PALMER v. DARR et al

Filing 27

ORDER granting 2 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; granting 17 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendants John Darr and Dane Collins are dismissed as explained in the order. Plaintiff's individual capacity claims against Darr and Collins remain pending, as do all of the claims against the other Defendants. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 12/05/2017. (CCL)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION QUINTIN PALMER, * Plaintiff, * vs. * CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC., CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, INC., JOHN DARR in his individual and official capacities, COMMANDER DANE COLLINS in his individual and official capacities, and Dr. EDET BASSEY, MD, in his individual and official capacities, * Defendants. * CASE NO. 4:17-CV-102 (CDL) * * * * O R D E R One hundred forty-three county jails are spread throughout the state of Georgia, housing tens of thousands of detainees on any given day.1 Many (perhaps most) of these detainees are awaiting trial and have been convicted of no crime. are presumed to be innocent. Someone must Thus, they address their essential needs during their detention, including the provision 1 According to the Georgia Department of Community Affairs, Georgia county sheriffs reported that there were 38,548 detainees in Georgia county jails as of November 2, 2017. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs Office of Research, Monthly Jail Report (Nov. 2017), ortNov17.pdf. For 2017, the lowest number of detainees was 34,697 in January and the highest number was 39,046 in September. See Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs Office of Research Monthly Jail Reports, of constitutionally mandated food and healthcare. Generally, county sheriffs and the county in which these jails are located share that responsibility--the sheriff operates the jail and the county funds it. may be Although operational and fiscal responsibility clearly demarcated under Georgia law, legal responsibility when something goes wrong apparently is not. And thus, the federal reporters are filling up with cases explaining who can be liable constitutional provide the when rights detainee a county jail are violated with essential detainee’s because of needs a such federal failure as food to and medical care. The issue presently before the Court is whether a county detainee may recover money damages in a federal court against a county sheriff in his official capacity to compensate him for injuries he suffered as a result of the violation of his federal constitutional medical care. a county medical right receive constitutionally mandated The resolution of this issue depends upon whether sheriff care to in acts a as county a state jail. officer If he when does, he provides the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution protects him from liability in his official capacity in federal court. The implications of a ruling that shields a county sheriff from liability for his unconstitutional conduct in the operation of a county jail are significant. 2 Such a ruling would deprive a detainee in conscious a county indifference sheriff of a jail to who his is injured medical because needs by of the the county meaningful remedy in federal court against the sheriff for this federal constitutional violation. And if a finding that the sheriff is a state actor means that he is not a county actor, the detainee may also have no remedy against the county pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 rejected the sheriff notion could be that liable neither for The undersigned previously the money county damages nor the arising county from the failure to provide constitutionally mandated medical care to a county detainee in a county jail. See Youngs v. Johnson, No. 4:06-CV-19 (CDL), 2008 WL 4816731, at *7-*8 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008). But the Eleventh Circuit has laid additional bricks in the “immunity wall” since the Court rendered that decision, and in light of recent Eleventh Circuit precedent, it appears that the Eleventh Amendment blocks a detainee from vindicating his federal constitutional rights against a Georgia sheriff under such circumstances. 1334, 1339-42, reh’g See Lake v. Skelton (Lake I), 840 F.3d denied 871 F.3d 1340 (2017) (en banc) (holding that a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the state when 2 To prevail on a claim against the county under § 1983, the detainee must establish that the sheriff is a final decisionmaker for the county. The Court does not have to decide today whether a finding that a sheriff wears a state hat when performing a particular function automatically precludes a finding that he also wears a county hat when performing that same function. Here, Plaintiff has not sued the county. 3 he provides food to county detainees in a county jail).3 Although the Eleventh Circuit has not yet held that a Georgia sheriff is protected by the Eleventh Amendment for his failure to provide constitutionally mandated medical care to county jail detainees, a constitutional claim arising from the failure to provide food, which the Eleventh Circuit held in Lake I cannot be asserted against a Georgia sheriff in his official capacity in federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment, appears indistinguishable for Eleventh Amendment purposes from a claim arising from the failure to provide medical care. Plaintiff Quintin Palmer suffers from sickle cell disease. Palmer alleges that he did not receive adequate medical treatment while he was a detainee at the Muscogee County Jail and that he suffered serious injuries as a result. He sued those parties who he claims are legally responsible for his injuries, including the Muscogee County commanding officer in the county jail. Sheriff and his Palmer sued the sheriff and his commander in their official and individual capacities. They seek dismissal of the official capacity claims based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. 3 The Eleventh Amendment wall protecting sheriffs in this Circuit in their operation of county jails rests on the foundational holding in Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003), an en banc decision with five dissenting judges (Anderson, Barkett, Birch, Tjoflat, and Wilson) and two strongly worded dissenting opinions. 4 Palmer makes a compelling argument that the Eleventh Amendment was never intended to shield a county sheriff and his officers from liability arising from their failure to provide adequate, persons constitutionally entrusted precedent in this to mandated their Circuit medical care. has But evolved to care Eleventh provide to those Amendment an almost insurmountable wall protecting Georgia sheriffs sued in their official capacities for violating the rights of county jail detainees. federal constitutional Whether that precedent is well-reasoned is of no concern to this Court; the Court is duty bound to apply it. Based on that precedent, this Court must find that the sheriff and his jail commander are entitled to Eleventh claims. Amendment immunity on Palmer’s official capacity Their motions to dismiss those claims (ECF Nos. 2 & 17) are therefore granted. DISCUSSION Under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, “[a] state is immune from a suit for damages in federal court by one of its own citizens.” Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1337 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 1, 134 U.S. 14–17 (1890)). Many courts have explained the ideological rationale for the Eleventh Amendment. The Amendment “‘is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty,’ and a purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to ‘accord[ ] the 5 States the respect owed them as members of the federation’ and not to affront the ‘dignity’ or ‘integrity’ of a state by requiring a state to respond to lawsuits in federal courts.” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Hess v. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39-40 (1994)). Port Auth. As a practical matter, the primary impetus was “the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury.” Hess, 513 U.S. at 48. Eleventh Amendment immunity extends name a state directly as a party. when he acts [in his official beyond actions that It also protects “an official capacity] as an ‘arm of the State.’” Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1337 (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308). But this immunity “does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Therefore, when a government actor’s unconstitutional conduct causes harm, zealous lawyers fight mightily over whether that official’s conduct arises from the performance of a state function or a local one. This battle is particularly intense when the government official appears to wear two hats from time to time—one for certain state functions and one for local ones. themselves capacity in the claims middle against of a this County sheriffs have found fight. sheriff 6 and Because his official deputies are considered claims fundamental sheriff against question was engaged the generally in a office becomes state of the whether function sheriff, the when the office its of officers committed the alleged unconstitutional conduct. The precise issue that the Court must resolve today is whether a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State when providing medical care to county jail detainees. If the sheriff acts as an arm of the State when performing this function, then Palmer’s official capacity claims against the sheriff and his jail commander are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims. See, e.g., McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[F]ederal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). Determining whether a county sheriff is a state official would seem to be a rather straightforward inquiry. But we have learned that it is not enough that the sheriff is the “Sheriff of Muscogee County” or that his law enforcement responsibilities are restricted primarily to the geographic boundaries of the county which he serves. It appears to matter little that he is in charge of the county jail and that this jail is funded by the county taxpayers. not terribly In fact, recent precedent suggests that it is important that the county sheriff’s budget is funded by the taxpayers who reside within the county in which 7 the sheriff serves and who elect the county sheriff. Such facts are brushed aside as the product of superficial analysis that must yield, of course, to one of those “sophisticated” multipart balancing tests loved by law professors and appellate judges. The four instructed factors to balance that are: we “(1) district how judges have been law defines the state entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the 1309. entity.” 338 F.3d at In the 2016 published panel decision in Lake I, two of the three members of the panel, after weighing these factors, concluded that a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State in providing food to county jail detainees. 1340–44.4 Lake I, 840 F.3d at The panel’s holding and rationale suggest that it would reach the same conclusion regarding a county sheriff’s provision of detainees. medical care (or lack thereof) to county jail Id. In fact, Judge Beverly Martin, in her dissent from the en banc majority decision not to rehear the Lake I panel decision, made the observation that the decision in Lake I meant that Georgia sheriffs would be entitled 4 to Eleventh Amendment Judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr., a United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, sat by designation on the Lake I panel and authored a dissent. 8 immunity on medical care claims. Lake v. Skelton (Lake II), 871 F.3d 1340, 1340 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). She stated, “no person in a county jail will be able to sue his jailer (in the jailer’s official capacity) for damages in federal court, even where the jailer violated the law by depriving the inmate of life’s most care.” basic necessities: food, clothing, and medical Id. at 1346 (Martin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). In response to Judge Martin’s dissent, Judge William Pryor, who authored the panel opinion in Lake I, noted that the Lake I panel “did not decide whether the sheriff is entitled to sovereign immunity when he provides medical care,” and he stated that “a review of Georgia law might lead to a different result in a case about the provision of medical care.” Id. at 1344. But he did not explain how the provision of medical care was distinguishable Amendment from purposes. the provision While it was of food unnecessary for to Eleventh make that distinction in Lake I, it cannot be ignored that Lake I (1) examined Georgia statutes that govern both the provision of medical care and the provision of food in Georgia county jails and (2) analogized the sheriff’s duty to provide food to county jail detainees to the sheriff’s duty to provide medical care to county jail detainees. See Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1339-42. Thus, while Lake I may not mandatorily bind future panels on the issue 9 of Eleventh Amendment immunity from county jail detainee medical claims, it certainly will constrain them. Bound rationale, Amendment by the this holding Court purposes can between in Lake find a I and constrained no distinction county sheriff for by its Eleventh feeding county detainees in a county jail and a county sheriff taking care of the medical needs of those same county detainees in that same county jail. Thus, with reservations as to whether this analysis reaches the proper constitutional result but with no hesitation that it is required by current binding precedent in this Circuit, the Court finds that the sheriff and his commander are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity here. It is likely sufficient to rest today’s holding on a simple proposition: because the provision of medical care cannot be distinguished from the provision of food for Eleventh Amendment purposes, Lake I requires a finding of immunity in this case. But for the sake of thoroughness, the Court performs the four part balancing test established by Manders as elucidated by Lake I. I. How State Law Defines the Function The first factor the Court must consider is how Georgia law defines the function in question. By statute, Georgia assigns certain duties directly to the sheriff. 1339. Lake I, 840 F.3d at One of those duties is the duty to furnish medical aid to 10 county jail detainees. Id.; accord O.C.G.A. § 42–4–4(a)(2) (“It shall be the duty of the sheriff . . . [t]o furnish persons confined in the jail with medical aid . . . . to be reimbursed if necessary from the county treasury[.]”). I’s interpretation interpreted of Georgia law, According to Lake “Georgia [O.C.G.A. § 42-4-4(a)(2)] as courts giving have sheriffs exclusive control vis-à-vis the county over choosing vendors for medical care.” Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1339 (citing Bd. of Comm'rs of Spalding Cty. v. Stewart, 668 S.E.2d 644, 645 (Ga. 2008)). Other Georgia statutes further specify the sheriff’s duties with regard to inmate supervision. health O.C.G.A. § in a facility 42-4-32(c) under requires the sheriff’s regular health inspections of jail facilities and requires “adequate separation [of] and treatment given [to]” new inmates. O.C.G.A. § 42-4- 32(d) requires that each inmate be “observed daily” and that “a physician shall be immediately called if there are indications of serious injury, wound, or illness.” And O.C.G.A. § 42-4- 51(b) a requires the sheriff to “provide sick, injured, or disabled inmate access to medical services.” Although state law mandates that a sheriff must provide a minimum level of medical care to detainees in his custody, a strong argument can be made that state law does not clearly establish that the provision responsibility of the sheriff. of medical care is solely the Georgia law also indicates that 11 the county that must fund the county jail shares responsibility for the persons detained in the county jail. Georgia law generally provides that “it shall be the responsibility of the governmental unit, subdivision, or agency having the physical custody of an inmate to maintain the inmate, furnishing him food, clothing, certainly any O.C.G.A. attention[.]” and § applies to the needed medical 42-5-2(a). sheriff, and While it also hospital this seems mandate to have application to the county as the “governmental unit . . . having custody of an inmate.” S.E.2d 539, 542 (Ga. See Middlebrooks v. Bibb County, 582 Ct. App. 2003) (“[A] county has [a] legislative duty to provide an inmate in its custody and care with medical care.”), overruled on other grounds by Tatnall Cty. v. Armstrong, 775 S.E.2d 573, 576-77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). panel in O.C.G.A. § Lake I, however, 42-5-2(a). It rejected concluded this that The interpretation this provision of of Georgia law requires “the sheriff to ‘take . . . custody of the jail and the bodies of such persons as are confined therein.’” Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1340 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 42–4–4(a)(1)). And the sheriff “is the ‘governmental unit, subdivision, or agency’ having custody of O.C.G.A. § 42–5–2. inmates in county jails” for purposes of Thus, this statutory provision supports the “conclusion that Georgia imposes food-service responsibilities directly on the sheriff as part of his custodial duties.” 12 Id. The Lake I panel also found it significant that O.C.G.A. § “42–4–32 imposes duties directly on the sheriff, a constitutional officer of the state of Georgia . . . and not on the county in which the jail is located.” 1340 (internal citation omitted). Lake I, 840 F.3d at According to the Lake I panel, this duty set forth in state law “is evidence that the provision of food is a state function under Georgia law.” The same statute, O.C.G.A. § 42-4-32, sets forth requirements regarding the provision of medical care. Id. some And the Court can conceive of no basis for concluding that the Court of Appeals would find that the provision of food in county jails is a state function, as the panel did in Lake I, while concluding that the provision of medical care is not. Finally, the Lake I panel looked to the “broader context and structure of Georgia law.” Id. at 1341. It noted that the sheriff holds a constitutional office independent of the county and its governing body and that counties “do not delegate power to sheriffs” or have the ability to exercise authority over how a sheriff spends his budget. respect to county jails, Id. The panel found that “[w]ith [O.C.G.A. §] 42–5–2 imposes two separate duties: the county must fund the provision of medical care, and the sheriff must select an appropriate provider and ensure that inmates receive care when necessary.” Id. According to Lake I, “[t]he Georgia Court of Appeals has never 13 construed section 42–5–2 to mean that a sheriff acts on behalf of the county when he provides medical care.” Id. “Instead, the Georgia Court of Appeals . . . distinguishes between the duty imposed by section 42–5–2 on a county to fund medical care and the duty of a sheriff to provide medical care.” on the appeals way the Georgia interpreted Supreme O.C.G.A. § Court 42-5-2 and with Id. Georgia regard Based Court to of the provision of medical care, the Lake I panel found that the duty to feed inmates, like the duty to provide them with medical care, “is not delegated by the county but instead is ‘directly assigned by the state.’” Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1342 (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319). In summary, based on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Lake I, the Court finds that Georgia law defines the provision of medical care to county jail detainees by the sheriff and his staff to be a state function.5 II. Where State Law Vests Control As to the second factor, the Lake I panel concluded that “Georgia law vests control over the denial of [an inmate’s] dietary request in the state through the law on feeding inmates 5 If this Court were writing on a blank slate, it would conclude that Georgia law defines the provision of medical care to county jail detainees to be a joint function shared by the sheriff as a state official and by the county as the “owner” and “funder” of the county jail. This does not mean that the sheriff does not act as a state actor when providing such medical care, but this factor may should be weighed differently in the Manders calculus if that responsibility is shared with a local government. 14 in county jails deputies.” Lake and I, the 840 law on F.3d at training 1342. and The disciplining same rationale extends to the provision of medical care in a county jail. discussed above, Georgia law contains specific As provisions governing the provision of medical care to county jail inmates; state law gives the sheriff, who is the officer in charge of the county care. jail, the function of providing inmates with medical In fact, “Georgia courts have interpreted [O.C.G.A. § 42- 4-4(a)(2)] as giving sheriffs exclusive control vis-à-vis the county over choosing vendors for medical care.” Id. at 1339.6 Furthermore, “[t]he training and discipline of deputies provides further evidence (explaining how of control by the state has discipline of sheriff’s deputies). the state.” control over Id. at training 1343 and Thus, following Lake I, the Court concludes that, under Georgia law, the State controls the provision of medical care in a county jail. 6 Palmer notes that when CCG contracted with a private company, Correct Care Solutions, to provide medical care to inmates, the sheriff signed the contract “acting as an agent of CCG.” Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 11. As discussed above, a county sheriff has the power to select a medical services provider for the county jail, although the county has a duty to pay for medical care to inmates. Under the rationale of Lake I, the fact that the sheriff signed the agreement with Correct Care Solutions does not mean that the sheriff is not an arm of the State in providing medical care to inmates in the Muscogee County Jail. But a joint arrangement for the provision of medical care to county detainees may should affect the weight given to this factor in the Manders analysis. Moreover, it raises the possibility of a county being legally responsible even if the sheriff acts on behalf of the state if he also represents the county as its final decisionmaker in the joint enterprise of providing medical care to county detainees. The Court does not need to decide that issue here because Plaintiff has not sued CCG. 15 The Court does note, however, that Palmer’s argument to the contrary is not frivolous. Georgia law to provide “quintessentially local The five dissenters in Manders read that county institutions jails that in Georgia are exist separate and apart from the state’s integrated system of prisons [and that] [t]heir operation is among the responsibilities of the county and, specifically, the county sheriff.” 1332 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Manders 338 F.3d at The Court also observes that the sheriff’s operation of the county jail is not unfettered. County governing authorities have oversight over a sheriff’s operation of the county jail through the investigative powers of grand juries, which must inspect jails recommendations to the county government. 71(b); see also O.C.G.A. § 15-12-78 annually and make See O.C.G.A. § 15-12(“Grand juries shall carefully inspect the sanitary condition of the jails of their respective counties at each regular inspection[.]”). Moreover, a county may be answerable to the federal government for the operation of county jails. Palmer asserts that in a 1999 consent decree between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Columbus Consolidated Government (“CCG”—the consolidated government of Muscogee County and the City of Columbus), the parties agreed that Muscogee County has a duty to provide medical care at the jail and that the sheriff acts on behalf of 16 the county in providing medical care.7 the United States Justice While not dispositive, Department’s recognition of the county’s substantial responsibility for providing medical care to county jail detainees should not be ignored in evaluating the weight to give to the factor of where the state vests control. As noted previously, it is the undersigned’s view that the county and the sheriff share responsibility for the provision of medical care in the county jail. This sharing of responsibility supports an argument that this factor is not decisive under the Manders calculus. III. Source of Funds The Lake I panel found that the third factor, “source of funding for the function at issue,” weighed slightly in favor of immunity. Id. at 1343-44. understand how this can be. state law detainees. required the Candidly, the Court does not The panel in Lake I found that county to pay to provide food to Likewise, here, state law requires the county to pay for the provision of medical care to detainees. See Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1341 (“With respect to county jails, [O.C.G.A. §] 42–5–2 imposes two separate duties: the county must fund the provision 7 Palmer also points out that the sheriff previously sued the Columbus Consolidated Government for failing to appropriate sufficient funding for inmate medical care. He alleged in that action that he was a county officer within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 45-9-21(e). Perhaps he was mistaken, but a more reasonable reconciliation of his opinion of his position and Georgia law is that a Georgia sheriff sometimes wears a state hat, but he sometimes wears two hats, a state one and a county one. 17 of medical care, and the sheriff must select an appropriate provider and ensure that inmates receive care when necessary.”). The panel in Lake I notes that “[t]he state pays for some of the operations of the sheriff’s office, and the county ‘bears the major burden of funding [the sheriff’s] office . . . because the State so (quoting mandates.’” Manders, 338 Id. at F.3d 1344 at (alterations 1323). According in original) to Lake “[u]nder Manders, this factor slightly favors immunity.” I, Id. Thus, under Lake I’s interpretation of Manders, it appears that any time the State imposes an unfunded mandate upon a county that requires the county to perform a function using county funds, that function becomes a state function, local not a county one.8 IV. Responsibility for Adverse Judgments “The fourth factor looks to ‘the source of the funds that will pay any adverse judgment.’” Id. (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1324). “[T]he vulnerability of the State’s purse” has been recognized “as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations.” Hess, 513 U.S. at 48. According to Lake I, “[i]n Georgia, counties are not liable for judgments against the sheriff in his official capacity, . . . and no law requires the state to pay an adverse judgment 8 against a sheriff in his The Court acknowledges that the Manders court did not go this far, and specifically stated, “[w]e stress that this case does not involve medical care, which counties have a statutory obligation to provide to inmates in county jails.” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323 n.43. 18 official capacity . . . .” omitted). Lake I, 840 F.3d at 1344. (citations “Instead, the sheriff ‘apparently would have to pay any adverse federal court judgment against him in his official capacity out [according funds.’” of to the Lake budget I] of the sheriff's ‘implicate[s]’ ‘both office,’ county and which state Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1327). With all due respect to the Court of Appeals, it is sheer speculation to conclude that state funds would ever be used in a material way to pay off a judgment against a sheriff in his official capacity for his failure to provide constitutionally mandated medical care to county jail detainees. On the other hand, it is reasonable to conclude that a county, which is mandated to fund the sheriff’s operation of a county jail and the provision of medical care to county jail detainees, would have to appropriate sufficient funds to operate the jail taking into consideration that part of those county funds will be used to pay an adverse judgment arising from the operation of that county jail. Thus, it is more likely that the county, not the state, would have to pay for an adverse judgment against the sheriff. Accordingly, this most important factor in the Manders analysis would seem to support a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity. But the Lake I panel brushed off this factor concluding that Manders supports (or perhaps requires) it to do so. Quoting Manders, the Lake I panel stated, “[a]t a minimum, 19 this final factor does not defeat immunity.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1338). In light of the similarity in the way that Georgia law treats the provision of food and the provision of medical care to county jail detainees, the Court has no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals, following Lake I, would find this factor dispositive here while summarily dismissing it there. CONCLUSION As discussed above, the Court finds that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Lake I requires the Court to conclude for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, that Sheriff Darr and Commander Collins acted as arms of the State medical care to Muscogee County jail detainees. in providing Therefore, the Court grants Darr and Collins’s motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 2 & 17) the individual official capacity capacity claims claims against against Darr them. and Palmer’s Collins remain pending, as do all of the claims against the other Defendants. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of December, 2017. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 20

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