PERRY v. MERTOPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
Filing
30
ORDER denying 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 08/30/2016. (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
SHARYEL PERRY,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
*
CASE NO. 4:16-CV-135 (CDL)
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff
disability
Insurance
Sharyel
insurance
Company
Perry
policy
was
that
(“MetLife”)
insured
under
issued
to
her
long
term
Metropolitan
Defendant
a
Life
former
employer,
Synovus Financial Corporation, for the benefit of its employees.
Perry alleges that she became disabled in January 2014.
initially
agreed
terminated
her
to
pay
Perry
benefits.
disability
Perry
benefits
appealed,
MetLife
but
contending
later
that
MetLife made factual and procedural errors that resulted in the
improper termination of her disability benefits.
Perry asserts
that MetLife did not render a timely decision on her appeal, and
she filed this action for breach of contract under the civil
enforcement
provisions
of
the
Employee
Retirement
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
Income
MetLife filed
a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11), contending that Perry did not
exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit.
MetLife asserts that Perry’s Complaint should be dismissed
for
failure
to
exhaust
administrative
remedies.
MetLife’s
present motion is not a motion for judgment as a matter of law
based on the administrative record.
Rather, the present Motion
to Dismiss is based on the allegations in Perry’s Complaint and
documents
attached
to
MetLife’s
Motion
to
Dismiss.
MetLife
contends that the Complaint and MetLife’s documents establish
that Perry failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Perry was employed by Synovus Financial Corporation, and
she was covered under a long term disability insurance policy
issued to Synovus for the benefit of its employees.
ECF
No.
1.
It
is
undisputed
that
Perry
Compl. ¶ 8,
sought
disability
benefits under the MetLife Policy and that MetLife initially
agreed to pay Perry disability benefits starting in April 2014.
In
May
2015,
benefits.
however,
MetLife
terminated
Perry’s
disability
Id. ¶ 17; Def.’s Suppl. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot.
to Dismiss Ex. B, Letter from Dyanne Roberts to Sharyel Perry
(May 13, 2015), ECF No. 26-2 (“Denial Letter”).
Perry asserts
that
her
there
had
not
been
“any
improvement
in
physical
condition or her ability to perform her prior job duties at
Synovus.”
Compl. ¶ 17.
The Policy states that an insured like Perry “must submit
[her] appeal to MetLife at the address indicated on the claim
2
form within 180 days of receiving MetLife’s decision.”
Def.’s
Suppl. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A, MetLife
Group Policy No. 153679-1-G, ECF No. 26-1 at 73 (“Policy”).
The
Policy further states that the appeal “must be in writing and
must
include
at
least
the
following
information:
Name
of
Employee; Name of the Plan; Reference to the initial decision;
An explanation why you are appealing the initial determination.”
Id.
And it states: “As part of your appeal, you may submit any
written
comments,
documents,
relating to your claim.”
records,
or
other
information
Id.
The Denial Letter MetLife sent to Perry states that Perry
“may appeal [the denial] decision by sending a written request
for
appeal
to
MetLife
Disability”
via
mail,
fax,
or
email
“within 2417 [sic] after [she] receive[s] th[e] denial letter.”
Denial Letter 3.
The letter further states that Perry should
“include in [her] appeal letter the reason(s) [she] believe[s]
the claim was improperly denied.” Id.
It also states that Perry
may “submit any additional comments, documents, records or other
information
relating
appropriate
for
consideration.”
There
is
to
[MetLife]
[her]
to
claim
give
that
[her]
[she]
appeal
deem[s]
proper
Id.
no
dispute
that
Perry
timely
appealed
the
termination of her disability benefits even though the Denial
Letter stated that the appeal was due “within 2417” after Perry
3
received the Denial Letter and did not explain that the Policy
required the appeal to be submitted within 180 days.
On October
28, 2015, 168 days after MetLife mailed Perry the Denial Letter,
Perry sent a detailed Appeal Letter to MetLife via facsimile and
mail.
Compl. ¶ 18; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A,
Letter from Michael Grabhorn to MetLife Disability Appeal Unit
(Oct. 28, 2015), ECF No. 27-1 (“Appeal Letter”).
The Appeal
Letter included Perry’s name, Perry’s claim number, the name of
her employer, and a detailed explanation of Perry’s “Issues with
MetLife’s
Termination
Decision.”
Id.
at
1-5.
MetLife
acknowledges that it received the Appeal Letter via facsimile on
October 28, 2015.
2, ECF No. 29.
Def.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
MetLife asserts that it received Perry’s CD of
supporting documentation via mail on November 4, 2015, 175 days
after MetLife sent Perry the Denial Letter.1
MetLife
specialist
contends
confirmed
that
on
receipt
November
of
1
Perry’s
12,
2015,
appeal
its
and
appeal
“advised
In support of this assertion, MetLife points to an unauthenticated
claim
activity
chart
excerpt,
which
MetLife
provided
without
explanation.
Def.’s Suppl. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
Ex. C, Print Claim Activity Excerpt, ECF No. 26-3. Even if the Court
considered this document without converting MetLife’s motion to
dismiss into a summary judgment motion, see Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d
1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005), the chart excerpt does not establish what
MetLife says it does. The chart excerpt appears to be pages 261 and
262 of a 298-page claim activity chart related to a claim number that
begins with 631403177083.
It contains entries for “Incoming Mail –
Appeal” on “Comment Date” October 29, 2015 and “Comment Date” November
5, 2015.
It is not clear from the face of the chart when MetLife
received the CD from Perry.
4
[Perry]
that
MetLife
may
request
an
extension
if
there
special circumstances requiring an extension of time.”
Reply Br. 2.
are
Def.’s
MetLife did not point to any evidence in support
of this assertion.
A MetLife employee sent Perry’s attorney a
letter dated December 8, 2015 stating that the employee had been
assigned
to
Perry’s
appeal.
Pl.’s
Resp.
to
Def.’s
Mot.
to
Dismiss Ex. B, Letter from Jill Brown to Michael Grabhorn (Dec.
8,
2015),
ECF
No.
27-2.
That
letter
did
not
request
an
extension of time for MetLife to consider Perry’s appeal, and it
did
not
request
any
information
from
Perry’s
attorney.
On
December 14, 2015, MetLife’s employee sent Perry’s attorney a
letter
stating
that
MetLife
needed
an
independent
medical
examination to complete its review of Perry’s claim.
Def.’s
Suppl. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Ex. D, Letter
from Jill Brown to Michael Grabhorn (Dec. 14, 2015), ECF No. 264 (“Extension Letter”).
The Extension Letter further stated
that Perry’s appeal had been placed in a “45 day tolling period”
and that MetLife would continue with its review of Perry’s claim
once it received the independent medical examination report or
the 45 day tolling period expired.
Id.
The Policy states that MetLife will notify an insured “in
writing of its final decision within a reasonable period of
time, but no later than 45 days after MetLife’s receipt of [the
insured’s] written request for review, except that under special
5
circumstances MetLife may have up to an additional 45 days to
provide written notification of the final decision.”
ECF No. 26-1 at 73.
Policy,
The Policy further states that if “an
extension is required, MetLife will notify [the insured] prior
to
the
expiration
of
the
initial
45
day
period,
state
the
reason(s) why such an extension is needed, and state when it
will make its determination.”
Id. (emphasis added).
DISCUSSION
Under
submitted
appeal,
the
an
with
circumstances
Policy
appeal,
one
and
MetLife
45–day
(such
ERISA’s
as
had
regulations,
“45
extension
the
need
days
to
hold
Perry
resolve
available
to
once
for
a
that
‘special
hearing).’”
Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 613
(2013)
(quoting
29
C.F.R. §§ 2560.503–1(i)(1)(i),
accord Policy, ECF No. 26-1 at 73.
(i)(3)(i));
If Perry “fail[ed] to submit
necessary information,” then MetLife’s “time for resolving [the]
appeal [could] be tolled again.”
Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 613
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(i)(4)); accord Policy, ECF No.
26-1 at 73.
If MetLife failed “to meet its own deadlines under these
procedures,
[Perry]
administrative
‘shall
remedies.’”
be
deemed
Heimeshoff,
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(l)).
internal
review
process,
to
[Perry]
6
have
134
exhausted
S.
Ct.
at
the
613
“Upon exhaustion of the
is
entitled
to
proceed
immediately to judicial review . . . .”
Id.
In other words, if
MetLife did not timely resolve Perry’s appeal, then Perry is
deemed to have exhausted her administrative remedies, and she
was permitted to file this action.
hinges
on
two
questions:
(1)
The parties’ dispute thus
when
did
Perry
appeal
the
termination of her benefits? and (2) did MetLife substantially
comply with ERISA’s deadlines for resolving that appeal?
The
Court will evaluate each question in turn.
I.
When Did Perry File Her Appeal?
The Policy states that MetLife “will conduct a full and
fair review of [the insured’s] claim” after it “receives [the
insured’s] written request appealing the initial determination.”
Policy, ECF No. 26-1 at 73.
The Policy also states that MetLife
will notify the insured “in writing of its final decision within
a reasonable period of time, but no later than 45 days after
MetLife’s
review.”
receipt
Id.
of
[the
insured’s]
written
request
for
Thus, the Policy’s review deadlines are tied to
MetLife’s receipt of the insured’s written request for review.
It
is
undisputed
that
Perry
sent
MetLife
a
Appeal Letter via facsimile on October 28, 2015.
seven-page
That letter
included Perry’s name, Perry’s claim number, the name of her
employer, and a detailed explanation of Perry’s contention that
MetLife wrongfully terminated her disability benefits.
does
not
dispute
that
it
received
7
Perry’s
Appeal
MetLife
Letter
by
facsimile on October 28, 2015.
MetLife argues, however, that
MetLife did not actually receive Perry’s appeal until November
4, 2015, which is when MetLife claims that it received Perry’s
CD of supporting information via mail.2
MetLife did not point to any provision in the Policy to
support its position that an appeal is not deemed filed until an
insured provides documents in support of the appeal.
simply
states
that
an
appeal
“must
be
in
The Policy
writing
and
must
include at least the following information: Name of Employee;
Name
of
the
Plan;
Reference
to
the
initial
decision;
An
explanation why you are appealing the initial determination.”
Id.
The Policy does state that an insured “may submit any
written
comments,
documents,
records,
or
other
relating to [her] claim” as part of her appeal.
Policy does not state that
information
Id.
But the
an insured’s written request for
review must include supporting documents in order to be deemed
“received.”
Moreover,
ERISA’s
regulations
state
that
“the
period of time within which a benefit determination on review is
required to be made shall begin at the time an appeal is filed
in accordance with the reasonable procedures of a plan, without
regard
to
whether
all
the
information
necessary
to
make
benefit determination on review accompanies the filing.”
2
a
29
Again, MetLife did not point to any evidence clearly stating when it
received the CD, but the Court assumes for purposes of this motion
that MetLife received the CD containing supporting documentation on
November 4, 2015.
8
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i)(4) (emphasis added).
In summary, nothing
in the Policy or ERISA’s regulations required Perry to submit
her
supporting
deemed
documentation
“received.”
received
received
Perry’s
Perry’s
The
Court
written
Appeal
in
order
thus
request
Letter
via
for
her
appeal
concludes
for
be
on
that
MetLife
when
review
facsimile
to
MetLife
October
28,
2015.
II.
Did MetLife Substantially Comply with ERISA’s Deadlines for
Resolving Perry’s Appeal?
It is undisputed that MetLife did not render a decision on
Perry’s appeal by December 12, 2015, which is forty-five days
after MetLife received Perry’s appeal on October 28, 2015.
It
is also undisputed that MetLife did not seek, in writing or
otherwise, an extension of time to review Perry’s appeal prior
to
December
12,
2015.
Thus,
under
the
Policy
and
ERISA’s
regulations, MetLife failed to resolve Perry’s appeal by the
applicable
deadline.
MetLife
nonetheless
argues
that
it
substantially complied with ERISA’s regulations by sending Perry
a letter dated December 14, 2014 informing Perry that MetLife
needed an independent medical exam and an extension of time to
complete the appeal review.
Neither party pointed to any authority from the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals regarding an ERISA plan administrator’s
substantial compliance with ERISA deadlines, and the Court found
9
none.3
a
The courts that have addressed the issue generally apply
substantial
requirements.
compliance
standard
to
ERISA
deadline
The courts “overlook administrators’ failure to
meet certain procedural requirements when the administrator has
substantially complied with the regulations and the process as a
whole
fulfills
the
broader
accompanying regulations.”
purposes
of
ERISA
and
its
Rasenack ex rel. Tribolet v. AIG
Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 1311, 1317 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Gilbertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 328 F.3d 625, 634 (10th Cir.
2003)).
decision
“[A]n
can
procedural
administrator
only
be
in
requirements
evidence-gathering
who
fails
substantial
if
process
there
in
is
which
to
render
compliance
an
the
a
with
ongoing
claimant
timely
ERISA’s
productive
is
kept
reasonably well-informed as to the status of the claim and the
3
MetLife did point to two Eleventh Circuit cases on substantial
compliance with other types of ERISA regulations.
See Perrino v. S.
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 F.3d 1309, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding
no abuse of discretion where the district court declined to waive the
plan participant’s exhaustion requirement when the plan technically
violated ERISA regulations on establishing a reasonable claims
procedure but did not deny “meaningful access to an administrative
remedy procedure through which [the plan participants] may receive an
adequate remedy” and thus substantially complied with ERISA’s
requirements); Counts v. Am. Gen. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 105,
108-09 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding no abuse of discretion where the
district court declined to excuse the plan participant’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies because the plan’s termination letter
substantially complied with ERISA notice requirements, even though it
was technically deficient).
Neither Perrino nor Counts addresses
substantial compliance in the context of a plan administrator missing
its deadline to resolve an appeal, which results in the plan
participant being “deemed to have exhausted the administrative
remedies.”
Heimeshoff,
134
S.
Ct.
at
613
(quoting
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(l)).
10
kinds of information that will satisfy the administrator.”
(quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 636.
Id.
“Pursuant to this test, a
plan administrator is in substantial compliance with a deadline
if the delay is: ‘(1) inconsequential; and (2) in the context of
an
on-going,
administrator
good-faith
and
the
exchange
of
claimant.’”
information
Id.
(quoting
between
Finley
the
v.
Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan,
379 F.3d 1168, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 2004)).
In one case MetLife cited to support its argument on this
point, the district court found that the plan administrator’s
“decision
was
delayed
pending
the
receipt
of
additional
information, either from [the insured’s] family, [the insured’s]
doctors, or from [the insured] herself.”
Lundsten v. Creative
Cmty. Living Servs., Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, No. 13-C108, 2014 WL 2440716, at *5 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2014).
The
Lundsten court also noted that during the review process, the
insured received six letters regarding the status of her appeal
and had several telephone conversations about her appeal with
the insurer’s representatives.
Id.
Thus, the Lundsten court
concluded that there was “an on-going, good faith exchange of
information,
and
inconsequential.”
the
Id.
resulting
In
another
delay
case
was
MetLife
completely
cited,
the
district court noted that although the insurer’s “decision was
not within the regulatory deadline,” the record revealed that it
11
“was
engaged
in
a
good
faith
attempt
to
comply
with
the
deadlines,” attempted to keep the insured informed regarding the
delay, and “did not ignore [the insured’s] appeal until the last
possible
minute.”
Seger
v.
ReliaStar
Life,
No.
3:04
CV
16/RV/MD, 2005 WL 2249905, at *11 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2005).
Here, MetLife’s delay in seeking an extension of time to
review Perry’s appeal was inconsequential.
But that is only one
of the two requirements for substantial compliance.
The problem
for MetLife is that it did not point to any evidence that it was
engaged in an on-going exchange of information with Perry that
justified its delay in resolving her appeal.
MetLife did not
point to any evidence that it asked Perry or her doctors for
additional information before it sent the Extension Letter, and
MetLife did not point to any evidence that the delay was caused
because Perry or her doctors failed to respond to MetLife’s
requests.
And, MetLife did not point to any evidence that it
communicated with Perry about a potential delay of her appeal
before it sent the Extension Letter.
Instead,
based
on
what
MetLife
submitted
to
the
Court,
MetLife acknowledged receipt of Perry’s appeal on November 12,
2015,
assigned
the
appeal
to
another
appeal
specialist
on
December 8, 2015, and did nothing to seek additional information
from Perry or her doctors before December 14, 2015.
The present
record simply does not establish that MetLife engaged in good
12
faith efforts to complete the administrative process.
based
on
the
present
record,
MetLife
comply with ERISA’s deadlines.
did
not
Thus,
substantially
Perry is therefore deemed to
have exhausted administrative remedies, and she is entitled to
proceed to judicial review.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
set
forth
Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is denied.
above,
MetLife’s
Motion
to
Within twenty-one days of the
date of this Order, the parties shall confer and submit a joint
proposed scheduling order that sets forth briefing deadlines for
the parties to seek judgment on the administrative record.
If
either party takes the position that discovery is permitted and
warranted in this action, the party shall provide authority for
this position, explain what discovery is needed, and propose a
discovery schedule.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 30th day of August, 2016.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
13
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