BARB v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 528 et al

Filing 14

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Remand; terminating as moot 3 Motion to Dismiss Complaint(); terminating as moot 8 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 05/03/2016. (VCP)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
DUANE BARB,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 528,
CALVIN SIDERS, and DEANGELOE
SMITH,

*

CASE NO. 4:16-CV-16 (CDL)

*
*

Defendants.
O R D E R
Duane Barb sues a union and two of its members for statelaw claims based on interference with his employment, invasion
of

his

privacy,

and

slander.

The

collective

bargaining

agreement between Barb’s employer and the Defendant union is not
essential

to

any

issue

in

this

action.

Accordingly,

Barb’s

claims are not completely preempted under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a),
and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
this action.

It is consequently remanded to the Superior Court

of Muscogee County, Georgia.
BACKGROUND
Barb alleges the following facts in support of his claims.
The Court must accept these allegations as true for purposes of
the pending motion.

Barb

began

working

as

a

transportation

manager

SpartanNash’s office in Midland, Georgia in March 2013.

at
Barb

supervised automobile drivers, some of whom were members of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union 528 (“Local
Union 528”).

Barb alleges that he disciplined several union-

member drivers for violating SpartanNash policy.

For example,

Barb alleges that he terminated or disciplined union members for
driving off the clock, having a bottle of liquor in a work
truck, failing to report a driving accident, and receiving too
many speeding tickets.

Barb alleges that he disciplined non-

union members in a similar manner around the same time.

Barb

does not allege that he is a member of Local Union 528.
After
drivers

Barb

and

punished

other

union

several

union-member

members

retaliated

drivers,

against

making false allegations about Barb to SpartanNash.

these

Barb

by

The union

members told SpartanNash that Barb was having an extramarital
affair with a subordinate, was racist, and was punishing union
members

more

harshly

than

non-union

members.

SpartanNash

conducted an investigation and exonerated Barb of all charges.
SpartanNash launched a second investigation into Barb in
January 2015 due to additional complaints made by union members.
Members

of

Local

Union

528

told

SpartanNash

that

Barb

was

instructing drivers to work off the clock (a practice prohibited
by

federal

law

and

SpartanNash

2

policy)

and

engaging

in

an

extramarital

affair

with

SpartanNash policy).

a

subordinate

(also

a

violation

of

Barb alleges that the union members knew

that these allegations were false and made them in an attempt to
retaliate against Barb for disciplining union members.
SpartanNash

sent

two

people

to

Midland,

investigate the allegations against Barb:
Relations

Manager

SpartanNash
Donnelly

for

Corporate

and

SpartanNash,
Vice

Winterstein

no

to

Traci Donnelly, Labor

and

Brian

President.

had

Georgia

Barb

interest

Winterstien,
alleges

in

that

conducting

a

legitimate investigation and were on a witch hunt for reasons to
terminate Barb to appease union members.

For example, Donnelly

interviewed one of the most senior drivers in the Midland office
about the accusations against Barb.
engaged in misconduct.
the

driver’s

apparent

answer

agenda

The driver denied that Barb

But Donnelly allegedly refused to accept
and

interrogated

calculated

to

prove

him

”according

an

Notice

misconduct.”

to

of

Removal Attach. 2, Compl. ¶ 54, ECF No. 1-2.
When Donnelly and Winterstein interviewed Barb, he denied
having a sexual relationship with a subordinate.

But Donnelly

refused to believe Barb and insisted that he was lying.
also

denied

instructing
he

had

drivers
actually

to

work

off

disciplined

the

clock

drivers

and

explained

that

conduct.

Donnelley refused to believe Barb and became “visibly

frustrated and upset” that he would not admit guilt.

3

for

Barb

such

Id. ¶ 87.

Next,

Donnelly

Rick Wright.

and

Winterstein

interviewed

Barb’s

boss,

Winterstein advised Wright that his reputation

would be tarnished if he kept Barb on board.

Wright responded

that Barb was one of the best transportation managers he had
ever worked with.
Barb was discharged from SpartanNash on January 22, 2015.
Barb was told that he was discharged because the company was
seeking a change in leadership qualifications.

But Barb alleges

that the real reason he was terminated was to appease union
members.
members

Barb now sues Local Union 528 and individual union
for

intentional

interference

with

business

relations,

slander, and invasion of privacy.

Barb originally filed this

action

Muscogee

in

the

Superior

Court

of

County,

Georgia.

Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal
question jurisdiction.

Barb now moves to remand the action.
DISCUSSION

“[S]tate

court

actions

that

could

have

been

filed

originally in federal court may be removed to federal court by a
defendant.”

Darden v. U.S. Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116, 1118

(11th Cir. 1987); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Defendants contend that

this action could have been filed originally in this Court based
on federal question jurisdiction.

To determine if a dispute

contains a federal question, courts typically follow the wellpleaded complaint rule.

Id.

The well-pleaded complaint rule

4

requires courts to look exclusively at the four corners of a
complaint to determine if a dispute sounds solely in state law
or

if

it

implicates

a

federal

question.

See

id.

at

1119

(explaining that usually “the plaintiff is the master of the
complaint

and

may

avoid

federal

exclusively upon state law”).

jurisdiction

by

relying

As a result, the general rule is

that a case may not be removed to federal court due to a federal
defense, including the defense of preemption.
But there is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule known as the complete preemption doctrine.
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
that

removal

is

proper

based

on

this

Caterpillar

Defendants contend

exception.

Complete

preemption occurs when “the [Supreme] Court . . . conclude[s]
that the pre-emptive force of a statute is so ‘extraordinary’
that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into
one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule.’”

Id.

(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,

481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987)).

If a state-law claim is completely

preempted by federal law, then the action may be removed to
federal court.
The

Id.

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

state-law

claims

for

violations of labor contracts are completely preempted by § 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”).
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).

5

Textile Workers
The LMRA “has

such

extraordinary

federal

statute

preemptive

under

which

force
to

as

to

find

be

an

complete

appropriate
preemption.”

Palmer v. Local 8285 United Steel Workers of Am., 234 F. App’x
884, 887 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

Section 301(a) states:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry
affecting
commerce
as
defined
in
this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

“This preemption doctrine exists to ‘ensure

uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, and
thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution of labormanagement disputes.’”

Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d

1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988)).

“[B]ut it is

important to note that ‘not every dispute concerning employment,
or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 . . . .’”
Chalmers
plaintiff
permitted

Corp.

v.

covered
to

Lueck,

471

by

collective-bargaining

assert

agreement . . . .”

a

U.S.

legal

202,

Id. (quoting Allis-

rights

211

(1985)).
agreement

independent

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 396.

of

“[A]
is
that

“[R]emoval

statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant
clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of

6

remand.”

Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th

Cir. 1994).
Courts

use

a

two-part

test

to

determine

claim is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.
if

it

is: (1) “founded

collective
dependent
agreement.”

bargaining
upon

an

directly

on

agreement,”

analysis

rights

a

Darden, 830 F.2d at 1119.

a

state-law

The claim is preempted

or

of

if

created

by

a

(2) “substantially

collective

bargaining

To determine if a state-

law claim falls within § 301, the Court looks to the elements of
the claim.

Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc., 60 F.3d 1551,

1557 (11th Cir. 1995).

The Court concludes that none of Barb’s

claims are preempted by the LMRA.

Thus, there is no federal

question jurisdiction and this action must be remanded.
I.

Tortious Interference with Business Relations
Barb brings a claim for tortious interference with business

relations based on Defendants allegedly telling SpartanNash that
Barb was instructing drivers to work off the clock and having an
affair with a subordinate.

Barb alleges that Defendants knew

these accusations were false and made them in an attempt to have
Barb terminated.

Barb alleges that SpartanNash terminated him

because of Defendants’ false allegations.

In Georgia, to state

a claim for tortious interference with business relations “a
plaintiff must show that the defendant, (1) acting improperly
and without privilege (2) and acting purposely and with malice

7

with the intent to injure, (3) induced a third party or parties
not to enter into or continue a business relationship with the
plaintiff (4) for which the plaintiff suffered some financial
injury.”

Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 1340.

Defendants argue that this action is preempted by the LMRA
by cherry picking allegations in the Complaint.

Barb alleges

that he was “the subject of several grievances filed by members
of Local 528.”

Compl. ¶ 39.

From this allegation, Defendants

argue that a fact finder will have to analyze the grievance
procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement to
resolve Barb’s claim.

But Barb’s claim is not based on the

union’s grievance procedures.

Barb sues because union members

communicated allegations that they knew were false in an attempt
to

have

Barb

terminated.

Even

though

Barb

alleges

that

he

disciplined employees in a manner consistent with the collective
bargaining agreement, these contentions are incidental to his
claim.

Barb does not allege that Defendants’ accusations were

related

to

bargaining

whether

he

agreement.

in

fact

Thus,

complied

whether

with

Barb

the

complied

collective
with

the

collective bargaining agreement when he disciplined employees is
not essential to his claim that Defendants retaliated against
him

and

interfered

with

his

allegations.

8

employment

by

making

false

Defendants
Barb’s

claim

bargaining

also

suggest

will

that

require

agreement.

The

some

of

their

interpretation
Court

is

not

of

defenses
a

to

collective

persuaded

that

the

collective bargaining agreement is in fact relevant to any of
Defendants’

suggested

defenses.

But

even

if

the

collective

bargaining agreement is relevant to a defense, the Supreme Court
has instructed that “the presence of a federal question, even a
§ 301 question, in a defensive argument does not . . . transform
the

action

into

one

arising

under

federal

law . . . .”

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99.
Defendants

rely

on

the

Eleventh

Circuit’s

decision

in

Bartholomew v. AGL Resources, Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th
Cir.

2004),

to

support

their

contention

that

§ 301

preempts

claims for tortious interference with business relations.

The

plaintiffs in Bartholomew were aggrieved employees suing a union
for breaching the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Id.

at

1336-37.

plaintiffs’

The

claims

for

Eleventh

Circuit

tortious

concluded

interference

with

that

the

business

relations were preempted by § 301 because the plaintiffs alleged
that they were terminated in a manner contrary to a collective
bargaining agreement.

Id. at 1340.

By contrast, Barb does not

allege that he is a union member.
SpartanNash

terminated

him

in

collective bargaining agreement.

9

a

Nor does he allege that
manner

prohibited

by

a

Although the Complaint does

reference a collective bargaining agreement, those allegations
are

inessential

to

Barb’s

dispute . . . tangentially

claim.

involving

a

“[N]ot
provision

every
of

a

collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 . . . .”
Allis-Chalmers,

471

U.S.

at

211.

In

sum,

Barb’s

claim

for

tortious interference with business relations is not preempted
by § 301 of the LMRA.
II.

Slander
Barb also alleges that Defendants slandered him when they

told SpartanNash that he was having an affair with a subordinate
and instructing drivers to work off the clock.
whether

Barb

asserts

this

claim

against

It is unclear
all

Defendants,

including Local Union 528, or only against the individual union
members. 1
Court

But for the purpose of resolving this motion, the

assumes

that

Barb

sues

Local

Union

528

for

slander.

“Under Georgia law, an oral defamation action lies when (1) a
defendant makes charges against the plaintiff in reference to
his trade, office, or profession, if such charges are calculated
to injure him therein; (2) the charge is false; (3) the charge

1

In Count Two of the Complaint, Barb brings a claim for slander
against “Defendants Siders, Smith and John Does.” Compl. ¶ 118. Barb
does not mention Local Union 528. By contrast, in Count One and Count
Three, Barb specifically states that the claim is brought against
“Individual Defendants and Local 528.”
Compl. ¶¶ 107, 127.
The
parties in their briefing, however, appear to assume that Barb accuses
Local Union 528 of slander. Thus, it is unclear to the Court whether
Barb’s slander claim is asserted against Local Union 528.

10

is

made

with

privileged.”

malice;

and

(4)

the

communication

is

not

Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 1341.

Defendants contend that Barb’s slander claim is preempted
by § 301 of the LMRA because the Complaint invoked a collective
bargaining agreement by alleging that off-the-clock driving is a
“contractual

breach.”

Compl.

¶ 99.

First,

it

is

unclear

whether Barb is referring to a collective bargaining agreement
or a contract between SpartanNash and the Department of Defense,
one

of

SpartanNash’s

assuming

that

Barb

customers.
is

Id.

referencing

¶ 25.

a

Second,

collective

even

bargaining

agreement, there is no need to interpret the agreement since all
the parties agree that working off the clock is a violation of
the agreement.
not

And most importantly, Barb’s slander claim is

dependent

on

whether

the

collective

bargaining

agreement

prohibits working off the clock because Barb alleges that offthe-clock

work

regulations.

is

prohibited

by

Department

of

Transportation

A state-law claim escapes the preemptive force of

§ 301 if it can exist independently of a collective bargaining
agreement.

See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212.

Defendants also argue that the “publication” element of the
slander

claim

will

require

the

fact

collective bargaining agreement.
Huggins,

888

F.

Supp.

1573,

1580

finder

to

interpret

a

Defendants rely on Agee v.
(N.D.

Ga.

1995),

for

the

proposition that “publication” of a slander claim requires a

11

fact finder to interpret a labor contract.

The facts in this

dispute, however, are meaningfully distinct from Agee.

In Agee,

a union filed grievances against a supervisor on behalf of an
aggrieved

employee.

Id.

at

1578.

A

collective

bargaining

agreement prohibited the supervisor from retaliating against the
employee for bringing the grievances.
employee

alleged

that

the

supervisor

Id. at 1578-79.
violated

the

The

collective

bargaining agreement by slandering her in retaliation for the
grievances.

Id.

Unlike the employee in Agee, Barb is not suing

for violations of a collective bargaining agreement.

This is a

simple slander claim; it can be resolved like any other slander
claim.

The collective bargaining agreement is not essential to

the claim.

Accordingly, Barb’s slander claim is not preempted

by § 301 of the LMRA.
III. Invasion of Privacy – False Light
Barb

also

brings

an

invasion

of

privacy

claim

based

on

Defendants accusing Barb of having a sexual relationship with a
subordinate and instructing subordinates to work off the clock.
Barb alleges that he was held up to embarrassing and unnecessary
scrutiny as a result of these false and malicious claims.

“[T]o

sustain a false light invasion of privacy claim, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant knowingly or recklessly published
falsehoods about him or her and, as a result, placed him or her
in a false light which would be highly offensive to a reasonable

12

person.”

Smith v. Stewart, 291 Ga. App. 86, 100, 660 S.E.2d

822, 834 (2008).
Defendants argue that Barb’s invasion of privacy claim is
preempted by § 301 for the same reason explained above regarding
publication.

The Court again finds this argument unpersuasive.

Accordingly, Barb’s invasion of privacy claim is not preempted
by § 301. 2
CONCLUSION
Barb’s

Complaint

contains

some

factual

regarding a collective bargaining agreement.

allegations

But a claim is not

preempted by the LMRA simply because a collective bargaining
agreement may be mentioned in, or even relevant to, the claim.
A claim is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA only if the collective
bargaining agreement is so essential to the claim that the claim
is

either

derived

substantially

from

dependent

rights
on

created

the

by

agreement

the

agreement

such

that

or
the

collective bargaining agreement is inextricably intertwined with
the claim.

Darden, 830 F.2d at 1119.

not meet this exacting standard.

Barb’s claims simply do

Accordingly, there is no basis

for federal question jurisdiction and Barb’s motion to remand
2

Defendants also contend that Barb’s claim for punitive damages is
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Barb seeks punitive damages based on
the false accusations Defendants made to SpartanNash.
Defendants
argue that resolution of Barb’s claim for punitive damages will
require a fact finder to interpret the grievance procedures outlined
in the collective bargaining agreement.
As explained above, Barb’s
claims are not substantially dependent on the union’s grievance
procedures.

13

must be granted.

(ECF No. 7).

The Clerk is directed to remand

this action to the Superior Court of Muscogee County, Georgia.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of May, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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