JOYNER v. WOODSPRING HOTELS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC

Filing 72

ORDER granting 53 Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 55 Motion to Strike. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D. LAND on 2/19/2019 (tlf).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
DOROTHEA L. JOYNER,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

NATIONWIDE HOTEL MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, LLC f/k/a WOODSPRING
HOTELS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
LLC,

*

CASE NO. 4:18-CV-37 (CDL)

*
*

Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Dorothea Joyner brought this action against Nationwide Hotel
Management Company seeking relief under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17,
and state law.1

Nationwide moves for summary judgment on all of

Joyner’s claims (ECF No. 53). For the following reasons, the Court
grants summary judgment on Joyner’s federal law claim and dismisses
her state law claims without prejudice so that she may refile them
in the appropriate state court.2

1

Joyner also brought a “federal fraud” claim, but she has since abandoned
that claim. Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 12, ECF No.
58-3.
2
The Court denies Joyner’s motion to strike Nationwide’s summary
judgment motion (ECF No. 55). During a status scheduling conference on
July 2, 2018, the Court granted Nationwide permission to file an
expedited motion for summary judgment on Joyner’s Title VII claim, and
the Court directed Nationwide to assume for purposes of the motion that
Joyner’s factual assertions were true. Joyner argues that Nationwide
violated that directive by not acknowledging some of her legal arguments
in its summary judgment motion. But, Nationwide was never required to

1

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).

Fed. R. Civ.

In determining whether a genuine dispute of material

fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment,

drawing

party’s favor.
(1986).

all

justifiable

inferences

in

the

opposing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the

outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual dispute is genuine if

the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.

Id.
DISCUSSION

Joyner asserts that she was sexually harassed when her coworkers, Nelwyn Smith and Robyn Evans, spread a rumor that she
received a promotion because she slept with her boss, Bill Mark.
The

central

issue

for

the

Court

to

determine

is

whether

a

assume for purposes of its motion that Joyner’s legal arguments were
true. Therefore, Nationwide did not violate the Court’s direction on
that basis. The Court also notes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that she needs additional discovery to oppose the summary judgment
motion, and thus she is not entitled to any relief pursuant to Rule 56(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court observes that
Nationwide’s summary judgment motion assumes that Plaintiff’s factual
allegations are true but nevertheless deficient as a matter of law.

2

reasonable jury could find that Joyner suffered this alleged
harassment because of her gender.
To make a prima facie showing of Title VII hostile work
environment sexual harassment, Joyner must prove that Smith and
Evans (both females) created a hostile work environment because of
Joyner’s sex (female).

Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala.,

480 F.3d 1287, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2007).

The Supreme Court has

identified three ways in which a plaintiff might prove that this
type

of

same-sex

plaintiff’s sex.
U.S.

75,

80-81

sexual

harassment

occurred

because

of

the

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523
(1998).

A

plaintiff

can

show

(1)

that

the

harasser's behavior is motivated by homosexual desire for the
plaintiff, (2) that the harasser used “such sex-specific and
derogatory terms ... as to make it clear that the harasser is
motivated by general hostility to the presence of [members of the
same

sex]

comparative

in

the

workplace,”

evidence

about

or

how

(3)

the

that

there

alleged

members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”

is

“direct

harasser

treated

Id.

Joyner did

not offer evidence that would satisfy any of these three scenarios.
There is no evidence that Smith and Evans spread the rumor
about Joyner because they had a homosexual desire for her.

There

is also no evidence that Smith and Evans spread the rumor because
they were motivated by a general hostility toward women in the
workplace.

Rumors of a heterosexual affair are not the type of

3

sex-specific statements from which a jury could infer a general
hostility toward women because the rumors degrade both men and
women equally.

See Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514,

517 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that, because rumors of an affair
affect men and women equally, these rumors alone did not show that
harassment was based on sex); Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety,
City & Cty. Of Denver, 397 F.3d 1300, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting
the same in dicta).
Joyner

seems

to

focus

primarily

on

establishing

gender-

related harassment under the third theory by alleging that Smith
and Evans treated women worse than men in a mixed-sex workplace.
Joyner’s only evidence of this unequal treatment, though, is that
Smith and Evans talked about the rumor in her vicinity more often
than in Mark’s vicinity.

And, as Joyner seems to note, Smith and

Evans likely did not talk about the rumor in Mark’s vicinity
because, unlike Joyner, Mark did not work in the Columbus office
with Smith and Evans daily and had “no contact with [them]” after
January 2017, not because he was a man.
No. 63.

Pl.’s Sur-Reply 6, ECF

Evidence that one man, who had little interaction with

the alleged harassers, was harassed less than a woman who worked
with the harassers on a daily basis is not enough for a jury to
find that the woman was harassed because she was a female.

See,

e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 413 n.6 (7th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting a mixed-sex workplace theory in part because no women

4

permanently worked in the area where the alleged harassment took
place and they only occasionally passed through the area).

Joyner

points to no other instances where Smith and Evans treated women
worse than men in their workspace.3

Accordingly, Joyner fails to

offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was harassed
because of her gender.

Therefore, the Court grants Nationwide

summary judgment on Joyner’s Title VII claim.
Joyner’s Title VII claim is the only basis for the Court’s
original

jurisdiction.

The

Court

declines

to

exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Joyner’s remaining state law claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Therefore, the Court dismisses Joyner’s

remaining claims without prejudice so that she may refile them in
the appropriate state court.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 19th day of February, 2019.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

3

Joyner does speculate that Smith and Evans would not have made up the
rumor of an affair had a male employee been promoted. But, this is pure
speculation which cannot create a fact dispute for purposes of summary
judgment. Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir.
2005)(“[U]nsupported speculation . . . does not meet a party’s burden
of producing some defense to a summary judgment motion.” (quoting Hedberg
v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1995))).

5