JOHNSON et al v. LANDTEK INC et al

Filing 37

ORDER denying 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 19 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 25 Motion for Leave to File Amended Answers. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 08/20/2018. (CCL)

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 1 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
BENNY JOHNSON, DALTON RAY
JOHNSON and DANIEL MCCRARY,

*
*

Plaintiffs,
*
vs.

CASE NO. 4:17-CV-191 (CDL)

*
LANDTEK, INC. and LUCIEN
LONGLAIS,

*

Defendants.

*
O R D E R

Plaintiffs Benny Johnson and Dalton Ray Johnson and opt-in
Plaintiff

Daniel

compensation

from

McCrary
their

seek
former

to

recover

overtime

Defendant

employer,

unpaid

Landtek,

Inc., under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(“FLSA”).

They also contend that Landtek’s owner, Defendant

Lucien Longlais, was their “employer” as defined by the FLSA.
Presently

pending

before

the

Court

motions for partial summary judgment.

are

the

parties’

cross-

As discussed below, the

Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF
No. 19) and denies Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 14).

Defendants’

motion for leave to amend their Answers (No. 25) is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 2 of 17

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

In determining whether a

genuine

Fed. R.

dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Landtek is a landscaping business.
CEO,

CFO,

delegated

secretary,
some

and

managerial

sole

Longlais is Landtek’s

owner.

responsibilities

Although

Longlais

to

Johnson,

Benny

Longlais is the operations manager for Landtek and manages the
day-to-day
work,

operations

processes

customers

about

of

the

payments,
their

company;

bills

he

customers,

requirements,

bids

handles

the

office

communicates
on

new

jobs,

with
and

communicates with his managers regarding the “day-to-day infield
operations.”

Longlais

Dep.

9:14-21,

1

10:12-17,

ECF

No.

21.

Defendants’ response to Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was due
on August 1, 2018, but Defendants did not file the response until
August 3, 2018 and did not seek an extension of the deadline.
Plaintiffs pointed out that Defendants’ response was untimely, but
they did not object to it on that ground, and the Court will consider
it.
Counsel is encouraged to review the current version of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d), as well as Local Rules 6.3 and 7.2.

2

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 3 of 17

Longlais

has

the

authority

to

hire

and

fire

laborers

and

supervisors, approve payroll, approve pay rates, and make other
policies for Landtek.

Longlais Dep. 20:19-23, 38:7-11, 40:1-7,

69:9-15; see also Longlais Answer ¶ 6, ECF No. 8 (admitting that
Longlais has this authority).

Longlais creates the schedule of

landscaping jobs, including the number of workers scheduled on
each crew and the amount of time to spend on each job.

Longlais

Dep. 16:7-25, 34:18-19.

Longlais spoke with Landtek’s general

manager, Benny Johnson,

several times each day and gave him

instructions on what to do or what not to do.
36:2-18, ECF No. 18.

B. Johnson Dep.

Longlais is also responsible for Landtek’s

wage and overtime policies.

Longlais Answer ¶ 6 (admitting that

Longlais has this authority).
In

2015,

Landtek

hired

Comp

Solutions

Group,

Inc.

to

provide “management, administrative, [and] workers’ compensation
services.”

Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. 10, Administrative

Service Organization Agreement 1, ECF No. 14-10.
agreement,

Landtek

retained

primary

Under the

responsibility

for

employment decisions like hiring, firing, work hours, conditions
of employment, and setting employee pay.

Id.

Comp Solutions

provided payroll and workers’ compensation services.

Id.

Landtek hired Benny Johnson as a project manager.
Johnson later became general manager of Landtek.
does not dispute that his

Benny

Benny Johnson

daily work consisted primarily

3

of

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 4 of 17

supervisory tasks.

Benny Johnson was responsible for reviewing

employees’ time sheets and making sure the hours were paid.
Johnson Dep. 23:3-13.

B.

Each morning, Benny Johnson looked over

the employees’ schedules and gave them their schedules for the
day.
control

Id.

at

and

34:1-9.

handling

He

was

customer

also

responsible

complaints.

Id.

for
at

quality

34:15-19.

Benny Johnson was paid $500 per week in 2014, $550 per week in
2015, $650 per week in 2016, and $525 per week in 2017.
18:20-19:22.
various

He did not

times,

paycheck.

Landtek

Id. at

receive overtime compensation.

made

deductions

from

Benny

At

Johnson’s

See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts

Ex. A, Paycheck Stubs 1, ECF No. 23-2 at 2 (listing year-to-date
“Misc Ded” of $435 in December 2014); id. at 2, ECF No. 23-2 at
3

(listing

year-to-date

“Misc

Ded”

of

$771.20

in

September

2015); id. at 8, ECF No. 23-2 at 9 (listing year-to-date “Misc
Ded” of $1,027.01 in December 2016).

Plaintiffs acknowledge

that Defendants have taken the position that Benny Johnson used
a

Landtek

credit

card

for

personal

reasons

and

authorized

deductions from his paycheck to cover those expenses, though
Defendants did not address this issue in their summary judgment
briefing.

Benny

Johnson

asserts

that

these

deductions

were

improper because he does not recall authorizing them and because
he did not incur some of the expenses for which the deductions
were made. B. Johnson Dep. 56:13-24, 70:2-71:2.

4

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 5 of 17

Dalton Ray Johnson and Daniel McCrary worked as supervisors
of Landtek’s work crews.

It is undisputed that they were paid a

fixed amount per week and did not receive overtime compensation.
Longlais testified that Dalton Ray Johnson and Daniel McCrary
were not considered exempt employees and that they were entitled
to overtime compensation.
Landtek

kept

daily

Longlais Dep. 27:3-12.
records

showing

worked and how much time each job took.
Ex.

D,

Crew

Timesheets,

ECF

No.

the

jobs

each

crew

Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J.

19-6.

In

summer

months,

supervisors typically arrived to work by 7:00 a.m., although
Landtek did not start paying them until they began work on the
first jobsite at 8:30 a.m.
Ray

Johnson

completed

Longlais Dep. 34:2-35:17.

timesheets,

but

those

Dalton

timesheets

only

indicated whether he was at work on a given day, not how many
hours he worked.
Before
consult

an

B. Johnson Dep. 46:10-25.

Plaintiffs
attorney

filed
or

the

this

action,

Department

of

Longlais
Labor

did

not

regarding

Landtek’s pay practices, although he did consult with Landtek’s
payroll services providers.

Longlais Dep. 21:23-23:15.

Plaintiffs Benny Johnson and Dalton Ray Johnson filed this
action on September 20, 2017.

Daniel McCrary filed his consent

to join this action on September 22, 2017.

5

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 6 of 17

DISCUSSION
Defendants moved for summary judgment on two issues: (1)
Longlais is not an employer under the FLSA and (2) Benny Johnson
was an exempt employee.

Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment

on five issues: (1) Defendants waived any exemption defense, (2)
Dalton Ray Johnson and Daniel McCrary are entitled to overtime
compensation for any overtime worked, (3) any failure to pay
Dalton Ray Johnson and Daniel McCrary overtime was willful, (4)
all

Plaintiffs

are

entitled

to

liquidated

Longlais is an employer under the FLSA.

damages,

and

(5)

The Court addresses

each issue below.
I.

Was Longlais an “Employer”?
Plaintiffs contend that the present record establishes as a

matter of law that Longlais was an “employer” within the meaning
of

the

FLSA.

establishes
employer.
person

as

Longlais
a

matter

argues
of

law

that
that

the

present

Longlais

was

record
not

an

The FLSA broadly defines “employer” to include “any

acting

directly

or

indirectly

employer in relation to an employee.”

in

the

interest

of

29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

an
“A

corporate officer is personally liable as an FLSA employer if he
has ‘operational control of a corporation’s covered enterprise,’
which may be involvement in the day-to-day operation of the
company or direct supervision of the employee at issue.”

6

Moore

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 7 of 17

v. Appliance Direct, Inc., 708 F.3d 1233, 1237 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637–38 (11th Cir. 1986)).
In

their

Complaint,

Plaintiffs

alleged

that

Longlais

“regularly exercised authority on behalf of” Landtek and “at all
times during Plaintiffs’ employment was an employer as defined
by 29 U.S.C. § 203 et seq.”
this allegation.

Compl. ¶ 10.

Longlais admitted

Longlais Answer ¶ 10, ECF No. 8.

Defendants

now argue that Longlais admitted ¶ 10 of the Complaint only to
the

extent

Landtek,

but

that
his

Longlais
Answer

exercised

is

authority

inconsistent

with

on
this

behalf

of

argument:

“Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint.”
allegations in ¶ 10.2

Id.

Thus, Longlais admitted all the

And, although Longlais moved to amend his

Answer to add an affirmative defense, he did not seek to amend
this portion of his Answer.

See Defs.’ Mot. for Leave to File

Am. Answers Ex. B, Longlais Proposed Am. Answer ¶ 10, ECF No.
25-2.

Longlais is bound by the admissions in his Answer.

See,

e.g., Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp., 432 F. App’x 801, 804 (11th
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Therefore, Longlais was an employer

under the FLSA.

2

Longlais also stated, “Except as expressly admitted, any remaining
allegations contained in this Paragraph of Plaintiffs’ Complaint are
denied.”
Longlais Answer ¶ 10.
But Longlais generally admitted the
allegations in ¶ 10 and did not expressly admit only a portion of
them, so it is unclear why he included this sentence.

7

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 8 of 17

Even if Longlais had not admitted that he was an employer,
the

present

record

establishes

that

he

controlled

Landtek.

Longlais may not personally mow lawns or communicate directly
with

laborers,

but

the

present

record

establishes

that

he

controlled virtually every aspect of the business during the
timeframe relevant to this action.

Longlais was the sole owner

of Landtek, and he was its CEO, CFO, and operations manager.
Running Landtek was his full time job, and he performed work for
Landtek on a daily basis.
operations
billing.

of

the

company,

He handled the day-to-day business
including

payment

processing

and

He generated new business for Landtek and communicated

with customers

He hired

and

fired employees, approved payroll, and approved pay rates.

He

made

about their landscaping goals.

Landtek’s

policies.
schedule

policies,

including

its

wage

and

overtime

Although Longlais did not personally distribute the
to

the

employees

each

day,

he

was

responsible

for

making it; he determined which laborers worked on each job and
how much time they should spend.

And although Longlais did not

directly supervise the laborers, he gave their manager, Benny
Johnson, specific instructions on what the laborers should do.
In summary, based on the present record, Longlais made all major
decisions regarding Landtek’s business affairs.

Accordingly, he

exercised operational control over Landtek and was an employer
within the meaning of the FLSA.

8

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 9 of 17

Longlais nonetheless argues that he cannot be considered an
employer

because

he

hired

a

vendor

to

provide

payroll

and

workers’ compensation services and hired a general manager to
implement his policies and supervise the laborers.

But these

facts do not create a fact question on whether Longlais had
operational control of Landtek, and Longlais did not point to
any evidence to dispute that he exercised control over Landtek’s
business operations and its wage and overtime policies.

For

these reasons, and because Longlais admitted in his Answer that
he was an employer under the FLSA, Plaintiffs are entitled to
summary judgment on this issue and Longlais is not.
II.

Were Plaintiffs Exempt Employees?
The FLSA requires employers to pay an overtime premium to

employees who work more than forty hours in a workweek.
U.S.C. §

207(a)(1)

(“[N]o

employer

shall

employ

any

See 29
of

his

employees . . ., for a workweek longer than forty hours unless
such employee receives [overtime] compensation . . . at a rate
not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which
he is employed.”).

There are exceptions to this rule; employers

are not required to pay the overtime premium to any employee who
is

“employed

in

a

bona

professional capacity.”

fide

executive,

administrative,

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).

or

If an FLSA

exemption applies, the employer may assert it as an affirmative
defense.

“The exemptions ‘are to be construed narrowly,’ and

9

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 10 of 17

the employer shoulders the burden of establishing that it is
entitled to an exemption.”

Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando

Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1156 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 965 (11th Cir.
1997)).
A.

Was Benny Johnson an Exempt Employee?

Defendants argue that Benny Johnson was an exempt employee
and that the present record establishes this issue as a matter
of law.

Benny Johnson contends that Defendants waived this

defense and that even if they did not, there is a genuine fact
dispute on this issue.
1.

Did Defendants Waive the Exemption Defense?

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), a party must
assert

an

affirmative

defense

in

responding

to

a

pleading;

failure to do so generally constitutes waiver of the defense.
See Hassan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 842 F.2d 260, 263 (11th Cir.
1988) (“[W]hen a party fails to raise an affirmative defense in
the pleadings, that party waives its right to raise the issue at
trial.”).

The purpose of this rule is “to guarantee that the

opposing party has notice of any additional issue that may be
raised

at

trial

litigate” it.

so

that

he

or

she

is

prepared

to

properly

Bergquist v. Fid. Info. Servs., Inc., 197 F.

App’x 813, 815 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hassan, 842 F.2d at
263). “When a plaintiff has notice that an affirmative defense

10

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 11 of 17

will be raised at trial, the defendant’s failure to comply with
Rule 8(c) does not cause the plaintiff any prejudice. And, when
the failure to raise an affirmative defense does not prejudice
the plaintiff, it is not error for the trial court to hear
evidence on the issue.”

Id. (quoting Hassan, 842 F.2d at 263).

In Bergquist, for example, the Eleventh Circuit found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in considering a
defendant’s

FLSA

exemption

affirmative

defense

because

the

plaintiff was “clearly on notice” that the “exemption was a
central issue of dispute between the parties.”

Id. at 816.

Here, Defendants did not raise the exemption defense as an
affirmative defense in their Answers, but they did deny that
Benny Johnson was entitled to any overtime compensation because
“he was a supervisor and a salaried employee.”
¶ 20,

ECF

Plaintiffs’

No.

7;

Longlais

requests

for

Answer

¶ 20.

admissions,

Landtek Answer
In

Defendants

response
denied

to
that

Benny Johnson was entitled to overtime pay because he was a
supervisor.

Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A,

Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Reqs. for Admis. ¶ 2, ECF No. 27-1 at 3.
And in response to Plaintiffs’ interrogatory seeking the reason
for

Defendants’

decision

not

to

pay

Plaintiffs

overtime,

Defendants responded that Benny Johnson was a supervisor and a
salaried employee.

Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex.

A, Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Interrogs. ¶ 3, ECF No. 27-1 at 12.

11

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 12 of 17

Because Defendants asserted in their Answers and again in their
discovery

responses

that

Benny

Johnson

was

not

entitled

to

overtime pay because he was a salaried supervisor, Plaintiffs
should have been on notice that Defendants intended to raise an
exemption defense as to Benny Johnson.
concludes

that

Defendants

did

not

Therefore, the Court
waive

the

exemption

affirmative defense as to Benny Johnson, and Defendants’ motion
for leave to amend their Answers to add the affirmative defense
(ECF No. 25) is granted.
2.

Is there a Genuine Fact Dispute on Whether Benny
Johnson was an Exempt Employee?

Defendants assert that the present record establishes as a
matter of law that Benny Johnson was employed in a bona fide
administrative capacity and was thus not entitled to overtime
pay.

Plaintiffs argue that there is a genuine fact dispute on

this issue.
The federal regulations define “employee employed in a bona
fide

administrative

capacity”

as

an

employee

who

is

“[c]ompensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less
than $455 per week . . ., exclusive of board, lodging or other
facilities

. . .

[w]hose

primary

duty

is

the

performance

of

office or non-manual work directly related to the management or
general business operations of the employer or the employer’s
customers; and . . . [w]hose primary duty includes the exercise

12

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 13 of 17

of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters
of significance.”

29 C.F.R. § 541.200.3

There is no dispute

that Benny Johnson’s primary responsibilities were to supervise
Landtek’s laborers and help manage Landtek’s operations.

There

is also no dispute that his primary duties included the exercise
of discretion and independent judgment.

Benny Johnson argues,

however, that there is a genuine fact dispute on whether he was
paid on a “salary basis.”
An employee is paid on a “salary basis” if he “regularly
receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a
predetermined amount constituting all or part of the employee’s
compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because
of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.”
29

C.F.R. § 541.602(a).4

Subject

to

certain

exceptions,

“an

exempt employee must receive the full salary for any week in
which

the

employee

performs

any

number of days or hours worked.”
3

work
Id.

without

regard

to

the

“An employee is not paid

The parties agree that this version of 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 applies
here, and the Court assumes for purposes of this motion only that this
is the correct version of the regulation. The regulation was amended,
effective December 1, 2016, to update the required salary amount, but
a U.S. District Judge in the Eastern District of Texas issued a
nationwide injunction enjoining the U.S. Department of Labor from
implementing the 2016 amendment.
Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218
F. Supp. 3d 520, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
4 Like 29 C.F.R. § 541.200, discussed supra n.3, 29 C.F.R. § 541.602
was updated, effective December 1, 2016, but implementation of that
amendment was enjoined. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
The Court assumes for purposes of this motion only that the preDecember 1, 2016 regulation, which is the version relied on by the
parties, applies.

13

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 14 of 17

on

a

salary

basis

if

deductions

from

the

employee’s

predetermined compensation are made for absences occasioned by
the employer or by the operating requirements of the business.”
Id.

An

employer

may,

however,

make

deductions

for

certain

absences, including absences for personal reasons and absences
due

to

sickness

or

disability

if

the

deduction

accordance with a bona fide leave plan.

is

made

in

29 C.F.R. § 541.602(b).

An employer may also make deductions as a penalty for safety
rule

infractions

suspension.

or

in

connection

with

a

disciplinary

Id.

If an employer makes deductions for employee absences that
do not fall within any of the exceptions to the salary-basis
requirement, then those deductions are improper.
who

makes

improper

deductions

from

salary

“An employer

shall

lose

the

exemption if the facts demonstrate that the employer did not
intend

to

pay

employees

29 C.F.R. § 541.603(a).

on

a

salary

basis.”

“An actual practice of making improper

deductions demonstrates that the employer did not intend to pay
employees on a salary basis.”

Id.

The employer loses the

exemption only “during the time period in which the improper
deductions

were

made

for

employees

in

the

same

job

classification working for the same managers responsible for the
actual improper deductions.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.603(b).

14

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 15 of 17

In this case, Plaintiffs pointed to evidence that Benny
Johnson did not authorize certain deductions that Landtek made
from his paycheck or incur some of the expenses for which they
were

allegedly

made.

Plaintiffs

acknowledge

that

Defendants

have taken the position that the deductions were proper because
that is how Benny Johnson reimbursed Landtek for his personal
expenses that had been paid by the company.

Accordingly, there

is a fact dispute on whether the deductions were improper, and a
jury must decide whether the facts demonstrate that Defendants
did not intend to pay Benny Johnson on a salary basis and, if
so, for which time periods.

Defendants are not entitled to

summary judgment on this issue.
B.

Were Dalton
Employees?

Plaintiffs

argue

Ray

Johnson

that

and

Daniel

Defendants

waived

McCrary
any

Exempt

exemption

defense they may have asserted as to Dalton Ray Johnson and
Daniel

McCrary,

Plaintiffs

were

so

the

Court

non-exempt

should

employees

conclude
as

a

Defendants did not respond to this argument.

that

matter

of

these
law.

Defendants did not

assert an exemption affirmative defense in their Answers as to
Dalton Ray Johnson or Daniel McCrary, they did not seek to amend
their Answers to include such an affirmative defense as to these
Plaintiffs,

they

did

not

argue

in

their

summary

judgment

briefing that these two Plaintiffs were exempt employees, and

15

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 16 of 17

Longlais testified that these two Plaintiffs were not considered
exempt employees.
that

Defendants

defense

as

Accordingly,

to

Based on this record, there is no indication
intend
Dalton

Defendants

to

raise

Ray

the

exemption

Johnson
not

shall

and

permitted

be

affirmative

Daniel

McCrary.

to

present

evidence on this issue at trial and will thus not be able to
meet their burden of proving that that Dalton Ray Johnson and
Daniel McCrary were exempt employees.
III. Are Dalton Ray Johnson and Daniel McCrary
Overtime Compensation as a Matter of Law?

Entitled

to

Dalton Ray Johnson and Daniel McCrary argue that they are
entitled to overtime compensation as a matter of law given that
Defendants will not be able to prove an exemption affirmative
defense

for

these

two

Plaintiffs.

But

as

Plaintiffs

acknowledge, there is a genuine fact dispute on whether Dalton
Ray Johnson and Daniel McCrary worked more than forty hours
during

any

McCrary

given

did

not

workweek.
record

Dalton

their

Ray

hours;

Johnson

their

and

Daniel

timesheets

just

contain a checkmark indicating that they were present for eight
hours

per

day.

On

the

other

hand,

Landtek’s

daily

records

suggest that the work crews often spent more than eight hours
per day on a job, and Longlais testified that the supervisors
usually arrived at work to prepare for the day at least an hour
before they went to their jobsites.

16

A jury must evaluate the

Case 4:17-cv-00191-CDL Document 37 Filed 08/20/18 Page 17 of 17

evidence and determine if Dalton Ray Johnson and Daniel McCrary
worked more than forty hours during any given workweek.
judgment is not appropriate on this issue.

Summary

In light of this

ruling, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that any
failure to pay Plaintiffs overtime compensation was willful or
that Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part
and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF No. 19) and denies
Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 14).

Defendants’ motion for leave

to amend their Answers (No. 25) to add the exemption affirmative
defense

as

to

Benny

Johnson.

Defendants

shall

file

their

amended Answers within seven days.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 20th day of August, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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