.
Nevertheless, Porter
claims that the Housing Authority intentionally defrauded her by
initially declining her request for travel reimbursement and a
cell phone stipend and then later giving her those benefits.
Id. at 111:20-23.
Second,
Porter
contends
that
the
Housing
Authority
defrauded her by not paying her the entire amount awarded by the
HUD grant.
The HUD grant provided $46,000 in funding for the
family self-sufficiency position and the Housing Authority used
approximately $40,000 to pay Porter.
Porter asked LaMee and
McGuire why she was not paid the entire $46,000 awarded by the
grant.
LaMee and McGuire explained that the Housing Authority
used the remaining funding to pay overtime, bonuses, and the
employer match on social security.
Porter was unsatisfied with
LaMee and McGuire’s answer so she met with Williams.
Williams
represented
pay
insurance
that
and
the
remaining
social
funding
security.
Porter
was
used
claims
to
that
for
Williams
intentionally lied to her because the Housing Authority never
provided her with health insurance.
She also claims that the
Housing
using
Authority
defrauded
her
by
some
of
the
grant
funding to pay the employer match on her social security; Porter
believes it is unlawful for an employer to use grant funding to
pay its portion of social security.
5
Id. at 89:1-15.
Finally, Porter contends that the Housing Authority made
fraudulent representations in a letter it sent regarding health
insurance.
This letter stated that the Affordable Care Act did
not require the Housing Authority to provide Porter with health
insurance.
Porter
asserts
that
the
letter
was
fraudulent
because she believes that the Affordable Care Act required the
Housing Authority to provide her with health insurance.
On
Porter.
January
16,
2014,
the
Housing
Authority
terminated
The Housing Authority asserts that it terminated Porter
due to “unsatisfactory job performance.”
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.
J. Ex. O, Separation Notice, ECF No. 10-21.
that she had no job performance problems.
to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 4-5.
Porter contends
Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n
A few months later, in August
2014, Porter filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”) regarding the Housing Authority’s
failure to provide her with health insurance.
An Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded that the Affordable Care Act did not
require
employers
to
provide
health
insurance
in
2014;
therefore, the ALJ granted the Housing Authority’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
the
State
Court
of
Muscogee
Porter then brought this action in
County,
removed it to this Court.
6
Georgia
and
Defendants
DISCUSSION
Porter brings claims against the Housing Authority for FLSA
violations.
She also brings several fraud claims against both
the Housing Authority and Williams.
I.
Fair Labor Standards Act
Porter
overtime
claims
that
compensation
in
the
Housing
violation
of
Authority
the
denied
FLSA.
The
her
FLSA
provides:
[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in
any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce for a workweek longer than forty
hours unless such employee receives compensation for
his employment in excess of the hours above specified
at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
To prevail on an FLSA overtime claim, an
employee must prove that she was “permitted to work [overtime]
without compensation.”
Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb
Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007).
carried
out
his
burden
if
he
proves
that
“[A]n employee has
he
has
in
fact
performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he
produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of
that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”
Id. at
1316 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680,
687 (1946), superseded by statute on other grounds, 29 U.S.C.
§ 254(a), as recognized in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v.
7
Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 516-17 (2014)).
“The burden then becomes
the employer's, and it must bring forth either evidence of the
precise
amount
of
work
performed
or
evidence
to
negate
the
reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's
evidence.”
Id.
Porter fails to produce any evidence indicating that she
worked over forty hours in a workweek without receiving overtime
compensation.
Porter worked overtime on only one occasion: she
worked forty-two hours during the week of December 9, 2013.
Dep. 42:17-20.
The Housing Authority’s records reveal that it
compensated Porter with three hours of paid time off.
Ex.
4,
dispute
Porter
Request
that
Pl.
for
she
asserts
Payment,
received
that
she
ECF
this
should
overtime pay instead of time off.
No.
8-4.
compensatory
have
been
Porter
time
Pl. Dep.
does
off.
not
But
compensated
with
The FLSA permits employers to
give employees of a public agency compensatory time off in lieu
of overtime pay:
Employees of a public agency which is a State, a
political subdivision of a State, or an interstate
governmental agency may receive, in accordance with
this subsection and in lieu of overtime compensation,
compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and
one-half hours for each hour of employment for which
overtime compensation is required by this section.
29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(1).
Housing
Authority
Porter introduces no evidence that the
awarded
compensatory
inconsistent with § 207(o).
8
time
off
in
a
manner
Porter also asserts that the Housing Authority denied her
overtime pay by preventing her from working over forty hours a
week.
For example, if Porter worked ten hours one day, then she
was required to work only six hours on another day of that same
week.
Pl. Dep. at 41:22-42:16.
This system ensured that Porter
did not work more than forty hours in one workweek.
43:5-8.
a
Id. at
“[A] workweek no longer than the prescribed maximum is
nonovertime
workweek
requirements . . . but
under
not
the
[the
Act,
to
which
overtime
29 C.F.R. § 778.101.
Porter
evidence
not
present
any
that
pay
compensation
requirements] are applicable.”
does
the
would
Because
allow
a
reasonable juror to conclude that she worked over forty hours in
a week without receiving overtime compensation, her claim for
overtime compensation under the FLSA fails.
Accordingly, the
Housing Authority is entitled to summary judgment on Porter’s
FLSA claim.1
1
In Porter’s response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Porter asserted for the first time that the Housing Authority violated
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., as
well as 18 U.S.C. § 1035 and 18 U.S.C. Chapter 47.
The Federal
Insurance Contribution Act does not create a private right of action.
McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718, 723 (11th Cir.
2002). Therefore, any claim under the Federal Insurance Contributions
Act fails as a matter of law.
Porter also claims that the Housing
Authority violated 18 U.S.C. § 1035 and 18 U.S.C. Chapter 47.
These
are criminal provisions of the U.S. Code that do not provide a private
right of action and do not suggest that Congress intended to create a
private right of action.
Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303
(5th Cir. 1960) (“The sections of Title 18 may be disregarded in this
suit. They are criminal in nature and provide no civil remedies.”).
Thus, any claims under Title 18 fail as a matter of law.
9
II.
State Law Claims
Porter’s state law claims against the Housing Authority and
Williams are dubious.
claims
against
the
But the resolution of her state law
Housing
Authority
requires
the
Court
to
decide a state law sovereign immunity issue that has not been
squarely addressed by the Georgia appellate courts.
Rather than
injecting itself unnecessarily into the resolution of a state
law
issue
of
first
impression,
the
Court
exercises
discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims.
its
Porter’s
Accordingly, this action shall be remanded to
the State Court of Muscogee County, Georgia for the resolution
of those state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the Court grants the Housing
Authority’s
claim.
motion
for
summary
judgment
as
to
Porter’s
FLSA
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over her state
Williams.
law claims against the Housing Authority and
Accordingly, the Clerk shall enter final judgment in
favor of the Housing Authority on Porter’s FLSA claim, and shall
then remand this action to the State Court of Muscogee County
for resolution of Porter’s state law claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of June, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
10
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