PALMER v. DARR et al
Filing
27
ORDER granting 2 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; granting 17 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendants John Darr and Dane Collins are dismissed as explained in the order. Plaintiff's individual capacity claims against Darr and Collins remain pending, as do all of the claims against the other Defendants. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 12/05/2017. (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
QUINTIN PALMER,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC.,
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE
COMPANIES, INC., JOHN DARR in
his individual and official
capacities, COMMANDER DANE
COLLINS in his individual and
official capacities, and Dr.
EDET BASSEY, MD, in his
individual and official
capacities,
*
Defendants.
*
CASE NO. 4:17-CV-102 (CDL)
*
*
*
*
O R D E R
One hundred forty-three county jails are spread throughout
the state of Georgia, housing tens of thousands of detainees on
any given day.1
Many (perhaps most) of these detainees are
awaiting trial and have been convicted of no crime.
are
presumed
to
be
innocent.
Someone
must
Thus, they
address
their
essential needs during their detention, including the provision
1
According to the Georgia Department of Community Affairs, Georgia
county sheriffs reported that there were 38,548 detainees in Georgia
county jails as of November 2, 2017.
Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs
Office
of
Research,
Monthly
Jail
Report
(Nov.
2017),
https://www.dca.ga.gov/development/research/programs/documents/JailRep
ortNov17.pdf. For 2017, the lowest number of detainees was 34,697 in
January and the highest number was 39,046 in September. See Ga. Dept.
of
Cmty.
Affairs
Office
of
Research
Monthly
Jail
Reports,
https://www.dca.ga.gov/development/research/programs/jailReports.asp.
of constitutionally mandated food and healthcare.
Generally,
county sheriffs and the county in which these jails are located
share that responsibility--the sheriff operates the jail and the
county funds it.
may
be
Although operational and fiscal responsibility
clearly
demarcated
under
Georgia
law,
legal
responsibility when something goes wrong apparently is not.
And
thus, the federal reporters are filling up with cases explaining
who
can
be
liable
constitutional
provide
the
when
rights
detainee
a
county
jail
are
violated
with
essential
detainee’s
because
of
needs
a
such
federal
failure
as
food
to
and
medical care.
The issue presently before the Court is whether a county
detainee may recover money damages in a federal court against a
county sheriff in his official capacity to compensate him for
injuries he suffered as a result of the violation of his federal
constitutional
medical care.
a
county
medical
right
receive
constitutionally
mandated
The resolution of this issue depends upon whether
sheriff
care
to
in
acts
a
as
county
a
state
jail.
officer
If
he
when
does,
he
provides
the
Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects him from
liability in his official capacity in federal court.
The implications of a ruling that shields a county sheriff
from liability for his unconstitutional conduct in the operation
of a county jail are significant.
2
Such a ruling would deprive a
detainee
in
conscious
a
county
indifference
sheriff of a
jail
to
who
his
is
injured
medical
because
needs
by
of
the
the
county
meaningful remedy in federal court against the
sheriff for this federal constitutional violation.
And if a
finding that the sheriff is a state actor means that he is not a
county actor, the detainee may also have no remedy against the
county pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
rejected
the
sheriff
notion
could
be
that
liable
neither
for
The undersigned previously
the
money
county
damages
nor
the
arising
county
from
the
failure to provide constitutionally mandated medical care to a
county detainee in a county jail.
See Youngs v. Johnson, No.
4:06-CV-19 (CDL), 2008 WL 4816731, at *7-*8 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30,
2008).
But the Eleventh Circuit has laid additional bricks in
the “immunity wall” since the Court rendered that decision, and
in light of recent Eleventh Circuit precedent, it appears that
the Eleventh Amendment blocks a detainee from vindicating his
federal constitutional rights against a Georgia sheriff under
such circumstances.
1334,
1339-42,
reh’g
See Lake v. Skelton (Lake I), 840 F.3d
denied
871
F.3d
1340
(2017)
(en
banc)
(holding that a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the state when
2
To prevail on a claim against the county under § 1983, the detainee
must establish that the sheriff is a final decisionmaker for the
county.
The Court does not have to decide today whether a finding
that a sheriff wears a state hat when performing a particular function
automatically precludes a finding that he also wears a county hat when
performing that same function.
Here, Plaintiff has not sued the
county.
3
he
provides
food
to
county
detainees
in
a
county
jail).3
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not yet held that a Georgia
sheriff is protected by the Eleventh Amendment for his failure
to provide constitutionally mandated medical care to county jail
detainees, a constitutional claim arising from the failure to
provide food, which the Eleventh Circuit held in Lake I cannot
be asserted against a Georgia sheriff in his official capacity
in
federal
court
because
of
the
Eleventh
Amendment,
appears
indistinguishable for Eleventh Amendment purposes from a claim
arising from the failure to provide medical care.
Plaintiff Quintin Palmer suffers from sickle cell disease.
Palmer
alleges
that
he
did
not
receive
adequate
medical
treatment while he was a detainee at the Muscogee County Jail
and that he suffered serious injuries as a result.
He sued
those parties who he claims are legally responsible for his
injuries,
including
the
Muscogee
County
commanding officer in the county jail.
Sheriff
and
his
Palmer sued the sheriff
and his commander in their official and individual capacities.
They seek dismissal of the official capacity claims based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
3
The Eleventh Amendment wall protecting sheriffs in this Circuit in
their operation of county jails rests on the foundational holding in
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003), an en banc decision
with five dissenting judges (Anderson, Barkett, Birch, Tjoflat, and
Wilson) and two strongly worded dissenting opinions.
4
Palmer
makes
a
compelling
argument
that
the
Eleventh
Amendment was never intended to shield a county sheriff and his
officers from liability arising from their failure to provide
adequate,
persons
constitutionally
entrusted
precedent
in
this
to
mandated
their
Circuit
medical
care.
has
But
evolved
to
care
Eleventh
provide
to
those
Amendment
an
almost
insurmountable wall protecting Georgia sheriffs sued in their
official
capacities
for
violating
the
rights of county jail detainees.
federal
constitutional
Whether that precedent is
well-reasoned is of no concern to this Court; the Court is duty
bound to apply it.
Based on that precedent, this Court must
find that the sheriff and his jail commander are entitled to
Eleventh
claims.
Amendment
immunity
on
Palmer’s
official
capacity
Their motions to dismiss those claims (ECF Nos. 2 & 17)
are therefore granted.
DISCUSSION
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, “[a]
state is immune from a suit for damages in federal court by one
of its own citizens.”
Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1337 (citing Hans v.
Louisiana,
1,
134
U.S.
14–17
(1890)).
Many
courts
have
explained the ideological rationale for the Eleventh Amendment.
The Amendment
“‘is rooted in a recognition that the States,
although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty,’
and a purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to ‘accord[ ] the
5
States the respect owed them as members of the federation’ and
not
to
affront
the
‘dignity’
or
‘integrity’
of
a
state
by
requiring a state to respond to lawsuits in federal courts.”
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2003) (en
banc)
(alteration
in
original)
(quoting
Hess
v.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39-40 (1994)).
Port
Auth.
As a practical
matter, the primary impetus was “the prevention of federal-court
judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury.”
Hess,
513 U.S. at 48.
Eleventh
Amendment
immunity
extends
name a state directly as a party.
when
he
acts
[in
his
official
beyond
actions
that
It also protects “an official
capacity]
as
an
‘arm
of
the
State.’” Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1337 (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at
1308).
But
this
immunity
“does
not
extend
to
counties
and
similar municipal corporations.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
Therefore, when a
government actor’s unconstitutional conduct causes harm, zealous
lawyers
fight
mightily
over
whether
that
official’s
conduct
arises from the performance of a state function or a local one.
This battle is particularly intense when the government official
appears to wear two hats from time to time—one for certain state
functions and one for local ones.
themselves
capacity
in
the
claims
middle
against
of
a
this
County sheriffs have found
fight.
sheriff
6
and
Because
his
official
deputies
are
considered
claims
fundamental
sheriff
against
question
was
engaged
the
generally
in
a
office
becomes
state
of
the
whether
function
sheriff,
the
when
the
office
its
of
officers
committed the alleged unconstitutional conduct.
The precise issue that the Court must resolve today
is
whether a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State when
providing medical care to county jail detainees.
If the sheriff
acts as an arm of the State when performing this function, then
Palmer’s official capacity claims against the sheriff and his
jail commander are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the
Court
lacks
jurisdiction
over
these
claims.
See,
e.g.,
McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256
(11th
Cir.
2001)
(“[F]ederal
courts
lack
jurisdiction
to
entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
Determining whether a county sheriff is a state official
would seem to be a rather straightforward inquiry.
But we have
learned that it is not enough that the sheriff is the “Sheriff
of Muscogee County” or that his law enforcement responsibilities
are restricted primarily to the geographic boundaries of the
county which he serves.
It appears to matter little that he is
in charge of the county jail and that this jail is funded by the
county taxpayers.
not
terribly
In fact, recent precedent suggests that it is
important
that
the
county
sheriff’s
budget
is
funded by the taxpayers who reside within the county in which
7
the sheriff serves and who elect the county sheriff.
Such facts
are brushed aside as the product of superficial analysis that
must yield, of course, to one of those “sophisticated” multipart
balancing
tests
loved
by
law
professors
and
appellate
judges.
The
four
instructed
factors
to
balance
that
are:
we
“(1)
district
how
judges
have
been
law
defines
the
state
entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the
entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is
responsible for judgments against the
1309.
entity.”
338 F.3d
at
In the 2016 published panel decision in Lake I, two of
the three members of the panel, after weighing these factors,
concluded that a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State in
providing food to county jail detainees.
1340–44.4
Lake I, 840 F.3d at
The panel’s holding and rationale suggest that it
would reach the same conclusion regarding a county sheriff’s
provision
of
detainees.
medical
care
(or
lack
thereof)
to
county
jail
Id.
In fact, Judge Beverly Martin, in her dissent from the en
banc majority decision not to rehear the Lake I panel decision,
made the observation that the decision in Lake I meant that
Georgia
sheriffs
would
be
entitled
4
to
Eleventh
Amendment
Judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr., a United States Circuit Judge for
the Second Circuit, sat by designation on the Lake I panel and
authored a dissent.
8
immunity on medical care claims.
Lake v. Skelton (Lake II), 871
F.3d 1340, 1340 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
She stated, “no
person in a county jail will be able to sue his jailer (in the
jailer’s official capacity) for damages in federal court, even
where the jailer violated the law by depriving the inmate of
life’s
most
care.”
basic
necessities:
food,
clothing,
and
medical
Id. at 1346 (Martin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
In response to Judge Martin’s dissent, Judge William Pryor, who
authored the panel opinion in Lake I, noted that the Lake I
panel
“did
not
decide
whether
the
sheriff
is
entitled
to
sovereign immunity when he provides medical care,” and he stated
that “a review of Georgia law might lead to a different result
in a case about the provision of medical care.”
Id. at 1344.
But he did not explain how the provision of medical care was
distinguishable
Amendment
from
purposes.
the
provision
While
it
was
of
food
unnecessary
for
to
Eleventh
make
that
distinction in Lake I, it cannot be ignored that Lake I (1)
examined
Georgia
statutes
that
govern
both
the
provision
of
medical care and the provision of food in Georgia county jails
and (2) analogized the sheriff’s duty to provide food to county
jail detainees to the sheriff’s duty to provide medical care to
county jail detainees.
See Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1339-42.
Thus,
while Lake I may not mandatorily bind future panels on the issue
9
of Eleventh Amendment immunity from county jail detainee medical
claims, it certainly will constrain them.
Bound
rationale,
Amendment
by
the
this
holding
Court
purposes
can
between
in
Lake
find
a
I
and
constrained
no
distinction
county
sheriff
for
by
its
Eleventh
feeding
county
detainees in a county jail and a county sheriff taking care of
the medical needs of those same county detainees in that same
county
jail.
Thus,
with
reservations
as
to
whether
this
analysis reaches the proper constitutional result but with no
hesitation that it is required by current binding precedent in
this Circuit, the Court finds that the sheriff and his commander
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity here.
It is likely sufficient to rest today’s holding on a simple
proposition: because the provision of medical care cannot be
distinguished from the provision of food for Eleventh Amendment
purposes, Lake I requires a finding of immunity in this case.
But for the sake of thoroughness, the Court performs the four
part balancing test established by Manders as elucidated by Lake
I.
I.
How State Law Defines the Function
The first factor the Court must consider is how Georgia law
defines the function in question.
By statute, Georgia assigns
certain duties directly to the sheriff.
1339.
Lake I, 840 F.3d at
One of those duties is the duty to furnish medical aid to
10
county jail detainees.
Id.; accord O.C.G.A. § 42–4–4(a)(2) (“It
shall be the duty of the sheriff . . . [t]o furnish persons
confined in the jail with medical aid . . . . to be reimbursed
if necessary from the county treasury[.]”).
I’s
interpretation
interpreted
of
Georgia
law,
According to Lake
“Georgia
[O.C.G.A. § 42-4-4(a)(2)]
as
courts
giving
have
sheriffs
exclusive control vis-à-vis the county over choosing vendors for
medical care.”
Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1339 (citing Bd. of Comm'rs
of Spalding Cty. v. Stewart, 668 S.E.2d 644, 645 (Ga. 2008)).
Other Georgia statutes further specify the sheriff’s duties with
regard
to
inmate
supervision.
health
O.C.G.A. §
in
a
facility
42-4-32(c)
under
requires
the
sheriff’s
regular
health
inspections of jail facilities and requires “adequate separation
[of] and treatment given [to]” new inmates.
O.C.G.A. § 42-4-
32(d) requires that each inmate be “observed daily” and that “a
physician shall be immediately called if there are indications
of serious injury, wound, or illness.”
And O.C.G.A. § 42-4-
51(b)
a
requires
the
sheriff
to
“provide
sick,
injured,
or
disabled inmate access to medical services.”
Although state law mandates that a sheriff must provide a
minimum level of medical care to detainees in his custody, a
strong argument can be made that state law does not clearly
establish
that
the
provision
responsibility of the sheriff.
of
medical
care
is
solely
the
Georgia law also indicates that
11
the county that must fund the county jail shares responsibility
for
the
persons
detained
in
the
county
jail.
Georgia
law
generally provides that “it shall be the responsibility of the
governmental unit, subdivision, or agency having the physical
custody of an inmate to maintain the inmate, furnishing him
food,
clothing,
certainly
any
O.C.G.A.
attention[.]”
and
§
applies
to
the
needed
medical
42-5-2(a).
sheriff,
and
While
it
also
hospital
this
seems
mandate
to
have
application to the county as the “governmental unit . . . having
custody of an inmate.”
S.E.2d
539,
542
(Ga.
See Middlebrooks v. Bibb County, 582
Ct.
App.
2003)
(“[A]
county
has
[a]
legislative duty to provide an inmate in its custody and care
with medical care.”), overruled on other grounds by Tatnall Cty.
v. Armstrong, 775 S.E.2d 573, 576-77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
panel
in
O.C.G.A. §
Lake
I,
however,
42-5-2(a).
It
rejected
concluded
this
that
The
interpretation
this
provision
of
of
Georgia law requires “the sheriff to ‘take . . . custody of the
jail and the bodies of such persons as are confined therein.’”
Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1340 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 42–4–4(a)(1)).
And
the sheriff “is the ‘governmental unit, subdivision, or agency’
having
custody
of
O.C.G.A. § 42–5–2.
inmates
in
county
jails”
for
purposes
of
Thus, this statutory provision supports the
“conclusion that Georgia imposes food-service responsibilities
directly on the sheriff as part of his custodial duties.”
12
Id.
The
Lake
I
panel
also
found
it
significant
that
O.C.G.A. § “42–4–32 imposes duties directly on the sheriff, a
constitutional officer of the state of Georgia . . . and not on
the county in which the jail is located.”
1340
(internal
citation
omitted).
Lake I, 840 F.3d at
According
to
the
Lake
I
panel, this duty set forth in state law “is evidence that the
provision of food is a state function under Georgia law.”
The
same
statute,
O.C.G.A. § 42-4-32,
sets
forth
requirements regarding the provision of medical care.
Id.
some
And the
Court can conceive of no basis for concluding that the Court of
Appeals would find that the provision of food in county jails is
a state function, as the panel did in Lake I, while concluding
that the provision of medical care is not.
Finally, the Lake I panel looked to the “broader context
and structure of Georgia law.” Id. at 1341.
It noted that the
sheriff holds a constitutional office independent of the county
and its governing body and that counties “do not delegate power
to sheriffs” or have the ability to exercise authority over how
a sheriff spends his budget.
respect
to
county
jails,
Id.
The panel found that “[w]ith
[O.C.G.A. §]
42–5–2
imposes
two
separate duties: the county must fund the provision of medical
care, and the sheriff must select an appropriate provider and
ensure
that
inmates
receive
care
when
necessary.”
Id.
According to Lake I, “[t]he Georgia Court of Appeals has never
13
construed section 42–5–2 to mean that a sheriff acts on behalf
of the county when he provides medical care.”
Id.
“Instead,
the Georgia Court of Appeals . . . distinguishes between the
duty imposed by section 42–5–2 on a county to fund medical care
and the duty of a sheriff to provide medical care.”
on
the
appeals
way
the
Georgia
interpreted
Supreme
O.C.G.A. §
Court
42-5-2
and
with
Id.
Georgia
regard
Based
Court
to
of
the
provision of medical care, the Lake I panel found that the duty
to feed inmates, like the duty to provide them with medical
care, “is not delegated by the county but instead is ‘directly
assigned
by
the
state.’”
Lake
I,
840
F.3d
at
1342
(quoting
Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319).
In summary, based on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in
Lake I, the Court finds that Georgia law defines the provision
of medical care to county jail detainees by the sheriff and his
staff to be a state function.5
II.
Where State Law Vests Control
As to the second factor, the Lake I panel concluded that
“Georgia law vests control over the denial of [an inmate’s]
dietary request in the state through the law on feeding inmates
5
If this Court were writing on a blank slate, it would conclude that
Georgia law defines the provision of medical care to county jail
detainees to be a joint function shared by the sheriff as a state
official and by the county as the “owner” and “funder” of the county
jail.
This does not mean that the sheriff does not act as a state
actor when providing such medical care, but this factor may should be
weighed differently in the Manders calculus if that responsibility is
shared with a local government.
14
in
county
jails
deputies.”
Lake
and
I,
the
840
law
on
F.3d
at
training
1342.
and
The
disciplining
same
rationale
extends to the provision of medical care in a county jail.
discussed
above,
Georgia
law
contains
specific
As
provisions
governing the provision of medical care to county jail inmates;
state law gives the sheriff, who is the officer in charge of the
county
care.
jail,
the
function
of
providing
inmates
with
medical
In fact, “Georgia courts have interpreted [O.C.G.A. § 42-
4-4(a)(2)] as giving sheriffs exclusive control vis-à-vis the
county over choosing vendors for medical care.”
Id. at 1339.6
Furthermore, “[t]he training and discipline of deputies provides
further
evidence
(explaining
how
of
control
by
the
state
has
discipline of sheriff’s deputies).
the
state.”
control
over
Id.
at
training
1343
and
Thus, following Lake I, the
Court concludes that, under Georgia law, the State controls the
provision of medical care in a county jail.
6
Palmer notes that when CCG contracted with a private company, Correct
Care Solutions, to provide medical care to inmates, the sheriff signed
the contract “acting as an agent of CCG.” Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 11.
As discussed above, a county sheriff has the power to select a medical
services provider for the county jail, although the county has a duty
to pay for medical care to inmates.
Under the rationale of Lake I,
the fact that the sheriff signed the agreement with Correct Care
Solutions does not mean that the sheriff is not an arm of the State in
providing medical care to inmates in the Muscogee County Jail. But a
joint arrangement for the provision of medical care to county
detainees may should affect the weight given to this factor in the
Manders analysis.
Moreover, it raises the possibility of a county
being legally responsible even if the sheriff acts on behalf of the
state if he also represents the county as its final decisionmaker in
the joint enterprise of providing medical care to county detainees.
The Court does not need to decide that issue here because Plaintiff
has not sued CCG.
15
The Court does note, however, that Palmer’s argument to the
contrary is not frivolous.
Georgia
law
to
provide
“quintessentially
local
The five dissenters in Manders read
that
county
institutions
jails
that
in
Georgia
are
exist
separate
and
apart from the state’s integrated system of prisons [and that]
[t]heir operation is among the responsibilities of the county
and, specifically, the county sheriff.”
1332 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Manders 338 F.3d at
The Court also observes that
the sheriff’s operation of the county jail is not unfettered.
County
governing
authorities
have
oversight
over
a
sheriff’s
operation of the county jail through the investigative powers of
grand
juries,
which
must
inspect
jails
recommendations to the county government.
71(b);
see
also
O.C.G.A.
§
15-12-78
annually
and
make
See O.C.G.A. § 15-12(“Grand
juries
shall
carefully inspect the sanitary condition of the jails of their
respective counties at each regular inspection[.]”).
Moreover,
a county may be answerable to the federal government for the
operation
of
county
jails.
Palmer
asserts
that
in
a
1999
consent decree between the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Columbus
Consolidated
Government
(“CCG”—the
consolidated
government of Muscogee County and the City of Columbus), the
parties
agreed
that
Muscogee
County
has
a
duty
to
provide
medical care at the jail and that the sheriff acts on behalf of
16
the county in providing medical care.7
the
United
States
Justice
While not dispositive,
Department’s
recognition
of
the
county’s substantial responsibility for providing medical care
to county jail detainees should not be ignored in evaluating the
weight to give to the factor of where the state vests control.
As
noted
previously,
it
is
the
undersigned’s
view
that
the
county and the sheriff share responsibility for the provision of
medical care in the county jail.
This sharing of responsibility
supports an argument that this factor is not decisive under the
Manders calculus.
III. Source of Funds
The Lake I panel found that the third factor, “source of
funding for the function at issue,” weighed slightly in favor of
immunity.
Id.
at
1343-44.
understand how this can be.
state
law
detainees.
required
the
Candidly,
the
Court
does
not
The panel in Lake I found that
county
to
pay
to
provide
food
to
Likewise, here, state law requires the county to pay
for the provision of medical care to detainees.
See Lake I, 840
F.3d at 1341 (“With respect to county jails, [O.C.G.A. §] 42–5–2
imposes two separate duties: the county must fund the provision
7
Palmer also points out that the sheriff previously sued the Columbus
Consolidated Government for failing to appropriate sufficient funding
for inmate medical care.
He alleged in that action that he was a
county officer within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 45-9-21(e).
Perhaps
he was mistaken, but a more reasonable reconciliation of his opinion
of his position and Georgia law is that a Georgia sheriff sometimes
wears a state hat, but he sometimes wears two hats, a state one and a
county one.
17
of medical care, and the sheriff must select an appropriate
provider and ensure that inmates receive care when necessary.”).
The panel in Lake I notes that “[t]he state pays for some of the
operations of the sheriff’s office, and the county ‘bears the
major burden of funding [the sheriff’s] office . . . because the
State
so
(quoting
mandates.’”
Manders,
338
Id.
at
F.3d
1344
at
(alterations
1323).
According
in
original)
to
Lake
“[u]nder Manders, this factor slightly favors immunity.”
I,
Id.
Thus, under Lake I’s interpretation of Manders, it appears that
any time the State imposes an unfunded mandate upon a county
that
requires
the
county
to
perform
a
function
using
county funds, that function becomes a state function,
local
not a
county one.8
IV.
Responsibility for Adverse Judgments
“The fourth factor looks to ‘the source of the funds that
will pay any adverse judgment.’” Id. (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d
at 1324).
“[T]he vulnerability of the State’s purse” has been
recognized “as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
determinations.”
Hess, 513 U.S. at 48.
According to Lake I,
“[i]n Georgia, counties are not liable for judgments against the
sheriff in his official capacity, . . . and no law requires the
state
to
pay
an
adverse
judgment
8
against
a
sheriff
in
his
The Court acknowledges that the Manders court did not go this far,
and specifically stated, “[w]e stress that this case does not involve
medical care, which counties have a statutory obligation to provide to
inmates in county jails.” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323 n.43.
18
official capacity . . . .”
omitted).
Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1344. (citations
“Instead, the sheriff ‘apparently would have to pay
any adverse federal court judgment against him in his official
capacity
out
[according
funds.’”
of
to
the
Lake
budget
I]
of
the
sheriff's
‘implicate[s]’
‘both
office,’
county
and
which
state
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Manders, 338
F.3d at 1327).
With all due respect to the Court of Appeals, it
is sheer speculation to conclude that state funds would ever be
used in a material way to pay off a judgment against a sheriff
in
his
official
capacity
for
his
failure
to
provide
constitutionally mandated medical care to county jail detainees.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to conclude that a county,
which is mandated to fund the sheriff’s operation of a county
jail and the provision of medical care to county jail detainees,
would have to appropriate sufficient funds to operate the jail
taking into consideration that part of those county funds will
be used to pay an adverse judgment arising from the operation of
that county jail.
Thus, it is more likely that the county, not
the state, would have to pay for an adverse judgment against the
sheriff.
Accordingly, this most important factor in the Manders
analysis would seem to support a denial of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
But
the
Lake
I
panel
brushed
off
this
factor
concluding that Manders supports (or perhaps requires) it to do
so.
Quoting Manders, the Lake I panel stated, “[a]t a minimum,
19
this final factor does not defeat immunity.”
Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1338).
In light of the
similarity in the way that Georgia law treats the provision of
food and the provision of medical care to county jail detainees,
the Court has no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals,
following Lake I, would find this factor dispositive here while
summarily dismissing it there.
CONCLUSION
As
discussed
above,
the
Court
finds
that
the
Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Lake I requires the Court to conclude for
purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, that Sheriff Darr and
Commander
Collins
acted
as
arms
of
the
State
medical care to Muscogee County jail detainees.
in
providing
Therefore, the
Court grants Darr and Collins’s motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 2 &
17)
the
individual
official
capacity
capacity
claims
claims
against
against
Darr
them.
and
Palmer’s
Collins
remain
pending, as do all of the claims against the other Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of December, 2017.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
20
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?