KASSA v. LIFEPOINT HEALTH, INC
Filing
14
ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 02/06/2017. (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
KELI D. KASSA,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
LIFEPOINT HEALTH, INC.,
*
Defendant.
CASE NO. 4:16-CV-333 (CDL)
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff
Keli
Columbus, Georgia.
parent
Kassa
(“ADEA”),
LifePoint
under
29
for
St.
Francis
Hospital
in
She brought this action against the hospital’s
corporation,
discrimination
worked
the
U.S.C. §§
Age
Health,
Inc.,
Discrimination
621-634,
and
in
disability
claiming
age
Employment
Act
discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §
12101 et seq.
arguing
that
action.
LifePoint Health, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss,
Kassa
did
not
timely
file
her
Complaint
in
this
For the reasons set forth below, LifePoint Health Inc.’s
motion (ECF No. 7) is granted.
Both
the
ADEA
and
the
ADA
require
plaintiffs
to
exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with
the
appropriate
administrative
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1);
agency
before
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a);
filing
suit.
(stating
the
procedures set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 apply in employment
actions
under
the
ADA);
42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
If
the
administrative agency dismisses the charge or otherwise terminates
the proceedings, the agency must send the plaintiff notice of that
decision; once the plaintiff receives that notice, she may file a
civil action within ninety days.
2000e-5(f)(1).
29 U.S.C. § 626(e); 42 U.S.C. §
“Dismissal is appropriate when the plaintiff fails
to file her lawsuit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue
letter, unless she shows that the delay was through no fault of
her own.”
Bryant v. U.S. Steel Corp., 428 F. App’x 895, 897 (11th
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
“Once the defendant contests the issue,
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that she filed her
claim within 90 days of receiving the notice.” Id.
Kassa asserts that she brought this action within ninety days
after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity
Commission
(“EEOC”).
She
filed
a
charge
of
discrimination with the EEOC on June 23, 2016, alleging that she
was suspended and terminated from her job because of her age and
disability in January 2016.
Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1; Compl. Ex. A,
June 2016 EEOC Charge, ECF No. 1-1.
Kassa named LifePoint Health,
Inc. as her employer with a street address of 2122 Manchester
Expressway in Columbus, Georgia and an alternate address of 330
Seven Springs Way in Brentwood, Tennessee.
June 2016 EEOC Charge.
Kassa received a right-to-sue letter on July 25, 2016.
Compl.
¶ 6; Compl. Ex. B, July 2016 Right-to-Sue Letter, ECF No. 1-2.
She filed this action within ninety days, on October 13, 2016.
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Based on these facts, standing alone, Kassa’s present action would
be timely.
But that is not the end of the story.
LifePoint Health, Inc. argues that this action is untimely
because
Kassa
previously
filed
an
EEOC
charge
regarding
her
suspension and termination, received a right-to-sue letter, and
filed
a
civil
prejudice.
action
in
this
Court
but
dismissed
it
without
All of the records relating to the prior EEOC charge,
prior right-to-sue letter, and prior action were filed in this
Court,
and
the
Court
“may
take
judicial
notice
of
its
own
records.”
Solis v. Glob. Acceptance Credit Co., L.P., 601 F.
App’x
771
767,
(11th
Cir.
2015)
(per
curiam)
(quoting
United
States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Kassa
filed
a
charge
of
discrimination
with
the
EEOC
on
February 26, 2016, alleging that she was suspended and terminated
from her job because of her age and disability in January 2016.
4:16-cv-192 Compl. Ex. A, Feb. 2016 EEOC Charge, ECF No. 1-1 in
4:16-cv-192.
a
street
Georgia.
Kassa named “LifePoint Health” as her employer with
address
of
2122
Manchester
Feb. 2016 EEOC Charge.
Expressway
in
Columbus,
The only difference between
Kassa’s February 2016 EEOC charge and her June 2016 charge is that
she named “LifePoint Health” instead of “LifePoint Health, Inc.”
in February and she only provided the 2122 Manchester Expressway
address.
Kassa received a right-to-sue letter on March 17, 2016.
4:16-cv-192 Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1 in 4:16-cv-192.
3
She filed her
prior action on June 8, 2016; that action was against “LifePoint
Health
Solutions,
LLC.”
At
some
point,
Kassa
learned
that
LifePoint Health Solutions, LLC is not the parent company of St.
Francis Hospital.
Instead of seeking to amend her Complaint to
add LifePoint Health, Inc., Kassa filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal on June 20, 2016.
LifePoint Health, Inc. argues that the Court should disregard
the second EEOC charge as an improper attempt to restart the 90day clock for filing Kassa’s lawsuit.
Kassa, on the other hand,
contends that the Court should disregard her first EEOC charge and
right-to-sue letter because she named “LifePoint Health” and not
“LifePoint
Health,
Inc.”
in
her
original
EEOC
charge.
Kassa
contends that these are completely different entities and that
LifePoint Health Inc. was not named in the first EEOC charge.
Kassa did not name LifePoint Health Solutions, LLC in either EEOC
charge.
The Court finds Kassa’s argument to be unpersuasive.
EEOC
charges,
Kassa
states
that
she
worked
for
St.
In both
Francis
Hospital and that an entity called LifePoint Health (or LifePoint
Health, Inc.) acquired St. Francis shortly before her termination.
And in both her Complaints, it is clear that Kassa intends to
bring suit against the LifePoint Health that acquired St. Francis
Hospital.
Thus, the Court finds that “LifePoint Health” named in
4
the first EEOC charge is the same entity as “LifePoint Health,
Inc.” named in the second EEOC charge.
Kassa’s second EEOC charge is based on the exact same facts
as her first EEOC charge.
Both right-to-sue letters are likewise
based on the same facts.
The Court agrees with the rationale of
Soso Liang Lo v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 787 F.2d 827, 828
(2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) and finds that under the circumstances
presented here, the question whether Kassa’s present action is
time-barred “must be determined with reference to only the first
Notice of Right to Sue.”
42
U.S.C.
§
Id.
2000e-5(f)(1)
“Otherwise, the time limitations of
[and
29 U.S.C. § 626(e)]
would
be
meaningless, because potential . . . plaintiffs could evade those
requirements simply by seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue
whenever they pleased.”
within
ninety
days
Id.
after
Here, Kassa did not file this action
receiving
following her February 2016 EEOC charge.
the
right-to-sue
letter
This action is therefore
time-barred.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, LifePoint Health Inc.’s motion to dismiss
(ECF No. 7) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 6th day of February, 2017.
s/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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