BARB v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 528 et al
Filing
14
ORDER granting 7 Motion to Remand; terminating as moot 3 Motion to Dismiss Complaint(); terminating as moot 8 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 05/03/2016. (VCP)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
DUANE BARB,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 528,
CALVIN SIDERS, and DEANGELOE
SMITH,
*
CASE NO. 4:16-CV-16 (CDL)
*
*
Defendants.
O R D E R
Duane Barb sues a union and two of its members for statelaw claims based on interference with his employment, invasion
of
his
privacy,
and
slander.
The
collective
bargaining
agreement between Barb’s employer and the Defendant union is not
essential
to
any
issue
in
this
action.
Accordingly,
Barb’s
claims are not completely preempted under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a),
and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
this action.
It is consequently remanded to the Superior Court
of Muscogee County, Georgia.
BACKGROUND
Barb alleges the following facts in support of his claims.
The Court must accept these allegations as true for purposes of
the pending motion.
Barb
began
working
as
a
transportation
manager
SpartanNash’s office in Midland, Georgia in March 2013.
at
Barb
supervised automobile drivers, some of whom were members of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union 528 (“Local
Union 528”).
Barb alleges that he disciplined several union-
member drivers for violating SpartanNash policy.
For example,
Barb alleges that he terminated or disciplined union members for
driving off the clock, having a bottle of liquor in a work
truck, failing to report a driving accident, and receiving too
many speeding tickets.
Barb alleges that he disciplined non-
union members in a similar manner around the same time.
Barb
does not allege that he is a member of Local Union 528.
After
drivers
Barb
and
punished
other
union
several
union-member
members
retaliated
drivers,
against
making false allegations about Barb to SpartanNash.
these
Barb
by
The union
members told SpartanNash that Barb was having an extramarital
affair with a subordinate, was racist, and was punishing union
members
more
harshly
than
non-union
members.
SpartanNash
conducted an investigation and exonerated Barb of all charges.
SpartanNash launched a second investigation into Barb in
January 2015 due to additional complaints made by union members.
Members
of
Local
Union
528
told
SpartanNash
that
Barb
was
instructing drivers to work off the clock (a practice prohibited
by
federal
law
and
SpartanNash
2
policy)
and
engaging
in
an
extramarital
affair
with
SpartanNash policy).
a
subordinate
(also
a
violation
of
Barb alleges that the union members knew
that these allegations were false and made them in an attempt to
retaliate against Barb for disciplining union members.
SpartanNash
sent
two
people
to
Midland,
investigate the allegations against Barb:
Relations
Manager
SpartanNash
Donnelly
for
Corporate
and
SpartanNash,
Vice
Winterstein
no
to
Traci Donnelly, Labor
and
Brian
President.
had
Georgia
Barb
interest
Winterstien,
alleges
in
that
conducting
a
legitimate investigation and were on a witch hunt for reasons to
terminate Barb to appease union members.
For example, Donnelly
interviewed one of the most senior drivers in the Midland office
about the accusations against Barb.
engaged in misconduct.
the
driver’s
apparent
answer
agenda
The driver denied that Barb
But Donnelly allegedly refused to accept
and
interrogated
calculated
to
prove
him
”according
an
Notice
misconduct.”
to
of
Removal Attach. 2, Compl. ¶ 54, ECF No. 1-2.
When Donnelly and Winterstein interviewed Barb, he denied
having a sexual relationship with a subordinate.
But Donnelly
refused to believe Barb and insisted that he was lying.
also
denied
instructing
he
had
drivers
actually
to
work
off
disciplined
the
clock
drivers
and
explained
that
conduct.
Donnelley refused to believe Barb and became “visibly
frustrated and upset” that he would not admit guilt.
3
for
Barb
such
Id. ¶ 87.
Next,
Donnelly
Rick Wright.
and
Winterstein
interviewed
Barb’s
boss,
Winterstein advised Wright that his reputation
would be tarnished if he kept Barb on board.
Wright responded
that Barb was one of the best transportation managers he had
ever worked with.
Barb was discharged from SpartanNash on January 22, 2015.
Barb was told that he was discharged because the company was
seeking a change in leadership qualifications.
But Barb alleges
that the real reason he was terminated was to appease union
members.
members
Barb now sues Local Union 528 and individual union
for
intentional
interference
with
business
relations,
slander, and invasion of privacy.
Barb originally filed this
action
Muscogee
in
the
Superior
Court
of
County,
Georgia.
Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal
question jurisdiction.
Barb now moves to remand the action.
DISCUSSION
“[S]tate
court
actions
that
could
have
been
filed
originally in federal court may be removed to federal court by a
defendant.”
Darden v. U.S. Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116, 1118
(11th Cir. 1987); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Defendants contend that
this action could have been filed originally in this Court based
on federal question jurisdiction.
To determine if a dispute
contains a federal question, courts typically follow the wellpleaded complaint rule.
Id.
The well-pleaded complaint rule
4
requires courts to look exclusively at the four corners of a
complaint to determine if a dispute sounds solely in state law
or
if
it
implicates
a
federal
question.
See
id.
at
1119
(explaining that usually “the plaintiff is the master of the
complaint
and
may
avoid
federal
exclusively upon state law”).
jurisdiction
by
relying
As a result, the general rule is
that a case may not be removed to federal court due to a federal
defense, including the defense of preemption.
But there is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule known as the complete preemption doctrine.
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
that
removal
is
proper
based
on
this
Caterpillar
Defendants contend
exception.
Complete
preemption occurs when “the [Supreme] Court . . . conclude[s]
that the pre-emptive force of a statute is so ‘extraordinary’
that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into
one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule.’”
Id.
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987)).
If a state-law claim is completely
preempted by federal law, then the action may be removed to
federal court.
The
Id.
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
state-law
claims
for
violations of labor contracts are completely preempted by § 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”).
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
5
Textile Workers
The LMRA “has
such
extraordinary
federal
statute
preemptive
under
which
force
to
as
to
find
be
an
complete
appropriate
preemption.”
Palmer v. Local 8285 United Steel Workers of Am., 234 F. App’x
884, 887 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Section 301(a) states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry
affecting
commerce
as
defined
in
this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
“This preemption doctrine exists to ‘ensure
uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, and
thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution of labormanagement disputes.’”
Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d
1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988)).
“[B]ut it is
important to note that ‘not every dispute concerning employment,
or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 . . . .’”
Chalmers
plaintiff
permitted
Corp.
v.
covered
to
Lueck,
471
by
collective-bargaining
assert
agreement . . . .”
a
U.S.
legal
202,
Id. (quoting Allis-
rights
211
(1985)).
agreement
independent
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 396.
of
“[A]
is
that
“[R]emoval
statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant
clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of
6
remand.”
Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th
Cir. 1994).
Courts
use
a
two-part
test
to
determine
claim is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.
if
it
is: (1) “founded
collective
dependent
agreement.”
bargaining
upon
an
directly
on
agreement,”
analysis
rights
a
Darden, 830 F.2d at 1119.
a
state-law
The claim is preempted
or
of
if
created
by
a
(2) “substantially
collective
bargaining
To determine if a state-
law claim falls within § 301, the Court looks to the elements of
the claim.
Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc., 60 F.3d 1551,
1557 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Court concludes that none of Barb’s
claims are preempted by the LMRA.
Thus, there is no federal
question jurisdiction and this action must be remanded.
I.
Tortious Interference with Business Relations
Barb brings a claim for tortious interference with business
relations based on Defendants allegedly telling SpartanNash that
Barb was instructing drivers to work off the clock and having an
affair with a subordinate.
Barb alleges that Defendants knew
these accusations were false and made them in an attempt to have
Barb terminated.
Barb alleges that SpartanNash terminated him
because of Defendants’ false allegations.
In Georgia, to state
a claim for tortious interference with business relations “a
plaintiff must show that the defendant, (1) acting improperly
and without privilege (2) and acting purposely and with malice
7
with the intent to injure, (3) induced a third party or parties
not to enter into or continue a business relationship with the
plaintiff (4) for which the plaintiff suffered some financial
injury.”
Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 1340.
Defendants argue that this action is preempted by the LMRA
by cherry picking allegations in the Complaint.
Barb alleges
that he was “the subject of several grievances filed by members
of Local 528.”
Compl. ¶ 39.
From this allegation, Defendants
argue that a fact finder will have to analyze the grievance
procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement to
resolve Barb’s claim.
But Barb’s claim is not based on the
union’s grievance procedures.
Barb sues because union members
communicated allegations that they knew were false in an attempt
to
have
Barb
terminated.
Even
though
Barb
alleges
that
he
disciplined employees in a manner consistent with the collective
bargaining agreement, these contentions are incidental to his
claim.
Barb does not allege that Defendants’ accusations were
related
to
bargaining
whether
he
agreement.
in
fact
Thus,
complied
whether
with
Barb
the
complied
collective
with
the
collective bargaining agreement when he disciplined employees is
not essential to his claim that Defendants retaliated against
him
and
interfered
with
his
allegations.
8
employment
by
making
false
Defendants
Barb’s
claim
bargaining
also
suggest
will
that
require
agreement.
The
some
of
their
interpretation
Court
is
not
of
defenses
a
to
collective
persuaded
that
the
collective bargaining agreement is in fact relevant to any of
Defendants’
suggested
defenses.
But
even
if
the
collective
bargaining agreement is relevant to a defense, the Supreme Court
has instructed that “the presence of a federal question, even a
§ 301 question, in a defensive argument does not . . . transform
the
action
into
one
arising
under
federal
law . . . .”
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99.
Defendants
rely
on
the
Eleventh
Circuit’s
decision
in
Bartholomew v. AGL Resources, Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th
Cir.
2004),
to
support
their
contention
that
§ 301
preempts
claims for tortious interference with business relations.
The
plaintiffs in Bartholomew were aggrieved employees suing a union
for breaching the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
at
1336-37.
plaintiffs’
The
claims
for
Eleventh
Circuit
tortious
concluded
interference
with
that
the
business
relations were preempted by § 301 because the plaintiffs alleged
that they were terminated in a manner contrary to a collective
bargaining agreement.
Id. at 1340.
By contrast, Barb does not
allege that he is a union member.
SpartanNash
terminated
him
in
collective bargaining agreement.
9
a
Nor does he allege that
manner
prohibited
by
a
Although the Complaint does
reference a collective bargaining agreement, those allegations
are
inessential
to
Barb’s
dispute . . . tangentially
claim.
involving
a
“[N]ot
provision
every
of
a
collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 . . . .”
Allis-Chalmers,
471
U.S.
at
211.
In
sum,
Barb’s
claim
for
tortious interference with business relations is not preempted
by § 301 of the LMRA.
II.
Slander
Barb also alleges that Defendants slandered him when they
told SpartanNash that he was having an affair with a subordinate
and instructing drivers to work off the clock.
whether
Barb
asserts
this
claim
against
It is unclear
all
Defendants,
including Local Union 528, or only against the individual union
members. 1
Court
But for the purpose of resolving this motion, the
assumes
that
Barb
sues
Local
Union
528
for
slander.
“Under Georgia law, an oral defamation action lies when (1) a
defendant makes charges against the plaintiff in reference to
his trade, office, or profession, if such charges are calculated
to injure him therein; (2) the charge is false; (3) the charge
1
In Count Two of the Complaint, Barb brings a claim for slander
against “Defendants Siders, Smith and John Does.” Compl. ¶ 118. Barb
does not mention Local Union 528. By contrast, in Count One and Count
Three, Barb specifically states that the claim is brought against
“Individual Defendants and Local 528.”
Compl. ¶¶ 107, 127.
The
parties in their briefing, however, appear to assume that Barb accuses
Local Union 528 of slander. Thus, it is unclear to the Court whether
Barb’s slander claim is asserted against Local Union 528.
10
is
made
with
privileged.”
malice;
and
(4)
the
communication
is
not
Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 1341.
Defendants contend that Barb’s slander claim is preempted
by § 301 of the LMRA because the Complaint invoked a collective
bargaining agreement by alleging that off-the-clock driving is a
“contractual
breach.”
Compl.
¶ 99.
First,
it
is
unclear
whether Barb is referring to a collective bargaining agreement
or a contract between SpartanNash and the Department of Defense,
one
of
SpartanNash’s
assuming
that
Barb
customers.
is
Id.
referencing
¶ 25.
a
Second,
collective
even
bargaining
agreement, there is no need to interpret the agreement since all
the parties agree that working off the clock is a violation of
the agreement.
not
And most importantly, Barb’s slander claim is
dependent
on
whether
the
collective
bargaining
agreement
prohibits working off the clock because Barb alleges that offthe-clock
work
regulations.
is
prohibited
by
Department
of
Transportation
A state-law claim escapes the preemptive force of
§ 301 if it can exist independently of a collective bargaining
agreement.
See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212.
Defendants also argue that the “publication” element of the
slander
claim
will
require
the
fact
collective bargaining agreement.
Huggins,
888
F.
Supp.
1573,
1580
finder
to
interpret
a
Defendants rely on Agee v.
(N.D.
Ga.
1995),
for
the
proposition that “publication” of a slander claim requires a
11
fact finder to interpret a labor contract.
The facts in this
dispute, however, are meaningfully distinct from Agee.
In Agee,
a union filed grievances against a supervisor on behalf of an
aggrieved
employee.
Id.
at
1578.
A
collective
bargaining
agreement prohibited the supervisor from retaliating against the
employee for bringing the grievances.
employee
alleged
that
the
supervisor
Id. at 1578-79.
violated
the
The
collective
bargaining agreement by slandering her in retaliation for the
grievances.
Id.
Unlike the employee in Agee, Barb is not suing
for violations of a collective bargaining agreement.
This is a
simple slander claim; it can be resolved like any other slander
claim.
The collective bargaining agreement is not essential to
the claim.
Accordingly, Barb’s slander claim is not preempted
by § 301 of the LMRA.
III. Invasion of Privacy – False Light
Barb
also
brings
an
invasion
of
privacy
claim
based
on
Defendants accusing Barb of having a sexual relationship with a
subordinate and instructing subordinates to work off the clock.
Barb alleges that he was held up to embarrassing and unnecessary
scrutiny as a result of these false and malicious claims.
“[T]o
sustain a false light invasion of privacy claim, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant knowingly or recklessly published
falsehoods about him or her and, as a result, placed him or her
in a false light which would be highly offensive to a reasonable
12
person.”
Smith v. Stewart, 291 Ga. App. 86, 100, 660 S.E.2d
822, 834 (2008).
Defendants argue that Barb’s invasion of privacy claim is
preempted by § 301 for the same reason explained above regarding
publication.
The Court again finds this argument unpersuasive.
Accordingly, Barb’s invasion of privacy claim is not preempted
by § 301. 2
CONCLUSION
Barb’s
Complaint
contains
some
factual
regarding a collective bargaining agreement.
allegations
But a claim is not
preempted by the LMRA simply because a collective bargaining
agreement may be mentioned in, or even relevant to, the claim.
A claim is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA only if the collective
bargaining agreement is so essential to the claim that the claim
is
either
derived
substantially
from
dependent
rights
on
created
the
by
agreement
the
agreement
such
that
or
the
collective bargaining agreement is inextricably intertwined with
the claim.
Darden, 830 F.2d at 1119.
not meet this exacting standard.
Barb’s claims simply do
Accordingly, there is no basis
for federal question jurisdiction and Barb’s motion to remand
2
Defendants also contend that Barb’s claim for punitive damages is
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Barb seeks punitive damages based on
the false accusations Defendants made to SpartanNash.
Defendants
argue that resolution of Barb’s claim for punitive damages will
require a fact finder to interpret the grievance procedures outlined
in the collective bargaining agreement.
As explained above, Barb’s
claims are not substantially dependent on the union’s grievance
procedures.
13
must be granted.
(ECF No. 7).
The Clerk is directed to remand
this action to the Superior Court of Muscogee County, Georgia.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of May, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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