JOYNER v. WOODSPRING HOTELS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC

Filing 50

ORDER denying 44 Motion for Recusal; terminating 48 Motion expedite; denying 49 Motion for Default Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D. LAND on 9/19/2018 (tlf).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
DOROTHEA L. JOYNER,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

NATIONWIDE HOTEL MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, LLC,

*

CASE NO. 4:18-CV-37 (CDL)

*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
It has been observed, somewhat sardonically, that “no good
deed goes unpunished.”
in

this

action

the

In an attempt to save the pro se Plaintiff
expense

of

pursuing

unnecessary,

costly

discovery should her claim not be cognizable under Title VII, the
undersigned

has

attempted

to

expedite

consideration

viability of Plaintiff’s novel Title VII claim.

of

the

This attempt at

kindness has backfired with the Plaintiff ironically accusing the
undersigned of personal bias in favor of the Defendant and its
counsel.

Rather than heading toward an expeditious resolution of

this case on the merits, the undersigned is now diverted to
deciding Plaintiff’s motion for recusal.
Plaintiff seeks recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 & 455.
Because

Plaintiff’s

affidavit

in

support

of

her

motion

is

insufficient on its face and because her alleged evidence of bias
consists of her dissatisfaction with the Court’s legal rulings,

1

her motion is denied.

Section 144 requires disqualification if a

judge has personal bias or prejudice either against a party or in
favor of an adverse party. 28 U.S.C. § 144.

To initiate a motion

for disqualification pursuant to § 144, the party must file a
“timely and sufficient” affidavit stating the facts and reasons
for the party’s belief of bias or prejudice.

Id.

Section 144

contemplates initial screening of a party’s recusal affidavit in
order to prevent manipulation of the judicial system by disgruntled
litigants.

See Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile Cty., 517

F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Once the motion is filed under
§ 144,

the

judge

must

pass

on

the

legal

sufficiency

of

the

affidavit.”)1 And, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute
a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”
States,

510

U.S.

540,

555

(1994).

Liteky v. United

Section

455

requires

disqualification if the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be
questioned” or if he has a personal bias or prejudice against a
party.

28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b)(1).

As explained in the remainder

of this Order, Plaintiff’s affidavit and motion fail to allege
sufficient facts that demonstrate bias or prejudice; nor do they
show that the impartiality of the undersigned might be reasonably
questioned.

1

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)
(en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of
business on September 30, 1981.

2

Plaintiff

filed

employer.

After

regarding

submission

this

pro

initial
of

a

se

lawsuit

difficulties
joint

conducted a scheduling conference.

against

between

scheduling

her
the

order,

former
parties

the

Court

During that conference, the

Court attempted to develop a plan that would “secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this action and that was
“proportional to the needs of the case.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
employees

sexually

harassed

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1;

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s
her

and

created

a

hostile

work

environment by spreading rumors that she allegedly had an affair
with her boss.

Compl. ¶¶ 66-72, ECF No. 1.

After reviewing

Plaintiff’s complaint and confirming her claims at the conference,
the Court had some skepticism as to whether Plaintiff’s claims
were cognizable under Title VII.

Given the novel nature of

Plaintiff’s legal theory, the Court concluded that the best course
would be to initially determine the viability of such a legal
theory under Title VII.

If such a claim is not recognized under

Title VII, deciding this issue at the beginning of the litigation
will save the parties time and expense and conserve valuable
judicial resources.
Consistent with this sentiment, the undersigned directed that
Defendant take Plaintiff’s deposition, and if Defendant concluded
that it was entitled to summary judgment, assuming Plaintiff’s
deposition testimony to be true, then Defendant could file a motion

3

for summary judgment before additional discovery was conducted.
The Court explained at the conference, however, that if Defendant
relied upon any evidence beyond the Plaintiff’s deposition or if
it became evident that Plaintiff needed additional evidence to
respond to the motion, then the Court would permit Plaintiff to
conduct

additional

discovery.

This

procedure

is

recognized under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

of

course

See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(b) (permitting summary judgment motion to be filed any
time until 30 days after the close of discovery); Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d) (allowing nonmovant to seek discovery to adequately respond
to a motion for summary judgment when facts are unavailable to
that party).
It is clear that the Court’s procedure announced at the
pretrial conference was not irregular and did not demonstrate bias
or prejudice.

Moreover, the Court’s initial skepticism as to

Plaintiff’s novel Title VII theory likewise does not indicate bias.
The Court made it clear that it had not pre-judged the claim and
would not make a decision on the merits until after any motion was
fully ripe.

The Court simply had not encountered a claim like the

one Plaintiff alleged, the viability of which the Court thought
should be considered in the early stages of the litigation.
Court

also

notified

the

Plaintiff

that

if

the

The

circumstances

warranted, she would be able to undertake additional discovery to
respond to the summary judgment motion.

4

Plaintiff, who genuinely

believes she has been wronged, fails to recognize that if she does
not have a legal claim recognized under the applicable law, she
will be better off with this expedited evaluation of her claim
because

she

will

not

waste

additional

unnecessary discovery for a meritless claim.

resources

pursuing

And if her claim is

meritorious and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied,
then she will not have been harmed because the case will proceed
with an opportunity for additional discovery.
Plaintiff’s disagreement with (and possible misunderstanding
of) the Court’s procedure do not support her conclusory allegations
of

bias

and

prejudice.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s

motion

to

disqualify the undersigned (ECF No. 44) is denied.2
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 19th day of September, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

2

Plaintiff also filed a motion to expedite and a motion for default
judgment regarding her motion to recuse. Her motion to expedite (ECF
No. 48) is terminated as moot. Her motion for default judgment (ECF No.
49) is denied because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 does not apply
under these circumstances.

5