WILLIAMS v. BROOKS TRUCKING COMPANY INC OF MEMPHIS, et al
Filing
54
ORDER granting 24 Motion to Dismiss; granting 4 Motion to Dismiss; granting 13 Motion to Dismiss; granting 15 Motion to Dismiss, and denying 49 Motion leave to retain counsel. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D. LAND on 6/5/2017 (tlf).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
EMMETT L. WILLIAMS,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
BROOKS TRUCKING COMPANY INC. OF
MEMPHIS, CANAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, RICHARD A. MARCHETTI,
JUDGE WILLIAM C. RUMER, BROWN &
ADAMS, LLC, CLAYTON M. ADAMS,
AUSTIN & SPARKS, P.C., JOHN T.
SPARKS, SR., NALL & MILLER,
LLP, MARK D. LEFKOW,
*
CASE NO. 4:17-CV-58 (CDL)
*
*
*
*
Defendants.
*
O R D E R
This
case
arises
from
a
September
17,
2004
automobile
collision between Plaintiff Emmett Williams and an employee of
Defendant
Brooks
Trucking”).
against
Trucking’s
Company
Trucking
and
lost
a
at
attorney,
Defendant
trial
state
court
action
Richard
Memphis
(“Brooks
(“personal
injury
Marchetti,
having
Proceeding pro se, Williams
based
(“state court constitutional action”).
1
of
He claims that the loss was the result of Brooks
unlawful contact with the jury.1
brought
Inc.
Williams filed a state court personal injury action
Brooks
action”).
Trucking
on
Marchetti’s
conduct
Williams lost that case.
Defendants have notified the Court and parties that Marchetti passed
away on March 27, 2017. ECF No. 5.
Still pro se, Williams now claims in this Court that all of the
attorneys, parties, and the superior court judge involved in his
state court actions violated his rights.
dismiss
or,
alternatively,
for
summary
Defendants move to
judgment.
For
the
reasons discussed below, the Court finds that all Defendants are
entitled to dismissal and grants their motions (ECF Nos. 4, 13,
15,
&
24).
Defendants’
Williams
There
is
alternative
also
obtain counsel.
filed
a
therefore
arguments
motion
no
need
for
indicating
to
address
summary
that
he
some
judgment.
intends
to
To the extent that Williams asks the Court to
defer ruling on Defendants’ motions until he does so, the Court
denies that motion (ECF No. 49).
STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
The factual allegations must be sufficient
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are
true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Thus, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.”
Id. at 556.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Williams does not dispute the authenticity of several state
court
documents
motions.
offered
by
Defendants
in
support
of
their
Considering these documents and accepting Williams’s
factual allegations as true, the record reveals the following.
See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A]
document attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered by
the court without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment only if the attached document is: (1) central to the
plaintiff’s claim; and (2) undisputed . . . mean[ing] that the
authenticity of the document is not challenged.”).
I.
Personal Injury Action
On
September
Trucking
hit
17,
another
2004,
car
an
into
employee
of
Williams’s
Defendant
vehicle.
Brooks
Brooks
Trucking’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, Compl. in SU-06-CV-2981-8 ¶¶ 5
& 6, ECF No. 15-3.
Williams sued for damages in Muscogee County
Superior Court, and the case proceeded to trial before Defendant
Judge
William
Rumer.
Trucking at trial.
Saturday,
jurors.
October
Defendant
Marchetti
represented
Brooks
Williams claims that during a lunch break on
13,
2012,
Marchetti
had
contact
with
two
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Brooks Trucking
later that day.
Williams moved for a new trial based on Marchetti’s alleged
contact
with
the
jurors.
Judge
3
Rumer
held
an
evidentiary
hearing where Marchetti testified that he went to the bailiff’s
office
for
about
fifteen
minutes
during
the
lunch
October 13 to watch an Auburn/Old Miss football game.
break
on
Marchetti
et al.’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 8, Pl.’s Notice of Intent to Seek
Cert. Ex. C, Marchetti Testimony 111:1-8, ECF No. 4-10 at 9.
Apparently, in doing so, Marchetti walked by or through the jury
room.
Marchetti testified that he did not have contact with any
of the jurors because the jurors were still at lunch.
Id. at
111:9-112:9,
denied
ECF
No.
4-10
at
9-10.
Williams’s motion for new trial.
Judge
Rumer
Brooks Trucking’s Mot. to
Dismiss Ex. 11, Order Den. Mot. for New Trial in SU-11-CV-275205, ECF No. 15-13.
Williams appealed, and the Georgia Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal due to Williams’s failure to pay
the filing fee.
Brooks Trucking’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 13, Order
Dismissing Appeal in A14A1332, ECF No. 15-15.
II.
State Court Constitutional Action
On
August
4,
2013,
Williams
sued
Marchetti,
Brooks
Trucking, and Canal Insurance Company, claiming that Marchetti
violated his constitutional rights by tampering with the jury
verdict in the personal injury action and lying about it under
oath.2
Brooks Trucking’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 14, Compl. in SU-
15-CV-2322-05, ECF No. 15-16.
On October 27, 2015, Judge Rumer
2
Presumably,
Canal
Insurance
was
Brooks
Trucking’s
insurer.
Williams’s original complaint in the state court constitutional action
did not include Canal Insurance as a defendant, but he purported to
amend his complaint to add this party.
4
granted Marchetti’s, Brooks Trucking’s, and Canal Insurance’s
motions
to
dismiss
or,
alternatively,
for
summary
judgment.
Brooks Trucking’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 22, Order Granting Defs.’
Respective Mots. to Dismiss/Mots. for Summ. J., ECF No. 15-24.
Williams appealed and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.
Brooks Trucking’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 27, Order in No. A16A1793,
ECF No. 15-29.
court denied.
Den.
Mot.
for
Williams moved for reconsideration, which the
Brooks Trucking’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 36, Order
Reconsideration
in
A16A1793,
ECF
No.
15-38.
Williams appears to have indicated intent to seek certiorari
from the United States Supreme Court, but it is unclear if he
did.
Brooks Trucking’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 37, Notice of Intent
to Seek Cert. 5, ECF No. 15-39.
On March 10, 2017, Williams
filed the present action in this Court.
DISCUSSION
Williams
purports
to
assert
claims
for
due
process
violations, discrimination under Title VII, violations of the
Thirteenth
Amendment
to
the
United
States
extortion, mail fraud, and racketeering.
Constitution,
It is unclear what
conduct Williams believes violates Title VII’s prohibition of
employment
discrimination
prohibition
of
slavery,
and
or
the
the
Thirteenth
Court
finds
Amendment’s
both
provisions inapplicable to the facts of this case.
of
these
Williams’s
claims of extortion and racketeering appear to be based on him
5
paying a filing fee and other costs associated with the state
court constitutional action.
See Pl.’s Resp. 4, ECF No. 33.
Williams’s
claims
fraud
Defendants
serving
litigation.
for
mail
Williams
with
appear
documents
to
be
based
throughout
on
that
See Pl.’s Suppl. Resp. Ex. F, Mail Fraud, ECF No.
44.
None of this conduct violates the law.
that
Williams’s
claims
are
best
The Court finds
characterized
as
42
U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims for violations of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I.
Claims Against Judge Rumer
Williams claims that Judge Rumer violated his due process
rights
by
denying
injury
action
and
his
motion
ruling
constitutional action.
for
against
new
him
trial
in
in
the
the
personal
state
court
He asks for injunctive relief from the
judgments and damages for the constitutional violations.
Court
has
no
authority
to
hear
these
claims.
“The
The
Rooker-
Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the
United States Supreme Court, have no authority to review the
final judgments of state courts.”
Goodman ex rel Goodman v.
Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Siegel v.
LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
The
doctrine extends to “claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’
with the state court judgment” as long as the plaintiff had a
reasonable opportunity to raise these claims in the state court.
6
Id. at 1332 (quoting Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172).
“A federal
claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if
the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state
court
wrongly
decided
the
issues
before
it.”
Id.
(quoting
Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172).
Here, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Rumer’s
rulings and it does not appear that Williams sought review at
the Georgia Supreme Court.
Thus,
Judge Rumer’s rulings are
final state court judgments that this Court cannot overturn.
See Wilson v. Selma Water Works and Sewer Bd., 522 F. App’x 634,
635 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (recognizing that the state
court judgment was final when the state supreme court denied
certiorari).
Rooker-Feldman also extends to Williams’s claims
for damages based on Judge Rumer’s rulings.
Finding that Judge
Rumer acted unconstitutionally in ruling against Williams would
require this Court to determine that Judge Rumer wrongly decided
the issues before him.
And Williams could have asserted that
Judge Rumer acted unconstitutionally in his state court appeal.
Thus, the Court does not appear to have jurisdiction over any of
Williams’s claims against Judge Rumer.
See Goodman, 259 F.3d at
1333 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is broad enough to bar all
federal claims which were, or should have been, central to the
state court decision, even if those claims seek a form of relief
that might not have been available in the state court.”).
7
Williams characterizes his claims against Judge Rumer as a
“rebuttal” lawsuit, see Compl. 19, ECF No. 1, indicating that he
essentially seeks to appeal the state court judgments in this
Court.
See Lindsay v. Adoption by Shepherd Care, Inc., 551 F.
App’x 528, 529 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“[Plaintiff]’s
continued
‘appeal’
insistence
of
the
that
state
his
federal
court
case
parental
is
rights
actually
an
termination
proceeding makes clear this is the type of case precluded by the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.”).
But
due
to
status, his claims are not entirely clear.
further
claims
finds
against
that
to
Judge
the
extent
Rumer
that
that
are
Williams’s
se
Thus, the Court
Williams
not
pro
barred
alleges
by
any
Rooker-
Feldman, Judge Rumer would be entitled to judicial immunity.
Judges are immune from suit for actions taken within their
judicial capacity unless the judge acts in the “clear absence of
all jurisdiction.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978)
(quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872)).
Judge
Rumer was acting in his judicial capacity during all of his
interactions with Williams.
See Wilson v. Bush, 196 F. App’x
796, 798-99 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (recognizing that a
judge acts in his judicial capacity when performing functions
normally performed by a judge).
And Williams does not establish
that Judge Rumer acted without subject matter jurisdiction over
his claims.
See id. at 799 (“A judge does not act in the ‘clear
8
absence
of
all
jurisdiction’
when
he
acts
erroneously,
maliciously, or in excess of his authority, but rather only when
he acts without subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
Accordingly,
the Court grants Judge Rumer’s motion to dismiss.3
II.
Claims Against Other Defendants
Williams also sues Defendants Brown & Adams, LLC, Clayton
Adams, Austin & Sparks, P.C., John Sparks, Sr., Nall & Miller,
LLP, and Mark Lefkow, as well as Marchetti, Brooks Trucking and
Canal
Insurance,
asserting
that
Marchetti
violated
his
constitutional rights by tampering with the jury and lying about
it under oath.
The new Defendants are attorneys and law firms
who
parties
adverse
and/or
state
represented
injury
Williams
action
does
Defendants.
not
allege
Rather,
any
to
Williams
court
specific
Williams’s
in
the
personal
constitutional
action.
facts
claims
regarding
against
these
the
new
Defendants appear to be based on Marchetti allegedly tampering
with the jury and lying about it under oath.
conduct
that
constitutional
Williams
action.
barred by res judicata.
complained
Thus,
of
in
Williams’s
This is the same
his
state
court
claims
are
likely
See Caswell v. Caswell, 290 S.E.2d 171,
172 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that res judicata applied even
3
Williams also appears to ask that this Court order Judge Rumer to
“resurrect” Williams’s state law personal injury action based on new
medical evidence regarding Williams’s damages. Compl. 19. The Court
is without jurisdiction to order Judge Rumer to reopen a final state
court judgment for the reasons stated above.
9
though three new defendants were added because these defendants’
liability was predicated on the same misconduct alleged in the
original action); see also Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d
1241,
1263
(11th
Cir.
2011)
(noting
that
a
district
court
applies Georgia’s law of res judicata to determine whether a
Georgia state court judgment has preclusive effect).
But Defendants do not raise a res judicata defense in their
motions, and therefore, the Court addresses alternative grounds
for
dismissal.
See
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
judicata as an affirmative defense).
8(c)(1)
(listing
res
To state a claim under
§ 1983, Williams must allege that Defendants acted “under color
of state law.”
See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315
(1981) (noting that this is a jurisdictional requirement).
actions
of
a
private
party
do
not
satisfy
this
The
requirement
unless the private party is “clothed with the authority of state
Id. at 317 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
law.”
299, 326 (1941)).
Marchetti’s conduct as a private attorney is
not attributable to the state.
even
a
public
representing
a
defender
client).
Id. at 318-19 (emphasizing that
fulfills
And
a
Williams
private
fails
function
to
allege
when
any
connection between the state and the other private Defendants.
Thus, Williams fails to allege that any Defendants acted under
color of law for purposes of § 1983.
grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
10
Accordingly, the Court
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
stated
above,
the
Court
grants
Defendants’ motions (ECF Nos. 4, 13, 15, & 24).
all
of
The Court
denies Williams’s motion for leave to retain counsel (ECF No.
49).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of June, 2017.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
11
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