MCKINNEY v. DARR et al
Filing
11
ORDER granting 3 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 03/24/2016. (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JEFFREY D. MCKINNEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
*
*
vs.
*
SHERIFF JOHN DARR and
CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT OF
MUSCOGEE COUNTY, GEORGIA,
*
Defendants.
CASE NO. 4:15-cv-181 (CDL)
*
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff Jeffrey D. McKinney, Jr. is an inmate in the
Muscogee County Jail.
McKinney claims that he is mentally ill
and that when he arrived at the jail as a pretrial detainee,
jail officials did not properly classify him as an individual
with a mental illness.
He also alleges that jail officials did
not properly supervise him or provide him with adequate mental
health
care.
McKinney
contends
that
as
a
result
of
these
alleged failures, McKinney had a fight with his cellmate that
resulted in the cellmate’s death and McKinney being charged with
murder.
McKinney brought this action against Defendants Sheriff
John Darr and the Columbus Consolidated Government (“CCG”) under
42
U.S.C. § 1983.1
He
claims
that
Defendants
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
1
violated
his
Defendants filed a
McKinney sued “Consolidated Government of Muscogee County, Georgia.”
The correct name of the entity is Columbus Consolidated Government.
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3), which is granted for the reasons
set forth below.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
The complaint must include sufficient factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In other words, the factual
allegations must “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims.
Id. at 556.
“Rule
well-pleaded
12(b)(6)
does
not
permit
dismissal
of
a
complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable.’” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
McKinney
claims.
alleges
the
following
facts
in
support
of
his
The Court must accept these allegations as true for
purposes of the pending motion.
McKinney was a pretrial detainee at the Muscogee County
Jail.
He and Issac Kindred were incarcerated together in a jail
2
cell.
Both
illness.
Kindred
McKinney
and
Kindred
had
a
history
of
mental
A violent fight broke out between the two inmates.
died,
and
McKinney
was
charged
with
murder.
Jail
officials discovered the incident after the fact.
McKinney,
Defendants
who
did
is
not
represented
properly
by
screen
counsel,
and
asserts
classify
him
that
as
a
mentally ill inmate and that Defendants did not properly monitor
him
to
ensure
his
safety
and
the
safety
of
other
inmates.
McKinney further contends that Defendants did not provide him
with adequate mental health care.
McKinney purports to bring
claims under § 1983 and Georgia law.
The Complaint does not
clearly articulate what injuries McKinney contends he suffered.
McKinney’s response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss likewise
does not explain what injuries McKinney claims he suffered.
DISCUSSION
McKinney
brings
two
claims
against
Defendants.
First,
McKinney claims that Defendants did not properly classify and
house him at the Muscogee County Jail.
that
Defendants
health treatment.
failed
to
provide
him
Second, McKinney claims
with
adequate
mental
The Court interprets these claims as claims
under § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.
See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff
of Monroe Cty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting
that pretrial detainees’ claims are governed by the Fourteenth
3
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
The Court addresses each claim
in turn.
I.
Failure to Classify and House Claim
McKinney’s
first
claim
is
properly classify and house him.
that
jail
officials
did
not
Sheriff Darr argues that he is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on this claim.
CCG
contends that it is not liable because McKinney did not allege
that a CCG policy or custom caused a constitutional violation
with regard to McKinney’s classification and housing.
The Court
agrees on both counts.
“The Eleventh Amendment protects a State from being sued in
federal court without the State’s consent.”
F.3d
1304,
1308
(11th
Cir.
2003)
extends to an “arm of the State.”
(en
Id.
Manders v. Lee, 338
banc).
This
immunity
The Eleventh Circuit has
concluded that a Georgia sheriff is an “arm of the state” in
establishing policies for processing detainees.
256
F.
App’x
229,
232
(11th
Cir.
2007)
(per
Scruggs v. Lee,
curiam).
The
Eleventh Circuit has also found that a Georgia sheriff is an
“arm of the state” in promulgating policies related to the risk
of inmate-on-inmate attacks.
Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan
v. Toombs Cty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005).
Based on
this precedent, the Court finds that Sheriff Darr is an arm of
the state in establishing policies related to the classification
and housing of jail inmates.
Thus, he is entitled to Eleventh
4
Amendment
immunity
on
McKinney’s
§ 1983
classification
and
housing claim, and Sheriff Darr’s motion to dismiss this claim
is granted.
Turning
to
McKinney’s
§
1983
classification
and
housing
claim against CCG, a local government is liable only when its
“official policy” causes a constitutional violation. Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Thus, McKinney
must show that he suffered a constitutional violation caused by
“(1) an officially promulgated [CCG] policy or (2) an unofficial
custom or practice of [CCG] shown through the repeated acts of a
final policymaker for [CCG].”
Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d
1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
McKinney does not allege that CCG has an official policy
regarding classification or placement of inmates.
allege
that
Sheriff
Darr
was
responsible
policies related to jail operations.
for
McKinney does
establishing
For CCG to be responsible
for Sheriff Darr’s policies and customs, Sheriff Darr must have
been acting as a CCG policymaker in establishing those policies.
Id. at 1347.
But McKinney does not allege a factual basis for
concluding that Sheriff Darr was the final policymaker for CCG
with
regard
to
inmate
classification
and
housing
policies.
Rather, as discussed above, Sheriff Darr is an arm of the state
in establishing such policies, so his “policy or practice cannot
be said to speak for [CCG] because [CCG] has no say about that
5
policy or practice.”
Id.
CCG’s motion to dismiss McKinney’s
§ 1983 housing and classification claim is therefore granted.2
II.
Failure to Provide Adequate Mental Health Treatment Claim
McKinney’s other claim is that the jail staff failed to
provide him with adequate mental health treatment.3
standard
under
for
the
standard
providing
Fourteenth
required
by
medical
Amendment
the
care
is
Eighth
2
to
the
a
pre-trial
same
Amendment
The “minimum
as
for
detainee
the
a
minimum
convicted
McKinney makes a vague allegation that a consent decree with the
United States Justice Department exists regarding the jail, but
McKinney makes no specific allegations as to whether CCG is a party to
that decree or CCG’s obligations, if any, with regard to that decree.
Therefore, the Court cannot determine from McKinney’s Complaint
whether such a decree could be construed to be a policy of CCG, which
CCG knowingly ignored, or whether the Sheriff is a final policymaker
for CCG with regard to compliance with that decree. Accordingly, the
Court makes no findings or conclusions regarding the effect of the
decree on the pending motion to dismiss.
3
Inexplicably, Defendants’ motion to dismiss McKinney’s medical
treatment claim focuses on Defendants’ contention that McKinney did
not allege that a CCG policy or custom caused any injury to McKinney.
In other words, Defendants’ primary argument addresses only McKinney’s
claim against CCG and does not address his claim against the Sheriff.
This decision to focus exclusively on the “policy or custom” issue
while ignoring the proper standard for a Fourteenth Amendment medical
treatment claim is perplexing given that, as Defendants acknowledge,
the Court previously concluded that a county sheriff acts as an arm of
the county in providing medical care to jail inmates and a sheriff can
serve as the county’s final policymaker regarding promulgation of
policies and procedures for providing adequate medical care to
inmates. See Youngs v. Johnson, No. 4:06-CV-19(CDL), 2008 WL 4816731,
at *8-*9 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008).
Defendants do argue (apparently as an afterthought) that McKinney’s
Complaint does not state a claim because McKinney did not adequately
allege causation on his medical treatment claim.
McKinney was on
notice of this argument, had a chance to respond to it, and did not
seek leave to amend his Complaint to add additional factual
allegations on causation.
As discussed in more detail below, even
accepting all of the allegations in the Complaint as true, the Court
agrees with Defendants that McKinney did not adequately allege
sufficient facts on causation and that his medical treatment claim
fails for this reason.
6
prisoner; both [rights] are violated by a government official’s
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”
Baldwin
Cty.,
596
F.
App’x
757,
763
(11th
Cir.
Jacoby v.
2014)
(per
curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Lancaster v. Monroe
Cty., Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997)).
“To
prevail on a deliberate indifference to serious medical need
claim, [a p]laintiff
must show: (1) a serious medical need;
(2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and
(3) causation
injury.”
between
indifference
and
the
plaintiff’s
Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07
(11th Cir. 2009).
the
that
defendant
In other words, “a plaintiff must show that
intentionally
or
recklessly
disregarded
serious medical needs in a way that injured him.”
his
Leigh v.
Armor Med. Servs., No. 14-13027, 2015 WL 8233608, at *2 (11th
Cir. Dec. 9, 2015) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
The Court assumes for purposes of the motion to dismiss
that
under
reasonable
a
generous
inferences
reading
drawn
in
of
the
Complaint
McKinney’s
favor,
with
all
McKinney
sufficiently alleged that he had a serious medical need and that
jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his condition.
But McKinney did not allege any facts to suggest causation.
In
other words, McKinney did not allege that he suffered an injury
that was caused by a jail official’s deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need that he had.
7
To state a deliberate
indifference claim, there must be a causal connection between an
injury suffered by McKinney and a jail official’s deliberate
indifference.
In other words, there must be some allegation
that the lack of medical care caused McKinney an injury.
See,
e.g., Harper v. Lawrence Cty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir.
2010) (finding that causation was adequately alleged where the
inmate died after jail officials failed to provide him treatment
for delirium tremens); Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1329
(11th Cir. 2007) (finding a fact question on causation where the
evidence
viewed
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
inmate
supported the conclusion that a jailer’s intentional delay in
providing medical care for a pregnant inmate “may have caused
the loss of her child”); see also Jacoby, 596 F. App’x at 767
(finding no causal connection on a claim related to delayed
treatment of pepper spray contamination because there was no
allegation or evidence that “the pepper spray or the delay in
decontamination caused” the plaintiff an injury).
Here, McKinney did not allege any facts to suggest that his
own health condition was adversely impacted because of a jail
official’s
actions,
such
as
facts
to
suggest
that
a
jail
officials’ failure to provide McKinney with medical treatment
caused exacerbation of his medical problem.
appears
to
contend
that
he
suffered
an
Rather, McKinney
injury
caused
by
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need because he has
8
been charged with murder in connection with Kindred’s death.
But McKinney did not point to any authority in support of his
theory that his killing of another person constitutes an injury
to himself, and the Court declines to fabricate such a theory of
causation.
Because McKinney did not allege any facts to suggest
that a causal connection existed between a serious medical need
that he had and a jail official’s deliberate indifference to
that need, his § 1983 claim for failure to provide adequate
mental health treatment must be dismissed.4
4
Neither McKinney nor Defendants mentioned the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, which applies to cases brought
by incarcerated prisoners regarding prison conditions.
Under the
PLRA, “an incarcerated plaintiff cannot recover either compensatory or
punitive
damages
for
constitutional
violations
unless
he
can
demonstrate a (more than de minimis) physical injury.”
Brooks v.
Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015).
But the Eleventh
Circuit has concluded that an incarcerated plaintiff may recover
nominal damages without a showing of physical injury. Id. at 1307-08.
In his Complaint, McKinney sought only compensatory and punitive
damages, and he did not ask for nominal damages.
Moreover, even if
McKinney had sought nominal damages, there still must be some
allegation of a constitutional injury for him to proceed with his
§ 1983 claim. In Brooks, for example, the plaintiff was “confined in
conditions lacking in basic sanitation” because a deputy warden forced
the plaintiff “to soil himself over a two-day period while chained in
a hospital bed,” which created “an obvious health risk and [was] an
affront to human dignity.”
Id. at 1298.
Based on these facts, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that while the plaintiff in Brooks did not
suffer a physical injury, he did suffer a constitutional injury. See
also Logan v. Hall, 604 F. App'x 838, 841 (11th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (finding that pro se prisoner had sufficiently alleged a First
Amendment violation because he “alleged that, in retaliation for
filing
lawsuits
and
grievances,
prison
officials
deliberately
falsified reports, which resulted in him spending excessive time in
disciplinary and close-management confinement and losing his yard
privileges”).
Here, McKinney simply alleged that jail officials
failed to provide him with mental health treatment. He did not allege
that he suffered a constitutional injury caused by that failure.
Again, the Court declines to conclude that McKinney was injured
because he was charged with killing another person.
9
III. State Law Claims
McKinney’s
Complaint suggests that McKinney is asserting
state law claims against Defendants.
See Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1
(basing jurisdiction in part “on the pendent authority of this
Court to entertain claims arising under State Law”).
It is not
clear from McKinney’s Complaint what state law claims he is
attempting to assert.
The Court has dismissed all of McKinney’s
§ 1983 claims, which are the only claims over which the Court
has
original
jurisdiction.
The
Court
declines
to
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims McKinney is
attempting to assert.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that
the
“may
district
courts
decline
to
exercise
supplemental
jurisdiction over” state law claims if “the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
set
forth
above,
Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss (ECF No. 3) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of March, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
10
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