JENKINS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Filing 17

ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner. Ordered by US MAGISTRATE JUDGE STEPHEN HYLES on 10-12-18. (bdd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
NAWATA JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 4:17-CV-221-MSH
Social Security Appeal

ORDER
The Social Security Commissioner, by adoption of the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ’s”) determination, denied Plaintiff’s applications for supplemental security income
and disability insurance benefits, finding that she is not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act and accompanying regulations.

Plaintiff contends that the

Commissioner’s decision was in error and seeks review under the relevant provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). All administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Both parties filed their written consents for all proceedings to be conducted by
the United States Magistrate Judge, including the entry of a final judgment directly
appealable to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).
LEGAL STANDARDS
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination of
whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards
were applied. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

“Substantial evidence is something more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this
court must affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s role in
reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The court may
neither decide facts, re-weigh evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. 1 Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). It must,
however, decide if the Commissioner applied the proper standards in reaching a decision.
Harrell v. Harris, 610 F.2d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The court must
scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual
findings. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). However, even
if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must be affirmed if
substantial evidence supports it. Id.
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that she is unable to perform her
previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff’s burden is
a heavy one and is so stringent that it has been described as bordering on the unrealistic.
Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1981). 2 A plaintiff seeking Social

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Credibility determinations are left to the Commissioner and not to the courts. Carnes v. Sullivan,
936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991). It is also up to the Commissioner and not to the courts to
resolve conflicts in the evidence. Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam); see also Graham v. Bowen, 790 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1986).
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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decision of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to
October 1, 1981.
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Security disability benefits must demonstrate that she suffers from an impairment that
prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a twelve-month period.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). In addition to meeting the requirements of these statutes, in order
to be eligible for disability payments, a plaintiff must meet the requirements of the
Commissioner’s regulations promulgated pursuant to the authority given in the Social
Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 et seq.
Under the Regulations, the Commissioner uses a five-step procedure to determine
if a plaintiff is disabled. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). First, the Commissioner determines whether the plaintiff is
working. Id. If not, the Commissioner determines whether the plaintiff has an impairment
which prevents the performance of basic work activities. Id. Second, the Commissioner
determines the severity of the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments. Id.
Third, the Commissioner determines whether the plaintiff’s severe impairment(s) meets or
equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of Part 404 of the Regulations (the “Listing”).
Id.

Fourth, the Commissioner determines whether the plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity can meet the physical and mental demands of past work. Id. Fifth and finally, the
Commissioner determines whether the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, age,
education, and past work experience prevent the performance of any other work. In
arriving at a decision, the Commissioner must consider the combined effects of all of the
alleged impairments, without regard to whether each, if considered separately, would be
disabling. Id. The Commissioner’s failure to apply correct legal standards to the evidence
is grounds for reversal. Id.
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Nawata Jenkins filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income on June 24, 2013, alleging that she became disabled to work
on July 15, 2009. Her claims were initially denied on October 22, 2013, and denied after
reconsideration on February 10, 2014. She timely requested an evidentiary hearing before
an ALJ on March 26, 2014, and the hearing was held on February 23, 2016. Plaintiff
appeared at the hearing with her attorney and gave testimony. Tr. 23. On October 4, 2016,
the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s claims. Tr. 20-42. She next
sought review by the Appeals Council but was denied on September 14, 2017. Tr. 1-6.
Having exhausted the administrative remedies available to her under the Social Security
Act, Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her
claims for benefits. This case is ripe for review. 42 U.S.C. 405(g), 1383(c).
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND EVIDENCE
When the ALJ rendered his decision, Plaintiff was forty-seven years of age. Tr. 234.
She has a high school education and has past relevant work as a home health attendant,
nursery school worker, and merchant patroller. Finding 6, Tr. 34. In conducting the fivestep sequential analysis of her claims mandated by the Commissioner’s regulations for the
determination of disability, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since her alleged onset date and has severe impairments of bipolar disorder,
headaches, hypertension, and morbid obesity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 and 416.971; 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c); Findings 2, 3, Tr. 25-26. At step three, he found
that these impairments, considered both alone and in combination with one another, neither
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meet nor medically equal a listed impairment set out in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. Finding 4, Tr. 26-27.
Between steps three and four, the ALJ formulated a residual functional capacity
assessment (“RFC”) which permits Plaintiff to engage in medium work with limitations to
jobs that are simple, unskilled, and have only occasional routine changes in the work
environment. Finding 5, Tr. 27-33. At step four, the ALJ found that this restricted RFC
assessment precludes Plaintiff from returning to any past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1565 and 416.965; Finding 6, Tr. 34. However, at step-five, he took administrative
notice of reliable job information as provided for in the Commissioner’s regulations at 20
§§ C.F.R. 404.1566(d) and 416.966(d), and found that there are jobs available to Plaintiff
in the national economy which she can perform within her assessed RFC. He therefore
determined that she is not disabled to work. Findings 10, 11, Tr. 34-35.
DISCUSSION
I. ALJ’s Consideration of Medical Opinion
In her brief before the Court, Plaintiff makes two contentions of error. First, she
argues that the ALJ failed to address the medical opinion of Brett Murphy-Dawson, M.D.
Pl.’s Br. 3-7, ECF No. 15. Evidence of record shows that Dr. Murphy-Dawson practices
at New Horizons Community Service Board (“NHCSB”) and saw Plaintiff for what he
described as “two brief appointments[.]” Tr. 577. While Plaintiff was treated extensively
at NHCSB, only one clinical notation was actually signed by this doctor. Id. The record
fails to establish that, as to Dr. Murphy-Dawson, Plaintiff had a sufficiently long record of
care for the doctor to be considered a treating physician.
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To be a treating physician “the doctor must treat the claimant on a regular basis and
have an ongoing treatment relationship with the claimant. See McSwain v. Bowen, 814
F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Eyre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 586 F. App’x 521,
523 (11th Cir. 2014). Although the ALJ did not mention Dr. Murphy-Dawson by name,
he thoroughly reviewed and discussed her records of care at NHCSB, including specific
records where Dr. Murphy-Dawson’s one entry is found. Ex. B9F, Tr. 31. He correctly
noted that in the entry at issue, Plaintiff was found to have only “minimum impairment” in
August 2013 and no more than “transient impairment” upon exposure to an identifiable
stressor in March 2014. Tr. 32. The ALJ correctly characterized Plaintiff’s mental status
examinations as “generally unremarkable” and found that symptoms she exhibited were
well controlled by medication.

Tr. 31-32.

The October 30, 2013, mental status

examination referenced in Dr. Murphy-Dawson’s note was marked “normal” as to
orientation, appearance and behavior, affect and mood, and thought processes and flow of
mental activity. Tr. 575. While Plaintiff is correct that there is a handwritten entry that
indicates she reported auditory and visual hallucinations, the full entry states that she is
logical and goal-directed with normal recent and remote entry, insight and judgment, and
clear speech. Tr. 575-76. Dr. Murphy-Dawson’s entry specifically found her to have the
ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, which finding was fully
incorporated into the RFC assessment. Tr. 576. Whether Dr. Murphy-Dawson is a treating
physician or a medical source, the ALJ adequately reviewed and discussed the records of
Plaintiff’s care at NHCSB, including the one entry signed by him. Plaintiff’s first assertion
of error lacks merit.
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II. ALJ’s RFC Formulation
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to account for marked difficulties in
concentration, persistence, and pace. Pl.’s Br. 7-9. At step three, the ALJ stated that
Plaintiff has marked difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace but further found
that the consultative examining psychologist determined her to be fully oriented with
relevant and coherent responses, and with no problem concentrating sufficiently to
complete tasks. Tr. 27. In order to take into account the limitations he found in formulating
her RFC, the ALJ restricted her to simple unskilled work with no more than occasional and
routine changes in the workplace. Tr. 27-28. This is exactly in line with what Dr. MurphyDawson found her capable of doing. It is the duty of the Commissioner to make factual
findings, including the formulation of an RFC assessment and where the findings are
supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record as a whole, the Court cannot
decide the facts anew or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Moore, 405
F.3d at 1211; Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s
second assertion of error is meritless.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the determination of the Social Security Commissioner
is affirmed.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of October, 2018.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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