PALMER v. DARR et al

Filing 27

ORDER granting 2 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; granting 17 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendants John Darr and Dane Collins are dismissed as explained in the order. Plaintiff's individual capacity claims against Darr and Collins remain pending, as do all of the claims against the other Defendants. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 12/05/2017. (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
QUINTIN PALMER,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC.,
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE
COMPANIES, INC., JOHN DARR in
his individual and official
capacities, COMMANDER DANE
COLLINS in his individual and
official capacities, and Dr.
EDET BASSEY, MD, in his
individual and official
capacities,

*

Defendants.

*
CASE NO. 4:17-CV-102 (CDL)
*
*
*
*

O R D E R
One hundred forty-three county jails are spread throughout
the state of Georgia, housing tens of thousands of detainees on
any given day.1

Many (perhaps most) of these detainees are

awaiting trial and have been convicted of no crime.
are

presumed

to

be

innocent.

Someone

must

Thus, they

address

their

essential needs during their detention, including the provision

1

According to the Georgia Department of Community Affairs, Georgia
county sheriffs reported that there were 38,548 detainees in Georgia
county jails as of November 2, 2017.
Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs
Office
of
Research,
Monthly
Jail
Report
(Nov.
2017),
https://www.dca.ga.gov/development/research/programs/documents/JailRep
ortNov17.pdf. For 2017, the lowest number of detainees was 34,697 in
January and the highest number was 39,046 in September. See Ga. Dept.
of
Cmty.
Affairs
Office
of
Research
Monthly
Jail
Reports,
https://www.dca.ga.gov/development/research/programs/jailReports.asp.

of constitutionally mandated food and healthcare.

Generally,

county sheriffs and the county in which these jails are located
share that responsibility--the sheriff operates the jail and the
county funds it.
may

be

Although operational and fiscal responsibility

clearly

demarcated

under

Georgia

law,

legal

responsibility when something goes wrong apparently is not.

And

thus, the federal reporters are filling up with cases explaining
who

can

be

liable

constitutional
provide

the

when

rights

detainee

a

county

jail

are

violated

with

essential

detainee’s

because

of

needs

a

such

federal

failure
as

food

to
and

medical care.
The issue presently before the Court is whether a county
detainee may recover money damages in a federal court against a
county sheriff in his official capacity to compensate him for
injuries he suffered as a result of the violation of his federal
constitutional
medical care.
a

county

medical

right

receive

constitutionally

mandated

The resolution of this issue depends upon whether

sheriff
care

to

in

acts
a

as

county

a

state

jail.

officer
If

he

when

does,

he

provides

the

Eleventh

Amendment to the United States Constitution protects him from
liability in his official capacity in federal court.
The implications of a ruling that shields a county sheriff
from liability for his unconstitutional conduct in the operation
of a county jail are significant.

2

Such a ruling would deprive a

detainee

in

conscious

a

county

indifference

sheriff of a

jail
to

who
his

is

injured

medical

because

needs

by

of

the

the

county

meaningful remedy in federal court against the

sheriff for this federal constitutional violation.

And if a

finding that the sheriff is a state actor means that he is not a
county actor, the detainee may also have no remedy against the
county pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
rejected

the

sheriff

notion

could

be

that

liable

neither
for

The undersigned previously

the

money

county

damages

nor

the

arising

county

from

the

failure to provide constitutionally mandated medical care to a
county detainee in a county jail.

See Youngs v. Johnson, No.

4:06-CV-19 (CDL), 2008 WL 4816731, at *7-*8 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30,
2008).

But the Eleventh Circuit has laid additional bricks in

the “immunity wall” since the Court rendered that decision, and
in light of recent Eleventh Circuit precedent, it appears that
the Eleventh Amendment blocks a detainee from vindicating his
federal constitutional rights against a Georgia sheriff under
such circumstances.
1334,

1339-42,

reh’g

See Lake v. Skelton (Lake I), 840 F.3d
denied

871

F.3d

1340

(2017)

(en

banc)

(holding that a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the state when

2

To prevail on a claim against the county under § 1983, the detainee
must establish that the sheriff is a final decisionmaker for the
county.
The Court does not have to decide today whether a finding
that a sheriff wears a state hat when performing a particular function
automatically precludes a finding that he also wears a county hat when
performing that same function.
Here, Plaintiff has not sued the
county.

3

he

provides

food

to

county

detainees

in

a

county

jail).3

Although the Eleventh Circuit has not yet held that a Georgia
sheriff is protected by the Eleventh Amendment for his failure
to provide constitutionally mandated medical care to county jail
detainees, a constitutional claim arising from the failure to
provide food, which the Eleventh Circuit held in Lake I cannot
be asserted against a Georgia sheriff in his official capacity
in

federal

court

because

of

the

Eleventh

Amendment,

appears

indistinguishable for Eleventh Amendment purposes from a claim
arising from the failure to provide medical care.
Plaintiff Quintin Palmer suffers from sickle cell disease.
Palmer

alleges

that

he

did

not

receive

adequate

medical

treatment while he was a detainee at the Muscogee County Jail
and that he suffered serious injuries as a result.

He sued

those parties who he claims are legally responsible for his
injuries,

including

the

Muscogee

County

commanding officer in the county jail.

Sheriff

and

his

Palmer sued the sheriff

and his commander in their official and individual capacities.
They seek dismissal of the official capacity claims based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity.

3

The Eleventh Amendment wall protecting sheriffs in this Circuit in
their operation of county jails rests on the foundational holding in
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003), an en banc decision
with five dissenting judges (Anderson, Barkett, Birch, Tjoflat, and
Wilson) and two strongly worded dissenting opinions.

4

Palmer

makes

a

compelling

argument

that

the

Eleventh

Amendment was never intended to shield a county sheriff and his
officers from liability arising from their failure to provide
adequate,
persons

constitutionally
entrusted

precedent

in

this

to

mandated

their

Circuit

medical

care.

has

But

evolved

to

care

Eleventh
provide

to

those

Amendment
an

almost

insurmountable wall protecting Georgia sheriffs sued in their
official

capacities

for

violating

the

rights of county jail detainees.

federal

constitutional

Whether that precedent is

well-reasoned is of no concern to this Court; the Court is duty
bound to apply it.

Based on that precedent, this Court must

find that the sheriff and his jail commander are entitled to
Eleventh
claims.

Amendment

immunity

on

Palmer’s

official

capacity

Their motions to dismiss those claims (ECF Nos. 2 & 17)

are therefore granted.
DISCUSSION
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, “[a]
state is immune from a suit for damages in federal court by one
of its own citizens.”

Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1337 (citing Hans v.

Louisiana,

1,

134

U.S.

14–17

(1890)).

Many

courts

have

explained the ideological rationale for the Eleventh Amendment.
The Amendment

“‘is rooted in a recognition that the States,

although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty,’
and a purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to ‘accord[ ] the

5

States the respect owed them as members of the federation’ and
not

to

affront

the

‘dignity’

or

‘integrity’

of

a

state

by

requiring a state to respond to lawsuits in federal courts.”
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2003) (en
banc)

(alteration

in

original)

(quoting

Hess

v.

Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39-40 (1994)).

Port

Auth.

As a practical

matter, the primary impetus was “the prevention of federal-court
judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury.”

Hess,

513 U.S. at 48.
Eleventh

Amendment

immunity

extends

name a state directly as a party.
when

he

acts

[in

his

official

beyond

actions

that

It also protects “an official
capacity]

as

an

‘arm

of

the

State.’” Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1337 (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at
1308).

But

this

immunity

“does

not

extend

to

counties

and

similar municipal corporations.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).

Therefore, when a

government actor’s unconstitutional conduct causes harm, zealous
lawyers

fight

mightily

over

whether

that

official’s

conduct

arises from the performance of a state function or a local one.
This battle is particularly intense when the government official
appears to wear two hats from time to time—one for certain state
functions and one for local ones.
themselves
capacity

in

the

claims

middle

against

of
a

this

County sheriffs have found
fight.

sheriff

6

and

Because
his

official

deputies

are

considered

claims

fundamental
sheriff

against

question

was

engaged

the

generally
in

a

office
becomes

state

of

the

whether

function

sheriff,
the

when

the

office

its

of

officers

committed the alleged unconstitutional conduct.
The precise issue that the Court must resolve today

is

whether a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State when
providing medical care to county jail detainees.

If the sheriff

acts as an arm of the State when performing this function, then
Palmer’s official capacity claims against the sheriff and his
jail commander are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the
Court

lacks

jurisdiction

over

these

claims.

See,

e.g.,

McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256
(11th

Cir.

2001)

(“[F]ederal

courts

lack

jurisdiction

to

entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
Determining whether a county sheriff is a state official
would seem to be a rather straightforward inquiry.

But we have

learned that it is not enough that the sheriff is the “Sheriff
of Muscogee County” or that his law enforcement responsibilities
are restricted primarily to the geographic boundaries of the
county which he serves.

It appears to matter little that he is

in charge of the county jail and that this jail is funded by the
county taxpayers.
not

terribly

In fact, recent precedent suggests that it is

important

that

the

county

sheriff’s

budget

is

funded by the taxpayers who reside within the county in which

7

the sheriff serves and who elect the county sheriff.

Such facts

are brushed aside as the product of superficial analysis that
must yield, of course, to one of those “sophisticated” multipart

balancing

tests

loved

by

law

professors

and

appellate

judges.
The

four

instructed

factors

to

balance

that
are:

we
“(1)

district
how

judges

have

been

law

defines

the

state

entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the
entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is
responsible for judgments against the
1309.

entity.”

338 F.3d

at

In the 2016 published panel decision in Lake I, two of

the three members of the panel, after weighing these factors,
concluded that a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State in
providing food to county jail detainees.
1340–44.4

Lake I, 840 F.3d at

The panel’s holding and rationale suggest that it

would reach the same conclusion regarding a county sheriff’s
provision

of

detainees.

medical

care

(or

lack

thereof)

to

county

jail

Id.

In fact, Judge Beverly Martin, in her dissent from the en
banc majority decision not to rehear the Lake I panel decision,
made the observation that the decision in Lake I meant that
Georgia

sheriffs

would

be

entitled

4

to

Eleventh

Amendment

Judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr., a United States Circuit Judge for
the Second Circuit, sat by designation on the Lake I panel and
authored a dissent.

8

immunity on medical care claims.

Lake v. Skelton (Lake II), 871

F.3d 1340, 1340 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

She stated, “no

person in a county jail will be able to sue his jailer (in the
jailer’s official capacity) for damages in federal court, even
where the jailer violated the law by depriving the inmate of
life’s

most

care.”

basic

necessities:

food,

clothing,

and

medical

Id. at 1346 (Martin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

In response to Judge Martin’s dissent, Judge William Pryor, who
authored the panel opinion in Lake I, noted that the Lake I
panel

“did

not

decide

whether

the

sheriff

is

entitled

to

sovereign immunity when he provides medical care,” and he stated
that “a review of Georgia law might lead to a different result
in a case about the provision of medical care.”

Id. at 1344.

But he did not explain how the provision of medical care was
distinguishable
Amendment

from

purposes.

the

provision

While

it

was

of

food

unnecessary

for
to

Eleventh
make

that

distinction in Lake I, it cannot be ignored that Lake I (1)
examined

Georgia

statutes

that

govern

both

the

provision

of

medical care and the provision of food in Georgia county jails
and (2) analogized the sheriff’s duty to provide food to county
jail detainees to the sheriff’s duty to provide medical care to
county jail detainees.

See Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1339-42.

Thus,

while Lake I may not mandatorily bind future panels on the issue

9

of Eleventh Amendment immunity from county jail detainee medical
claims, it certainly will constrain them.
Bound
rationale,
Amendment

by

the

this

holding

Court

purposes

can

between

in

Lake

find
a

I

and

constrained

no

distinction

county

sheriff

for

by

its

Eleventh

feeding

county

detainees in a county jail and a county sheriff taking care of
the medical needs of those same county detainees in that same
county

jail.

Thus,

with

reservations

as

to

whether

this

analysis reaches the proper constitutional result but with no
hesitation that it is required by current binding precedent in
this Circuit, the Court finds that the sheriff and his commander
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity here.
It is likely sufficient to rest today’s holding on a simple
proposition: because the provision of medical care cannot be
distinguished from the provision of food for Eleventh Amendment
purposes, Lake I requires a finding of immunity in this case.
But for the sake of thoroughness, the Court performs the four
part balancing test established by Manders as elucidated by Lake
I.
I.

How State Law Defines the Function
The first factor the Court must consider is how Georgia law

defines the function in question.

By statute, Georgia assigns

certain duties directly to the sheriff.
1339.

Lake I, 840 F.3d at

One of those duties is the duty to furnish medical aid to

10

county jail detainees.

Id.; accord O.C.G.A. § 42–4–4(a)(2) (“It

shall be the duty of the sheriff . . . [t]o furnish persons
confined in the jail with medical aid . . . . to be reimbursed
if necessary from the county treasury[.]”).
I’s

interpretation

interpreted

of

Georgia

law,

According to Lake

“Georgia

[O.C.G.A. § 42-4-4(a)(2)]

as

courts

giving

have

sheriffs

exclusive control vis-à-vis the county over choosing vendors for
medical care.”

Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1339 (citing Bd. of Comm'rs

of Spalding Cty. v. Stewart, 668 S.E.2d 644, 645 (Ga. 2008)).
Other Georgia statutes further specify the sheriff’s duties with
regard

to

inmate

supervision.

health

O.C.G.A. §

in

a

facility

42-4-32(c)

under

requires

the

sheriff’s

regular

health

inspections of jail facilities and requires “adequate separation
[of] and treatment given [to]” new inmates.

O.C.G.A. § 42-4-

32(d) requires that each inmate be “observed daily” and that “a
physician shall be immediately called if there are indications
of serious injury, wound, or illness.”

And O.C.G.A. § 42-4-

51(b)

a

requires

the

sheriff

to

“provide

sick,

injured,

or

disabled inmate access to medical services.”
Although state law mandates that a sheriff must provide a
minimum level of medical care to detainees in his custody, a
strong argument can be made that state law does not clearly
establish

that

the

provision

responsibility of the sheriff.

of

medical

care

is

solely

the

Georgia law also indicates that

11

the county that must fund the county jail shares responsibility
for

the

persons

detained

in

the

county

jail.

Georgia

law

generally provides that “it shall be the responsibility of the
governmental unit, subdivision, or agency having the physical
custody of an inmate to maintain the inmate, furnishing him
food,

clothing,

certainly

any

O.C.G.A.

attention[.]”

and

§

applies

to

the

needed

medical

42-5-2(a).
sheriff,

and

While

it

also

hospital

this
seems

mandate
to

have

application to the county as the “governmental unit . . . having
custody of an inmate.”
S.E.2d

539,

542

(Ga.

See Middlebrooks v. Bibb County, 582
Ct.

App.

2003)

(“[A]

county

has

[a]

legislative duty to provide an inmate in its custody and care
with medical care.”), overruled on other grounds by Tatnall Cty.
v. Armstrong, 775 S.E.2d 573, 576-77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
panel

in

O.C.G.A. §

Lake

I,

however,

42-5-2(a).

It

rejected
concluded

this
that

The

interpretation
this

provision

of
of

Georgia law requires “the sheriff to ‘take . . . custody of the
jail and the bodies of such persons as are confined therein.’”
Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1340 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 42–4–4(a)(1)).

And

the sheriff “is the ‘governmental unit, subdivision, or agency’
having

custody

of

O.C.G.A. § 42–5–2.

inmates

in

county

jails”

for

purposes

of

Thus, this statutory provision supports the

“conclusion that Georgia imposes food-service responsibilities
directly on the sheriff as part of his custodial duties.”

12

Id.

The

Lake

I

panel

also

found

it

significant

that

O.C.G.A. § “42–4–32 imposes duties directly on the sheriff, a
constitutional officer of the state of Georgia . . . and not on
the county in which the jail is located.”
1340

(internal

citation

omitted).

Lake I, 840 F.3d at

According

to

the

Lake

I

panel, this duty set forth in state law “is evidence that the
provision of food is a state function under Georgia law.”
The

same

statute,

O.C.G.A. § 42-4-32,

sets

forth

requirements regarding the provision of medical care.

Id.
some

And the

Court can conceive of no basis for concluding that the Court of
Appeals would find that the provision of food in county jails is
a state function, as the panel did in Lake I, while concluding
that the provision of medical care is not.
Finally, the Lake I panel looked to the “broader context
and structure of Georgia law.” Id. at 1341.

It noted that the

sheriff holds a constitutional office independent of the county
and its governing body and that counties “do not delegate power
to sheriffs” or have the ability to exercise authority over how
a sheriff spends his budget.
respect

to

county

jails,

Id.

The panel found that “[w]ith

[O.C.G.A. §]

42–5–2

imposes

two

separate duties: the county must fund the provision of medical
care, and the sheriff must select an appropriate provider and
ensure

that

inmates

receive

care

when

necessary.”

Id.

According to Lake I, “[t]he Georgia Court of Appeals has never

13

construed section 42–5–2 to mean that a sheriff acts on behalf
of the county when he provides medical care.”

Id.

“Instead,

the Georgia Court of Appeals . . . distinguishes between the
duty imposed by section 42–5–2 on a county to fund medical care
and the duty of a sheriff to provide medical care.”
on

the

appeals

way

the

Georgia

interpreted

Supreme

O.C.G.A. §

Court
42-5-2

and
with

Id.

Georgia
regard

Based

Court
to

of
the

provision of medical care, the Lake I panel found that the duty
to feed inmates, like the duty to provide them with medical
care, “is not delegated by the county but instead is ‘directly
assigned

by

the

state.’”

Lake

I,

840

F.3d

at

1342

(quoting

Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319).
In summary, based on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in
Lake I, the Court finds that Georgia law defines the provision
of medical care to county jail detainees by the sheriff and his
staff to be a state function.5
II.

Where State Law Vests Control
As to the second factor, the Lake I panel concluded that

“Georgia law vests control over the denial of [an inmate’s]
dietary request in the state through the law on feeding inmates
5

If this Court were writing on a blank slate, it would conclude that
Georgia law defines the provision of medical care to county jail
detainees to be a joint function shared by the sheriff as a state
official and by the county as the “owner” and “funder” of the county
jail.
This does not mean that the sheriff does not act as a state
actor when providing such medical care, but this factor may should be
weighed differently in the Manders calculus if that responsibility is
shared with a local government.

14

in

county

jails

deputies.”

Lake

and
I,

the
840

law

on

F.3d

at

training
1342.

and

The

disciplining

same

rationale

extends to the provision of medical care in a county jail.
discussed

above,

Georgia

law

contains

specific

As

provisions

governing the provision of medical care to county jail inmates;
state law gives the sheriff, who is the officer in charge of the
county
care.

jail,

the

function

of

providing

inmates

with

medical

In fact, “Georgia courts have interpreted [O.C.G.A. § 42-

4-4(a)(2)] as giving sheriffs exclusive control vis-à-vis the
county over choosing vendors for medical care.”

Id. at 1339.6

Furthermore, “[t]he training and discipline of deputies provides
further

evidence

(explaining

how

of

control

by

the

state

has

discipline of sheriff’s deputies).

the

state.”

control

over

Id.

at

training

1343
and

Thus, following Lake I, the

Court concludes that, under Georgia law, the State controls the
provision of medical care in a county jail.
6

Palmer notes that when CCG contracted with a private company, Correct
Care Solutions, to provide medical care to inmates, the sheriff signed
the contract “acting as an agent of CCG.” Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 11.
As discussed above, a county sheriff has the power to select a medical
services provider for the county jail, although the county has a duty
to pay for medical care to inmates.
Under the rationale of Lake I,
the fact that the sheriff signed the agreement with Correct Care
Solutions does not mean that the sheriff is not an arm of the State in
providing medical care to inmates in the Muscogee County Jail. But a
joint arrangement for the provision of medical care to county
detainees may should affect the weight given to this factor in the
Manders analysis.
Moreover, it raises the possibility of a county
being legally responsible even if the sheriff acts on behalf of the
state if he also represents the county as its final decisionmaker in
the joint enterprise of providing medical care to county detainees.
The Court does not need to decide that issue here because Plaintiff
has not sued CCG.

15

The Court does note, however, that Palmer’s argument to the
contrary is not frivolous.
Georgia

law

to

provide

“quintessentially

local

The five dissenters in Manders read
that

county

institutions

jails

that

in

Georgia

are

exist

separate

and

apart from the state’s integrated system of prisons [and that]
[t]heir operation is among the responsibilities of the county
and, specifically, the county sheriff.”
1332 (Barkett, J., dissenting).

Manders 338 F.3d at

The Court also observes that

the sheriff’s operation of the county jail is not unfettered.
County

governing

authorities

have

oversight

over

a

sheriff’s

operation of the county jail through the investigative powers of
grand

juries,

which

must

inspect

jails

recommendations to the county government.
71(b);

see

also

O.C.G.A.

§

15-12-78

annually

and

make

See O.C.G.A. § 15-12(“Grand

juries

shall

carefully inspect the sanitary condition of the jails of their
respective counties at each regular inspection[.]”).

Moreover,

a county may be answerable to the federal government for the
operation

of

county

jails.

Palmer

asserts

that

in

a

1999

consent decree between the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Columbus

Consolidated

Government

(“CCG”—the

consolidated

government of Muscogee County and the City of Columbus), the
parties

agreed

that

Muscogee

County

has

a

duty

to

provide

medical care at the jail and that the sheriff acts on behalf of

16

the county in providing medical care.7
the

United

States

Justice

While not dispositive,

Department’s

recognition

of

the

county’s substantial responsibility for providing medical care
to county jail detainees should not be ignored in evaluating the
weight to give to the factor of where the state vests control.
As

noted

previously,

it

is

the

undersigned’s

view

that

the

county and the sheriff share responsibility for the provision of
medical care in the county jail.

This sharing of responsibility

supports an argument that this factor is not decisive under the
Manders calculus.
III. Source of Funds
The Lake I panel found that the third factor, “source of
funding for the function at issue,” weighed slightly in favor of
immunity.

Id.

at

1343-44.

understand how this can be.
state

law

detainees.

required

the

Candidly,

the

Court

does

not

The panel in Lake I found that

county

to

pay

to

provide

food

to

Likewise, here, state law requires the county to pay

for the provision of medical care to detainees.

See Lake I, 840

F.3d at 1341 (“With respect to county jails, [O.C.G.A. §] 42–5–2
imposes two separate duties: the county must fund the provision
7

Palmer also points out that the sheriff previously sued the Columbus
Consolidated Government for failing to appropriate sufficient funding
for inmate medical care.
He alleged in that action that he was a
county officer within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 45-9-21(e).
Perhaps
he was mistaken, but a more reasonable reconciliation of his opinion
of his position and Georgia law is that a Georgia sheriff sometimes
wears a state hat, but he sometimes wears two hats, a state one and a
county one.

17

of medical care, and the sheriff must select an appropriate
provider and ensure that inmates receive care when necessary.”).
The panel in Lake I notes that “[t]he state pays for some of the
operations of the sheriff’s office, and the county ‘bears the
major burden of funding [the sheriff’s] office . . . because the
State

so

(quoting

mandates.’”
Manders,

338

Id.

at

F.3d

1344

at

(alterations

1323).

According

in

original)

to

Lake

“[u]nder Manders, this factor slightly favors immunity.”

I,
Id.

Thus, under Lake I’s interpretation of Manders, it appears that
any time the State imposes an unfunded mandate upon a county
that

requires

the

county

to

perform

a

function

using

county funds, that function becomes a state function,

local
not a

county one.8
IV.

Responsibility for Adverse Judgments
“The fourth factor looks to ‘the source of the funds that

will pay any adverse judgment.’” Id. (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d
at 1324).

“[T]he vulnerability of the State’s purse” has been

recognized “as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
determinations.”

Hess, 513 U.S. at 48.

According to Lake I,

“[i]n Georgia, counties are not liable for judgments against the
sheriff in his official capacity, . . . and no law requires the
state

to

pay

an

adverse

judgment

8

against

a

sheriff

in

his

The Court acknowledges that the Manders court did not go this far,
and specifically stated, “[w]e stress that this case does not involve
medical care, which counties have a statutory obligation to provide to
inmates in county jails.” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323 n.43.

18

official capacity . . . .”
omitted).

Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1344. (citations

“Instead, the sheriff ‘apparently would have to pay

any adverse federal court judgment against him in his official
capacity

out

[according
funds.’”

of

to

the

Lake

budget

I]

of

the

sheriff's

‘implicate[s]’

‘both

office,’

county

and

which
state

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Manders, 338

F.3d at 1327).

With all due respect to the Court of Appeals, it

is sheer speculation to conclude that state funds would ever be
used in a material way to pay off a judgment against a sheriff
in

his

official

capacity

for

his

failure

to

provide

constitutionally mandated medical care to county jail detainees.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to conclude that a county,
which is mandated to fund the sheriff’s operation of a county
jail and the provision of medical care to county jail detainees,
would have to appropriate sufficient funds to operate the jail
taking into consideration that part of those county funds will
be used to pay an adverse judgment arising from the operation of
that county jail.

Thus, it is more likely that the county, not

the state, would have to pay for an adverse judgment against the
sheriff.

Accordingly, this most important factor in the Manders

analysis would seem to support a denial of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.

But

the

Lake

I

panel

brushed

off

this

factor

concluding that Manders supports (or perhaps requires) it to do
so.

Quoting Manders, the Lake I panel stated, “[a]t a minimum,

19

this final factor does not defeat immunity.”

Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1338).

In light of the

similarity in the way that Georgia law treats the provision of
food and the provision of medical care to county jail detainees,
the Court has no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals,
following Lake I, would find this factor dispositive here while
summarily dismissing it there.
CONCLUSION
As

discussed

above,

the

Court

finds

that

the

Eleventh

Circuit’s decision in Lake I requires the Court to conclude for
purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, that Sheriff Darr and
Commander

Collins

acted

as

arms

of

the

State

medical care to Muscogee County jail detainees.

in

providing

Therefore, the

Court grants Darr and Collins’s motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 2 &
17)

the

individual

official
capacity

capacity
claims

claims

against

against

Darr

them.

and

Palmer’s

Collins

remain

pending, as do all of the claims against the other Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of December, 2017.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

20