SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION LLC v. REAL ESTATE et al
Filing
127
ORDER denying 118 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 10/05/2018 (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION, LLC,
Plaintiff,
*
*
vs.
*
REAL ESTATE and W. LYNN
LASSETER,
*
CASE NO. 4:16-CV-102 (CDL)
*
Defendants.
*
O R D E R
In this condemnation action, the jury returned a verdict in
favor
of
the
condemnee
in
the
total
amount
of
$107,916.50,
including $103,385.00 for the value of easements taken by the
condemnor.
The condemnor maintains that the evidence presented
at trial supported an award of no more than $19,979.00 for the
value of those easements.
The condemnor therefore filed a motion
for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the jury verdict.
Because the jury verdict is within the range supported by the
evidence
at
trial,
the
condemnor’s
motion
for
judgment
as
a
matter of law (ECF No. 118) is denied.
BACKGROUND
The
Fifth
Amendment
to
the
United
States
Constitution
prohibits the taking of private property for public use without
“just
compensation.”
U.S.
Const.
amend.
V.
Congress
has
authorized utility companies to construct pipelines to transport
natural gas across state lines, provided they obtain certificates
of
public
convenience
and
Regulatory Commission.
pipeline
crosses
necessity
from
the
Federal
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 717f.
private
property,
a
natural
gas
Energy
When a
company
may
obtain easements by eminent domain to facilitate the construction
of
the
pipeline.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).
But
it
must
pay
the
Transmission,
LLC
landowners just compensation for the easements.
In
this
case,
Plaintiff
Sabal
Trail
constructed a pipeline from Tennessee to northern Florida through
Alabama and Georgia.
A portion of that pipeline crosses a 75-
acre piece of property in Colquitt County, Georgia that is owned
by Defendant W. Lynn Lasseter.
The permanent easement for the
pipeline is fifty feet wide and covers approximately 1.28 acres.
The temporary construction easement, which expires on June 14,
2019, covers approximately 0.79 acres.
Under the terms of the
easement, Lasseter may not construct any permanent structures on
the
permanent
easement,
including
buildings,
walls
or
similar
structures, swimming pools, decks, pipelines and conduits, septic
systems, leach fields, and wells.
Lasseter also may not plant
trees on the permanent easement, and Sabal Trail has discretion
to remove any structures or obstructions in or on the easement
that might interfere with Sabal Trail’s use of the easement.
Lasseter
wishes
to
build
a
road
or
put
utilities
across
easement, he must get Sabal Trail’s permission to do so.
2
If
the
Sabal Trail had the legal right to obtain an easement across
Lasseter’s
completed.
amount
of
property,
and
the
pipeline
construction
has
been
The only issue left for resolution at trial was the
“just
compensation”
that
Sabal
Trail
must
pay
Lasseter for this public taking of his private property.
to
Sabal
Trail argued at trial that the taking is restricted to the fair
market value of the actual permanent and temporary easements plus
the
value
of
merchantable
timber
removed
from
the
easements.
Lasseter maintained that in addition to the fair market value of
the
property
taken
for
the
easements,
he
is
entitled
to
a
diminution in the value of his property that is adjacent to the
permanent easement.
ability
to
develop
He argued that the easement restricts his
that
property
and
thus
he
should
receive
compensation for the diminution in value to the property due to
this development restriction.
easement
results
in
no
Sabal Trail responded that the
diminution
in
value
to
any
of
the
remainder property.
Sabal Trail relied on an appraiser named Carl Schultz to
establish the fair market value of the property on which Sabal
Trail’s easements run.
Schultz opined that the highest and best
use of Lasseter’s property as of the date of the taking was for
residential development, and he determined that the property was
worth $15,500.00 per acre.
116.
Trial Tr. vol. i 161:13-20, ECF No.
Schultz opined that the fair market value of the 1.28-acre
3
permanent easement before the taking was
165:20-22.
$19,840.00.
Id. at
He further opined that the value of the permanent
easement was eighty-five percent of the full fee simple value of
the 1.28 acres, or $16,864.00.
temporary
construction
Id. at 164:25-166:2.
easement,
compensation would be $3,115.00.
Schultz
As to the
opined
Id. at 166:3-20.
that
just
Sabal Trail
also called a timber value expert who opined that the value of
the timber removed from Lasseter’s property for the easements was
$4,117.50.
Trial Tr. vol. ii 110:16-111:1, ECF No. 117.
Schultz testified that he did not believe that the existence
of
the
easement
would
have
any
detrimental
impact
on
the
remainder of Lasseter’s property, so his valuation testimony did
not
include
any
diminution
in
value
to
the
remainder.
The
easement restrictions that were admitted into evidence, however,
clearly indicate that there are certain permanent prohibitions on
what activity Lasseter is permitted to engage in on the easement.
Trial Ex. D1, ECF No. 107-26; accord Trial Tr. vol. 1 165:4-12.
For other activities that are not absolutely prohibited, Sabal
Trail
has
full
discretion
to
decide
whether
to
allow
such
activities, including activities necessary for the development of
a residential subdivision near the easement.
See Trial Ex. D1.
Lasseter was unable to mount much of a fight at trial beyond
his lawyer’s cross examination of Sabal Trail’s experts.
trial,
the
Court
excluded
certain
4
opinions
of
his
Before
valuation
expert because the methodology she used was flawed.
further
prevented
Lasseter
from
testifying
as
to
The Court
fair
market
value issues because he was never properly disclosed as a witness
who would testify as to those issues.
Sabal Trail’s counsel moved for judgment as a matter of law
at
the
close
of
all
the
evidence,
maintaining
that
the
only
evidence of just compensation was presented by it and that the
value was established as $16,864.00 for the permanent easement,
$3,115.00
timber.
allowed
for
the
temporary
easement
and
$4,117.50
for
the
The Court reserved ruling on Sabal Trail’s motion and
the
case
to
be
presented
to
the
jury.
The
jury,
apparently finding the evidence less clear than Sabal Trail’s
counsel
made
it
out
to
be,
returned
a
verdict
for
just
compensation for the easements in the total amount of $103,385.00
and for the timber in the amount of $4,531.50.
Sabal Trail
renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law.
DISCUSSION
Judgment
as
a
matter
of
law
is
authorized
“only
if
the
evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of [Sabal Trail] that a
reasonable
jury
could
not
arrive
at
a
contrary
verdict.”
Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach, 890 F.3d 942, 948 (11th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256
F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Thus, Sabal Trail is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law only if no reasonable jury could
5
have
found
from
the
evidence
presented
at
trial
that
just
compensation for the easements and timber was anything other than
$24,096.50.
Sabal
Trail
cannot
carry
this
high
burden.
A
careful review of the evidence presented at trial reveals how a
reasonable jury could reach the verdict returned here.
Sabal Trail argues that the only evidence at trial as to
just
compensation
testified
of
the
specifically
easements
that
the
came
value
from
of
its
the
expert
who
permanent
and
temporary easements was $19,979.00, with no diminution to the
remainder
of
Lasseter’s
property.
While
Lasseter
put
up
no
valuation evidence during his case in chief, other evidence was
presented to the jury during the trial on the diminution in the
value of the remainder of Lasseter’s property.
And just as the
jury was instructed that it may consider testimony from witnesses
regardless of who may have called them and exhibits regardless of
who
may
have
tendered
them,
this
Court
evidence in deciding the present motion.
may
not
ignore
that
That evidence includes
the following.
Sabal Trail’s expert testified that the pre-easement value
of Lasseter’s property was $15,500.00 per acre.
161:13-20.
Trial Tr. vol. i
He further opined that this value was based on the
property’s highest and best use, a residential subdivision.
at 147:18-21.
Id.
The evidence further established that Lasseter had
developed a subdivision just across the street from this property
6
which had finished lots available for sale.
ii
168:5-169:2,
185:13-17;
Trial
Ex.
E.g., Trial Tr. vol.
P33,
ECF
No.
107-14.
Evidence was also elicited during cross examination that Lasseter
intended
to
develop
the
property
adjacent
easement as a residential development.
to
the
permanent
Trial Tr. 178:9-179:16,
180:15-17, 188:8-190:21.
The easement terms were admitted into evidence, and those
terms restrict what can be done on that easement.
Trial Ex. D1.
A reasonable juror could conclude that these restrictions would
prevent activities that would be necessary to develop a portion
of
Lasseter’s
Specifically,
easement
ran
property
exhibits
in
for
were
relation
residential
admitted
to
that
wetlands
on
development.
showed
the
where
property,
the
and
a
reasonable jury could conclude that due to the restrictions of
the easement and its proximity to these wetlands, the property
adjacent to the easement and near the wetlands could not be used
for residential development.
13.
E.g., Trial Ex. P32, ECF No. 107-
Lasseter, the owner and potential developer of the property,
testified
that
this
part
of
the
property
was
prime
for
the
development of lots facing or backing up to the natural wetlands.
Trial Tr. vol. ii 178:9-179:16, 188:8-190:21.
Thus, it would be
reasonable for a jury to find, contrary to the opinion of Sabal
Trail’s
expert,
that
this
part
of
developable for residential purposes.
7
the
property
is
now
not
The evidence was certainly
not
so
one-sided
conclusion.
that
Evidence
roughly six acres.
no
reasonable
was
also
jury
introduced
Id.at 49:13-14.
could
that
reach
this
that
area
is
Using Sabal Trail’s expert’s
own opinion as to fair market value of the property per acre, the
jury’s verdict is within the range of the evidence when the loss
of
value
Trail’s
to
this
expert’s
remainder
value
property
attributable
is
to
combined
the
with
actual
Sabal
easements.
Accordingly, Sabal Trail is not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on the value of the easements.
The
regarding
record
the
as
value
a
whole
of
the
also
supports
timber
permanent and temporary easements.
that
the
was
jury’s
removed
verdict
from
the
The jury returned a verdict
for just compensation for the timber in the amount of $4,531.50.
Sabal Trail maintains that evidence at trial does not support
this verdict because its timber expert, Craig Ganas, opined that
the timber removed from the easements was worth $4,117.50.
Tr. vol. ii 110:16-111:1.
Trial
This is a difference of $414.00.
It
was undisputed that Ganas did not see the trees that were removed
from the easements, or even the stumps.
Id. at 114:21-115:16.
Rather, he had to estimate the value of the trees based on the
trees
he
saw
on
either
side
of
the
easements.
Id.
Ganas
estimated that the merchantable value of the pine trees removed
from the easement was $3,703.50 if used for saw timber, chip and
saw, or pulpwood; his estimate did not include any pole timber,
8
which is the most valuable type of pine timber.
Ganas further
estimated that the hardwood trees removed from the easement were
worth $414 if used for pulpwood, the lowest valuation for such
trees.
trees
Id. at 110:16-111:1.
before
they
were
Lasseter, who actually saw the
removed
from
the
easements,
testified
about the characteristics of the trees that were removed from the
easements.
Id. at 149:5-150:4.
Based on the record as a whole
with reasonable inferences drawn in Lasseter’s favor, the jury’s
verdict regarding the value of timber removed from the easements
is supported by the evidence.
Sabal Trail is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the value of the timber.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Sabal Trail’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law (ECF No. 118) is denied.1
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of October, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
1
The Court notes that neither party filed a motion for new trial, but
if one had been sought, it would not have been granted.
The verdict
was not against the great weight of the evidence.
9
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