LOCKETTE v. COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT

Filing 27

ORDER granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 12/06/2018 (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
ERIKA J. LOCKETTE,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED
GOVERNMENT,

*

CASE NO. 4:17-CV-47 (CDL)
*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Erika Lockette
Muscogee County.

is an employee of the Juvenile Court

of

She brought this action against the Columbus

Consolidated Government (“CCG”), claiming that she was subjected
to race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 200e-17
(“Title VII”).

CCG asserts that it is not Lockette’s employer

and seeks summary judgment on this ground.1

For the reasons set

forth below, the motion (ECF No. 23) is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
1

CCG raised this argument in its motion to dismiss. The Court denied
that portion of the motion to dismiss because its review at that time
was limited to the allegations in the Complaint and Lockette
adequately alleged that she was a CCG employee. Order (Nov. 9, 2017),
ECF No. 8. The Court emphasized that “the record may be different at
summary judgment.”
Id.
Despite CCG’s suggestion that she had sued
the wrong entity, Lockette never sought to amend her Complaint to add
Juvenile Court Judge Warner Kennon/the Juvenile Court as a Defendant.

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

In determining whether a

Fed. R.

genuine dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

Under the Court’s local rules, a party moving for summary
judgment

must

attach

to

its

motion

“a

separate

and

concise

statement of the material facts to which the movant contends
there is no genuine dispute to be tried.” M.D. Ga. R. 56. Those
facts

must

be

supported

by

the

record.

The

respondent

to

a

summary judgment motion must respond “to each of the movant’s
numbered material facts.” Id. “All material facts contained in
the movant’s statement which are not specifically controverted
by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the
record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise
inappropriate.” Id.
CCG submitted a statement of undisputed material facts with
its summary judgment motion.
se,

received

a

notice

Lockette, who is proceeding pro

regarding

2

the

significance

of

CCG’s

summary judgment motion and of her opportunity to respond to the
motion and statement of material facts. Notice to Pro Se Party
of

Mot.

for

Summ.

J.,

ECF

No.

24.

Though

Lockette

filed

a

response brief and one exhibit, she did not respond to CCG’s
statement

of

material

facts.

Therefore,

CCG’s

statement

of

material facts is deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.
The Court reviewed CCG’s citations to the record to determine if
a genuine factual dispute exists.
F.3d

1253,

1269

Lockette’s

(11th

response

Discrimination”
arguments.

so

Cir.

2008).

brief
that

See Reese v. Herbert, 527
The

and

it

Court

attached

could

also

reviewed

“Timeline

understand

of

Lockette’s

The unsworn “Timeline of Discrimination” suggests

that Lockette sought assistance from CCG’s human resources when
she encountered difficulties at work (to no avail), but it does
not contain any assertions to suggest that CCG was her employer
and thus would not create a genuine fact dispute on this issue
even if it were reduced to admissible form.
The Court recognizes that Lockette asserts that she could
prove her case if she were given a hearing.
not

argue

justify

that

her

she

is

opposition;

unable
she

to

present

simply

argues

But Lockette does
facts
that

essential
she

to

“cannot

defend against the many verbose motions brought by Defendant(s)
many attorneys without a hearing.”
for Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 25.

Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

The Court finds that a hearing is

3

unnecessary

to

decide

the

issues

raised

by

CCG’s

summary

judgment motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
CCG is a consolidated city-county government.

The Juvenile

Court is under the Muscogee County Superior Court, and it is run
by the Juvenile Court Judge.

Kennon Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 23-3.

Lockette was employed by the Juvenile Court, not CCG.
The

Juvenile

Court

Judge

had

authority

over

conditions of Lockette’s employment Id. ¶ 5.

the

Id. ¶ 4.
terms

and

Lockette was hired

by the Juvenile Court Director on behalf of the Juvenile Court
Judge.

Id.

¶ 9.

The

Juvenile

Court

Judge

made

decisions

regarding the operation and organization of his staff, including
whom to place in staff positions and how to discipline employees
for infractions.

Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 13, 16-17.

Although Lockette’s

benefits and health insurance were through CCG, CCG did not have
any control over the supervision of Lockette, and her salary was
paid by a state grant and not CCG funds.

Id. ¶¶ 6-7.

Lockette

had access to CCG’s “fair treatment process,” but CCG’s role
with regard to Juvenile Court employees is not binding on the
Juvenile Court, and CCG does not have authority to overturn
employment

decisions

made

by

Hollowell Aff. ¶ 9, ECF No. 23-2.

4

the

Juvenile

Court

judge.

DISCUSSION
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee with respect to the terms and conditions of
her employment.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

An employee may

only bring a Title VII action against her employer.
Cobb Cty., 835 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2016).

Peppers v.
The question

for the Court is whether Lockette presented evidence to create a
genuine fact dispute that CCG is her employer.

She did not.

Georgia juvenile courts are authorized under the Georgia
Constitution and created by state statute.
§ 1,

¶ I

(“The

exclusively

judicial

in

the

power

following

of

the

classes

Ga. Const. art. VI,

state
of

shall

courts:

be

vested

magistrate

courts, probate courts, juvenile courts, state courts, superior
courts, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court.”); Ga. Const. art.
VI,

§

1,

circuits,

¶

VI

each

(“The
of

state

which

shall

shall

be

consist

divided
of

not

into
less

judicial
than

one

county. Each county shall have at least one superior court,
magistrate court, a probate court, and, where needed, a state
court and a juvenile court.”); O.C.G.A. § 15-11-50(a) (“There is
created

a

juvenile

court

in

every

county

in

the

state.”).

Juvenile court judges are generally appointed by “a majority of
the

judges

of

the

O.C.G.A. § 15-11-50(b).
training

requirements,

superior
State
and

court
law

other

5

in

each

circuit.”

sets

the

qualifications,

rules

for

juvenile

court

judges.

O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-51

to

15-11-59.

judges are paid in part by state grants.

Juvenile

court

O.C.G.A. § 15-11-

52(c).
Georgia law provides that juvenile court judges “shall have
the

authority

to

appoint

clerks

and

personnel.” O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a).

any

other

[necessary]

And, juvenile court judges

are responsible for fixing the “salary, tenure, compensation,
and all other conditions of employment, with the approval of the
governing
Juvenile

authority
court

county funds,
state

of

the

employee

salaries

id., though

grant.

The

county.”

power

O.C.G.A. §

are

typically

15-11-63(b).
paid

out

of

Lockette’s salary was paid from a
granted

to

counties

by

the

Georgia

Constitution does not extend to “[a]ction affecting any court or
the personnel thereof.”
Based

on

this

Ga. Const. art. IX, § 2, ¶ I(c)(7).

authority,

the

Court

is

satisfied

that

the

Juvenile Court of Muscogee County is separate from CCG.
Even

though

the

Juvenile

Court

and

CCG

are

separate

entities, Lockette could still be considered an employee of CCG
if she established that CCG was her joint employer.
employer”

finding

recognizes

that

the

two

are

A “joint

separate

but

“collaborated to jointly employ an individual.”

Peppers, 835

F.3d

governmental

at

1299.

subdivisions

are

“[W]hen
joint

considering
employers,

whether
[the

two

courts]

must

remain

mindful of the state’s expressed determination that the agencies

6

and subdivisions of government are divided and separated.”

Id.

“The test for determining whether two entities acted as joint
employers

is

relatively

straightforward:

‘The

basis

of

the

finding is simply that one employer while contracting in good
faith with an otherwise independent company, has retained for
itself

sufficient

employment

of

control

the

of

employees

the
who

terms

are

and

conditions

employed

by

the

of

other

employer. Thus, the joint employer concept recognizes that the
business entities involved are in fact separate but that they
share

or

co-determine

those

matters

governing

terms and conditions of employment.’”

the

essential

Id. at 1300 (quoting

Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
In

Peppers,

for

example,

the

Eleventh

Circuit

concluded

that the Cobb County District Attorney’s criminal investigator
had not established that Cobb County was his joint employer.
Although Cobb County “provided paymaster, administrative, and
budgetary functions for the District Attorney’s Office” and “had
authority to approve the District Attorney’s budget, including
individual

salaries,”

Cobb

County

“had

no

involvement

in

recruiting or hiring [the plaintiff] as a criminal investigator,
creating his job title, establishing his job responsibilities
and pay, regulating his work environment, or supervising him in
any way.”

Id.

at 1300-01.

Thus, Cobb County

7

was not

the

criminal

investigator’s

joint

employer.

Likewise,

here,

the

undisputed evidence establishes that CCG was not involved in
hiring

Lockette,

regulating

her

establishing
work

her

environment,

job
or

responsibilities,
supervising

her.

Accordingly, CCG was not Lockette’s employer, and Lockette may
not maintain her Title VII action against CCG.2
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, CCG’s summary judgment motion (ECF No.
23) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 6th day of December, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

2

To the extent that Lockette’s complaint could be construed as one
against “the Juvenile Court of Muscogee County,” the Court finds that
“the Juvenile Court of Muscogee County” is not a legal entity capable
of being sued. The Court expresses no opinion as to whether Lockette
could maintain a claim against a named juvenile court judge in his
official capacity. But no such claim has been asserted here.

8